So you think you can tell sense from nonsense, real doubts from sceptical games

Abstract

In order to consider whether Wittgenstein's strategy regarding scepticism succeeds or fails, I will examine his approach to certainty. To this end, I will establish a comparison between different uses of language as mentioned in "On Certainty" and his distinction between meaningful, senseless, and nonsense statements in the "Tractatus". This comparison has three advantages: first, it allows us to clarify the role of the so-called special propositions in "On Certainty"; second, it illuminates the relationship between some features of special propositions in On Certainty and the characteristics that define senseless statements in the "Tractatus"; and, finally, it shows the status of the so-called insight-ful nonsenses in the "Tractatus". As a consequence of this argument, I believe in a halfway house between the so-called traditional and new interpretations of "Tractatus".