INTRODUCTION

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"It is within our grasp to contribute, each in our own way, to overcoming the division of Europe and ending the military confrontation there."

George Bush
Malta, December 3, 1989

"We searched for the answer to the question of where do we stand now. We stated, both of us, that the world leaves the epoch of the Cold War and enters another epoch."

Mikhail S. Gorbachev
Malta, December 3, 1989

It is the speed that awes. The new Administration of President George Bush, now approaching it's first year of age, is confronted with a world that is changing with such dazzling speed. Perhaps never in human history has it changed so rapidly, at least not in peacetime. The preconceptions of the last 40 years are suddenly obsolete. A visionary reformer, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, is in charge in Moscow and on his own has set about dismantling the Soviet Empire. Whether intentional or not, he has gutted the very Communist ideology that has driven the Soviet state and fueled revolutions around the world since the Bolsheviks first marched on to the world stage in 1917. He has denied communism's historical inevitability, it's moral raison d'tre, and all but admitted it's failure as he reaches out to the capitalist economies of the West for aid and guidance. He has largely cut free Eastern Europe to go it's own path. With the threat of Soviet tanks removed, with

the threat of another Prague '68 or Hungary '56 ended, Communist government after government in Eastern Europe has been falling under great outpourings of public protests for multi-party democracy and greater economic freedom. The overriding metaphor of both the cruel repression of the past and the sweeping change of the present is the Berlin Wall: it has literally been torn down. When President Bush and President Gorbachev met smilingly aboard the Soviet cruise ship Maxim Gorky in Malta in December 1989, it only confirmed the change. Communism is bankrupt; the Cold War seems over.

Yet there has been little cheering in the West. There has been satisfaction, some smugness, even tears. But no cheers.

Why? One reason has been shell-shock. The changes are coming too fast to grapple and comprehend. Another reason has been caution. The Warsaw Pact still exists, the Soviets are still a superpower, and the old forces inside the East did not simply disappear overnight. But perhaps the greatest reason has been uncertainty and fear. No one is sure what comes next.

It is an irony of history that this moment of great triumph for Western democracy is also a moment of supreme instability. The shapes of the new governments in Eastern Europe are still to be decided. As the East-West antagonisms of the Cold War die, old nationalistic antagonisms are re-arising inside Europe and inside the Soviet Union itself. Europe, for all it's trappings of civilization, has a history of very uncivilized and uniquely savage wars. The map of Europe is suddenly an issue again. The German Question, unresolved for more than a century, has returned to the fore, this time in the form of the reunification of East and West Germany. The tie that binds between Europe and the United States is also being re-examined. As the Warsaw Pact crumbles -- and it will

crumble despite Soviet wishful thinking that a non-Communist Eastern Europe will remain loyal to the Pact -- then the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is also robbed of one of it's chief reasons to exist. NATO will soon face an internal crisis. Adding to that crisis is the resurgence of historical isolationist pressures inside the U.S. itself. Many in the American public want finally to bring the boys home.

But the developments in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union are in some senses only the most dramatic manifestations of more fundamental changes that were already underway. The world is moving from the bi-polar structure that emerged from World War II to a new multi-polar one. Japan is by all definitions an economic superpower. Western Europe, through the 12-nation European Community, economically surpasses the United States in many measures on paper. As the Twelve continue their process of integration up through the unified market of 1992 and beyond, they could surpass the U.S. in political and conventional military might as well. China, meanwhile, has awakened from two centuries of torpor to be a giant in the re-making, it's sheer size and ambition by themselves giving it weight. The country is politically unstable, it's brand of Communist dictatorship breaking up in violent fits and starts, but it has talent and ambition. India, the world's most populous democracy, is saddled with gargantuan development problems but also has gargantuan possibilities, matched by it's own talent and ambition. The growth of the ASEAN countries of Southeast Asia and the "little tigers" of East Asia reflect the rise of the Pacific Basin in comparison to the Atlantic.

All the while, the United States is shrinking in relative economic and political weight as it not just faces the dynamic growth of the rest, but also wallows in profligate debt and social indiscipline. The American hegemony after

World War II was an unnatural exception, caused as much by circumstances as by Yankee ingenuity and hard work. The American Century is coming to a premature end, even as it's arch-enemy, the Soviet "Evil Empire," is in retreat. History knows no favorites.

