

THE *PAX AMERICANA* AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SECURITY, STABILITY AND PEACE OF SOUTH AMERICA

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(Resumen)

En este artículo, se analiza la hipótesis de la "paz hegemónica" en el contexto histórico suramericano de paz regional, desde finales de la Guerra del Chaco entre Bolivia y Paraguay, en 1935. En la primera parte de este estudio, se formula un planteamiento sobre las implicaciones teóricas de la proposición enunciada y se traza un plan de estudio para constatar su valor explicativo. A continuación, se realiza una especie de reconstrucción de lo que ha sido la posición política de los Estados Unidos de América ante los posibles brotes de violencia y crisis militarizadas entre las naciones del continente suramericano. Una vez que se ha concluido que los Estados Unidos de América han mantenido históricamente una postura clara y directa en favor de la paz regional, se busca comprobar si, en efecto, su poder político-militar ha sido un factor determinante para evitar guerras y mantener la paz interestatal en ese continente. Después de una profunda indagación sobre la evidencia histórica, se llega a concluir que el poder y los intereses estadounidenses no han sido factores más determinantes que el papel jugado por otros Estados vecinos. De hecho, se afirma que la relación causa-efecto entre la hegemonía estadounidense y la paz interestatal en América del Sur desde 1935 es muy tenue para ser considerada como una de las explicaciones concluyentes de tal fenómeno histórico.

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Edward D. Mansfield examines the relationship among the international distribution of power, trade and war, and concludes that "like all interstate wars, non-major-power wars begin more frequently during periods of hegemony than during non-hegemonic periods..."¹ One of the implications of this finding is that hegemony does not lead automatically to interstate order, stability and peace, as postulated originally by power preponderance theorists and other realists. In particular, this general finding stands in sharp contrast with the view held by many mainstream realists, as well as several area specialists, who maintain that the outbreak and permanence of interstate peace in South America is a direct consequence of United States hegemony.² The purpose of this study is to evaluate empirically the explanatory value of the hegemonic peace hypothesis, connecting the power and interest of the United States with the evolution and permanence of intraregional interstate peace in South America since 1935.

1. Edward D. Mansfield, *Power, Trade, and War*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994. 97 and 108.

2. See chapter two. 85-87, 73-74.

1. HEGEMONY AND PEACE: OPERATIONALIZATION OF A POWER RELATION

When international relations theorists and students of South American intraregional politics link causally U.S. hegemony and the outbreak and maintenance of interstate peace in South America, they are in effect asserting a causal power relation in which the capabilities and interests of actor "A" alone cause or influence a change in the international behavior of one, several, or all actors within the same region. In this sense, to postulate that U.S. hegemony causes interstate peace in South America is methodologically equivalent to adopting a first-face-of-power causal relationship which entails two elements: first, the initiator or power source and, second, the receiver or target of power. Accordingly, in order to evaluate the robustness of such a power relationship, it is necessary to establish, first, the undisputed hegemonic role of the United States, and the identification of its national interest with the goal to promote and preserve interstate peace in South America.

Since it is undeniable that for over a century now the United States has been the most powerful and influential actor in the Americas, I will assume its hegemony in South America and the subordinate roles of the other states in the region. Further, in order to gauge historically the interest level of the United States in promoting and maintaining interstate peace in the area, I will identify its publicly stated policy goal towards the region and, then, contrast it with its actual behavior, that is, the degree of tangible commitment and involvement. Also, I will compare U.S. goals in same with other regions, e.g., Africa, South East Asia, and the Middle East where it has been more involved militarily and politically than in South America. The objective of this line of inquiry is to determine how resolute, assertive, and successful has the United States been in promoting and maintaining interstate peace and security in South America since 1935. In other words, I will try to answer the following question: Has the United States been willing to put its military might and treasure at the service of its stated principles and goals? To ascertain U.S. commitment, close attention will be paid to those moments of crises in South America when an immediate response from the U.S. could have averted further international complications.

The receiving end or target is the second element in a first-face-of-power causal relationship. From this angle, I will ascertain the level of compliance by the South American states with U.S. policy goals and directives regarding intraregional interstate peace and security. For that specific purpose I will establish, first, the original demands of individual disputants. Then, I will contrast these with their latest negotiating positions or final outcome in the dispute. This is intended to gauge how much have the contenders agreed to compromise their original demands in order to comply with U.S. directives.

2. SOURCE OF POWER: U.S. MIGHT AND EVOLUTION OF ITS NATIONAL INTEREST IN LATIN AMERICA

Consistent with realist precepts, the primary interest of any country in the world, including that of the United States, is to ensure its own military, political, and economic security. To satisfy that end states develop a set of goals and implement their foreign policy to

attain them. Consistent with this logic, the hegemonic peace hypothesis advances the notion that the United States sought to protect and advance its national interest in Latin America by pursuing a two-pronged approach. First, it sought to prevent and exclude the influence and control of extra-hemispheric powers in the region. Second, it favored and encouraged national and regional political stability and peace. In other words, the United States has been keenly interested in maintaining peaceful intraregional relations and preventing violent and sudden regime changes in Latin America. Its objective has been to forestall involvement opportunities in Latin America to any rival, extra-continental Great Power.³

Prior to the Spanish-American-Cuban War of 1898, U.S. policy towards Latin America was characterized by a "benign neglect."⁴ Except for the 1846 war against Mexico, the United States did not display a marked interest in the internal and intraregional affairs of Latin American countries. Still itself engaged in the process of nation-building, economically and militarily weak, and totally surrounded by ideologically and militarily hostile European powers, the early the US opted for a cautious position by turning its diplomatic attention to Europe as a tactic to gain European support for the democratic experiment at home.⁵

Subsequent to the Spanish-American-Cuban War and the rise of the United States to great power status, its Latin American policy has oscillated between interventionist and noninterventionist periods. During interventionist periods, the U.S. has undertaken an active role in preventing political instability and the penetration of extra-hemispheric influences in the region, particularly in the Caribbean and Central American sub-regions. To accomplish these objectives the U.S. has intervened militarily in the internal affairs of these countries, and has undermined and destabilized governments through economic and political means. It is important to point out here, however, that the intensity of the interventionist policy has varied

3. For different analyzes of U.S. interests and goals in Latin America, see Harrison Wagner, R. *United States Policy Toward Latin America: A Study in Domestic and International Politics*. Stanford, CA.: Stanford University Press, 1970. 11-43; M. Coleman, Kenneth. "The Political Mythology of the Monroe Doctrine: Reflections on the Social Psychology of Hegemony," in Martz, John D. and Lars Schoultz, eds. *Latin America, the United States, and the Inter-American System*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980. 95-114; Daly Hayes, Margaret. *Latin America and the U.S. National Interest: A Basis for U.S. Foreign Policy*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984. 1-19; G. Gil, Federico. "The Kennedy-Johnson Years," in John D. Martz, ed. *United States Policy in Latin America: A Quarter Century of Crisis and Challenge, 1961-1986*. Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1988. 3; Pope Atkins, G. *Latin America in the International Political System*, 2nd ed. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1989. 108-134; Blachman, Morris J. "U.S. Interests in South America," in G. Pope Atkins, ed. *South America Into the 1990's: Evolving International Relationships in a New Era*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1990. 121-141; and Michael J. Kryzaneck, *Leaders, Leadership, and U.S. Policy in Latin America*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1992. 39-59.

4. Pope Atkins, G. *Latin America in the International Political System* . 37; and Arthur P. Whitaker, *The United States and the Southern Cone: Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976. 355.

5. Michael J. Kryzaneck, *U.S.-Latin American Relations*. New York: Praeger, 1990. 21.

considerably over time and according to the specific sub-regions involved. For example, while U.S. military interventions have been routine in Central America and the Caribbean basin, none has ever taken place in any of the South American republics. Perhaps that may be the result of the relative power of key local states and/or their remote geographical distance from the United States. In fact, some countries in South America are further away from the United States than many countries in Africa, Asia, the Middle East and Europe. On the other hand, noninterventionist periods have been characterized by the fulfillment of U.S. national interests in Latin America via friendly, cooperative diplomatic negotiations, based on mutual respect and understanding.

Despite periodic oscillations in the Latin American policy of the United States, it is evident that the U.S. has pursued consistently and continuously the exclusion of extra-continental rivals from the Western Hemisphere, and the maintenance of stable political regimes capable of safeguarding its national interests. The Monroe Doctrine is the earliest public manifestation of U.S. intentions and interests in Latin America. In June 19, 1822 Gran Colombia became the first Latin American nation to receive diplomatic recognition by the United States,⁶ and on December 2, 1823, President James Monroe issued a warning to the European powers against trying to recolonize the region.⁷ In that statement President Monroe not only acknowledged the essential differences between the political systems of the European powers and that of the United States. More importantly, he proceeded to identify and stress the first and most vital U.S. political goal in Latin America. President Monroe warned the Europeans that

we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the Governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of a unfriendly disposition toward the United States.⁸

6. For a chronology and analysis of the process of diplomatic recognition by the United States of the newly independent states in Latin America, see G. Gil, Federico. *Latin American-United States Relations*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1971. 22-24; and Spencer Robertson, William. *Hispanic American Relations with the United States*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1923. 26-42.

7. For a historical analysis of the circumstances and events leading up to the formulation of the Monroe Doctrine, see Lieuwen, Edwin. *U.S. Policy in Latin America: A Short History*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1965. 3-20.

8. Emphasis added. For a fuller version of President James Monroe statement, see Karnes, Thomas L., ed. *Readings in The Latin American Policy of the United States*. Tucson, Arizona: The University of Arizona Press, 1972. 37-40.

In four other subsequent instances the spirit and application of the Monroe Doctrine have been reaffirmed, strengthened, and expanded further, underlining the true interest and purpose of the United States in Latin America. First, a bitter civil war between the Spanish population and Indians of Mayan descent on the peninsula of Yucatan prompted Yucatecan officials to appeal for aid concurrently from the United States, Great Britain, and Spain. Concerned that either the British or the Spaniards could regain influence and control of Mexican territory, President James K. Polk addressed the two houses of Congress in April 1848. In his appeal for aid for the Yucatecans, he argued that

Whilst still considering Yucatan as a portion of Mexico, if we had troops to spare for this purpose, I would deem it proper, during the continuance of the war with Mexico, to occupy and hold military possession of her territory, and to defend the white inhabitants against the incursion of the Indians, in the same way that we have employed our troops in other states of the Mexican republic in our possession, in repelling the attacks of savages upon the inhabitants, who have maintained their neutrality in the war ... I submit to the wisdom of Congress to adopt such measures as, in their judgment, may be expedient, *to prevent Yucatan from becoming a colony of any European power, which, in no event, could be permitted by the United States; and, at the same time, to rescue the white race from extermination or expulsion from their country.*⁹

Evidently, this passage reveals that the U.S. was not only willing to protect the independence and sovereignty of the newly created republics in Latin America against European encroachment, but, also, to intervene in their internal affairs to avert involvement opportunities in Latin America to rival European powers. The crisis in Yucatan underscores the importance for U.S. interests in Latin America to maintain domestic stability and peace. This is something that in subsequent events in inter-American affairs becomes more evident and easier to identify as one of the central goals of U.S. policy toward Latin America.

