

A "NEW BREEZE" OR THE WINDS OF OLD? THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION

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On Friday, January 20, 1989, the new President of the United States, George Herbert Walker Bush, acknowledged in his inaugural address that he was assuming office in unusually favorable historical circumstances. "I come before you and assume the presidency at a moment filled with promise," he said. "We live in a peaceful, prosperous time, but we can make it better. For a new breeze is blowing, and a world refreshed by freedom seems reborn; for in man's heart, if not in fact, the day of the dictator is over. The totalitarian era is passing, its old ideas blown away like leaves from an ancient, lifeless tree."¹

President Bush was able to declare, as neither Dwight Eisenhower at an earlier time of "peace" and "prosperity" nor his own immediate predecessor, Ronald Reagan, could have done when assuming office, that the long ideological struggle waged by the United States for "freedom" against tyranny was nearing its end. Going even further, a newly appointed State Department planning officer, Francis Fukuyama, suggested that "The End of History" (with history regarded as a Hegelian dialectical process) had arrived. As Fukuyama grandly speculated, with a sense of triumph but also a tinge of regret: "What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government."²

Neither on the political right nor on the political left, neither in defeated fascism nor in failing communism, does the Bush administration perceive a serious rival, at least in the realm of ideas. As the President observed on January 20, in words that merit quotation:

Great nations of the world are moving toward democracy--through the door to freedom. Men and women of the world move toward free markets--through the door to prosperity. The people of the world agitate for free expression and free thought--through the door to the moral and intellectual satisfactions that only liberty allows.

We know what works. Freedom works. We know what's right. Freedom is right. We know how to secure a more just and prosperous life for man on Earth--through free markets, free speech, free elections, and the exercise of free will, unhampered by the state.

For the first time in this century--for the first time in perhaps all history--man does not have to invent a system by which to live. We don't have to talk late into the night about which form of government is better. We don't have to wrest justice from the kings; we only have to summon it from within ourselves.

These propositions reflect traditional prejudices of Americans. They reveal the anti-mercantilist and anti-monarchist impulses of their own colonial days within the British Empire. They also indicate the influence of subsequent American political concepts, including Woodrow Wilson's idea of national self-determination, Franklin

Roosevelt's humanitarian Four Freedoms, and Ronald Reagan's views regarding deregulation and privatization. President Bush's philosophical summary of recent events meaningfully can be read, in fact, as a recapitulation of the American national experience. Although ostensibly a description of actual progress in history, his interpretation also has the abstract quality of a list of eternal verities, of enduringly "self-evident" truths as Thomas Jefferson called them in the Declaration of Independence. In Bush's statement, the specific lessons of America's past are presented as general instructions for mankind's future.³

This idea that the universalization of liberal democracy and economy is a final historical achievement and, moreover, the ultimate validation of American principles of government is doubly dangerous. First, there is the risk that its dogmatic quality ("We know what works. . . . We know what's right.") will preclude creative thought, by Americans and also by others, in response to entirely new problems now confronting the planet. Policies that have proved relatively successful in the United States, and in certain other advanced societies of the West and also the fringes of Asia, may not be applicable to the most urgent needs of other groups of nations. These include the countries now emerging from a disintegrating Soviet empire--with a strong desire for Western freedoms but also with a strong socialist ethos--and many countries of the Third World currently struggling with problems of underdevelopment and external indebtedness.⁴ Such countries, especially in the short run, may not be responsive to the panacea of American market democracy.

A second, related risk involved in the Bush administration's faith in universal democratization and marketization arises from its faulty concept of historical causation. It attributes far too large a role to the mere philosophical acceptance by other societies of the superiority

of free speech and free enterprise. The American public can be led to assume, too easily, that betterment of the world must occur more or less automatically--without the involvement of the state and, in particular, without American government involvement. The implication of such thinking is that help from the outside is not only unnecessary but also undesirable. The argument goes: it might detract from the recipients' self-reliance; it might prove materially too costly; and it might be viewed by third parties (i.e., the Soviet Union) as provocative. It would be a mistake, from this perspective, to try to "rush history along."⁵ Events should be allowed to take their course.

II

Such an outlook--emphasizing American ideals rather than American power--precludes an accurate assessment of the actual strength of the United States in international relations. The problem of America's "world power" is a serious and a longstanding one. Because it suggests a possible explanation of the reluctance of President Bush in his inaugural speech to promise bold action--as John F. Kennedy, for instance, had pledged to "pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty"--this question of America's international strength deserves a brief opening comment.⁶

If overestimated in certain times past, as in the "Pax Americana" period after World War II, America's national strength today seems more often to be underestimated. The United States is said to be in historical "decline," owing in part to a phenomenon that the British historian Paul Kennedy calls "imperial overstretch."⁷ This comparative-historical assertion has deepened the concern of many

Americans, probably including some members of the Bush administration, about the capacity of the United States practically to meet its obligations--in Walter Lippmann's classic term, to maintain "solvency" between national resources and national policy.⁸ In a "post-historical" age, when the glory of ideological victory fades, many other, more concrete, and perhaps more intractable problems--e.g., commercial, technological, and environmental concerns--will become visible and require solution by the United States. The material base of American competence, it is feared, no longer will be adequate to the task.

This sense of America's historical descent from "world leadership" has been sharpened in recent years by the implicit claims of Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany, in particular, for "equal partnership" with the United States in certain international areas. That is to say, "decline" is felt not only in relation to objective global problems but also in relation to other nations, viewed as "rivals" even though they are political allies. The fact that it is two countries that the United States helped to vanquish in World War II that are mounting the challenge compounds the American psychological problem of adjusting to a less predominant world role.

The present tendency in the United States to sentimentalize the experience of "The Good War," during which issues were defined and enemies were known, is related to the "declinist" pathology.⁹ The fact that President Bush himself as a U.S. Navy torpedo-bomber pilot fought in World War II--probably to be the last U.S. President to be a veteran of that conflict--is an important factor in his own makeup. It also is an element in the electoral support he has received. The "youngest aviator in the Navy when I got my wings," he pointed out in his campaign autobiography, Looking Forward, he earned the Distinguished Flying Cross after his airplane was shot down

in a mission against the Japanese-held island of Chichi Jima. He was the only member of his crew to survive.¹⁰

Bush's own recollection of the Second World War, in contrast with the prevailing nostalgia, is distinctly sober in tone. "There has been time for healing," he has reflected. "The West Germans and Japanese are two of our most important allies, even though sometimes we are passionate economic rivals." All wars are "terrible," in his view. "I know what it was like to be a 21-year-old kid out there in the middle of the Pacific Ocean, disoriented, nauseous, agonizing over the deaths of my closest friends, and terrorized by the thought of imminent capture," he remembers. "To some people war may appear glamorous and romantic in the history books, and it is tragic that each generation usually experiences several wars until it has had its fill of them. I suppose that's why I feel so strongly about maintaining a powerful defense--so that this country never has to go to war again."¹¹

How can an American "powerful defense"--capable not merely of resisting possible acts of aggression but of overawing any conceivable aggressor--today be afforded and maintained? And, to be sure, why is it necessary to have such a defense if the dominant force in present-day international affairs is American idealism--the country's espousal of liberal democratic and economic principles? President Bush has been criticized for a lack of "vision."¹² No less important in explaining the seeming vacuity of his early foreign-policy statements, it might be speculated, is a confusion about the state of American power in the world. This factor may be a key to the future development of U.S. international policy under his leadership. Unless a realistic sense of "powerfulness" can be generated, partly from a recovery of America's own internal dynamism and also partly from much greater synergisms of international cooperation with Japan and with the countries of Western

Europe, particularly the F.R.G., President Bush may fail to realize the full potential of the challenging opportunities that greeted him on Inauguration Day.

To restate the point succinctly, there was a temptation at the beginning of the new U.S. administration in January 1989, which President Bush's ideological interpretation of recent international events did little to inhibit, to treat such positive signs as democratic-reform efforts and free-market experiments in the "totalitarian" world as a consequence and a confirmation of the American example. The ideological conversion of the world, by dint of America's own past success and good fortune, was conceived as being almost a self-executing task--a product of others' deciding to share the American faith, rather than of the U.S. government's own action upon it.

III

George Bush was not, of course, complacent. Inactivity was contrary to his energetic nature. "America is never wholly herself unless she is engaged in high moral principle," he declared in his inaugural address. "We as a people have such a purpose today. It is to make kinder the face of the nation and gentler the face of the world. My friends, we have work to do."

He specifically identified various domestic problems--the homeless, teenage mothers, neglected children, drug addicts--that urgently needed addressing. By citing these internal concerns, President Bush tacitly acknowledged that attention to America's own social-welfare agenda was long overdue. "We will make the hard choices, looking at what we have and perhaps allocating it differently," he said, hoping for some assistance from the American spirit of voluntarism ("a thousand points of light"). Stubbornly

refusing to recommend new taxes, he could gain the needed funds only by reducing other government expenses. That he recognized the importance of solvency (in Lippmann's sense) as the basis of the U.S. government's credibility abroad is evident. "We must bring the Federal budget into balance. We must ensure that America stands before the world united--strong, at peace, and fiscally sound."