And as in the bi-polar world, what happens at each of these multi-polar poles reverberates through the economically less fortunate parts of the world, the Third World, particularly Latin America, Africa and the less prosperous nations of Asia. As communism is being rejected in the metropole, it is losing it's glamor in the periphery. Fidel Castro no longer looks a revolutionary; he looks a reactionary dictator, a Stroessner with leftist rhetoric (and even Stroessner is no more). But the end of Soviet meddling, should that indeed come to past, does not mean the end of revolutions in countries like El Salvador and of revolutionary regimes in countries like Libya. Many countries are still faced with social discontent and choking economic blocks, not to mention questions of denomination and identity itself. The Third World is politically moderating, but so long as it's economic and social ills fester, continued political eruptions and violence are likely.

That then is the world, not according to Garp, but as it is. Never since World War II ended and the Cold War began has there been so much promise for peace, and never have there been so many unknown pitfalls. It is a heady challenge. What kind of Administration does the United States have to confront it? What are the implications for Spain?

George Bush is hardly a visionary or great statesman. In those categories, he is little match for Gorbachev, or, for that matter, many West European leaders, among them Spain's own Felipe González. But then, the modern American political system does not foster great leaders. It promotes mediocrity, or, at best, the above average. The

last American president who was also a great visionary and statesman was Franklin D. Roosevelt. John F. Kennedy and Ronald Reagan were charismatic, but the former was undeveloped and unproven and the latter was simplistic. Harry Truman was a grass roots man; Gerald Ford was a decent one. Jimmy Carter had a spiritual vision that translated to human rights, but he lacked political skills. Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard M. Nixon had the egos and even some of the visionary instinct for great leadership, but they were fallen by personality flaws. That leaves Dwight D. Eisenhower, a prudent, solid, colorless leader. He is also the precursor for George Bush.

People make history as much as events and evolutionary trends do. Personality makes people, though assessing personality is risky business. But it can be safely said that, like Eisenhower, Bush is mostly a staff man who rose through the ranks. Bush did run for political office, and held two terms in the House of Representatives. But since his defeat in 1970 in a senatorial race against Lloyd Bentsen, his political mark has been made instead as a staff man, albeit a prominent one. He was a Republican Party functionary, an envoy to China, an ambassador to the United Nations, a head of the Central Intelligence Agency and Reagan's vice-president. In that last post, though he was technically the number two man in the country, he was lost in the shadows of loyalty to the number one, Mr. Reagan. Bush has shown personal mettle, both as a combat fighter pilot in the Pacific in World War II and as an entrepreunerial businessman in Texas. But prudence is virtually a password of his in public pronouncements, and small wonder, as prudence and loyalty have personally served him well in his staff rise.

Bush is a throwback to Eisenhower in other ways as well. He is the direct descdendent of the old liberal wing of the Republican Party, the Eastern Establishment wing

that surrounded and nurtured Eisenhower when he was president but largely saw it's demise with the demise of, first, Nelson Rockefeller and then of Rockefeller's creation, Henry Kissinger. It was a wing that was centrist in the greater American political scale then, and is centrist now. Pragmatics is prized over ideology, unlike under Reagan. Bush was raised a Connecticutt Yankee, not a Texan, and while many of the men around him, like Secretary of State James Baker, may not literally come from the East, they were largely educated there and spiritually share in the old Establishment views. The Establishment was and is anti-Communist, but not blindly so. Containment and nuclear weapons are not ends in themselves. Bush has conceeded areas of domestic policy such as abortion and taxes to the conservative, ideological wing of the Republican Party, but his foreign policy is pure New York Council on Foreign Relations. Moralizing is largely out, both the moralizing of the right, as seen in Bush's backing off from the Contras in Central America, and the moralizing of the left, as seen in his hand slapping of the Chinese over their bloody crackdown on freedom demonstrators.

Prudent, cautious, pragmatic, bland -- hardly the stuff of visionaries. But those qualities may be some of his presidency's greatest assets, and, by extension, the greatest assets for the United States and the world. Eisenhower, after all, not only oversaw a successful presidency, but also an unequalled military campaign in World War II Europe that will forever gain him a prominent place in history books. The strength of the American system is not it's leaders, but, for all it's flaws, the system itself. Eisenhower was a system man, and so is Bush. While Reagan and Carter were outside renegades, Bush relies and bows to the system. In his first year, he has returned foreign policy to largely bi-partisan consensus for the first time since early Johnson. Instead of shooting off on his own course of dead

reckoning, he is drawing on the wisdom of the system. He is himself extraordinarily experienced in foreign affairs. He has surrounded himself with a few wise men, among them his highly experienced National Security Adviser, Brent Scowcraft. Secretary Baker is a relative international novice, but has proven to be a fast learn highly attuned to the criticisms and advice of the press and Congress.

