So you think you can tell sense from nonsense, real doubts from sceptical games
AuthorsVillarmea Requejo, Stella
IdentifiersPermanent link (URI): http://hdl.handle.net/10017/7436
Lund University Press
AffiliationUniversidad de Alcalá. Departamento de Historia y Filosofía. Unidad Docente Historia I y Filosofía. Área de Filosofía
T. Rønnow-Rasmussen, B. Petersson, J. Josefsson y D. Egonsson (eds.). Homage à Wlodek-Philosophical Papers in Honour of Wlodek Rabinowicz. Lund (Suecia): Lund University Press, E-Book (www.fil.lu.se), 2006.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1889-1951)
Teoría del conocimiento
In order to consider whether Wittgenstein's strategy regarding scepticism succeeds or fails, I will examine his approach to certainty. To this end, I will establish a comparison between different uses of language as mentioned in "On Certainty" and his distinction between meaningful, senseless, and nonsense statements in the "Tractatus". This comparison has three advantages: first, it allows us to clarify the role of the so-called special propositions in "On Certainty"; second, it illuminates the relationship between some features of special propositions in On Certainty and the characteristics that define senseless statements in the "Tractatus"; and, finally, it shows the status of the so-called insight-ful nonsenses in the "Tractatus". As a consequence of this argument, I believe in a halfway house between the so-called traditional and new interpretations of "Tractatus".