A second episode, which enabled U.S. officials to strengthen the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine, occurred on July 20, 1895, when the United States, demonstrating a marked degree of assertiveness, defied Great Britain in its dispute with Venezuela over the boundary with British Guiana. On that occasion, President Grover Cleveland ordered his Secretary of State, Richard Olney, to dispatch a long, aggressive note to the British government discussing the dispute, condemning British policy, and insisting upon impartial arbitration. For our purpose here, however, the most interesting and revealing aspects of Olney's Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine are, first, the reaffirmation of U.S. intent to prevent European meddling in the Americas, particularly in countries like Venezuela, situated on the Caribbean littoral, an area of

9. Emphasis added, see Karnes, ed. *Readings in The Latin American Policy of the United States*. 106-107.

greater importance to U.S. national interests than the South American sub-region, and, second, the public declaration of U.S. hegemony in this sub-region in Latin America.¹⁰

The third and, perhaps, the broadest extension of the Monroe Doctrine was promulgated by President Theodore Roosevelt on December 6, 1904. Prior to the unveiling of Roosevelt's Corollary, Germany, Great Britain, and Italy had blockaded Venezuela to enforce their financial claims. These were subsequently settled in favor of the European powers at The Hague Court of Arbitration. Then, again, in 1904, when European powers threatened to use force against the Dominican Republic to collect defaulted debts, and mindful that, perhaps, a precedent for the use of force in the collection of national debts had been set, President Roosevelt explained in his annual message to Congress that

*All that this country desires is to see the neighboring countries stable, orderly, and prosperous. Any country whose people conduct themselves well can count upon our hearty friendship. If a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, it need fear no interference from the United States. Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power.*¹¹

Finally, in 1912 there were rumors that Japanese investors were considering the purchase from a U.S. company of a large strip of land near Magdalena Bay in Mexican Baja California. Since U.S. policymakers assumed that such an acquisition by a Japanese firm would threaten U.S. national security, the Department of State ordered the American company to stop negotiations with the Japanese investors because they violated the Monroe Doctrine. This was the situation when Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, introduced a resolution stating that

When any harbor or other place in the American continents is so situated that the occupation thereof for naval or military purposes might threaten the communications or the safety of the United States, the Government of the United States could not see without grave concern the possession of such harbor or other place by any corporation

10. For Richard Olney's pronouncement, see Bartlett, Ruhl J., ed. *The Record of American Diplomacy: Documents and Readings in the History of American Foreign Relations*, 3rd ed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1954. 344-345.

11. Emphasis added, quoted in Bartlett, ed. *The Record of American Diplomacy: Documents and Readings in the History of American Foreign Relations*, 3rd ed. 539.

or association which has such a relation to another Government, not American, as to give that Government practical power of control for national purposes ...¹²

While this resolution received Senate approval, it was never endorsed by the administration of President William Howard Taft. Nonetheless, the passage of this resolution underscored further the significance for U.S. foreign policy interests of preventing the involvement of extra-continental powers in Latin America. The Lodge Corollary extended this principle for the first time to an Asian power.

The Monroe Doctrine, together with Polk's, Olney's, Roosevelt's, and Lodge's Corollaries, establish clearly three basic points regarding U.S. interests in Latin America: First, it is clearly demonstrated that the primary interest of the United States is to prevent the involvement of rival extra-continental powers in the Americas. This is a common theme running from the Monroe Doctrine to Lodge's Corollary. Second, that in order to thwart great power interference in the Western Hemisphere, the United States is willing to intervene in the domestic affairs of Latin American countries. And, third, the United States considers itself as the regional hegemon, with authority to lead the countries of Latin America.

With respect to the issue of intraregional interstate conflict and war, the Monroe Doctrine and the four corollaries discussed above remained silent. Interestingly enough, however, this aspect of inter-American affairs has been dealt with somewhat differently from the issues of European and Japanese involvement in the Americas, and of domestic political turmoil in the Latin American republics. While U.S. policy has been forceful and harsh regarding these two points, it has been, on the other hand, accommodating and soft on the issue of interstate disputes in South America. Since the early inception of inter-American affairs, the policy of the United States has been to remain politically neutral and non-committal regarding the use of military power as a conflict-settling mechanism.

Favoring neutrality and the bargaining table over the use of military power, the United States has tried to nudge the real and potential belligerents toward diplomatic negotiations and peaceful settlements of conflicts and wars. In other words, there is no evidence that the U.S. ever exerted real power to compel peaceful resolution of local intraregional interstate disputes. For example, when in the course of the first South American intraregional interstate conflict, republican Argentina inquired whether its war with imperial Brazil (1824-1828) was not a violation of Monroe's Doctrine on the part of Brazil, Secretary of State Henry Clay replied that such a purely American war would not bear the "remotest analogy to the case which President Monroe's message deprecates."¹³ This reaction sent a clear signal to the newly created republics in South America: the United States could not and would not intervene militarily in intraregional interstate conflicts in South America, either to coerce belligerents into peaceful

12. Kames, ed. *Readings in The Latin American Policy of the United States*. 208.

13. As discussed and quoted by Kames, ed *Readings in The Latin American Policy of the United States*. 104.

coexistence, or to deter potential local revisionist states.¹⁴ Also, the United States maintained a distance from South America during the La Plata War (1836-1852) fought by Argentine rebels, allied with Brazil and Uruguay, against the dictatorship of Juan Manuel de Rosa in Argentina, and then, again, during the Paraguayan War, or War of the Triple Alliance, fought by Paraguay against Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay (1864-1870).

It was not until the 1880's that the United States opted for a more direct and involved approach to the question of interstate conflict and war in South America. Upon becoming Secretary of State in President James A. Garfield's administration, James G. Blaine implemented a new policy toward Latin America. As described and explained by diplomatic historian Alexander DeConde:

Blaine's policy toward Latin America had two main objectives: promotion of peace and increased trade ... Peace, he believed ... called for effort on his part to try to end turbulence and wars then sweeping over parts of Latin America ...¹⁵

The initial effort toward the attainment of these goals came in June 1881, when at the request of Guatemala—a Central American, not a South American state—Secretary of State Blaine offered his country's good offices for arbitration in a boundary dispute between Guatemala and Mexico. The result was detrimental to U.S. objectives because Mexico, believing that the U.S. had sided with Guatemala, refused Blaine's offer. This caused the failure of his peacekeeping attempt and the temporary distancing of U.S.-Mexican trade relations.¹⁶

During the War of the Pacific (1879-1884) between Chile on one side, and Peru and Bolivia on the other, Secretary of State Blaine had his second opportunity to advance his peace policy. The immediate cause of this war was Chilean expansion into an area rich in guano and nitrates. Alarmed by Chile's action, Bolivia and Peru signed a secret treaty of alliance against Chile. Therefore, when Bolivia declared war on Chile in 1879, because the latter refused to pay

14. In fact one U.S. historian admits that "the Monroe Doctrine was a dead letter from its promulgation to the end of the nineteenth century, for the United States during that period had developed neither the naval power nor the diplomatic influence to enforce such a presumptuous admonition ... [i]t was not until the decade of the 1890s that the United States, having become an industrial power of the first rank and consolidated political control of the territory on its own continent, acquired the economic and military capability to project its power to the southern half of its hemisphere." Keylor, William R. *The Twentieth-Century World: An International History*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1984. For citation see page 22, and for an extended analysis see pages 20-27.

15. DeConde, Alexander. *A History of American Foreign Policy*, Vol. I, 3rd ed. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1978. 268.

16. For more details on this episode, see DeConde, *A History of American Foreign Policy*, Vol. I, 3rd ed. 268-269.

a heavy tax on exported nitrates from Bolivian territory, Peru immediately honored its treaty obligations with Bolivia and joined the war against Chile the same year.¹⁷

By the time Blaine took office in March 1881, Chile had defeated Bolivia and controlled most of the Peruvian territory, including its besieged capital, Lima. Concerned with the precarious balance of power in South America, and the prospect of a more generalized war in the region, Secretary of State Blaine took an active role in attempting to end the one-sided war. His position was specified in a stern note that he sent to the Chilean government through the U.S. minister to Chile, William H. Trescot. Secretary Blaine stated that:

We cannot regard with unconcern the destruction of Peruvian nationality. If our good offices are rejected, and this policy of the absorption of an independent state be persisted in, this government will consider itself discharged from any further obligation to be influenced in its action by the position which Chile has assumed, and *will hold itself free to appeal to the other republics of this continent to join it in an effort to avert consequences which cannot be confined to Chile and Peru*, but which threaten with extreme danger the political institutions, the peaceful progress, and the liberal civilization of all America.¹⁸

Secretary Blaine's peacemaking effort failed for two fundamental reasons. First, since Chile was steadfastly determined to keep Peru's nitrate deposits as an indemnity for her victory, there was no latitude for compromise and peaceful settlement. Second, President Garfield's assassination in July 1881 and Blaine's impromptu departure from the State Department prevented him from carrying out his public threat to call for a multinational force to stop Chile's action in Peru. Subsequent to Blaine's departure, Frederick Frelinghuysen became Secretary of State in the new administration of President Chester A. Arthur. Unfortunately for Peru, the new Secretary came with no plans to either unilaterally force Chile to acquiesce to U.S. demands, or to organize any type of hemispheric cooperative effort for the resolution of the War of the Pacific. Therefore, Chile did not accede to a conciliatory peace, and kept all the victor's spoils at the end of the war.

Notwithstanding Secretary Blaine's failure to exert moral pressure on Chile through inter-American cooperation, this idea became, almost a decade later, the kernel for launching the Pan-American movement. In May 1888, Congress passed a resolution asking President

17. For background information on the War of the Pacific, see Barros Arana, Diego. *Historia de la Guerra del Pacifico, 1879-1881*. Santiago de Chile: Editorial Andrés Bello, 1979; and Caivano, Tomás. *Historia de la Guerra de America Entre Chile, Perú, and Bolivia*. Lima, Perú: Editorial Científica, S.R.L., 1979.

18. Quoted in Karnes, ed. *Readings in The Latin American Policy of the United States*. 129-130. Emphasis added. Simultaneously, Stephen A. Hurlbut, the new U.S. minister to Lima, delivered a similar message to the commander of the Chilean army of occupation in Peru. For the text of this message, see Burr, Robert N. *By Reason or Force: Chile and the Balance of Power in South America, 1830-1905*, Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1974. 156.

Grover Cleveland to call a conference of American states. It stated that the purpose of this conference was to promote uniform trade regulations, free trade, and regional peace. The culmination of this request was the First International Conference of American States held in Washington, D.C. from October 2, 1889 to April 19, 1890.¹⁹

The significance of the First Inter-American Conference is that it gave institutional form to U.S. policy interest on the issue of intraregional interstate conflict and war in the Americas. In this gathering the U.S. made explicit its desire to pursue the peaceful resolution of interstate conflict and war through arbitration, and diplomatic negotiations.²⁰ No allusion was ever made to the possibility of a unilateral military or coercive effort on the part of the United States to either deter or resolve disputes. This demonstrates and reaffirms a long-term practice by the U.S. to remain impartial and to favor diplomatic means in either the prevention or resolution of intraregional interstate conflicts and wars in South America.

From the closing of the First Inter-American Conference in Washington in 1890 to the introduction by President Franklin D. Roosevelt of the Good Neighbor Policy on March 4, 1933, U.S. policy toward Latin America followed a somewhat dichotomous or even, perhaps, schizophrenic approach. On the one hand, the United States intervened repeatedly in the internal affairs of some of the Caribbean and Central American states. Based on the presumption that U.S. national security demanded control of areas that other great powers might utilize as footholds in the Western Hemisphere, the administrations of Presidents Theodore Roosevelt, William Howard Taft, and Woodrow Wilson instituted gradually a system of "protectorates" in the Caribbean basin and Central America. Between 1901 and 1933, Cuba, Panama, Mexico, Nicaragua, Honduras, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic experienced recurrent U.S. military interventions and political control.²¹

While the U.S. was engaged in an imperialistic and interventionist policy in the Caribbean basin and Central America, it continued to pursue, on the other hand, a diplomatic approach to the peaceful settlement of interstate disputes in South America. It condemned routinely the use of force by Latin American states. And as Bryce Wood, a scholar on inter-American affairs, explains: "The United States rarely undertook to enforce peace between states

19. For background reading on the planning and organization of the First Inter-American Conference, see Samuel Guy Inman, *Inter-American Conferences, 1826-1954: History and Problems*. Washington, D.C.: The University Press, 1965. 33-40 and 45-46; Jack Child, "The 1889-1890 Washington Conference Through Cuban Eyes: José Martí and the First International American Conference," *Inter-American Review of Bibliography*, Vol. 29 No. 4, 1989. 443-456; and Alexander DeConde, *A History of American Foreign Policy*, Vol. I, 3rd ed. 269-271.

20. Evidently, the United States position was built into the section on arbitration of the final report of the First Inter-American Conference. For the full text of the arbitration agreement, see Conferencia Internacional Americana, *Dictámenes de las Comisiones Permanentes y Debates a que Dieron Lugar*, Tomo II. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1890. 995-1201.