Mr. Bush is not a man to make history, but history is making him. In his first year, in dealing with the changes of the East, his presidency has been cautious but adept, looking before it leaps but leaping nonetheless. After initial reluctance, Bush has supported Gorbachev when support was necessary. His dramatic meeting with Gorbachev in the Mediterranean was more than just symbolism; it was brokering the end to the Cold War. Gorbachev has been the catalyst, but that is in fact the way it should be. It is the Soviet Union that has lost, in that it is internally bleeding and has been so for a long time. It's economy and those of it's Eastern Europe satellites are in ruin. Gorbachev is in ways merely the first Soviet leader to recognize it. That is a recognition that no outsider, no American or West European leader, can force on the Soviets. Gorbachev is suing for long term national survival. It is just as well there is a listener rather than an actor in the White House to receive him, all puns aside.

Indeed, it can be argued that one visionary among the two superpowers is enough. For all the comparisons of Yalta and Malta, another Yalta, or pretensions for one, would be disastrous. One of the results of the growing multi-polarity of the world is that two leaders (or Yalta's three) can no longer sit down and carve up the world into zones of influence. The prime responsibility for the future of Europe lies not with Washington or Moscow, but with Bonn and Madrid and Prague and the other European capitals. If there is to be a Marshall-type plan for Eastern

Europe, it must and should come primarily from Western Europe, for there are the countries with the greatest immediate interest. Likewise, the German Question is first and foremost a European question. The United States, as a world power, will be a major player in such European questions and should be, but mostly to balance the Soviet Union. "While it is not for the United States and the Soviet Union to design the future for Europeans or for any other people, I am convinced that a cooperative U.S.-Soviet relationship can indeed make the the future safer and brighter," Bush said at Malta. The Soviets themselves, while speaking of a common European home, only partly fall into a European framework, being socially, economically and politically very apart from the rest of Europe. The extent to which the Soviet Union, stretching as it does across Asia, is even culturally European is debateable. In any event, the point is that a headstrong American president in these delicate times for Europe might be more like having a bull in the china shop. The threats facing the West today are not the sorts demanding Churchillian resolve. What the West needs is consensus, cooperation and patient wisdom as it gropes with the upheavals, totally unexpected, underway in the world order. It is a stroke of luck that a consensus man with world experience and willingness to draw on others' wisdom sits as president in Washington.

Still, no one can say how the personality of Bush and his new Administration will ultimately effect it's handling of today's frenetically changing world. Despite the reasons for optimism after the first year, the Bush presidency could still nose dive into mediocrity. Or it's lack of vision could become a lack of commitment and backbone and a currying to the basest domestic political denominator inside the United States. Secretary Baker was, after all, chairman of Bush's presidential election campaign, a campaign which stooped to baseness.

The chapters that follow deal in depth with the challenges themselves -- the events and trends -- facing the Bush presidency in the world and with Spain. Each chapter dissects how the new Administration has acted so far and how it can be expected to continue to act in the future. These chapters are written by some of the leading academic analysts in both Spain and the United States of current foreign affairs. All are based on presentations given at the Center for American Studies at the University of Alcal de Henares in March 1989 in conjunction with the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University.

The United States and the international economic scene by Benjamin J. Cohen is the subject of the first chapter because of the primacy of economics today. Ironically, the decline of communism and the Soviet empire partly confirms one of Karl Marx's central tenets: the economic determinism of history. Economics, not missiles, is doing communism in. But the economic shoe is also on the American foot. The United States appears to be declining as an economic power in relation to rising powers such as Japan and Western Europe. Still, the U.S. economy remains the world's single largest. The industrial world and many newly industrial countries have been enjoying more than six years of remarkable growth. The Bush Administration's economic policy will greatly effect whether that prosperity will continue. At least equally as important as the Administration's international policy on pressing issues such as Third World debt and growing trade frictions is it's domestic policy, particularly as it effects the country's tremendous external debt. The Reagan years were years of uncontrolled spending and of a country living beyond it's means. After one year in office, however, Bush, restricted by an unjudicious campaign promise not to raise taxes, has made no dramatic remedies. "Read my lips," he has repeated, and what they say is timidity towards domestic

policy change.