Partly for this reason, the passages of the Bush inaugural speech dealing with international affairs were not as concrete as those concerning domestic affairs. Beyond a general commitment to maintain "unity" and "strength" in facing the world, he said comparatively little that had actual programmatic content. The first foreign-related subject he mentioned was the problem of U.S. citizens "held against their will"--the hostages--and U.S. citizens "unaccounted for"--the missing in action--in foreign lands. He did not conceal his feeling of helplessness in dealing with these matters, inviting others' intercession. "Assistance can be shown here and will be long remembered. Good will begets good will. Good faith can be a spiral that endlessly moves on."

The dominant tone of his address was in fact conciliatory. Invoking a figurative "statute of limitations," he declared an end to the American internal division over the Vietnam War, wishing for a restoration of the bipartisan foreign-policy consensus that had made possible the Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan, and North Atlantic Treaty. "The final lesson of Vietnam is that no great nation can long afford to be sundered by a memory," he stated. "A new breeze is blowing, and the old bipartisanship must be made new again."

In "the age of the offered hand," as he termed it, external adversaries, too, would be offered reconciliation. While eterned to "stay strong to protect the peace," Bush made it clear, as he consistently had done during his

campaign, that the country would negotiate from strength--but still negotiate. "The 'offered hand' is a reluctant fist," he said. "While keeping our alliances and friendships around the world strong--ever strong--we will continue the new closeness with the Soviet Union, consistent both with our security and with progress." He frankly admitted that there was risk involved in this: "One might say that our new relationship in part reflects the triumph of hope and strength over experience."

Which tendency, one might ask, will predominate in the Bush administration foreign policy: expectation or experience? Will that policy prove to be a fresh, "new breeze" of reconciliation at home and abroad, premised on the President's evident wish to let bygones be bygones and proceed to practical solutions and political cooperation? Or will it continue the stale, older winds of policy--laissez-faire economic theory, negotiation-from-strength diplomacy, and Cold War political morality? In short, what actually will be done with the "moment rich with promise" that the forty-first U.S. President recognized in January 1989 was his to grasp?

A comprehensive answer depends, first of all, on a careful assessment of the world situation that the Bush administration confronted. Second, it requires a close examination of what he and his colleagues indicated they wish to accomplish during their four (possibly eight) years in office. Third, it involves an evaluation of what, at this writing (in November 1989), the Bush administration actually has accomplished in trying to conform the world to its outlook. In the passages that follow, I shall address these issues before returning to the initial question of the primary character of the Bush administration foreign policy: Is it fundamentally forward-looking or is it backward looking--brisk with modernity or befogged in tradition?

IV

International conditions when George Bush took office did in fact seem more propitious for U.S. diplomatic success than in any recent period--certainly since the Vietnam War and perhaps even since the Second World War. The most noteworthy positive development was, of course, the distinct improvement of Western relations with the Soviet Union and People's Republic China--the former undergoing glasnost and perestroika and the latter moving toward a more market-oriented society. The easy assumption at the time was that the Soviet Union's political "openness" would result, inevitably, in deeper economic restructuring, and that China's economic experiments would lead, ineluctably, to a more democratic political system. The two countries' reform programs would, so to speak, cross-stimulate and thus work to complete each other.

This first positive circumstance--the improvement of East-West relations--was most strikingly evident in the field of arms control. The December 1987 agreement providing for the total removal of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) from Europe, with its unprecedented measures for on-site verification, seemed to foreshadow even more significant reductions in conventional forces and also nuclear weapons, both short-range and long-range. Many observers thought that the United States and Soviet Union might even achieve the utopian goal--initially floated by Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev at the October 1986 Reykjavik Summit--of cutting in half, and later wholly eliminating, the two countries' strategic-weapons arsenals. That idea no longer seemed fanciful, even though some officials frankly did not want to envision it.¹³ For the first time since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it seemed nonetheless, mankind could see beyond the Nuclear Age, in which peace had depended partly on a

nuclear "balance of terror."

The second favorable world development was the nearly simultaneous conclusion of cease-fire accords and disengagement agreements in regional wars--in Southwest Asia, in southern Africa, and in Central America. Peace, it then seemed, was breaking out all over. These arrangements, if faithfully adhered and fully implemented, promised to remove from the international agenda issues of regional violence that had exacerbated world politics for more than a decade. The successful negotiations--specifically those concerning Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq, Namibia and Angola, and Nicaragua--were not the only efforts being made. The fighting in Kampuchea, too, was under active international deliberation. So also was Ethiopia, Sudan, and Western Sahara. The "peace epidemic" of the time, as Stanley Hoffmann of Harvard University commented, showed that the international system was placing "sharp limits" on the usefulness of military force.¹⁴

Closely associated with these regional discussions, both as a partial cause and as a partial effect of them, was the benign presence of the United Nations. For decades in eclipse, that organization in 1988 was awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace in recognition of its peacekeeping functions over the years. Moreover, with the United States, Soviet Union, and People's Republic of China--all permanent members of the UN Security Council--no longer at odds internationally, the UN suddenly seemed capable of being a place to do business. Its organizational efficiency was considerably improved. "Over the past several years, due in large part to congressional initiative," said a State Department official before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "there has been some real progress throughout the UN system to reform both UN management and budget processes."¹⁵

The third noteworthy positive international trend at

the beginning of the Bush administration was the rapid progress--much faster than had been expected--of the European Community (EC) toward its long-standing goal of a single unified market by approximately its target date of 1992. The economic integration of Europe--including, ideally, Eastern Europe--had been a "cornerstone" of U.S. foreign policy since the time of the Marshall Plan. An "open and vibrant Europe," pointed out a U.S. official commentary, "reinforces the common bond of democracy, strengthens the Atlantic alliance, and can be a powerful engine for economic growth."¹⁶ Moreover, it might have been added, an economically consolidated Europe would be a peaceful Europe. With a new common identity, it no longer would be riven by rival national identities.

An especially promising aspect of this new European construction, from the American perspective, was the ostensibly outward- rather than inward-looking expansionary emphasis of the EC's development. Europe's "economic space" progressively widened in 1981 with the admission to the Community of Greece and, in 1986, with the entry of Spain and Portugal. The inclusion of Spain, in particular, was heartening to the United States. The Spanish economy, in which many American firms had invested heavily owing to Spain's relatively low labor costs, was seen as a bridge to the rest of the continental market. By expanding and upgrading production facilities in Spain, U.S. companies hoped thereby to "conquer Europe."¹⁷

A somewhat comparable regional economic development, also viewed by President Bush and his colleagues warmly, was the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement (FTA). This came into effect just as they took office, and the President's symbolic first foreign trip, appropriately, was to Canada. The amount of trade in goods and services exchanged between the two North American countries during the previous year was \$154

billion, making their bilateral relationship already the largest such two-way trade flow in the world. All remaining tariffs would be phased out by the end of the century. Certain elements of the FTA, particularly its provisions concerning services and investment, could serve as models for wider international agreements. So too, it was thought, could the accord's novel comprehensive dispute-settlement mechanism.¹⁸

Washington and Ottawa hoped that their achievement, though only a bilateral pact, would have a strong exemplary effect on the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which was progressing slowly and with difficulty. "The accord provides a powerful signal against protectionism and for trade liberalization," as the official Canadian commentary on the FTA asserted. "It reflects the commitment of both governments to liberalize trade on a global basis through multilateral negotiations under the GATT." A New York Times advertisement stated the point concisely: the U.S.-Canada agreement is "clear evidence that the trade liberalization movement is still alive."¹⁹

V

There were, of course, difficulties and constraints in each of these three positive international developments--in the East-West military, regional-political, and commercial-economic spheres, respectively. Some of these problems briefly should be noted, lest the statesmanly task facing the Bush administration in 1989 be made to seem excessively simple or easy. A realistic standard by which to judge its historical success or failure is needed.

The field of arms control has its own complications. A continuing problem with the arms talks under way in

Vienna and Geneva, warned Henry Kissinger, is that vital considerations of East-West security might be reduced to mere technical discussion and become stalemated at that lower conceptual level. To place the emphasis on "pure arms control," he went so far as to say, "gets us off the subject." To deal with the problem of conventional-arms control narrowly within the NATO-Warsaw Pact context risks turning the whole matter into "a numbers game that will feed on itself." Instead, he proposed, the United States and the Soviet Union should envision an arrangement between themselves that "separates the security issues from the political issues." If, for example, the governments of Eastern Europe were to accept clearly defined limits on their military capabilities, somewhat as Finland had done, they might more easily gain from the Soviet Union more room--if limited room--for the exercise of political freedoms.²⁰

Given the widespread suspicion within the United States, especially among political conservatives, of the very idea of an agreement with Moscow that would impose restrictions of any kind on Eastern European countries, Kissinger's making this proposal ("Yalta II," critics called it) was somewhat hard to understand. "Finlandization" then seemed to many Americans to be tantamount to one-sided appeasement. Not surprisingly, such a strategy--trading acknowledgement of Soviet military power in Eastern Europe for the prospect of political pluralism there--was difficult for the Bush administration to accept. In any case, it was not at all obvious that it had to consider such a plan. "It seeks from the men in the Kremlin something they are already willing to grant--latitude for diversity and liberalization in the 'fraternal' countries of Eastern Europe," critically observed Strobe Talbott in Time magazine. "And it offers in return assurances that have little to do with the Soviets' real fears--political deterioration inside the bloc, not a military threat from outside."²¹ The "Yalta II" question

would continue, however, to haunt East-West discussions of security in Eastern Europe.