21. For more information on U.S. policy of intervention in the Caribbean and Central American states during this period, see Gil, *Latin American-United States Relations*. 87-119; and DeConde, *A History of American Foreign Policy*, Vol. I, 3rd ed. 338-349, and 379-393.

in the Americas, but it did feel a deep sense of responsibility to assist morally, ceremonially, and institutionally in the maintenance of peace.²²

No other issue in inter-American affairs demonstrates more accurately the sharp contrast in U.S. interest and policy toward Middle and South America than its mediating role in intraregional interstate conflicts. Three different cases prior to 1935 illustrate clearly the U.S. position and level of commitment to the maintenance of interstate peace in these two separate regions. First, in 1921 an acrimonious boundary dispute between Panama and Costa Rica made war appear imminent. Although this conflict was settled when Panama yielded to a decision arbitrated by the United States, it was only after the latter dispatched to the area a battleship, four hundred marines, and an ultimatum that it would not tolerate a resumption of the clashes that had been taking place along the border.²³

Contrasting sharply with such an assertive and bullying position in the Panamenian-Costa Rican case, a more congenial and conciliatory United States worked arduously toward the peaceful resolution of two different crises taking place concurrently in South America. First, the U.S. tried to mediate the 1928 Paraguayan-Bolivian dispute over the Chaco Boreal territory, which eventually evolved into the 1932-35 Chaco War.²⁴ Second, the Leticia dispute, simmering since 1922, broke into fighting in August 31, 1932, when three hundred armed Peruvian civilians took control of the hamlet of Leticia in Colombian territory.²⁵ In both cases, the United States demonstrated clearly an absolute and relentless commitment to the peaceful prevention and resolution of these crises. At no time during the long negotiating process, however, did the United States try to compel the belligerents toward a negotiated settlement, utilizing intimidation, coercion, or any other form of punitive and/or forceful military action against them.²⁶ Clearly, the U.S. wanted interstate peace in South America, but it was not

22. Wood, Bryce. *The United States and Latin American Wars, 1932-1942*. Columbia University Press, 1966. 2.

23. For a more thorough discussion of this episode, see Gil, *Latin American-United States Relations*. 131-133.

24. For an analysis of causes and evolution of the Chaco War by a U.S. scholar, see Zook, David H. *The Conduct of the Chaco War*. New Haven: Bookman Associates, 1960. For a Bolivian analysis, see Ayala Moreira, Rogelio. *Por Qué no Ganamos la Guerra del Chaco*. La Paz: Talleres Gráficos Bolivianos, 1959. For a Paraguayan view, see Macias, Silvio. *La Guerra de Chaco*. Asunción: Ediciones La Tribuna, 1942.

25. For a background on the Leticia incident, see López, Nicolás F. *Estudios Internacionales Sobre el Conflicto Colombo-Peruano*. Quito: Talleres Gráficos Nacionales, 1934; Lozano y Lozano, Fabio. *El Punto de Vista Colombiano en la Cuestión de Leticia*. México, D.F.: A. Mijares y Hermanos, 1933; and Ulloa, Alberto. *Posición Internacional del Perú*. Lima: Imprentas Torres Aguirre, 1941. For a descriptive account of the dispute and its riverine clashes, see Scheina, Robert L. *Latin America: A Naval History, 1810-1987*. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1987. 121-122.

26. My conclusion on the role played by the United States in, both, the Chaco and Leticia conflicts are based on my reading of the detailed historical account presented by diplomatic historian of inter-American affairs, Bryce Wood. Referring to the South American crises

prepared to enforce it. In fact, reflecting on the U.S. course of action or attitude regarding these two territorial disputes in the 1930's, Secretary of State Cordell Hull writes in his *memoirs* that after extensive consultations with President Roosevelt, the decision was made to cooperate with, and acquiesce in the assumption of jurisdiction by the League of Nations Advisory Committee handling these disputes in the heart of the Western Hemisphere. He elaborates further that:

Our acceptance signified our willingness to cooperate with other nations in the settlement of Latin American questions. *Unilateral action on our part was now in the discard.* We began to apply a principle to which we adhered in the years to follow. This was to refrain from acting until after having consulted with all the other interested nations. Only in this way could we work from under the deep-seated, resentment engendered in Latin America by previous one-sided actions of our country.²⁷

Both, the Chaco and Leticia crises demonstrate that in spite of U.S. resolute commitment to the peaceful settlement of these disputes, they evolved contrary to the publicly expressed objectives and interests of the United States in the region. While the Leticia conflict was contained to few casualties and small scale fighting between Colombia and Peru, the Chaco dispute evolved into the first major and deadliest South American interstate war in the twentieth century.²⁸ In this sense, one can infer from these outcomes that, at least prior to 1935, the power and diplomatic leadership of the United States in South America could neither deter hostile neighbors²⁹ from fighting, nor lead them toward a peaceful resolution of their militarized conflicts.

between 1928 and 1942, Wood maintains that " ... the government of the United States did not find it possible to take the lead in the adoption of measures firm enough to prevent warfare in South America. The burdens that would have been shouldered had the United States undertaken to prevent fighting by the use of force or other effective means might have been onerous indeed. In addition, the initiation of such action by the United States would not have been in keeping with the noninterventionist principles that the United States government strove mightily to keep inviolate in other aspects of the good neighbor policy." For this citation, see Wood, *The United States and Latin American Wars, 1932-1942*. 14.

27. Hull, Cordell. *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, Vol. I. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948. 310-311.

28. The casualty count during the Leticia dispute is put at 50, all occurring in the Battle of Tarapacá. The estimate for the Chaco War is well over 52,000 Bolivian deaths and 36,000 Paraguayan soldiers. See Micheal Clodfelter, *Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference*. Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 1992. 700 and 703.

29. In fact, Bryce Wood, discussing the diplomatic failure at the Montevideo Conference to secure peace and end the Chaco War, affirms that: "Finally, when the Paraguayan army could advance no more, nor the Bolivian army counterattack, the two governments accepted an armistice proposed by five American states in June 1935." Wood, *The United States and Latin American Wars, 1932-1942*. 62.

When the Chaco War ended in 1935, the Roosevelt administration was concerned principally with the growth and diffusion of Fascist regimes in Europe and their increased activities in Latin America. Consequently, in an effort to partly counteract these developments in the late 1930's, the United States assembled a cooperative hemispheric security system. Besides aiming to stymie the spread of Fascist-European influence to the Western Hemisphere, the U.S. sought to establish, consistent with its national interests, an institutional mechanism to settle intraregional interstate conflicts and to provide mutual security for its members.

The inter-American security system that emerged in the late 1930's, and that was later strengthened during and after World War II, was in part an extension of the First International Conference of American States held in Washington, D.C. in 1889-1890. In this gathering, as in subsequent International Conferences of American States and Special Conferences, the United States continued to reiterate its absolute commitment to the peaceful settlement of intraregional interstate disputes in the Americas.³⁰

Ultimately, the Rio de Janeiro Special Conference of 1947 produced the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. To the extent that this treaty reflects the position and diplomatic leadership of the United States in the post-World War period, it is an unequivocal and direct statement, delineating and revealing U.S. interest and policy on the issue of interstate disputes in the Americas. The Rio Treaty stipulates clearly in Article 2 that:

[T]he High Contracting Parties undertake to submit every controversy which may arise between them to methods of peaceful settlement and to endeavor to settle any such controversy among themselves by means of the procedures in force in the Inter-American System before referring it to the General Assembly or the Security Council of the United Nations.³¹

Furthermore, Article 3 introduces the concept of collective security into the inter-American system. It specifies that:

[A]n armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the American States and, consequently, each of the said Contracting Parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense ...³²

30. Background information on the evolution of the inter-American system and the role of the United States in it may be found in Atkins, *Latin America in the International Political System*, 2nd ed. 202-236; and John D. Martz and Lars Schoultz, ed. *Latin America, the United States, and the Inter-American System*.

31. Bartlett, ed. *The Record of American Diplomacy: Documents and Readings in the History of American Foreign Relations*, 3rd ed. 730. For a full text of the 1947 Rio Treaty, see 730-733.

32. Bartlett, ed. *The Record of American Diplomacy: Documents and Readings in the History of American Foreign Relations*, 3rd ed. 730-731.



In sum, the Rio Treaty not only embodies the publicly-stated interests and goals of the United States in Latin America but, more importantly, since the end of the Second World War to the present, it has served as the main legal institutional framework to deal with the prevention and/or resolution of interstate conflicts in the Americas.

The purpose of the previous discussion has been to identify the national interest and political position of the United States in South America with respect to intraregional interstate peace. Based on this analysis, it has been demonstrated empirically that the U.S. has been fully committed to the promotion and maintenance of interstate peace in this region. Moreover, it has been shown that the U.S. has been determined to serve as a diplomatic catalyst in the prevention and resolution of interstate disputes in the Americas. First, it has been instrumental in organizing institutional mechanisms for the promotion and maintenance of interstate peace. And, second, whenever it has been confronted with a militarized conflict in South America prior to 1935, it has decidedly favored diplomatic avenues over military options as the policy choice to either prevent or resolve a crisis. Given its evident power and demonstrated interest in preventing the outbreak of war in the Americas prior to 1935, is the peace in South America a direct consequence of U.S. hegemonic behavior in the region? I turn my attention in the following section to an analysis of this important question.

3. POWER, INTEREST AND BEHAVIOR: A RECIPE FOR INTERSTATE PEACE?

While the end of the Chaco War ushered in a long period of interstate peace in South America, the region has not been immune from recurrent territorial disputes and militarized crises. There have been several South American dyads involving conflicting claims. These are the Ecuadorian-Peruvian dispute over territory in the Amazon; the Argentine-Chilean quarrel over the islands in the Beagle Channel; the Colombian-Venezuelan controversy over the Gulf of Venezuela; and the dispute over the Essequibo territory between Venezuela and Guyana.

That these disputes have not evolved into major intraregional interstate wars in the last sixty years is more significant than their lingering effect. Many analysts attribute this happy and unexpected development to the pacifying influence exerted by the United States in South America since 1935. Therefore, I will examine the role played by this country in the most critical moments of crisis and maintenance of interstate peace in the region.

In the course of this investigation I will present, first, a general background to each crisis. The aim is to outline the origin of the dispute, the stake in question, and the claims of the disputants. Second, I will describe and analyze the position of the United States toward the situation and its effort to prevent war. Third, I will explain either the final outcome, or present status of the controversy in question. Finally, I will present my conclusion as to whether or not the position of the U.S. prevailed and influenced the final outcome of the crisis. In sum, by concentrating on the militarized crises and diplomatic standoffs that have occurred since 1935, I intend to uncover if indeed U.S. hegemonic power has been instrumental in preserving peace

and stability in South America in the post-Chaco-War period.

4. THREE MILITARIZED CRISES IN ECUADORIAN-PERUVIAN RELATIONS

The Ecuadorian-Peruvian territorial dispute is the most enduring and virulent controversy in South America since 1935. These two countries began to haggle over the limits of their territory as early as 1830, when Ecuador became an independent state separate from Colombia. The stakes of this quarrel have involved a small area in the Pacific Ocean and some 120,000 square miles of territory east of the Andes and between the Equator and the Marañón River.³³ Since its independence, Ecuador has strived to be an Amazonian nation.³⁴ Hence, its national objective has been to gain access and control over parts of the Amazon jungle and the river system draining this area. On the other hand, Peru's aim has been to prevent Ecuador from expanding its territory eastward, particularly in the aftermath of its defeat in the 1932 Leticia Dispute with Colombia.

