RT info:eu-repo/semantics/article T1 Feeding the Leviathan: political competition and soft budget constraints. Evidence from Argentine subnational districts T2 Alimentando al Leviatán: competencia política y restricciones presupuestarias blandas. Evidencia de los distritos subnacionales argentinos A1 Meloni, Osvaldo K1 Political competition K1 Soft budget constraints K1 Fiscal policy K1 Vertical fiscal imbalance K1 Fiscal federalism K1 Competencia política K1 Restricciones presupuestarias blandas K1 Política fiscal K1 Desbalance fiscal vertical K1 Federalismo fiscal K1 Economía K1 Economics K1 Geografía K1 Geography K1 Sociología K1 Sociology AB This paper presents evidence of the influence of political competition on the behavior of fiscal policy in Argentine provinces from 1987 to 2015. Contrary to the predominant theory and empirical evidence from subnational districts my estimations of a dynamic panel data show that political competition is associated with increases in public outlays and changes in its composition. This finding is strongly related to the large vertical fiscal imbalances that characterize the Argentine fiscal federalism. I conjecture that governors use the additional low-cost spending power given by federal transfers to feed clientelistic networks, increase public employment and direct subsidies to constituencies, thus enhancing their chances to remain in office. PB Asociación Española de Ciencia Regional (AECR) SN 2340-2717 YR 2022 FD 2022 LK http://hdl.handle.net/10017/51966 UL http://hdl.handle.net/10017/51966 LA eng DS MINDS@UW RD 28-mar-2024