The making of regional peace in the Third World also was full of pitfalls. Each of the various areas afflicted by violence, most of them non-Western and not well known to most Americans, were deeply endemic and not readily amenable to outside influence. To move from short-term diplomatic accords to long-term political solutions surely would prove difficult, requiring the imagination, knowledge, and, not least, continuous attention of the finest political minds. It was not at all certain that, in Washington or anywhere else, such world-class statesmanship was available.

Even within the Western Hemisphere--the traditional domain of the Monroe Doctrine--the United States government found itself unable to fix peace. The U.S. government's failed efforts to remove General Manuel Antonio Noriega and restore tranquility to Panama--and thus secure the canal--is a case in point. President Bush's reluctance to use large-scale force during the Panamanian officers' coup attempt early in October probably reflects not so much personal indecisiveness on his part as it does his realistic appreciation of the likelihood that the U.S. government could not easily manage the situation in Panama if its dictator were removed.²²

There are difficult problems as well that arise from the construction of regional trading entities, not only the European Community and the U.S.-Canadian free-trade partnership but also the emerging East Asian/Pacific economic formation led by Japan. Mutual suspicions between such apparent commercial "blocs" could degenerate into bitter, debilitating interregional conflict. The altercation early in 1989 between the United States and the EC over hormone-treated beef--a European import ban, U.S. retaliation by doubling import duties on European cheese and other food products, and a subsequent European

Community threat of "countermeasures"--illustrates the vicious cycle of charge and countercharge that can develop. A later controversy over an EC "Television Without Frontiers" directive, suggesting that more than fifty percent of the programs shown in Europe be European-made, is but another example.²³ The image of "Fortress Europe" remains a vivid one in Americans' minds. Equally convinced is the belief of Europeans in American "protectionism." Both Americans and Europeans now are persuaded of the Japanese reliance on "structural" import restrictions.

The possible "regionalizing" tendency of the world economy could make the process of multilateral trade negotiations within the GATT much more difficult. In effect, bloc-to-bloc bargaining might be needed, with the participants insisting hard on "reciprocal treatment" and "comparable effective market access." A particular concern of U.S. officials at present is that in the Uruguay Round the European Community might try to claim "credit" for the liberalizing effects of its internal market unification. The refusal by the U.S. government of such "credit" might be used to justify EC penalties. In other words, the U.S. government fears that Europe's 1992 market plan might be used to gain negotiating leverage, simply to accumulate bargaining chips. From Washington's perspective, the United States "paid" once in negotiating with Europe when the EC first was established, and should not have to do so again.²⁴ Such clashes of attitude seriously could impede further movement toward a broad global trading system.

VI

The possible deadlocks that are developing in each of these three areas--arms control, regional settlements, and trade negotiations--are not wholly unrelated to one another.

The reductions now occurring in the levels of the two superpowers' military forces, it has been argued, almost promote political and economic demands by other countries that have been oppressed by the disciplines of the postwar world order--that is, the Cold War. The Bush administration thus is confronted with a manifold challenge.

A major abatement of "the Soviet threat," the argument goes, tends to produce an increase in international difficulties of other kinds. This argument is stated with particular clarity by the strategist Edward N. Luttwak. In a New York Times article, "The Alliance, Without an Enemy," Luttwak postulates: "Americans, Europeans and Japanese are natural competitors. But in the past, none of their commercial and financial rivalries could become political rivalries because of the looming presence of a threatening Soviet Union. Strategic cooperation in the face of the common threat always had absolute priority." In the current period, however, with the Gorbachev regime upon reducing perceptions of the Soviet menace, the Western harmony that "was once virtually automatic can no longer be taken for granted." Free governments cannot now rely on the "imperative of alliance solidarity," either to maintain their military and political unity or, more pertinently, to keep disputes about other matters, such as trade, in perspective and under control.

Luttwak notes a phenomenon within the American-European-Japanese Alliance, or security-based relationship, that he terms "economic brinkmanship." This practice has become very rewarding for some of its members in advancing their claims. The pattern of behavior, briefly, is this: "The greater the outcry, the more extreme the demands, the sooner would the imperative of alliance solidarity assert itself to insure that the loudest complainers were paid off." The Alliance, at least hitherto, had constituted a "strategic safety net" preventing the parties to

it from falling into a debilitating retaliatory cycle, such as the controversy over beef exports. "The beef-and-hormones dispute with Western Europe, with its abrupt diktats and open-ended threats, is a reminder of how close we are to the edge of the abyss," Luttwak writes, adding rather apocalyptically: "It is worth recalling that during the 1920's--the last 'threatless' era--commercial competition quickly deteriorated into economic warfare."

More than the coherence of the American-European-Japanese Alliance is alleged to be at stake. The regularity and predictability of international affairs generally is jeopardized. "If the Soviet Union were now to adopt the normal conduct of a great power, subject to normal inhibitions, world politics would drastically change. That, of course, has yet to happen," Luttwak acknowledges.²⁵ But the unmistakable lesson of previous history, as he reads it, is that it well could.

If this line of reasoning is correct, there is cause to be very anxious about the consequences of the apparent American "victory" in the Cold War. If a "threatless" world also will be a structureless world, then the international challenge facing the Bush administration may be far deeper than most commentators have appreciated. The danger, however, is exaggerated.

Contrary to the gloomy prognostication of Luttwak, my own expectation is that, following a period of initial confusion in the NATO and U.S.-Japanese-security-treaty relationships, the basic structural features of the current free-world order will be maintained, and possibly even strengthened--whatever the kind or degree of reduction in the external Soviet threat. Such an interpretation of events rests on a more complex conception of the historical origins of present-day transatlantic and transpacific systems than Luttwak provides.

It simply is a misreading of history to attribute the

North Atlantic Alliance in particular--which, after all, was negotiated within four years of the close of the Second World War in which Germany was the main adversary--almost exclusively to the ideological and military challenge posed by the Soviet Union. For the French people especially, concern about Germany was hardly less grave. The 1947 Treaty of Dunkirk and the 1948 Brussels Pact--precursors of the North Atlantic Treaty--both explicitly mentioned Germany as the adversary, and did not name the Soviet Union. The Soviet threat, undoubtedly, was a necessary condition of the formation of NATO, but it was not, by itself, a sufficient condition of it. The German and Soviet dangers were in many Western minds in fact intermingled: it was the fear of Soviet control of and in Germany, exploiting its resources and enlisting its manpower, that gave the French and other Western Europeans, and also many Americans, their nightmares. The root cause of the formation of NATO was a systemic, generic one: a pervasive feeling within the West of a need for a durable security arrangement for combining the western part of Europe with the reserve-force area of North America. This would be a strong and wide enough framework to preclude another breakdown, for the third time in the century, of the political order "balance of power" of Europe.²⁶ The same basic motivation remains the foundation of NATO today, and it is sound.

If it be feared that the smiles of Mikhail Gorbachev toward Western Europeans might result in their joining a "common European home" from the Urals to the Atlantic, it also should be kept in mind that a no less commodious Atlantic home, built by the Western wartime allies on the basis of their vital transoceanic experiences, has been in place for more than forty years.²⁷ The "Atlantic Community" ideal is a political concept that has a historical, and even a geographical, legitimacy fully comparable to that of the

Soviet "European" vision.²⁸ Where free human exchanges are possible, it makes little difference whether the medium is maritime or territorial.

Spain, though the newest member of the NATO community itself, has perhaps the oldest national appreciation of the importance of Europe's sea-borne connection to the New World. Great Britain, another onetime seat of an overseas empire, has a similar continuing awareness--not limited to the "special relationship" with the United States--of Europe's westward-facing maritime reliances. This "Occidental" habit of thought has remained strong, even when "crises" in Atlantic Alliance politics occur, such as the 1956 Suez débâcle and the 1966 French withdrawal from NATO's military structure. The more recent controversy over the basing of seventy-two U.S. F-16 fighters at Torrejón was a difficulty which the Alliance, proving itself resilient, was able to absorb with considerable smoothness, even if not without additional fiscal expense. As Charles Krauthammer remarked soon afterward in Time, "The Western alliance is stronger than ever. Europe is embarked on full economic integration. NATO, whose imminent demise is annually declared by critics, has shown remarkable cohesiveness, withstanding with nary a blink the planned removal of an American air wing from Spain and its relocation in Italy."²⁹

Other, more recent intra-Alliance tensions, such as that arising from the Federal Republic of Germany's request for early East-West negotiations to eliminate short-range nuclear weapons from German territory, have been managed most impressively as well.³⁰ Even the issue of German reunification, revived because of current rapid changes in East Germany, so far has not upset NATO. The F.R.G.'s Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, voluntarily has made clear: "The Federal Republic of Germany will remain irrevocably anchored in a strong and lasting relationship

with the Atlantic alliance and in the community of values of the free peoples of the West."³¹ Cooperation still predominates over competition within the North Atlantic Alliance, despite the prospect of a continued abatement of Soviet military pressure from the outside.