Three times in the last sixty years, Ecuador and Peru have been at the brink of a major war over the disputed territory in the Amazon. First, on July 5, 1941 hostilities broke out when an Ecuadorian army patrol encountered a group of Peruvian agricultural workers and civil guards near the Zarumilla River, inside Ecuador's borders. While in Quito it was reported that the Peruvians opened fire against the patrol; in Lima, the foreign ministry issued a statement explaining that Ecuadorian soldiers had attacked Peruvian positions and had been defeated.³⁵

In the 1941 Marañón Conflict, Ecuador and Peru engaged in sporadic, but sometimes heavy and fierce fighting along their boundaries. Before these two countries finally negotiated the Talara truce on October 2, 1941, they had mobilized together close to 18,000 troops, and

33. For detailed background to the Ecuadorian-Peruvian territorial dispute, see John B. Allcock, et. al., 3rd ed., *Border and Territorial Disputes*. London, England: Longman Group UK Limited, 1992. 586-591; Gordon Ireland, *Boundaries, Possessions, and Conflicts in South America*. New York: Octagon Books, 1938 (1971). 219-230; Zook, David H. *Zarumilla-Marañón: The Ecuador-Peru Dispute*. New York: Bookman Associates, 1964; Wood, *The United States and Latin American Wars, 1932-1942*; Maier, Georg. "Ecuadorian-Peruvian Boundary Dispute," *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 63 (January 1969). 28-46; Carlos Palacios Saena, *La Guerra del 41: El Protocolo de Río no Demarcó Fronteras Definitivas*. Guayaquil: Ediciones Ara, 1979; Bolívar López, Hermán. *El Ecuador y su Problema Territorial con el Perú*. Quito: Biblioteca Militar Ecuatoriana, 1978; Monteza Tafur, Miguel. *El Conflicto Militar del Perú con el Ecuador*. Lima: Editorial Arica, 1976; and Valencia Rodríguez, Luis. "Antecedentes Históricos del Problema Limitrofe," in Lasso, Xavier and Edmundo Guerra, eds. *Ecuador y Perú: Futuro de Paz?* Quito: Ed. La Bunga, 1993. 11-17.

34. Ricardo Muñoz Chávez, "El Derecho Amazónico Es Irrenunciable," in Lasso and Guerra, eds. *Ecuador y Perú: Futuro de Paz?* 95-101.

35. For the Ecuadorian account of events, see Donoso Tobar, Julio. *La Invasión Peruana y el Protocolo de Río*. Quito: Ediciones Ecuatorianas, 1945. 174-175. The Peruvian version is reported by Wood, *The United States and Latin American Wars, 1932-1942*. 278.

had sustained enormous material losses and over 600 combat casualties.³⁶ At the end, the clear military victor was Peru who not only prevented Ecuadorian expansion in the Amazon, but, more importantly, had military control over the province of El Oro in Ecuador and was threatening to overtake Guayaquil.

After considerable diplomatic maneuvering by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the United States, the Talara truce between Ecuador and Peru led to the signing of The Protocol of Rio de Janeiro on January 29, 1942. The acceptance of this convention by both parties effectively ended organized fighting along the Ecuadorian-Peruvian border in the 1940's. This treaty specified the boundary line by naming certain points along the border. Moreover, it stipulated that Peru would withdraw its troops from Ecuadorian territory. It granted to Ecuador freedom of navigation on rivers controlled by Peru, and designated Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the United States as guarantors.³⁷

The Marañón conflict did not just happen in a political and historical vacuum. On the contrary, it was the culmination of a long, arduous, and tense diplomatic process that began on August 1, 1887, when the foreign ministers of Ecuador and Peru signed an arbitration accord. At the time, they agreed to submit the territorial question to the decision of the King of Spain. Pending direct bilateral negotiations between Ecuador and Peru, the decision was delayed for over twenty years. In addition, the original decision to enlist the King of Spain as arbitrator was quite whimsical: in 1887, Alfonso XIII, the son of the late king Alfonso XII, had not yet celebrated his first birthday. Final mediation had to be delayed 20 years to allow the King to reach his majority. Finally, in 1910 King Alfonso XIII of Spain declined to hand down a verdict, because a partial and premature disclosure³⁸ of unfavorable terms of the award for Ecuador created a public outcry in that country.

Mutual recriminations in Quito and Lima led to a general military mobilization in both countries. The war scare of 1910 ceased under strong diplomatic pressure from Argentina, Brazil, and the United States. The three countries offered to act as mediators between Ecuador

36. For the factual information on the military campaign, the diplomatic negotiations between Ecuador and Peru, and the position of the United States in regard to the Marañón Conflict, I rely on Wood, *The United States and Latin American Wars, 1932-1942*. 255-344; for the specific casualty count of this conflict, see Clodfelter, *Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference*. 705. He reports that Peru lost 80 to 100 soldiers in battle and Ecuador 500 to 600. As specified in chapter one in this work, this conflict does not classify as a major war because it falls short of the one-thousand-fatalities count that I utilized throughout this study as the basic criterion to identify major wars from other militarized crises in the region. For more information on this point, see in this work chapter one. 20 fn 5.

37. For the text of the Rio de Janeiro Protocol, see Leland M. Goodrich, ed. *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1941-1942*, Vol. IV, July 1941-June 1942. Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1942. 433-435; and in U.S. Department of State, *Bulletin*, Vol. VI, February 28, 1942. 195-196.

38. Allcock, et. al., 3rd ed., *Border and Territorial Disputes*. 586-591; and Ireland, *Boundaries, Possessions, and Conflicts in South America*. 221-226.

and Peru and declared that it was "unthinkable that Ecuador and Peru should go to war over a boundary dispute which both, by solemn agreement, submitted to arbitration."³⁹

As a mediator, rather than as an enforcer of interstate peace, is how the United States first got involved in the territorial dispute between Ecuador and Peru. Since its initial involvement, the U.S. demonstrated a marked commitment to the peaceful settlement of that conflict. This was particularly evident in 1910, when the U.S. representative in Quito was instructed to convey to the President of Ecuador that the failure of his country to be "conciliatory" would be regarded by the United States as an indication of "a disinclination to reach a peaceful and honorable solution of the boundary difficulty..."⁴⁰

The impartial and mediating attitude of the United States, and its commitment to a peaceful settlement of the Ecuadorian-Peruvian dispute is revealed further in a cogent exchange of letters between the President of Ecuador, Federico Páez, and President Franklin D. Roosevelt. On May 7, 1936, President Páez wrote to President Roosevelt requesting him to pressure Peru to accede to move the Ecuadorian-Peruvian Peace Conference from Lima to Washington. This petition was accompanied by an outline of events in the negotiations between the two countries in Lima, and by yet another reference to Ecuador's inevitable recourse "to defend by arms her vital interests."⁴¹ To this request, President Roosevelt responded:

But I feel confident that Your Excellency will recognize that the arbitrator of an international dispute, if he is to carry out his high duties with the complete impartiality which his position demands, must refrain from taking any action which would appear to imply the bringing of any pressure, even in the form of moral influence, upon either of the parties to the dispute. If ... I were now to take any action, even action in the nature of a friendly and informal request, which might be construed by the Government of Peru as being beyond the limits of complete judicial impartiality, the confidence of the Peruvian Government in the arbitrator might be shaken ...⁴²

With this statement, President Roosevelt made very clear to all South American states that the new policy of the United States regarding intraregional relations was to participate as just another state among equals, and that the U.S. was not disposed to exert unilateral pressure on any one party in a dispute in the region.⁴³

39. As quoted by Wood, *The United States and Latin American Wars, 1932-1942*. 256.

40. Wood, *The United States and Latin American Wars, 1932-1942*. 257.

41. *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers 1936*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954. Vol. V. 110.

42. Emphasis added. *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers 1936*, Vol. V. 113.

43. To emphasize this policy and make it clear to the Ecuadorians, Assistant Secretary of State Sumner Welles sent a memorandum to the Chief of the Division of Latin American Affairs in the U.S. Department of State, Laurence Duggan, instructing him to explain to the Government of Ecuador the functions of the U.S. in the negotiations leading up to the 1936 Ecuadorian-

From the war scare of 1910 to the 1936 Washington conference between the delegations of Ecuador and Peru, the bilateral relations of these two states were plagued by, both, multiple militarized border incidents, and failed diplomatic initiatives intended to solve the territorial dispute. In this sense, the 1936 Washington conference proved to be no different from other diplomatic efforts. It was broken off in 1938 without having achieved any type of negotiated settlement.⁴⁴

Notwithstanding its immediate failure, the 1936-1938 Ecuadorian-Peruvian conference in Washington, D.C. is an important element in identifying and explaining the role of the United States government toward the territorial dispute in the Amazon. In the course of these negotiations, U.S. diplomats adhered to a position of impartiality and refused to take the lead in matters such as the suggestion of a compromise boundary line.⁴⁵ Illustrative of this position is the reaction of Under Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, to the possibility of Ecuador resorting to force in June 1937 in an attempt to settle the territorial dispute. Overtly concerned with Ecuador's posture, Welles asked the Ambassador from Ecuador, Colón Eloy Alfaro:

[I]f he would not consider it peculiarly deplorable at this very moment, when the prospects seemed brighter than they have for some months past, for his Government to consider breaking off negotiations or even to contemplate hostilities. ... how would it be possible for the Government of Ecuador, after the peace treaties which it had signed at the Buenos Aires Conference and in view of the unanimous desire on the part of all of the American Republics there expressed always to resort to peaceful means of adjudicating disputes, now to contemplate hostilities when no act of aggression had been committed against Ecuador by Peru.⁴⁶

Peruvian Conference in Washington. In this memorandum, Assistant Secretary Welles, explains that the role of the U.S. government: "is merely that of a friendly and conciliatory host and that we have no intention of being represented during the course of the preliminary negotiations between the two delegations." *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers 1936*, Vol. V. 119.

44. Bryce Wood, *Aggression and History: The Case of Ecuador and Peru*. Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International, 1978. 5, and 55-59. This conference was carried out on the basis of an agreement signed by Ecuador and Peru in Lima on July 6, 1936. This document specified that both countries should respect and maintain a *status quo* line in the disputed territory until a final arbitral decision could be reached in the conference. For the text of this document, see *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers 1936*, Vol. V. 116-117.

45. For details of the negotiations and factual information regarding the role of the United States in them, see *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers 1937*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954, Vol. V (1937). 46-56; *Ibid.*, Vol. V (1938). 217-245; and *Ibid.*, Vol. V (1939). 141-147.

46. For a memorandum of the entire conversation on June 10, 1937, see *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers 1937*. 49-52; and for this specific citation, see 50-51.

Ecuador did not resort to war at the time. Instead, it responded by proposing arbitration of the whole controversy by the President of the United States. This proposal was accompanied by an outline of Ecuador's position as to the boundary line itself and by, yet, another reference to war appearing to be "our only recourse."⁴⁷

The role played by the United States and how it perceived itself in the Ecuadorian-Peruvian Conference of 1936 in Washington, D.C. is illustrated further by the reply of Under Secretary Welles to Ecuador's proposal of August 26, 1937. He responded that:

[W]hile this Government was acting as host to the two delegations, it did not possess the functions of mediator nor of intermediary and that, while I was prepared and had been prepared to do everything I could to facilitate the successful termination of the negotiations, I did not feel authorized by either of the two Governments involved to suggest specific solutions or methods of procedure.⁴⁸

The collapse of the Ecuadorian-Peruvian Conference in Washington, D.C. on September 29, 1938 effectively ended for more than two years any sustained effort by third parties to settle the dispute. Only in December 1938, during the eighth conference of American states in Lima, Peru, several unofficial attempts were made to resolve the controversy.⁴⁹ In this gathering, Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, discussed with Peru's Foreign Minister, Carlos Concha, his concern with the Ecuadorian-Peruvian situation. In his report of his conversation with Concha to Under Secretary Welles, Secretary of State Hull writes:

I told him that the world situation requires that the peace of the Americas be maintained; that the public sentiment in the Americas is unanimous in its insistence that there be peace on this hemisphere; that the Ecuador-Peru boundary dispute is the only major blight on the peace of the Americas; that because of its resources, strength and experience Peru should take the initiative although Ecuador of course should do its full part; and after complimenting Dr. Concha for his handling of the Conference, appealed to him to take upon his shoulders the responsibility for removing the last major obstacle towards peace in the Americas. Dr. Concha has assured me that the President [Manuel Prado Ugarteche] is genuinely desirous of a settlement of the dispute and I believe that Dr. Concha was impressed by my personal appeal to him to take the initiative and endeavor to find a solution. ... Under the circumstances, I believe I have done all that I possibly can.⁵⁰

47. *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers 1937*. 55.

