So you think you can tell sense from nonsense, real doubts from sceptical games
Authors
Villarmea Requejo, StellaDate
2011-01-17Keywords
Filosofía
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1889-1951)
Escepticismo
Teoría del conocimiento
Description / Notes
The XXII World Congress of Philosophy, "Rethinking Philosophy Today", International Federation of Philosophical Societies y Korean Philosophical Association, Seoul National University, Seúl, Corea, 30 julio-5 agosto 2008.
Document type
info:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObject
Access rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Abstract
In order to consider whether Wittgenstein's strategy regarding scepticism succeeds or
fails, I will examine his approach to certainty. To this end, I will establish a comparison between
different uses of language as mentioned in On Certainty and his distinction between meaningful,
senseless, and nonsense statements in the Tractatus. This comparison has three advantages: first, it
allows us to clarify the role of the so-called special propositions in On Certainty; second, it
illuminates the relationship between some features of special propositions in On Certainty and the
characteristics that define senseless statements in the Tractatus; and, finally, it shows the status of
the so-called insight-ful nonsenses in the Tractatus. As a consequence of this argument, I believe in
a halfway house between the so-called traditional and new interpretations of Tractatus.
Files in this item
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So you think(PONENCIA).pdf | 152.6Kb |
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Files | Size | Format |
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So you think(PONENCIA).pdf | 152.6Kb |
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