VII

In the midst of the above contrary trends and contradictory analyses, what has been the position of the United States government? A fact too readily overlooked in the excitement of a new administration is that American foreign policy, even before George Bush and his colleagues entered office, already had been adjusted to fit many of the complex realities noted above, and some others besides. In the field of foreign policy at least, the second Reagan term was not a "lame duck" presidential period. Even though their doing so meant overturning some of their own doctrinaire positions assumed earlier in the 1980s, President Reagan together with Secretary of State George Shultz by January 1989 had in many ways altered the very terms of debate over American foreign policy.

Their "helpful gifts" to the new Bush administration included first and foremost the improved American relationship with the Soviet Union, a country President Reagan earlier had denounced as the "evil empire." The INF arms-control agreement and the May 1988 Reagan summit trip to Moscow put his strong seal of approval on another period of Soviet-American good feelings--"Détente II," it has been called. These actions inevitably put a certain pressure on President Bush to follow in his predecessor's outsized footsteps. As Senator John McCain, an Arizona Republican, commented, Bush inherits "some very high expectations for progress on arms-control issues." Jack

Beatty, writing in The Atlantic Monthly, observed that "Reagan imparted a political momentum to progress on nuclear-arms reduction that, if Bush moves to exploit it, could yield a high-profile political victory early in his term, perhaps even by the end of the year." There was even talk of a Nobel Peace Prize.³²

Secretary Shultz's own "gifts" to his successor, James Baker, widened the range of options for President Bush's close friend and campaign manager, also a former White House chief of staff and a Treasury Secretary. Baker generally was perceived as a man of a very pragmatic turn of mind, a dealmaker--not unprincipled but ready to conclude workable agreements that met domestic political criteria as well as good-policy standards. He plainly intended to be the President's man in the State Department, rather than the State Department's representative to the President. Preferring to work with a small "inner circle" of loyal aides, he would not be likely to become a captive of bureaucratic tradition.³³

One of Shultz's helpful moves was at last to approve the scheduling of a session of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Moscow for 1991. This issue had delayed the conclusion of the current CSCE session in Vienna and, as a consequence, the beginning of CSCE-sponsored talks on conventional military force reductions in Europe--a new and wider international forum for negotiations on that critical subject. Shultz took into account Moscow's cessation of radio jamming, its release of some political prisoners, and its partial relaxation of emigration limits. Apparently deciding that he had "squeezed" as much as he could from the Russians on these points, he consented to the 1991 CSCE Moscow meeting. Thereby, he probably allowed Baker to begin conventional-arms negotiations without being encumbered by "linkage" to human-rights questions, and spared the new Secretary and

his team some right-wing criticism.

Other particular matters that Shultz thoughtfully adjusted in his final weeks in office concerned the Near East, southern Africa, and Libya. Specifically, he permitted the start of a U.S. political dialogue with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). He drew to a close Assistant Secretary Chester Crocker's eight-year diplomatic mediation of the interrelated Angola and Namibia problems. Perhaps most interestingly, he amended U.S. economic sanctions against the Qaddafi regime so as to allow American oil companies to operate their concessions in Libya through third-country subsidiaries. "George Shultz has never liked economic sanctions," as one U.S. official explained. "He felt this was a mess he helped create, and he wanted to clean it up before he left."³⁴

VIII

Thus given a partial clean slate, what will the Bush administration ultimately decide--and be able--to write on it? What is likely to be George Bush's own distinctive contribution to American foreign policy and to the larger history of the world? The indications were much less clear during the early months of the new administration than might have been expected, given the fact that Bush had been Vice President in the preceding administration and that there was continuity of Republican party control over the executive branch. There was no definitive "hundred days," a quick succession of decisive actions establishing a pattern for future policy.³⁵

The uncertainty regarding the direction of Bush's foreign policy was to some extent a result of difficulties encountered in the appointment of certain key officials, especially a Secretary of Defense. Following the politically

embarrassing defeat in the Senate of the President's first nominee, former Senator John Tower of Texas, the less personally controversial Richard Cheney, a Wyoming Congressman and a former White House chief of staff under President Gerald Ford, was designated. Owing in part to Cheney's position as the second-ranking figure in the Republican leadership in the House, his confirmation was almost a foregone conclusion, and he was duly installed. Cheney's views, although generally conservative, were not well known. It was evident that he would have to spend much time dealing with the Pentagon's mounting budgetary and management problems.³⁶

The appointment to the position of National Security Adviser of Brent Scowcroft, a former U.S. Air Force Lieutenant General who previously had served in that role in the Ford administration, provided somewhat clearer signals. During the early Reagan administration, General Scowcroft had chaired the "Scowcroft Commission," which had recommended placement of the new multi-warhead MX missile in Minuteman silos and had provided a rationale that theoretically closed the question of a "window of vulnerability." He also had been a member of the three-man "Tower Commission" (chaired by John Tower) which had looked into the Iran-Contra affair and the integrity of the NSC machinery.³⁷

Another significant second-level appointment was that of Lawrence S. Eagleburger, a retired senior career diplomat, to be Deputy Secretary of State. A former U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia, he was especially familiar with European affairs. Eagleburger ventured the early prognostication that "West-West" relations would be the biggest problem facing the Bush administration. He evidently feared a new spirit of divisiveness within the Alliance over relations with the Soviet Union. "East-West" and "North-South" relations could be managed if relations with allies could. His own

skepticism regarding the motivation behind Gorbachev's reforms was evident: "The only purpose that explains his policy is to create a stronger, more efficient Soviet Union."³⁸

The fact that both Scowcroft and Eagleburger lately had been close working colleagues of Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, as fellow executives in the consulting firm of Kissinger Associates, suggested a Kissingerian, or heavily "geopolitical," influence over the Bush administration's foreign policy. It further raised the intriguing question of the return to official life in Washington of Dr. Kissinger himself. Past personal relations between Bush and Kissinger, combining with the new President's determination to conduct his own foreign policy free of burdensome historical associations with the Vietnam war and "Détente I," made such a prospect unlikely--although it cannot be ruled out.³⁹

Given President Bush's own strong interest in international affairs, the best indication of the inclinations of the new administration in foreign policy may be the previous international experiences of George Bush himself--for the most part in diplomacy, rather than in policy-making. He had the career background to be America's first modern "diplomat President." There probably has been no U.S. President, since the early days of the republic when having served as Secretary of State was considered a major qualification for the Presidency, who was more knowledgeable about international matters and, hardly less important, more familiar with the leading persons around the world who dealt with them.⁴⁰ Bush stands, in this regard, in complete contrast to his immediate presidential predecessors, Ronald Reagan and also Jimmy Carter, whose previous political experience had been at the state level.

Bush's most distinctive earlier foreign experience was his tour of duty, in 1974 and 1975, as head of the U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing, established following the historic

trip to China of President Richard Nixon in 1972. President Carter's formal recognition of the People's Republic of China in 1979 raised the office to embassy status. Bush had requested the Beijing post, in preference to more visible and prestigious diplomatic assignments in Europe, for example. While in China he had tried to be "an active liaison officer," as he later described his image of his role. Kissinger, then Secretary of State and very protective of his own relationship with the P.R.C., "didn't think much" of Bush's gregarious approach, as Bush recalled. Kissinger once told him: "It doesn't matter whether they like you or not." Bush "disagreed." As he explained: "My purpose wasn't to win popularity contests in Beijing but to get to know the Chinese--and to get them to know Americans--at a personal level."⁴¹ The statement epitomizes the Bush approach to international relations, in general.

The occasion of the state funeral of Japan's Emperor, Hirohito, in February 1989 gave the President an early opportunity, by extending his Japan visit to China and also to South Korea, to renew old ties in Asia. His trip and his remarks there, though not highly planned, suggested in fact the beginnings of a U.S. effort to encourage a stronger and wider sense of Pacific community, as well as to consolidate the U.S. relationship with Japan. More traditional elements of American policy toward the region also were evident. The United States, as Bush pointedly declared during a stopover in Alaska on the way out, "is as much a Pacific nation as it is an Atlantic one." Moreover, as his visit would show, it intended "to stay a Pacific power."⁴²

Bush's emphasis nonetheless appeared to be not on the military aspects of America's Pacific policy but, rather, on its economic, ideological, and political facets. Northeast Asia as a whole then was undergoing important common developments--a process of marketization and democratization--that facilitated his traveling from Tokyo to

Beijing and Seoul on the same journey, despite the philosophical contradictions he encountered. "Of course, differences remain and work is yet to be done, opening foreign markets to U.S. competition, continuing to encourage the growth of democracy and human rights, strengthening our alliances," he reported when he returned. "But common ground was found." There had been "important symbols" on the trip, he said, probably referring to the transcendence of his own and other Americans' World War II-related anti-Japanese memories. He had come home "pleased with the progress made toward mutually beneficial relationships with our allies and friends."⁴³ The word "mutually" here is worthy of note. The Bush trip indicated the possibility of future coordination, even integration, of America's transpacific relationships (both "alliances" and "friendships"). Hitherto mostly bilateral, these perhaps somehow could be fitted together multilaterally.⁴⁴