48. For memorandum of this exchange on January 28, 1938, see *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers 1938*, Vol. V. 217-218.

49. Wood, *Aggression and History: The Case of Ecuador and Peru*. 266.

50. Telegram 74, from Lima, Peru, December 27, 1938. *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers 1938*. 244.

Again, this exchange with Concha is indicative of U.S. circumspection, limitations, and/or inability to act as an authoritative enforcer of interstate peace in South America. This is particularly evident when the U.S. Secretary of State confides to one of his Under Secretaries that he has done all he can, omitting all references to any sort of coercive or authoritative action by the United States, to settle the dispute between Ecuador and Peru. In fact, Secretary of State Hull makes no mention in his *memoirs* of the territorial dispute between Ecuador and Peru.⁵¹

The role of the United States in the Ecuadorian-Peruvian dispute is revealed in two other instances. First, in receipt of a tepid acceptance message from Peru to a mediation proposal made by Argentina, Brazil, and the U.S., Secretary of State Cordell Hull, showing reticence to apply pressure on the disputants, suggested to the other mediators that the course of action should be to consider the messages of acceptance from Peru and Ecuador as "satisfactory." He "feared" that if any attempt was made by the three governments to elicit a more favorable response from Peru, the latter would claim that "pressure was being exercised upon it which was not consonant with its national sovereignty and dignity ..."⁵²

Second, reacting candidly to an effort made by Oswaldo Aranha, the Brazilian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to include Chile as a mediator and future guarantor of the Ecuador-Peru peace accord, Secretary Hull confided to the U.S. Ambassador in Lima that:

For your personal information you are informed that this Government *had no prior knowledge* of the renewed initiative with regard to the inclusion of Chile until it was informed that Foreign Minister Aranha in the course of his visit to Santiago had agreed with the Chilean Foreign Minister with regard thereto and had thereafter agreed with the Foreign Minister of Argentina as to the desirability of this step.⁵³

Such an uneventful episode, nevertheless, demonstrates on the part of the U.S. a marked degree of apathy and lack of information regarding the thrust of diplomatic maneuvering in the aftermath of the outbreak of hostilities between Ecuador and Peru in July 1941.

The evidence presented above indicates, on the one hand, that the United States was publicly committed to help bring about a peaceful settlement between Ecuador and Peru. But, on the other hand, the record discloses that in the years prior to the 1941 Marañón crisis, the U.S. was either unable, or unwilling to force or lead towards an unilateral territorial arrangement in South America. It was not only Under Secretary Welles's statements of impartiality and refusal to impose or dictate a unilateral settlement on Ecuador and Peru. More importantly, it was President Roosevelt's refusal to exert any type of pressure on both disputant,

51. Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull* . 601-611. See particularly his chapter discussing the focal points of the Pan American Conference in Lima, Peru, on December 9, 1938.

52. *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers 1941* . Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1941. 226.

53. Italics are mine. *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers 1941*. 244.

and Secretary of State Hull's candid admission that he had done all he could to convince Peru to take the diplomatic initiative towards a peaceful solution of the controversy.

Perhaps the United States concern with the expanding war in Europe, and the spirit of the Good Neighbor policy towards Latin America made this country quite cautious and reluctant to apply such force on these two South American disputants as would lead them toward a resolution of their controversy. In the final analysis, all the peace conferences, negotiations, and diplomatic efforts organized by the U.S. in conjunction with several other South American countries did not prevent the outbreak of a militarized crisis between Ecuador and Peru in July 1941. I conclude, accordingly, that in this particular instance the United States failed to prevent the outbreak of hostilities and promote a peaceful and long-lasting settlement in South America.

Due to Ecuador's military weakness in the 1941 Marañón conflict, to the United States concern with the war in Europe, and to the haste of the other South American states to close a violent chapter in the Ecuador-Peru territorial dispute, Ecuador was effectively compelled to accept and sign the 1942 Protocol of Rio de Janeiro, a treaty that essentially shattered Ecuador's sovereign objective to be an Amazonian nation.

Never satisfied with the Rio Protocol and claiming that it had signed the treaty under duress, Ecuador invoked the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (the 1947 Rio Treaty) in 1955, arguing that Peru was preparing to invade again. At this juncture, the Organization of American States organized a peace-observing team of military attachés stationed in Lima. To Ecuador's dismay, the military observers found no evidence of Peruvian military preparation for a possible invasion of Ecuador. Despite the set back, Ecuador was able to keep alive in the 1950's the territorial dispute with Peru due to certain legal, cartographic, and geographic technicalities. Finally, in 1960 Ecuador formally declared the 1942 Rio de Janeiro Protocol null and void. Such unilateral action was immediately rejected by Peru who claimed that the territorial dispute with Ecuador had been settled permanently at the 1942 Rio de Janeiro Conference.⁵⁴

As a continuation of their territorial dispute in the Amazon jungle, Ecuador and Peru clashed militarily for a second time on January 28, 1981. This time the area involved was a poorly demarcated 48-mile stretch along the Cónдор Mountains, believed to be rich in gold and oil. In 1942, when the Rio Protocol specified the border between the two states, the cartographers were unaware of the existence of the Cenepa River.⁵⁵ Since the discovery of this river, Ecuador has claimed jurisdiction over 130 square miles west of the Cenepa watershed.

54. For this sequence of events I draw on the historical account in Jack Child, *Geopolitics and Conflict in South America: Quarrels Among Neighbors*. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1985. 92-98.

55. The Cenepa river was discovered in 1947 by a U.S. aerial cartographic expedition. For more details, see Jorge Pérez Concha, "Tesis de Nulidad e Inejecutibilidad: El Arbitraje Papal" in Lasso and Guerra, eds. *Ecuador y Peru: Futuro de Paz?* 20.

The immediate source of the 1981 militarized crisis was Peru's claim that Ecuador had occupied three abandoned Peruvian military outposts in the Cónдор Mountains. Consequently, Peru launched a surprise attack against Ecuadorian forces allegedly stationed there.⁵⁶ Before Ecuador and Peru accepted on February 2, 1981 cease-fire appeals from Pope John Paul II, the United States, and other Latin American states, including the three other 1942 Rio Treaty guarantors, both nations sustained heavy material losses and some combat casualties.⁵⁷ In addition, the newly instituted democratic governments in both countries were seriously shaken from the effects of the economic and political disruptions brought about by the short, but costly, military campaign.

The fact that the 1981 militarized crisis lasted only five days, and that it was prevented from escalating further is the result of the quick and decisive action of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the United States. On January 29, 1981 the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States convened in Washington, D.C. and urged Ecuador and Peru to accept the creation of a commission to investigate the border clashes. Ecuador agreed immediately to this proposal but Peru rejected it, arguing that only the Rio Protocol guarantors were competent to mediate the latest crisis.⁵⁸ On the heels of the O.A.S. mediating failure, the four state guarantors, together with representatives from Ecuador and Peru, gathered in Brasilia on January 31 to negotiate a peaceful settlement. After more than twenty hours of discussions, the two warring parties finally agreed to terminate hostilities on February 2, 1981 and to continue negotiating a peaceful solution to the border dispute.

In the 1981 crisis, as in the previous border clash between Ecuador and Peru, the official position of the United States government was to remain neutral and to urge the warring parties to negotiate a peaceful solution to their century-old territorial controversy. Despite press reports indicating that U.S. officials were "working behind the scene to help minimize the

56. For a description of the second Ecuadorian-Peruvian crisis in the post-Chaco-War period and its immediate causes, see *The Christian Science Monitor*, January 29, 1981. 2; *Idem*, February 2, 1981. 6; *The New York Times*, January 24, 1981. 2; *Idem*, January 29, 1981. 8; *Idem*, January 30, 1981. 6; *Idem*, January 31, 1981. 6; *Idem*, February 1, 1981. 3; *Idem*, February 2, 1981. 1 and 7; *Idem*, February 3, 1981. 3; *Idem*, February 8, 1981, Section IV. 4; and Edward Schumacher, "Behind Ecuador War, Long-Smoldering Resentment," *The New York Times*, February 10, 1981. 2.

57. Casualty counts range from the official figure of both countries which puts the total number at nine soldiers killed to estimates as high as two hundred killed and wounded. For the official figure, see Clodfelter, *Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference*. 1190, and *The New York Times*, February 8, 1981, Section IV. 4. For other higher estimates quoted, see Child, *Geopolitics and Conflict in South America: Quarrels Among Neighbors*. 96.

58. See *Latin America Weekly Report*, Friday, February 6, 1981. 1-2. This is a key obstacle to the successful settlement of the Ecuadorian-Peruvian territorial dispute. Ever since in 1960 Ecuador abrogated the 1942 Rio Protocol unilaterally, it has preferred to bring the territorial dispute to international organisms like the O.A.S. and the U.N. On the other hand, Peru refuses the mediation of all parties, except that of the four guarantors of the Rio Protocol.

damage,"⁵⁹ I have found no official evidence of a forceful or authoritative effort on the part of the U.S. government to prevent further military encounters in South America.⁶⁰ In fact, the only, perhaps, the boldest U.S. action toward this end came in February 7, 1977 when the Carter Administration blocked the sale by Israel to Ecuador of 24 Kfir aircraft. At the time, U.S. officials maintained that since the General Electric J-79 engines of those airplanes were U.S.-made, the United States government had the right to veto the transaction. In response to the U.S. action, in November 1977 Ecuador purchased 18 advanced French Mirage F-1 aircraft.⁶¹

In sum, it appears that in the 1981 Ecuadorian-Peruvian conflict the United States had no greater or lesser role than any of the other three Latin American guarantors. Even when the U.S. has acted to defuse tension between these two countries, as was the case with the blocked sale of Israeli Kfir combat aircraft to Ecuador in 1977, Ecuador and Peru, as well as other South American countries have been able to circumvent U.S. restrictions on arms supplies by procuring weapons from other countries. In this sense, blame for the failure to prevent the outbreak of hostilities along the Ecuadorian-Peruvian border, or credit for quickly terminating the military clash in 1981 is shared equally by the four 1942 Rio Protocol guarantors.

Albeit its inferior military position relative to that of Peru, Ecuador has remained adamant about its "sovereign right" to be an Amazonian state. It continues to press the issue on its right to have access to the Amazon and the river system draining this region. It insists that the discovery of the Cenepa River, a tributary of the Marañón River, strengthens its claim over parts of the Cónдор Mountains between the Zamora and Santiago rivers.

Since the cease-fire agreement ending the 1981 conflict, Ecuador and Peru have been unable to settle peacefully their territorial dispute. Thus, numerous shooting incidents on the disputed border between the two nations occurred yearly during the 1980's and early 1990's. In the midst of this tense and volatile relationship, Peru and Ecuador clashed for the third time in the post-Chaco War period on January 27, 1995.⁶² Again, the immediate cause of the latest

59. See Edward Schumacher, "Behind Ecuador War, Long-Smoldering Resentment," *The New York Times*, Tuesday, February 10, 1981. 2.

60. I base my conclusion on a review of several volumes of the U.S. Department of State, *Bulletin* covering the months prior, during, and after the January-February 1981 Ecuadorian-Peruvian crisis. In my search I found no evidence of any public U.S. statement alluding to or discussing specific steps either to prevent or settle peacefully this or future militarized crises between Ecuador and Peru. To corroborate, see U.S. Department of State, *Bulletin*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980 and 1981, Vols. 80 and 81, Nos. 2034 to 2057 (January 1980 to December 1981).

61. Graham Hovey, "U.S. Blocks Sale of Israeli Planes to Ecuadorians," *The New York Times*, Tuesday, February 8, 1977. 1 and 4; *The New York Times*, Saturday, June 4, 1977. 7; *The New York Times*, Wednesday, July 6, 1977. 1 and 15; Bernard Weinraub, "U.S. Again Blocks Israeli Sale of Jets to Ecuador," *The New York Times*, Thursday, July 7, 1977. 4. For a report of the sale to Ecuador of French Dassault-Breguet Mirage F-1 planes, see *Latin American Political Report*, Vol. XI, No. 6, February 11, 1977. 47.