Alan K. Henrikson tackles the Bush Administration's diplomatic posture and mixed record throughout the world. Bush was fortunate to inherit a momentum already underway in arms control, regional conflicts and Soviet dissolution. But while the failure of the Communists foreshadows a threatless world as we have known it, it also foreshadows a structureless one. One side of the Bush presidency has shown signs of being tempted to bask in a dogmatic smugness that liberal democracy and economy are a final historical achievement -- an end to history, in a sense. Such smugness over American political, economic and philisophical superiority is misguided. For one thing, the likelihood is that the Eastern Europeans will opt for social welfare states closer to West European models than to what they see as American jungle capitalism. More importantly, such smugness could blind the need for action to build the new structures for the new world. As the Soviet Union and China look inward, the need is all the greater for the United States, Western Europe and Japan -- the liberal industrial democracies -- to cooperate to build that structure for stability. NATO is not dead. The year 1992 also marks the 500th anniversary of Columbus' discovery of America and five centuries of tradition behind the concept of a trans-Atlantic home, a concept Spain largely founded. But Japan must be folded in as an equal partner as well. Increasingly, González and other leaders throughout Europe have been echoing the sentiments of Bush and Gorbachev in Malta that the two great blocks -- NATO and the Warsaw Pact -- are needed to negotiate not just arms control and other issues, but also the foundations for a new world order.

Angel Viñas analyzes the relations between the United States and Spain, particularly in relation to Latin America, or, as the Spaniards like to say, Iberoamerica. The

term reflects Spain's strong and growing interest in it's former colonies, even as Spain integrates into Europe. Since the death of dictator Francisco Franco in 1975, Spain has returned to have great influence in Latin America. It is an influence that is sentimental, cultural and economic, not military. The country has maintained an unusual internal consensus in it's Latin American policy, as dramatized by the refusal of Franco himself to break relations with Castro. That consensus continues as Spain increasingly challenges the U.S. for influence in the region. Spanish influence is hardly equal to American influence there, but Spain is a respected and increasingly appreciated presence. The Socialist Government of Prime Minister González has demonstrated it's willingness to differ with the U.S. in hot spots such as Nicaragua, but it is controlled difference, as the Socialists, reflecting their own pragmatic bent, also recognize natural U.S. interest in the region. Spain's integration into the European Community may add to Spanish weight, as the country is sensitive to Latin American concerns inside the E.C. However, in one of the most critical Latin American issues, that of national debt, Spain is itself slow to move.

Hewson A. Ryan critiques U.S. policy in Latin America and the Caribbean from a North American vantage. As both he and Professor Viñas note, the United States has been driven mostly by security concerns in the region. There is an historically deep-rooted tendancy in the U.S. to look on Latin America as it's personal backyard, somewhere where the normal rules of sovereignty don't apply. But while the Reagan Administration focused on Granada and two small Central American countries whose combined populations don't equal greater New York City, the real problems in the region are multiple. They include more complex, long term issues such as drugs, debt, demographics, economic development and the environment.

Illegal immigration from Mexico and Central America into the United States and the parasitic drug connection between consumption and supply underline how U.S. interests are deeply effected by these more fundamental Latin American and Caribbean developments. The Bush Administration has begun with two welcome initiatives: the Brady Plan seeks finally to begin helping Latin America to reduce it's strangling foreign debt, while the new Baker formula of "fair play" in Central America promises support for negotiated Central American solutions in Nicaragua and El Salvador. The ending of the Cold War holds hope that the U.S. will stop looking at the region through red-tinted glasses only. But a reverse fear is that the Administration will revert to an alternative American historical tendancy of benign neglect in the region. The embarrassing attempts and inability of the U.S. to unseat General Noriega in Panama reflect the new limits of U.S. power and actions in the region. But it would be a tragedy if that prompts a chastened U.S. to withdraw from engagement with the region, so filled with benefits and needs.

The Bush presidency has happened on to the unfolding of a brave new world. The year 1990 is scheduled to include the signing of agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union dramatically reducing both long range nuclear weapons in each country and their conventional forces in Europe. The U.S. is pledged to help the Soviets integrate into such instruments of world capitalism as the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs. Issues such as the world's environment are moving to the fore. How wisely the Bush Administration handles these many challenges and changes, so sweeping in scope, will effect us all for years to come.

Madrid, December 5, 1989