President Bush's former service as U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, between 1971 and 1973, also furnished a clue to possible future directions of American policy. Bush's experience in international-organization diplomacy is almost unique among American politicians at the highest level, particularly among veterans of the generally "unilateralist" Reagan administration. It must be acknowledged that Bush, although an early believer in the UN, had been somewhat disillusioned by his experience there. He deplored its members' habit of "bloc" voting and also their indulgence in anti-American rhetoric. His worst memory was his defeat in a valiant, maybe quixotic effort on behalf of the "Dual Representation" of both the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the People's Republic of China in the organization. The majority of the United Nations' members would allow only the P.R.C. to belong.⁴⁵

"Like most Americans who had idealistic hopes for

the United Nations when it was created in 1945, I'd undergone a sea change in attitude by the early 1970s," he later stated. "As 'the last best hope for peace' the UN was another light that failed." However, despite his sense that it was "largely ineffective--and sometimes counterproductive--in the political area," Bush ended up his tour at the UN being more a defender than a detractor of the institution. "What many Americans find hard to accept is that even if it doesn't live up to its original expectations, the UN still serves a valuable purpose," he remarked. He cited in particular its valuable peacekeeping activities as well as its worthy efforts in science, medicine, agriculture, space technology, and support for refugees and the hungry. These were areas where "ideological differences can be held to a minimum."⁴⁶

It is indicative of President Bush's continuing regard for the UN that his first official dinner guest at the White House following the inauguration was UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar. The Peruvian diplomat and he had worked closely together in New York in the early 1970s. Although more symbolic than substantive, this gesture nonetheless expresses a sensitivity toward the UN community that seemed to promise greater support for it. It now remained for the Bush administration, together with Congress, to make good on the unpaid American debt to the UN, both for its regular budget and for its peacekeeping costs.⁴⁷ President Bush signified his willingness to help.

The United Nations offered the Bush administration a forum for considering a much wider range of issues than had been addressed during the Reagan administration, with its heavier ideological agenda. Edward Luck, president of the United Nations Association of the United States of America, observed of the close relationship between Bush and Pérez de Cuéllar, that "their agendas--regional conflict, chemical weapons, drugs, AIDS, the environment, human

rights, terrorism, and debt--converge in ways that could be mutually advantageous." Moreover: "They need each other, since neither has all the answers. Working with an unusually cooperative Kremlin, they could accomplish a great deal."⁴⁸

No less pertinent, particularly in considering his personal conception of the future U.S. relationship with the Soviet Union, was Bush's period of service (1976-1977) as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. "In the Ford Administration I was Director of the CIA," he recalled, "and I wear that as a badge of honor. That job opened my eyes to the world as it is, not as we might want it to be." It gave a certain temper and technique to his relationship with the Soviet Union. "As the nation's chief intelligence officer, I saw the reality of Soviet intentions, and how they are cloaked by disinformation and propaganda," he stated. "For example, in arms negotiations, the Soviets' overt agenda is to reduce nuclear weapons. We share that goal. But the Soviets' covert agenda, their unstated objective, is twofold: They want to drive a wedge between us and our allies, and they want to weaken the defenses of Western Europe."⁴⁹

Bush's CIA period appears also to have given him a keener sense of "the Soviet threat" as a factor in American domestic politics. The New York Times political writer, R. W. Apple, has pointed out that Bush's service at the CIA during the Ford presidency was the time when the détente policy inherited from the Nixon administration came under attack from those, notably former California Governor Ronald Reagan, who advocated more rearmament against and more confrontation of Moscow. Governor Reagan nearly wrested the Republican presidential nomination from Ford, "an episode that left its mark, to a greater or lesser degree, on all the people in the Ford inner circle," Apple notes.⁵⁰ In the 1980 presidential campaign, Bush, himself for the first time a candidate, was defeated in the primaries by a much

more anti-Soviet Reagan. Even if not actually traumatized by these political events, Bush's CIA-influenced professional cautiousness could only have been reinforced by them.

In part, the Bush administration's hesitancy toward Moscow was a functional consequence of the "policy reviews" of defense programs and arms-control positions, as well as of basic Soviet thinking and behavior, that the President ordered to be undertaken. This laborious process, which seems to have shed very little new light (owing partly to the fact that holdovers from the Reagan administration had to do most of the assignments), caused weeks of delay. Predictably, the lessons learned from this exercise were cautionary, rather than visionary.⁵¹ Bush, having become accustomed to such systematic methods of analysis during his time as CIA Director, may have in fact employed the "policy review" technique as much to impose his discipline on the U.S. federal bureaucracy --to make it his own-- as to try to indoc-trinate it.

Such a constraint could only be temporarily effective. In a speech before a joint session on Congress on February 9, President Bush indicated that decisions soon would be forthcoming regarding U.S. relations with the Soviet Union. "Prudence and common sense dictate that we try to understand the full meaning of the change going on there, review our policies carefully and proceed with caution," he emphasized. "But I have personally assured General Secretary Gorbachev that at the conclusion of such a review, we will be ready to move forward. We will not miss any opportunity to work for peace."

As in his inaugural address, Bush expressed his determination to "negotiate from strength." He would "vigorously pursue" the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). He would "stand firm for self-determination and democracy in Central America, including in Nicaragua." He would "strengthen the alliance of the industrial democracies, as

solid a force for peace as the world has ever known." Referring perhaps to the wrangle with Western European countries over "beef hormones," he advised: "This is an alliance forged by the power of our ideals, not the pettiness of our differences." He said that Secretary Baker shortly would visit Europe for consultations about "the wide range of challenges and opportunities we face together, including East-West relations." He was looking forward later to meeting with "our NATO partners."⁵²

When the policy review at last was completed, President Bush spoke more affirmatively about U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union. This he did early in May in a commencement speech in College Station, Texas. Forty years of perseverance in the policy of "containment," he argued in that address, had obliged the Soviet Union to confront the reality of its own internal contradictions. "Containment worked," he contended.⁵³ The Soviet Union was turning inward, as the craftsmen of that strategy--Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower, Arthur Vandenberg and Sam Rayburn, and George Marshall, Dean Acheson, and George Kennan--had predicted. In consequence: "We are approaching the conclusion of a historic postwar struggle between two visions--one of tyranny and conflict and one of democracy and freedom."

It therefore now was possible, Bush proposed, to move "beyond containment." Rather than just constraining Soviet expansionism, "we seek the integration of the Soviet Union into the community of nations." Such an integration process would have to be carried out, however, reciprocally--step by step. He clearly expected Moscow to have to make the initial moves. These he actually stipulated for Gorbachev: first, greater reduction of Soviet military forces; second, respect for self-determination in Eastern Europe (specific abandonment of the Brezhnev Doctrine and dismantlement of the Iron Curtain); third,

diplomatic collaboration in finding solutions to the world's regional disputes; fourth, political pluralism and respect for human rights within the Soviet Union itself; and, fifth, joint action in addressing global problems, including the international drug menace and dangers to the environment. "As the Soviet Union moves toward greater openness and democratization--as they meet the challenge of responsible international behavior--we will match their steps with steps of our own," Bush promised. "Ultimately, our objective is to welcome the Soviet Union back into the world order."⁵⁴ The strict new Bush posture, whose material difference from the old "containment" stance was not yet really evident, was characterized by skeptical commentators as "containment plus."

IX

President Bush's policy--a curious mixture of triumphalism and incrementalism--has been severely tested by world events. In view of what was occurring internationally, particularly in East Asia and in Eastern Europe, it seemed at once boastful and too modest. That is, it exaggerated the effect of past U.S. policy and it minimized the possible effectiveness of future U.S. policy.

An underlying cause of the puzzling inconsistency between the Bush administration's philosophical temerity and political timidity to date is, as suggested earlier in this essay, the President's lack of confidence regarding the actual power and influence of the United States, allegedly in "decline" and clearly needing economic readjustment. Of immediate concern to the administration was the Gramm-Rudman budget-balancing law.⁵⁵ The President found himself under a legal obligation to cut government costs while at the same time honoring his Inauguration Day

promise of more resources for the nation's social-welfare needs, even while keeping the nation's defenses strong. Obviously, something had to give.

In effect, the Bush administration is reversing the priorities of the Reagan administration. It will have to rob the foreign-affairs budget--notably defense, and possibly foreign aid--in order to pay the cost of renewing the country's domestic programs, which voluntary activities ("a thousand points of light") could only supplement. As a result, the United States probably is considering its "last Cold War defense budget."⁵⁶ In such circumstances, it has been difficult for President Bush and his colleagues even to consider taking bold foreign-policy initiatives, with substance. The U.S. government, having grown dependent on external borrowing to cover its fiscal shortfalls, has become virtually broke. "How can you be a superpower," asked a Swedish economist succinctly, "when you are out of pocket?"⁵⁷

As inhibiting as have been budgetary constraints on President Bush's foreign policy, these probably have restricted its development less than the stunning effect of what today is happening in the world. Although professedly open to the possibility of change, the Bush administration has not anticipated the scope, the depth, and, most of all, the suddenness of recent international occurrences. This is the more obvious reason for the President's hesitation to proffer solutions, which quickly could be overtaken by events. Some of these developments are unwelcome. They shake the very premises of the Bush administration's sanguine outlook.