62. *The New York Times*, Saturday, January 28, 1995. 2; and *El Tiempo*, Santa Fe de Bogotá, Colombia, Saturday, January 28, 1995. 1, 9-10.

incident was Peru's claim that Ecuador had occupied Peruvian territory in the remote Andean region of the Cónдор Mountains. In response, it launched an attack to dislodge Ecuadorian soldiers from two border posts within the disputed area. Meanwhile, Ecuador's President, Sixto Durán Ballén vowed, "Ecuador will not back off from the positions that it maintains in the border." He added, "if we back down, we are convinced that Peru will continue to invade our land."⁶³

Nationalistic rhetoric from both Peru's President, Alberto Fujimori, and Ecuador's President, Sixto Durán Ballén, made negotiations very difficult. One, or both sides rejected several mediating offers. These included that by U.N. General Secretary, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, one from the non-permanent or rotating U.N. Security Council President, Carlos Saúl Menem of Argentina, another by the General Secretary of the O.A.S., César Gaviria Trujillo of Colombia, and one by former Presidents and Nobel Peace Laureates Oscar Arias Sánchez of Costa Rica and Jimmy Carter.⁶⁴

The January 1995 border skirmish between Ecuador and Peru proved to be the most costly militarized crisis in South America since the 1941 Marañón conflict. The human toll from both sides oscillates between as few as 47 casualties to as many as 300 soldiers killed.⁶⁵ Several estimates put the cost of the military campaign for each side at ten million dollars per day.⁶⁶ Despite these heavy losses, the territorial dispute still remains unsettled. And the cease-fire agreement that went into effect as of 12 noon, on Friday, February 17, 1995 did not deal with the basic problems that originally caused the latest military conflict between Ecuador and Peru.⁶⁷

Based on the material I have been able to review, I do not find evidence indicating that the United States government played a more significant mediating role than any of the other three South American guarantors.⁶⁸ When the first cease-fire attempt failed on Thursday,

63. As quoted in the *The New York Times*, Sunday, January 29, 1995. 6.

64. *The New York Times*, Sunday, January 29, 1995. 6; *La Nación*, Buenos Aires, Argentina, Sunday, January, 29, 1995. 1-3; *El Tiempo*, Santa Fe de Bogotá, Colombia, Saturday, January 28, 1995. 1 and 9; and *The New York Times*, Sunday, February 12, 1995. 16.

65. For casualty figures, see *The New York Times*, Sunday, February 12, 1995. 16; and Juan Jesús Aznárez, "Perú y Ecuador Ponen Fin a Su Guerra Fronteriza," *El País Internacional*, Spain, Monday, February 20, 1995. 3. Again, this conflict produced less than one thousand fatalities and for that reason it is not treated here as a war, as it was called in the U.S. For more information on this criterion, see in this work chapter one. 20 fn. 5.

66. *The New York Times*, Thursday, February 9, 1995. 6; and Luis Salas, "Espíritu de Combate," *Cambio 16*, Spain, No. 1213, February 20, 1995. 46-47.

67. James Brooke, "Peru and Ecuador Halt Fighting Along Border, Claiming Victory," *The New York Times*, Wednesday, February 15, 1995. 6; and *El País Internacional*, Spain, Monday, February 20, 1995. 3.

68. In fact, in the few official statements I have found explaining the position and role on the United States government in the 1995 Ecuadorian-Peruvian crisis, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Alexander Watson, explains that the guarantors' job "was not to resolve the

February 2, President Bill Clinton wrote to Presidents Fujimori and Durán Ballén urging both to accept a cease-fire. The next day, Michael D. McCurry, the White House spokesman, said: "The United States is prepared to participate in a mission to observe a cease-fire once one is in place."⁶⁹ These efforts pale in light of those made by South American diplomats and heads of states, and next to U.S. involvement in Bosnia, Haiti, Somalia, etc. For instance, President Carlos Menem of Argentina admitted on one occasion that throughout the conflict he talked on the telephone seven or eight times with his counterparts in Ecuador and Peru urging both to cease fighting.⁷⁰ At any rate, the turning point in this conflict came after more than seven days of high-level negotiations in Brasilia, when Peru declared a unilateral truce on Tuesday, February 14.71 Shortly thereafter, Ecuador accepted that offer and at 12 noon, Friday, February 17, the cease-fire went into effect officially.

To conclude, the record demonstrates that the January 1995 Ecuadorian-Peruvian conflict, as the previous two other crises in 1941 and 1981, was neither prevented nor successfully solved by the hegemonic role of the United States. These crises generated out of their own complex dynamics. Despite the poor and militarily weak conditions of the belligerents, there was very little the U.S. and other regional powers could do, short of outright coercion, to prevent them from fighting.

underlying dispute by any means, but to try to end the current fighting, stop the bloodshed, and, if we could, set up a mechanism by which the underlying dispute could be addressed in an effective way." He further elaborates, "the Rio Protocol does not give to the guarantor countries authority to determine or impose a solution." Moreover, he discloses, "the Brazilians are the leaders of the guarantor group." He also indicates that "[the United States] will be fully committed and prepared to work intensely with Peru and Ecuador as may be required." For the complete version of this briefing, see U.S. Department of State, *Dispatch*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995, Vol. 6, No. 7 (February 13, 1995). 24-26. In another official U.S. policy statement towards the Americas in 1995, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Alexander Watson, acknowledges once again the importance of "Brazil's leadership within the Group of Guarantors of the Peru-Ecuador Protocol of Rio," and characterizes the roles of the United States, Argentina, and Chile as those of "energetically" contributing partners. See U.S. Department of State, *Dispatch*, Vol. 6 No. 21 (May 22, 1995). The recognition of Brazil's leadership in this conflict is emphasized again by Thomas F. McLarty III, Counselor to the President and Secretary of State for the Summit of the Americas, when in an address to the Council of the Americas in Washington, D.C. he points out that: "Under Brazil's valued leadership and with the welcome participation of Argentina and Chile, we remain committed to assisting the parties to reach a long-term solution on the underlying issues." U.S. Department of State, *Dispatch*, Vol. 6 No. 22 (May 29, 1995). 46. For other major U.S. policy statements toward the Americas in 1995, see U.S. Department of State, *Dispatch*, Vol. 6 No. 24 (June 12, 1995). 1-5.

69. As quoted by James Brooke, "Peru and Ecuador Wage Guerrilla War as Talks Break Off," *The New York Times*, Monday, February 6, 1995. 5.

70. James Brooke, "Fighting Intensifies Along Peru-Ecuador Border," *The New York Times*, Friday, February 3, 1995. 8.

71. *The New York Times*, Tuesday, February 14, 1995. 8.

International coercion is a statecraft tool that the U.S. has been unwilling to utilize in the southern half of the Western hemisphere to prevent intraregional interstate conflict. Hence, the role of the U.S. has been relegated to being a mediator instead of an enforcer of intraregional interstate peace. Accordingly, whenever hostilities have broken out in the past, several countries, including the United States, have played a part in bringing the two disputants to the bargaining table. However, negotiations have not solved the basic territorial problem, at least in the Ecuadorian-Peruvian dispute, and the seed of discord and potential for armed conflict still lingers in the bilateral relations between Ecuador and Peru.

5. THE BEAGLE CHANNEL DISPUTE BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND CHILE

Historically, relations between Argentina and Chile have been affected by as many as twenty-five different territorial disputes along their 2,500-mile border.⁷² Since the 1870's, their boundary question has involved three distinct geographical areas: the inter-Andean plateaus between the eastern and western heights of the Andes, the Patagonia region, and the Strait of Magellan and Tierra del Fuego. Among these, the latter zone has proven to be the most salient and difficult to settle and demarcate.

During its early years as an independent and unified state, Argentina was less interested than Chile in controlling the Strait of Magellan and the Tierra del Fuego. However, in the late 1870's Argentina changed its foreign policy objective and decided to challenge Chile's jurisdictional claim over this region. The ensuing controversy was initially settled after Argentina and Chile, with the help of United States mediation, negotiated and signed a boundary treaty on July 23, 1881. This agreement stipulated that Chile would give up its claim to the Patagonia in exchange for Argentina's acceptance of Chilean sovereignty over the entire Strait of Magellan. Moreover, Chile accepted neutralization of the strait, and Argentina agreed never to block the Atlantic access to and egress from the strait. Finally, a provision was made for the division of Tierra del Fuego between Argentina and Chile, and for the arbitration of disputes arising over interpretation of the treaty's terms.⁷³

The issue of how to divide Tierra del Fuego and define the line between the South Atlantic and South Pacific has proven to be quite intractable. At the center of this controversy figures three small islands (Nueva, Pictón, and Lennox) at the eastern entrance to the Beagle Channel. Since neither the limits of this channel, nor the ownership of these islands were ever clearly defined in the boundary treaty of 1881, Argentina challenged the easternmost point of

72. For background information to all these controversies, see Allcock, et. al., 3rd ed., *Border and Territorial Disputes*. 548-549; Ireland, *Boundaries, Possessions, and Conflicts in South America*. 17-27; and *El Universal* Caracas, Venezuela, Wednesday, July 31, 1991. 3.

73. For a general discussion of the early stages of the Argentine-Chilean territorial controversy in the Strait of Magellan and the Tierra del Fuego, see Burr, *By Reason or Force*. 111-113, 124-126, 132-135, 144-146, and for a specific discussion of the 1881 boundary treaty between Argentina and Chile, see 155-156, 184-186, and 206. Also, see del Carril, Bonifacio. *La Cuestión con Chile*. Buenos Aires, Argentina: Emecé Editores S.A., 1984. 54-64.

Chilean sovereignty involving the possession of these three islands. In a series of boundary treaties, known as "Pactos de Mayo," signed on May 28, 1902, Argentina succeeded in obtaining from Chile the concession that the islands were negotiable and should be submitted to arbitration by the British Crown.⁷⁴ This is the inception of the so-called Beagle Channel dispute, which brought Argentina and Chile to the brink of war in late 1978.⁷⁵

Except for the signing on June 28, 1915 of a protocol, reiterating the submission for arbitration of the ownership of the islands in the Beagle Channel, the matter remained dormant until May 3, 1938. On that occasion, the Foreign Ministers of Argentina and Chile informed the U.S. Ambassador in Chile, Norman Armour, that they had agreed to resubmit to arbitration the question of the islands at the eastern end of the Beagle Channel. They agreed to rely on a sole arbitrator and they chose for that position the Chief Justice of the United States. However, when Chief Justice Hughes excused himself, the two states requested the services of U.S. Attorney General, Homer Cummings.⁷⁶

Subsequent to Cummings' failed mediation attempt in the 1940's, the British Crown took up the matter again in 1971. Weary of British neutrality because of its own territorial dispute in the South Atlantic with the United Kingdom, Argentina insisted that the arbitration arrangement be changed so that the actual judgment would be made by an impartial panel of five members of the International Court of Justice at The Hague. In early 1977 the British Crown announced the ruling confirming Chile's sovereign right over the disputed islands. Then, in December 1977 Argentina threatened to declare the arbitration not binding and stated that it would pursue the matter in bilateral negotiations with Chile.⁷⁷

74. For the historical background to the Pactos de Mayo, see Burr, *By Reason or Force*. 247-256.

75. For background information to this crisis, see Rizzo Romano, Alfredo. *La Cuestión de Límites con Chile en la Zona del Beagle*. Buenos Aires: Ediciones Pleamar, 1968; Santibáñez Escobar, Rafael. *Los Derechos de Chile en el Beagle*. Santiago de Chile: Editorial Andrés Bello, 1969; F.V., "The Beagle Channel Affair," *American Journal of International Law*, No. 71 (October 1977). 733-740; Ruggeri, Andrés. "Canal de Beagle. Algunas Reflexiones Sobre el Laudo Austral," *Estrategia*, No. 45 (March-April 1977). 48-60; Hugo G. Gobbi, "Problemas Australes Argentino-Chilenos," *Estrategia*, No. 48 (September-October 1977). 27-36; Olivera, Dario A. "Caso Beagle: Antecedentes," *Revista Argentina de Relaciones Internacionales*, Year IV, No. 11 (May-August 1978). 62-72; Juan E. Guglielmelli, "Cuestión del Beagle. Negociación Directa o Diálogo de Armas," *Estrategia*, Nos. 49 and 50 (January-February 1978). 5-22; and Villalobos, Sergio. *El Beagle: Historia de una Controversia*. Santiago, Chile: Editorial Andrés Bello, 1979. For a useful summary of the dispute, see Schumacher, Edward. "Three Small Islands Loom Large In Argentine Leader's Plans," *The New York Times*, Thursday, January 5, 1984. 16.

76. *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers 1938*. 210-217.

77. Caviedes, César. *The Southern Cone: Realities of the Authoritarian State in South America*. Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld, 1984. 155-156; and Child, *Geopolitics and Conflict in South America: Quarrels Among Neighbors*. 80-81; *The New York Times*, Sunday, January 15, 1978. 9.

Bilateral negotiations between Argentina and Chile began on January 14, 1978 when General Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda, former director of Chile's intelligence agency, delivered a proposal from President Augusto Pinochet to President Jorge Rafael Videla of Argentina.⁷⁸ The two military presidents met privately for five hours on January 19.⁷⁹ But the meeting was a fiasco: five days later, on January 25, Argentina officially "repudiated" the international arbitration decision.⁸⁰ The stage was set for what, up to 1978, proved to be the most serious militarized crisis in South America since the 1941 Ecuadorian-Peruvian conflict.

The rhetoric coming out of Argentina and Chile became increasingly bellicose. By August 1978, bilateral negotiations had reached an impasse, and the negotiators fixed November 2, 1978 as the final date to arrive at an agreement.⁸¹ In September and October of 1978 the tempo of acrimonious allegations picked up with both sides accusing each other of troop movements and illegal incursions.⁸² When the November 2 deadline came, the negotiators for both countries announced that they had not been able to work out an agreement, but that they would urge their respective governments to seek a peaceful solution to the dispute.⁸³

While Argentina increased pressure on Chile by demanding a "total accord as soon as possible," Chile proposed that the two countries should submit the dispute to a friendly nation, like Spain, for arbitration. This proposal was rejected outright by Argentina, asserting that "direct negotiations are the suitable way to resolve disputes."⁸⁴ Consequently, the Beagle Channel dispute had ushered in the most dangerous and bellicose six weeks in the recent history of Argentine-Chilean relations. Belligerent statements from both governments, deployment of armored forces along the border, naval maneuvers near the Beagle Channel, and troop movements led both countries "to be four hours away" from a major military conflagration on December 23, 1978.⁸⁵ War was averted when Pope John Paul II agreed to arbitrate the dispute

78. *The New York Times*, Thursday, January 19, 1978. 2.

79. *The New York Times*, Friday, January 20, 1978. 2.

80. Juan de Onís, "Argentina Rejects Ruling on 3 Islands," *The New York Times*, Thursday, January 26, 1978. 6.

81. *The New York Times*, Supplementary Material, August 29, 1978. 118.

82. *The New York Times*, Supplementary Material, September 27, 1978. 57; *Ibid.*, Supplementary Material, October 17, 1978. 39; and *Ibid.*, Supplementary Material, October 25, 1978. 65.

83. *The New York Times*, Supplementary Material, November 3, 1978. 26.

84. *The New York Times*, Supplementary Material, November 4, 1978. 48.

85. Scheina, *Latin America: A Naval History, 1810-1987*. 187; Juan de Onís, "Argentina and Chile Break Off Talks Over Rejects Islands," *The New York Times*, Thursday, December 14, 1978. 3; and Juan de Onís, "Argentina, Chile Feud Masks Other Troubles," *Ibid.*, Sunday, December 31, 1978, Section IV. 3.

and Argentina accepted his mediating role.⁸⁶ Finally, on January 23, 1984 the Vatican announced that Argentina and Chile had reached an agreement regarding the Beagle Channel dispute and the delineation of their respective territories.⁸⁷

Throughout the time leading up to the major crisis between Argentina and Chile and during the six weeks of tense crisis, the role of the United States government was consistent with its previous position in other interstate disputes in South America in the post-Chaco War period. The Carter administration urged both governments to avoid war and to find a peaceful solution to their territorial dispute. It asked the Organization of American States to intervene in the dispute. But all U.S. efforts were to no avail in settling the dispute.⁸⁸

I have found no evidence indicating that the U.S. government leaned heavily on either of the two parties in the dispute to prevent or solve the Beagle Channel controversy. In fact, it appears that the U.S. government kept a distance from this imbroglio. For instance, during the time when Argentine and Chilean negotiators were trying to settle their territorial dispute, President Jimmy Carter, addressing the O.A.S General Assembly, recalled the coming centennial anniversary of the War of the Pacific between Chile and Peru, and pledged to view this occasion "as an opportunity to reaffirm our commitment to harmony in this hemisphere and to avoid conflict." While he mentioned that other disputes (i.e., Bolivia's access to the sea, the Honduras-El Salvador border dispute, and the future of Belize) in our hemisphere could "be settled peacefully," he failed to even allude to the ongoing discussions between Argentina and Chile over the disputed Beagle Channel.⁸⁹ Similarly, at the height of this crisis on December 14, 1978, in a major U.S. policy address to the Pan American Society of the United States in New York, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Viron P. Vaky did not even mention the failed negotiations.⁹⁰

86. de Onís, Juan. "Argentina and Chile Accept Papal Effort in Dispute," *The New York Times*, Sunday, December 24, 1978. 6; and "Keeping the Peace Around Cape Horn," *The New York Times*, Thursday, December 28, 1978. 16.

87. *The New York Times*, Tuesday, January 24, 1984. 3. A final treaty ending the Beagle Channel dispute between Argentina and Chile was signed in the Vatican on November 29, 1984, see *Ibid.*, Friday, November, 30, 1984. 5. For more information of the mediating role played by the Vatican, see Fraga, Jorge Alberto. "Beagle. Hablar Con Claridad al Sumo Pontífice," *Estrategia*, No. 69 (1981). 62-66; Güido, Claudio. "El Beagle, La Iglesia, y América Latina," *Cuadernos de Iglesia y Sociedad*. No. 8 and 9. Buenos Aires, 1984; and Vio Valdivieso, Fabio. *La Mediación de S.S. El Papa Juan Pablo II en el Conflicto Chileno-Argentino Sobre Delimitación de Jurisdicciones Marítimas en la Zona Austral*. Santiago de Chile: Editorial Aconcagua, 1984.

88. *The New York Times*, Wednesday, December 13, 1978, p. 6; and *Ibid.*, Saturday, December 16, 1978. 7.

89. As reprinted in U.S. Department of State, *Bulletin*. Vol. 78, No. 2018. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978. 54-57.

90. As reprinted in U.S. Department of State, *Bulletin*. Vol. 79, No. 2024. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979. 64-67.

In sum, the only allusion to the Beagle Channel crisis and the successful mediation by Pope John Paul II in late 1978 was U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's expression of appreciation to the Holy See "for undertaking to mediate the long-standing and troubling differences between Argentina and Chile concerning the Beagle Channel."⁹¹ As is evident from the above discussion, it was Vatican, not U.S. diplomacy, that was the determining factor in preventing the outbreak of hostilities and finding the solution to the long-running dispute between Argentina and Chile over the Beagle Channel. In this vein, I surmise from this case that the hegemonic role of the U.S. had very little to do with the maintenance of interstate peace in South America in the post Chaco-War period.

6. THREE MILITARIZED CRISES IN SOUTH AMERICA

First, Venezuela and Colombia have been involved in a low intensity, but long-running feud over the Gulf of Venezuela, the Los Monjes archipelago, and the Guajira Peninsula.⁹² The origin of this dispute stems from opposite claims from both countries as to what constitutes the line dividing the seabed and territorial waters in the Gulf of Venezuela and near the Los Monjes islands.

In 1939 the two countries signed the Treaty of Non-aggression, Conciliation, Arbitration, and Judicial Settlement of Border Demarcation and Navigation. This agreement was intended to settle all territorial disputes between Colombia and Venezuela, but since its signing many influential Venezuelans, including members of the military, have disavowed the treaty as overly "generous" with Colombia and as a "treasonous mutilation of Venezuelan sovereignty."⁹³ Consequently, in March 1981 the Venezuelan Supreme Court accepted a plea to abrogate the 1939 treaty with Colombia.

91. See U.S. Secretary of States Cyrus Vance address to the ninth regular session of the General Assembly of the Organization of American States in La Paz, Bolivia, October 23, 1979. As reprinted in U.S. Department of State, *Bulletin*. Vol. 79, No. 2033. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979. 65.

92. For general background on this territorial dispute, see Curiel, José. *Venezuela Mutilada*. Caracas, Venezuela: Libreria Historia, 1981; Vázquez Carrizosa, Alfredo. *Las relaciones de Colombia y Venezuela: La Historia Atormentada de Dos Naciones*. Bogotá, Colombia: Ediciones Tercer Mundo, 1983; Ojer, Pablo. *El Golfo de Venezuela: Una Síntesis Histórica*. Maracaibo, Venezuela: Corporación de Desarrollo de la Región Zulina, 1983; Rojas Cabot, Román and Edmundo Viña Laborde. *Al Otro Lado del Golfo, Colombia Refuta a Colombia*. Caracas, Venezuela: Impresos Urbina, C.A., 1984; Zalamea, Alberto. *Catálogo de Errores: La Crisis Colombo-Venezolana*. Bogotá, Colombia: Oveja Negra, 1987; Antonio Aguilera, Jesús. *Las Fronteras de Venezuela*. Caracas, Venezuela: Ediciones del Congreso de la República de Venezuela, 1988; and Toro Hardy, Alfredo. *La Maldición de Sisifo: Quince Años de Política Externa Venezolana*. Caracas, Venezuela: Editorial Panapo, 1991. 9-30.

93. See the discussion of this point by Child, *Geopolitics and Conflict in South America: Quarrels Among Neighbors*. 153-155.

The Venezuelan Supreme Court decision on the 1939 treaty was viewed in Colombia as an indication that Venezuela was becoming more aggressive and less open to compromise. In the 1970's and early 1980's the bargaining position of both countries hardened and a settlement became increasingly difficult to achieve. The matter came to a head on the evening of Wednesday, August 5, 1987, when the Venezuelan Ambassador to Colombia, Luis La Corte, handed to President Virgilio Barco Vargas the official Venezuelan rejection of the Colombian proposal to rejoin the Permanent Conciliation Commission and settle the territorial differences between the two countries.⁹⁴

The territorial dispute between Colombia and Venezuela reached a serious impasse on Sunday, August 9, 1987 when Colombia tried to force the issue by flexing its military muscle. On that occasion, the Colombian Navy stationed the war corvette, "A.R.C. Caldas" less than a mile south of the Castilletes parallel, inside what Venezuela defines as its territorial waters in the Gulf of Venezuela. This navy vessel remained in that location until Tuesday, August 18.⁹⁵

As might be expected, the "Caldas incident," as it became known in Colombia and Venezuela, caused a national uproar in Venezuela. Not only ultra-nationalist elements, but all segments of Venezuelan society called for a military response to Colombia's provocation. According to public demands, President Jaime Lusinchi ordered the Venezuelan armed forces on full alert along the Colombian border, and sent a stern message to his Colombian counterpart demanding the relocation of the corvette Caldas to Colombian territorial waters. Also, he requested an official explanation of the incident and the resumption of direct diplomatic negotiations between the two countries as soon as possible.⁹⁶ Fortunately, Colombia acceded several days later and moved the corvette Caldas back inside its territorial waters.⁹⁷ Then, both countries pledged to continue negotiations toward a long-lasting peaceful settlement of this controversy. Notwithstanding the absence of a final solution to the territorial dispute between Colombia and Venezuela,⁹⁸ the "Caldas incident" was solved peacefully through short-term bilateral negotiations, and without the mediation of any international actor.