The first, and most sobering, shock to the Bush policy's master assumption--viz., that of the universalization of Western liberal democracy, as a concomitant of the diffusion of free-market principles--was "Tiananmen Square." The brutal crackdown on gatherings of students in Beijing

and other Chinese cities by a communist government determined to retain total control, even at the risk of significant gains achieved from internal economic reform and through liberalized trade, challenged any easy notion of history as an inevitable, unassisted process of "freedomization." President Bush, seeking "a proper, prudent balance" in his response to the events in China, admitted: "The process of democratization of communist societies will not be a smooth one, and we must react to setbacks in a way which stimulates rather than stifles progress toward open and representative systems."⁵⁸

Thus he approved only limited sanctions, including the suspension of military-equipment exports, and insisted on maintaining an ambassador-level U.S. diplomatic representation in Beijing. He kept up ambassadorial ties partly in order not to seem to abandon the students who bravely had risen in protest. There was a geopolitical purpose, too. He intended to protect the "constructive relationship" that had been built up by the United States and the People's Republic of China over the past two decades.⁵⁹ His decisive handling of this problem reflected his own personal experience in dealing with the Chinese leadership. It also revealed his retrospective sense of having a stake in the existing U.S.-Chinese "relationship," conceived of as a value in itself and as a means of exercising political and economic leverage.

Critics, including some noted China experts, accused him of placing too much emphasis on geostrategic and commercial calculations--both unrealistic at a time of receding Soviet pressures and declining prospects of exploiting the vast China market--and not enough stress on human-rights considerations, from which might emerge the bond that could unite America with a post-revolutionary China.⁶⁰ The fault, once again, was widely thought to be Bush's problem with "the vision thing." It probably was at

least as much, however, America's weakness in dealing with the communist Chinese. In the assessment of one White House official: "The U.S. has no influence over the Chinese government's behavior. Zero. None." A presidential adviser said: "For the Chinese leaders this is a battle to the death and they're not particularly interested in what we think of them."⁶¹

One consequence of the chilling of the U.S.-P.R.C. friendship owing to the Beijing government's acts of totalitarian repression was a heightened sensitivity in the United States, on the popular level as well as the official level, to the U.S. relationship with Japan. "We thought we were on a real roll with China, and look what happened," said one U.S. official. "Now, our 35-year relationship with Japan takes on more importance." Public-opinion poll data indicating that Americans had come to regard "economic competitors like Japan" as constituting a greater threat to U.S. national security than "military adversaries like the Soviet Union" now seemed almost dangerous.⁶² No longer would it be possible to let disputes over trade matters or joint development projects involving high technology, such as a controversial plan to help the Japanese build a new fighter aircraft, the FSX, get out of hand. "In considering FSX," as Deputy Secretary of State Eagleburger said, "we must keep in mind the larger dimensions of our security ties and our overall relationship with Japan."⁶³ After Tiananmen Square, such advice carried weight.

A second challenge to the Bush administration's freedom-oriented, beyond-containment policy was what might be called the summons to multilateralism--to accept the increased need to subordinate national independence of action ("sovereignty") to the disciplines of large-scale international cooperation in managing global-systemic problems. President Bush, speaking to the 44th General Assembly of the United Nations on September 25, himself

has urged the members of that body to go beyond the advancement of "freedom" to confront "the global challenges of the 21st century: economic health, environmental well-being, the great questions of war and peace." More specifically, he commended the Brady plan as a way of reducing the debt burdens of developing nations. He reaffirmed the U.S. government's commitment to phase out production of chlorofluorocarbons by the year 2000 and its intention to amend the U.S. Clean Air Act. He proposed a treaty to ban all chemical weapons within a ten-year period, offering to begin destroying American chemical-weapons stockpiles at once. He placed his emphasis on regional conflicts which, because of a worrisome combination of "old and unappeasable animosities and modern weapons of mass destruction," threatened the peace of the world as a whole as never before. The United States would take "an active role" in settling the regional conflicts, he pledged. The United Nations must go beyond mere "peacekeeping" to actual "peacemaking."⁶⁴

None of these commitments, however, implied a significant cession of political authority to United Nations, or even designated that body as the primary instrument for handling the "global" questions President Bush identified. His specific proposals themselves, too, were far more modest than many proponents of debt forgiveness, chlorofluorocarbon- and carbon-dioxide reduction, and a chemical-weapons production ban, respectively, had been hoping for. The central world question of U.S.-Soviet strategic arms control scarcely was mentioned, apart from an allusion to the fact a U.S.-Soviet summit meeting recently had been scheduled for the spring or summer of 1990. Moreover, despite President Bush's own stated wish, the U.S. Congress had not met, nor did it seem likely fully to meet, the large outstanding U.S. financial obligation to the United Nations organization.⁶⁵ It is not surprising, therefore,

that President Bush's appearance, though warmly welcomed, did not usher in the new era of global management that many believers in that possibility envisioned.

A third, and probably the most serious challenge to President Bush's foreign policy, was the question of how, when, where, and to what extent to respond to the dramatic changes that were occurring within the Soviet sphere, most notably the rise of nationalism and reform movements in the countries of Soviet-controlled Eastern Europe. Although it was possible to attribute these breathtaking developments--the formation of a Solidarity-led government in Poland, the abandonment of the name "Communist" by the ruling party in Hungary, and the East German government's decision to open its border (including the Berlin Wall) with West Germany--simply to the human desire for "freedom," they also indicated the force of more traditional factors, with divisive as well as unifying potential. Far from marking the "end" of history, as Francis Fukuyama hypothesized, the events in Eastern Europe equally could be regarded as signifying the recommencement of history in that long-stagnated region of the world.⁶⁶ Forces were being released there which went well beyond the libertarian wish for "free markets, free speech, free elections, and the exercise of free will unhampered by the state" that President Bush had celebrated in his inaugural address.

That he at least sensed the power of these other urges--nationalist sentiment, class consciousness, religious feeling--was evident in the very restrained language he used when he visited Poland in July. Speaking to the Parliament there, he warned that, "even under the best circumstances," representative government has its own challenges. "It requires patience, tolerance, and give-and-take between political opponents." The material assistance that he offered to Poland--part of the U.S. government's "action plan" for

that country--consisted of a carefully measured \$100 million enterprise fund and a \$15 million environmental grant for the city of Krakow. The rest of his support consisted mainly of promised encouragement of further help from other governments and international institutions.⁶⁷

Subsequently, when Bush arrived in Paris for the seven-power Economic Summit meeting at the time of the celebration of the French Revolution Bicentennial, he made it plain to his colleagues, particularly the EC members, that he regarded them as equal partners in bringing about a "Europe whole and free." Somewhat reluctantly, he deferred to the European Community, with its greater stake in a reunited Europe, its practical experience in dealing with the Eastern European nations, and its impressive capital and technological assets, to be coordinator of international aid to Poland, Hungary, and perhaps other Eastern bloc countries undertaking liberal reforms. In the process, Bush unequivocally endorsed the cause of European integration. "Let me say clearly a stronger Europe, a more united Europe, is good for my country," he said in the Netherlands before departing for the United States. "It's a development we welcome, a natural evolution within our alliance, the product of a true partnership 40 years in the making."⁶⁸

X

How are we to assess the basic character of the Bush administration's foreign policy, at a time of extraordinary international change and America's own internal adjustment? Has that policy been realistic, practical, and innovative, enlivening the world with a "new breeze" of statesmanship, or has it been sentimental, doctrinaire, and conventional, dominated by the winds of opinion and undercurrents of interest that have governed American

foreign policy in the past? Has it been forward-looking--anticipatory and constructive--or backward-looking--dilatory and reactive? Has it moved, as President Bush has promised, "beyond containment," or has it remained mired in Cold War history--so to speak, within containment?

On the basis of the first ten months of the Bush administration, one must render a mixed judgment. In none of three areas in which conditions appeared so promising in January--arms control, regional settlements, and trade negotiations--has significant progress been made. (A Nobel Prize will have to wait.)