Second, Venezuela is also part of a territorial dispute with Guyana over the Essequibo

94. *El Tiempo*, Santa Fe de Bogotá, Colombia, 14 August 1987. 1 and 8.

95. Bogotá Inravisión, Televisión Cadena 1 in Spanish, 16 August 1987 in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service* (FBIS-LAT-87-158), 17 August 1987. O3; *El Tiempo*, Santa Fe de Bogotá, Colombia, 19 August 1987. 1; and Alan Riding, "Two Claims of Territory Roil Waters in Gulf of Venezuela," *The New York Times*, 28 August 1987. 2.

96. AFP in Spanish (Paris), 13 August 1987 in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service* (FBIS-LAT-87-157), 14 August 1987. T 1.

97. For the late night national message, delivered by Colombian President Virgilio Barcos Vargas announcing the decision, see AFP in Spanish (Paris), 18 August 1987 in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service* (FBIS-LAT-87-159), 17 August 1987. O7; and *El Tiempo*, Santa Fe de Bogotá, Colombia, 18 August 1987. 1 and 9-C.

98. See *El Universal*, Caracas, Venezuela, 31 July 1991. 1 and 14.

territory.⁹⁹ In 1899 Great Britain and Venezuela reached an agreement, which established the present boundary between Guyana and Venezuela. However, in 1962 Venezuela unilaterally declared the arbitral accord null and void, claiming that there had been certain irregularities in the original treaty of 1899.

In 1966 Great Britain, Guyana, and Venezuela signed a protocol establishing a mixed border commission to arbitrate and settle the Essequibo dispute. By 1970 no settlement had been reached and a second accord, known as The Protocol of Port of Spain, went into effect. This agreement provided for a twelve-year "cooling off period" to be renewed automatically unless either Guyana or Venezuela objected to it. On December 11, 1981 Venezuela announced that it would not renew the Protocol of Port of Spain, due to expire on June 17, 1982. Instead, Venezuela requested the arbitration of the U.N. Secretary General.¹⁰⁰ On May 10, and on September 3 and 5, 1982 respectively, Guyana formerly protested to the U.N. Security Council over alleged border incursions into its territory by Venezuelan soldiers.¹⁰¹ The Venezuela authorities dismissed these complaints as "propaganda."¹⁰² Finally, on March 28, 1983, Guyana acceded to Venezuela's petition for U.N. mediation, but no further progress has been made on this territorial dispute. Fortunately, the issue has remained dormant and there have been no additional militarized border incidents between the two states.

Third, in another development along the Venezuelan border with Brazil, a unit from the Venezuelan National Guard border patrol clashed with Brazilian gold miners, or "garimpeiros," who entered Venezuelan territory to dig out gold and encroach on the Yanomami Indian territory. In separate incidents, Venezuelan army units fired at Brazilian private planes overflying the area. In one instance, the Venezuelans shot down a small, private

99. For this brief historical background I have relied on Rout, Leslie B. *Which Way Out? An Analysis of the Venezuelan-Guyana Border Dispute*. East Lansing: Michigan State University, Latin American Studies Center, 1971. Rafael Angel Sureda Delgado, *Betancourt and Leoni en la Guayana Esequiba* (Caracas, Venezuela: Universidad Central de Venezuela, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Sociales, División de Publicaciones, 1984); Rafael Angel Sureda Delgado, *La Guyana Esequiba: Dos Etapas en la Aplicación del Acuerdo de Ginebra* (Caracas, Venezuela: Biblioteca de la Academia Nacional de la Historia, 1990); Guyana, Ministry of Economic Planning and Finance, *Guyana's Upper-Mazaruni Hydro-electric Project* (Georgetown, Guyana: Ministry of Economic Planning and Finance, 1981); and Jacqueline Anne Braveboy-Wagner, *The Venezuela-Guyana Border Dispute: Britain's Colonial Legacy in Latin America* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984).

100. Latin-Reuter in Spanish (Buenos Aires), 11 December 1981 in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service* (FBIS), Vol. VI No. 240, 15 December 1981. L 1.

101. Bridgetown CANA in English (Georgetown, Guyana), 2 May 1982 in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service* (FBIS), Vol. VI No. 089, 7 May 1982. T 1.

102. See EFE (Madrid) in Spanish, 9 September 1982 in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service* (FBIS), Vol. VI No. 175, 8 September 1982. V1; and *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*. Vol. XXX. London: Keesing Publishers, Ltd., 1984. 31066.

plane, killing five miners on board.¹⁰³ This incident led Venezuela to launch a formal protest against Brazil, which in turn agreed to curtail the operations of gold miners along the Venezuelan-Brazilian border in the Amazon jungle. Again, this case was resolved without the intervention or mediation of any third party and further escalation of hostilities were prevented in South America.

These three minor disputes illustrate the potentiality for interstate-armed conflict that has prevailed in South America. They also reveal that unstable peace is maintained via other sufficient conditions short of outright U.S. mandate in the region. Among these three crises, the most threatening to regional peace and U.S. interests in the area was the "Caldas incident" between Colombia and Venezuela. Once again, I found no evidence indicating any type of U.S. involvement aimed at preventing or settling the dispute.¹⁰⁴ Moreover, these crises have been temporarily settled without the mediating efforts of a plethora of international actors in contrast to the Ecuadorian-Peruvian and Argentine-Chilean crises.

7. RECEIVING END: SOUTH AMERICAN COMPLIANCE WITH U.S. INTEREST

In the final analysis, the peacemaking and/or peacekeeping impact of the United States on the South American Peace appears inconclusive. Despite its public commitment to the prevention and resolution of armed conflict in South America, several militarized crises have occurred in the post-Chaco-War period. These incidents evince the inability of the U.S. to control unilaterally events in South America, especially the maintenance of interstate peace and stability. The record shows that albeit the absence of major intraregional wars since 1935, there have been several instances revealing that when nations are bent on fighting each other for what they deem to be their national interests, there is very little the U.S. government can do to prevent it. Short of a unilateral military intervention to enforce peace, the U.S. possesses just as much leverage as any large South American state. And the record demonstrates that the U.S. has been reluctant to intervene militarily in South America, even when it has involved either its strategic interests, or when it has been a relatively easy case in which to prevent the outbreak of hostilities.¹⁰⁵

103. Brooke, James. "'Mineral Province' Divides Brazil and Venezuela," *The New York Times*, 10 February 1991. 7; and *Idem.*, "Venezuela's Policy for Brazil's Gold Miners: Bullets," *The New York Times*, 16 February 1992. 20.

104. I base my assertion on the extent I was able to find relevant material in U.S. Department of State, *Bulletin* for the period in question. See U.S. Department of State, *Bulletin*. Vol. 87, Nos. 2124-2129. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1987. Even in the only major newspaper article in the U.S. on the Caldas incident, there was no single reference to U.S. policy and/or position on the controversy. To corroborate, see *The New York Times*, Friday, 28 August 1987. 2.

105. I have in mind two cases here, although they fall outside the scope of my analysis. First, the reticence on the part of the U.S. to intervene and prevent the outbreak of hostilities between El Salvador and Honduras in the now infamous Football War of 1969; second, during the South Atlantic confrontation between the United Kingdom and Argentina in 1982. In neither case did

The relation between U.S. hegemony and intraregional interstate peace appears tenuous at best when we compare the degree and frequency of U.S. political involvement and military interventions in other major regions of the world and in South America in particular. As demonstrated above, since late in the nineteenth century the United States has been active in promoting peace and security in South America as a way to advance its global strategic objectives by preventing or denying involvement opportunities to other great power rivals. Such a goal has partially guided U.S. foreign policy, particularly since 1945, in every other major region of the world from Africa to the Middle East. Specifically in South America, the United States sought that objective through a combination of diplomatic and covert political involvements in all intraregional conflicts and militarized disputes. But in comparative terms from region to region this kind of behavior is insignificant. The evidence shows that since 1935 the U.S. has intervened politically and militarily more frequently and with greater strength in interstate conflicts and militarized disputes in Africa, Asia, Central America, the Caribbean basin, and the Middle East than in South America. Yet, these other regions have experienced more intraregional interstate violence since 1935 than has South America. Clearly, this contradicts the argument linking U.S. hegemony to the absence of intraregional interstate conflict in South America.

Partial indication supporting the above conclusion is presented subsequently in table 1, where I translate the target territory code numbers of all U.S. foreign overt military interventions from 1945 to 1991. This table contains data extracted from a much larger database describing 690 instances of foreign overt military interventions worldwide in the time period specified above. As it is evident from this table, the U.S. intervened militarily abroad thirty times: thirteen times in Asia, seven times in the Middle East and in the Central American-Caribbean basin regions respectively, once in Europe, and twice in Africa. While most of these U.S. military interventions did not aim to preserve intraregional interstate peace in other regions, the much greater degree of U.S. military muscle-flexing in regions other than South America renders, at least, as exaggerated, if not preposterous, the claim that the origin of the Peace in South America is the direct consequence of U.S. hegemony and/or military preponderance in the region.

the U.S. choose to coerce the belligerents to sue for peace and avoid war at all costs. This is proof that despite what some experts claim as the direct responsibility of the U.S. to maintain intraregional peace in South America, the role of the U.S. in this endeavor is mixed or inconclusive. The South American peace is not an automatic result of U.S. hegemonic power in the region.

Table 1

United States Overt Military Interventions Abroad, 1945-1991

| Target Territory | Beginning | Ending | Name of Intervention |
|-------------------|-----------|----------|--------------------------|
| South Korea | 09/08/45 | 08/15/48 | Korean Occupation |
| P. Rep. of China | 09/30/45 | 09/06/46 | American Guard Duties |
| South Korea | 06/27/50 | 07/27/53 | Korean War |
| North Korea | 06/30/50 | 07/27/53 | Korean War |
| Trieste | 11/06/53 | 11/06/53 | Trieste Riots |
| Republic of China | 02/07/55 | 02/11/55 | Tachens Evacuation |
| Lebanon | 07/15/58 | 10/25/58 | Lebanese Civil War |
| Panama Canal Zone | 11/03/59 | 11/30/59 | Panama Demonstrations |
| South Vietnam | 03/22/62 | 01/27/73 | Vietnamese War |
| South Korea | 07/29/63 | 11/03/63 | Korean Conflict |
| Panama | 01/09/64 | 01/16/64 | Panama Flag Riots |
| Laos | 06/08/64 | 08/15/73 | Vietnamese Civil War |
| North Vietnam | 08/04/64 | 01/27/73 | Vietnamese Civil War |
| Dominican Rep. | 04/28/65 | 09/21/66 | Dominican Rep. Civil War |
| South Korea | 11/18/65 | 10/18/69 | Korean Conflict |
| Cambodia | 09/20/66 | 08/15/73 | Vietnamese War |
| South Vietnam | 04/28/75 | 04/29/75 | Saigon Evacuations |
| Vietnam | 05/14/75 | 05/15/75 | Mayaguez Incident |
| Iran | 04/24/80 | 04/25/80 | Tehran Rescue Mission |
| Lebanon | 08/25/82 | 03/26/84 | Multilateral Force |
| Grenada | 10/25/83 | 12/15/83 | Operation Urgent Fury |
| Libya | 03/24/86 | 04/15/86 | Libya Raids |
| Virgin Islands | 09/21/89 | 10/31/89 | St. Croix Disaster |
| Panama | 12/20/89 | 04/30/90 | Panama Invasión |
| Kuwait | 01/17/90 | 02/28/91 | Gulf War |
| Liberia | 08/05/90 | 08/19/90 | Monrovia Evacuation |
| Panama | 12/05/90 | 12/05/90 | Herrera's Mutiny |
| Somalia | 01/05/91 | 01/05/91 | Somalia Evacuation |
| Iraq | 01/17/91 | 07/15/91 | Desert Storm |
| Saudi Arabia | 01/29/91 | 01/30/91 | Khafji Defense |

Source: Tillema, Herbert K. "Foreign Overt Military Interventions, September 2, 1945 December 31, 1991." Columbia, MO: Department of Political Science, University of Missouri, March 31, 1997.