To be sure, President Bush attended a NATO Summit meeting in Brussels at the end of May and unveiled a "revolutionary" plan for a conventional-arms agreement, to be concluded within "6 months or maybe a year." He did, thereby, temporarily seize the diplomatic "offensive." The impracticability of such a rapid negotiation on this subject, which involves all twenty-three countries of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, was bound soon to become evident. No such comprehensive accord on conventional armed forces has been concluded at Vienna. Ironically, one of the reasons for delay is the possibility that non-negotiated unilateral reductions, made by one side or the other because of irresistible political or economic pressures, could overtake the formal East-West arms control process. In this case, the requirement of an actual agreement could impede the process of arms reduction. Arrangements for confidence-building in the security field might be easier to complete. The United States and the Soviet Union have achieved a practical agreement regarding the avoidance of accidental confrontation between their own military forces, but no large-scale U.S.-Soviet pact, on strategic nuclear weapons themselves, yet has emerged. The Bush administration insists on a conventional-arms agreement first, on the theory that an overwhelming nuclear deterrent still is necessary to

offset the Soviet Union's continuing conventional-force advantages. "While Washington dithers," observes the New York Times in an editorial, "not a single warhead aimed at the U.S. has been eliminated after nine years of negotiating."⁶⁹

Progress toward pacification of troubled regions--the Middle East, southern Africa, and Southeast Asia--also has been limited. In some cases, notably Central America, some of the political movement actually has been retrograde. A bipartisan agreement achieved with Congress early in the Bush term to give only humanitarian support to the Nicaraguan Contra forces was jeopardized by renewed violence in several parts of Central America. The fighting in El Salvador, in particular, has worsened. The Reagan-era obsession with the Sandinista threat, seen to be responsible for much of the unrest in the region, continues to preclude the Bush administration's strong support for international negotiations looking toward peace and development in Central America.⁷⁰

On the field of international trade, too, few advances have been made. Early in October the United States concluded a new trade-and-investment agreement with Mexico, aimed at identifying specific industrial sectors which might benefit from a mutual lowering of tariffs. This facilitating arrangement will not necessarily result, however, in a broad pact on bilateral free trade, analogous to the U.S.-Canadian agreement.⁷¹ America's economic relations with the European Community remain difficult. The Secretary of Commerce, Robert Mosbacher, told a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee that "European integration can be a great thing." However, if the Europeans continued to hammer away at new requirements for local "European content," as in the areas of television programming and semiconductor manufacturing, "we will have to take a whole new look at it and think about it differently."⁷² The

fact that some of these restrictive European measures were aimed primarily at Japanese, rather than American, producers, only compounded the difficulty, making bilateral U.S.-EC discussions seem beside the point.

Prompted by the dramatic events overseas and by fiscal and other pressures at home, the Bush administration, so far, has exhibited a pattern in its diplomacy of reacting, rather than acting, with sudden initiatives--as if to cover its previous apparent indecision and lassitude.⁷³ Thus, for example, President Bush boldly announced his "Conventional Parity Initiative" in Brussels in May. Secretary Baker, on the defensive because of Democratic charges that he and his colleagues have seemed almost nostalgic about the Cold War, has emphasized what the administration is doing "creatively" to respond to proposals coming from the Soviet Union.⁷⁴

President Bush's surprise announcement on October 31 that he would join President Gorbachev at a meeting ("the saltwater summit") off Malta at the beginning of December is perhaps the most egregious case of all, although he and his staff insisted that he had been contemplating such a rendezvous with the Soviet leader since his NATO trip to Brussels in May and his subsequent journey to Eastern Europe and the Economic Summit. Responding to a question about whether this seemingly abrupt get-together was a response to criticism of his being "too timid" regarding the Eastern European situation and toward Gorbachev himself, Bush acknowledged that he had "elected to remain very quiet in the face of a good deal of sentiment that we were missing an opportunity." This had not "perturbed" him, however. He now was acting because he did not want, at a time of dynamic change, to "miss something," something he could best get "firsthand" from his Soviet counterpart. As he vividly said: "I don't want to have two gigantic ships pass in the night because of failed

communication." The purpose of this agenda-free "interim informal meeting" with Gorbachev, as distinct from a fully prepared "arms control summit" to be held in 1990, Bush explained, was mainly "to allow us to become better acquainted with one another and to deepen our respective understanding of each other's views."⁷⁵

Whatever its exact origin or the motive behind it, President Bush's decision thus to meet with President Gorbachev clearly marked an end to his administration's vacillation about whether or not to "support" (rather than merely to witness) the changes occurring within the Soviet sphere. Unmistakably, he has chosen the more active course--the one more consistent with his own open, enthusiastic, and trusting personality. "Good will begets good will," he had said in his inaugural. Thus it would appear that the forty-first President in his foreign policy has crossed over into a "post-historical" realm of possible new forms of international cooperation, in direct U.S.-Soviet dealings and perhaps also in various multilateral settings, such as the CSCE context and the UN. As he said in a televised address to the American people on the eve of Thanksgiving Day, "We can now dare to imagine a new world..."⁷⁶

In many minds, particularly in Europe, there was a suspicion, however, that any direct American-Soviet discussion would prove to be a continuation of "history"--that is, of great-power domination of world events. The idea of a Bush-Gorbachev conclave on board ship suggested to those who cannot forget the past an attempt at American-Soviet condominium over Europe and Asia--a new Yalta ("It Rhymes with Malta").⁷⁷ However benign in purpose, an arrangement of this kind now would be wholly unacceptable internationally. It could involve a subtle compromise of American principles (if not mentioned) and a neglect of interests of others (if not invited or consulted).

Mindful of such suspicions, Bush in his Thanksgiving message promised "no surprises." He assured those fearing another Yalta: "We are not meeting to determine the future of Europe--after all, the peoples of Europe are determining their own future."⁷⁸

Paradoxically, President Bush's decision to pay closer attention to events in the East could shift the focus of American foreign policy to developments within the West itself. In the long run, American relations with Bonn, London, Paris, Rome, Ottawa, and Tokyo may be even more important--in the sense of being more productive--than relations with Moscow or Beijing. A no less promising line of diplomacy than the current movement toward a limited U.S.-Soviet entente, it therefore might be argued, is the evolution that is occurring, almost without being noticed, toward a consensual, not merely consultative, American-European-Japanese relationship. Despite disagreements on commercial and other lesser matters, the so-called Trilateral pattern of international cooperation--based on NATO and the U.S.-Japanese security treaty, and also on the economic bonds across the Atlantic and Pacific--would seem actually to have been strengthened, rather than weakened, by the replacement of the Soviet "enemy" by a different Russia.

A deepened, and perhaps even more formalized, mutual commitment among the United States, Western Europe, and Japan--an "Economic Summit" Community, in effect--is needed for many reasons, some of them only indirectly related to the East-West conflict that has dominated most of the post-Second World War period. This strong grouping alone commands the resources--economic and technological and also political--that are needed to meet future global challenges, including planetary environmental problems.⁷⁹ It is clear that the United States--in "decline" if assessed in a competitive but not in a cooperative international context--no longer can meet these alone.

Europe and Japan must be viewed now solely as partners and not as rivals.

The Bush administration actually has worked to build such a three-continent alliance, but without the architectural vision needed to complete it. Its preoccupation has been with events in the Soviet sphere--the principal mistake, too, of some of the originators of the "containment" strategy. Alliance-building, seemingly a backward step, also can be a move forward, as Truman, Eisenhower, Vandenberg, Rayburn, Marshall, Acheson, and Kennan in their day demonstrated. NATO, an outgrowth of war, became a framework for peace. Not only a basis for international order, an alliance can become international order itself.⁸⁰

Today, a new world construction is needed: one that would include, as full equals, the leading countries of Western Europe joined formally with Japan.⁸¹ Participation by the United States in building such a new free-world cooperative order would bar a return to the unilateralist policies that still exercise some attraction for American foreign-policy makers and the American public. Such tendencies could be strengthened by an inward-turning China and Soviet Union. Far better would it be to concert with allies, particularly those in Western Europe, North America, and Japan, in forming what the Bush administration calls a "commonwealth of free nations," as an inspiring world counter-attraction.⁸²

NOTES

1. Inaugural Address of President Bush, January 20, 1989, Department of State Bulletin 89, no. 2154 (April 1989), pp. 1-3. Subsequent references Bush's inauguration speech are to this text.

2. Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" The National Interest, no. 16 (Summer 1989), pp. 3-18; quotation on p. 4. Fukuyama's ambivalence about democracy's triumph is unmistakable: "The end of history will be a very sad time. The struggle for recognition, the willingness to risk one's life for a purely abstract goal, the worldwide ideological struggle that called forth daring, courage, imagination, and idealism, will be replaced by economic calculation, the endless solving of technical problems, environmental concerns, and the satisfaction of sophisticated consumer demands" (p. 18). On Fukuyama's celebrity and possible influence, see James Atlas, "What Is Fukuyama Saying? And To Whom Is He Saying It?" The New York Times Magazine (October 22, 1989), pp. 38-40, 42, 54-55.

3. The transhistorical quality of much of American political thought--including the propositions of President Bush's inaugural message--is related to what the historian Daniel J. Boorstin calls its "givenness"--that is, the notion that America's values have been received as a "gift" from the past and are continuously manifested in an American Way of Life. It is as if, Boorstin notes critically, the Founding Fathers "equipped our nation at its birth with a perfect and complete political theory, adequate to all our future needs"--and, by extension, the needs of all other peoples. Daniel J. Boorstin, The Genius of American Politics (Chicago: Phoenix Books, 1953), pp. 9-10.

4. Francis Fukuyama, focusing on East-West relations, virtually ignores North-South problems: "Clearly, the vast bulk of the Third World remains very much mired in history, and will be a terrain of conflict for many years to come. But let us focus for the time being on the larger and more developed states of the world who after all account for the greater part of world politics." Fukuyama, "The End of History?" p. 15.

5. Edwin M. Yoder, Jr., "US Should Restrain the Urge to Rush History Along," The Boston Globe, August 29, 1989. Yoder argues that the dominant factor today in changing the situation in the Soviet bloc is "the force of example, amplified by the irresistible spread of information"--not America's strength or strategy.

6. For the text, and the background, of President Kennedy's January 1961

inauguration speech, see Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Bantam Books, 1965), pp. 269-78.

7. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987), pp. 514-35. For a critical analysis of the "declinist" arguments, see Samuel P. Huntington, "The U.S.--Decline or Renewal?" Foreign Affairs 67, no. 2 (Winter 1988/89), pp. 76-79.

8. The "solvency" test of foreign policy was articulated by Walter Lippmann in U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1943).

9. American wartime recollections are captured in Studs Terkel, "The Good War": An Oral History of World War Two (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984). A recent sharp critique of the retrospective idealization of World War II, by a literary historian, is Paul Fussell, Wartime: Understanding and Behavior in the Second World War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

10. For details, see George Bush, with Victor Gold, Looking Forward (New York: Doubleday, 1987), pp. 31-41.

11. George Bush, with Doug Wead, Man of Integrity (Eugene, Oregon: Harvest House Publishers, 1988), pp. 5-6.

12. A typical critique is that of Massachusetts Senator Edward M. Kennedy. "The administration holds office but doesn't know what to do with it," as Kennedy stated. "Across a range of concerns the administration seems frozen in the ice of its own intellectual emptiness." John Robinson, "Kennedy Says Lack of Vision Threatening Bush Administration," The Boston Globe, March 7, 1989.

13. President Bush himself seems to have had reservations about his predecessor's notion of a nuclear-free world--one of the "myths," along with the idea of a perfectly effective strategic defense, that Bush and his colleagues felt they had to dispel. When former President Reagan criticized Bush for letting the dispute with West Germany over modernization of short-range nuclear weapons get out of hand, Bush, reportedly, was "deeply pricked." He "agreed fully" with a retort in the press blaming Reagan who had forced the Germans to accept elimination of Pershing I missiles as part of the INF treaty and thus had encouraged their hopes for complete denuclearization. E. A. Wayne, "Bush Breaks Clear From Reagan's Mold," The Christian Science Monitor, June 8, 1989.

14. Stanley Hoffmann, "Lessons of a Peace Epidemic," The New York Times, September 6, 1988.

15. Ethan Schwartz, "'88 Saw Rediscovery of the UN," The Boston Globe,

December 31, 1988; Dennis C. Goodman, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, July 29, 1988, Department of State Bulletin 88, no. 2139 (October 1988), pp. 70-72.

16. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, "The European Community's Program for a Single Market in 1992," Western Europe, Regional Brief, November 1988.

17. Philip Revzin, "Spain's Businesses Rush to Love the Free Trade the EC Plans for 1992," The Wall Street Journal, November 16, 1988; "Reshaping Europe: 1992 and Beyond," Special Report, Business Week, no. 3083 (December 12, 1988). An example of a U.S. company with such a strategy is American Telephone & Telegraph Co.. It had joined with the Spanish national telephone company, Telefónica, in a joint venture to manufacture state-of-the-art microchips for the entire European market.

18. Michael T. Kaufman, "Bush Visit Today Gratifies Ottawa," The New York Times, February 10, 1989; "U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement," Department of State Bulletin 89, no. 2151 (October 1989), pp. 1-6; Ernest H. Preeg, The American Challenge in World Trade: U.S. Interests in the GATT Multilateral Trading System (Washington, D.C.: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1989), p. 63.

19. The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement Synopsis, 2nd ed. (Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, 1988), quotation on p. 1; "U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement," advertisement, The New York Times, February 27, 1989.

20. "Kissinger's World View," The Christian Science Monitor, January 6, 1989.

21. Responding to criticism of his proposal, Kissinger insisted that he was not trying to redo Yalta but to undo it. Strobe Talbott, "What's Wrong with Yalta II," Time 133, no. 17 (April 24, 1989), p. 36. The columnist William Safire asked: "Do we really want the grand-design set deciding the fate of nations over people's heads, even if this time the intent is--grit your teeth--freedomization?" William Safire, "A Second Yalta?" The New York Times, March 6, 1989.

22. Stephen Kurkjian, "Bush Rebuts His Critics on Panama," The Boston Globe, October 7, 1989; "Sensible Restraint on Panama," editorial, The New York Times, October 5, 1989.

23. John Yemma, "Trade Blocs Push to the Fore," The Christian Science Monitor, January 4, 1989; Timothy Aepfel, "Europeans Not Cowed by US Threat," The Christian Science Monitor, January 10, 1989; John W. Tuthill, "Finding a Truce on Beef Hormones," The Christian Science Monitor, February 21, 1989; Jeannine Johnson, "In Search of . . . the European TV Show," Europe: Magazine of the European Community, no. 291 (November 1989), pp. 22-23, 47.

24. The Effects of Greater Economic Integration Within the European Community on the United States, Publication 2204, July 1989 (Washington, D.C.: United States International Trade Commission, 1989), pp. 5-11, 15-7.
25. Edward N. Luttwak, "The Alliance, Without an Enemy," The New York Times, February 3, 1989.
26. For supportive historical details and reasoning, see Alan K. Henrikson, "Los orígenes de la Alianza Atlántica," Revista de Occidente, No. 57 (Febrero 1986), pp. 77-96, and "1983, un año crítico. La alianza en disolución? Europa versus Usa?" in Bernhard Hagemeyer, Javier Rupérez, and Francisco Javier Peña, eds., España, Europa, Occidente: Una política integrada de seguridad (Madrid: Distribución y Comunicación, S.A., por encargo de la Konrad Adenauer-Stiftung, 1984), pp. 57-70. See also Alan K. Henrikson, "The Creation of the North Atlantic Alliance," in John F. Reichart and Steven R. Sturm, eds., American Defense Policy (5th ed.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), pp. 296-320, and "The North Atlantic Alliance as a Form of World Order," in Alan K. Henrikson, ed., Negotiating World Order: The Artisanship and Architecture of Global Diplomacy (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1986), pp. 111-35.
27. The "common European home" metaphor is elaborated upon in Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World (new, updated ed.: New York: Harper and Row, 1988), chap. 6, "Europe in Soviet Foreign Policy."
28. On Atlanticism, see, for example, Christian A. Herter, Toward an Atlantic Community (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), which includes in an appendix the January 1962 Declaration of Paris of the Atlantic Convention of NATO Nations, calling for "the creation of a true Atlantic Community within the next decade."
29. Charles Krauthammer, "After the Cold War Is Won," Time 132, no. 19 (November 7, 1988), pp. 33-34.
30. The "compromise" reached at the NATO summit meeting in Brussels in May 1989 postponed a decision on modernization of the short-range Lance missiles until 1992, when it would be considered "in the light of overall security developments." President Bush, in a speech in Mainz on May 31, acknowledged, significantly, that the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany now share "an added role--partners in leadership." The official record may be found in Department of State Bulletin 89, no. 2149 (August 1989), pp. 11-45.
31. Kohl address to the West German Parliament, November 8, 1989, quoted in Craig R. Whitney, "Unification Issue," The New York Times, November 9, 1989.

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32. Jack Beatty, "Reagan's Gift," The Atlantic Monthly 263, no. 2 (February 1989), pp. 58-62, 64-66.
33. Pamela Constable, "Bush Choices Signal Trend to Pragmatic," The Boston Globe, February 14, 1989; Thomas L. Friedman, "Baker Brings an Inner Circle of Outsiders to State Dept.," The New York Times, March 27, 1989; Thomas L. Friedman, "Baker's World," The New York Times, September 21, 1989.
34. E. A. Wayne, "Shultz's 'Gifts' to New Team at State," The Christian Science Monitor, January 25, 1989.
35. Eugene J. McCarthy, "Give Bush Another 100 Days," The New York Times, March 3, 1989. McCarthy, a former U.S. Senator, interestingly attributes part of Bush's problem in taking the initiative to the Twenty-second Amendment. Had President Reagan retired from office "voluntarily," rather than because of the constitutional two-term limit, his image of authority would have been weaker, and perhaps Bush's stronger.
36. Gerald M. Boyd, "President Selects a Leader in House for Defense Post," and Andrew Rosenthal, "Bush's Safer Choice," The New York Times, March 11, 1989; Andy Pasztor, "Cheney Faces Raft of Issues Held in Limbo For Months as He Takes Over Pentagon," The Wall Street Journal, March 20, 1989; Andrew Rosenthal, "The Man Who Got the Pentagon's Attention," The New York Times, April 5, 1989.
37. Charlotte Saikowski, "Brent Scowcroft: Quiet Adviser," The Christian Science Monitor, February 14, 1989. For a comment on the Scowcroft Commission report, see McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York: Random House, 1988), pp. 562-63. George Bush long had admired the competent, balanced, respectful way NSC affairs had been handled in the Ford administration by Scowcroft. By his conduct, Scowcroft evidently shared Bush's own view that the National Security Council, established by law in 1947 as a coordinating body, was "never intended to be in the policy-making loop of government--much less the operational end of American foreign policy." Bush, Looking Forward, pp. 173-74. The Tower Commission Report, it may be pertinent to note, did not identify any significant role played by then-Vice President Bush in the Iran-Contra affair. See The Tower Commission Report: The Full Text of the President's Special Review Board, intro. by R. W. Apple, Jr. (New York: Bantam Books and Times Books, 1987). It may be surmised that President Bush assumed that General Scowcroft did not hold him culpable in the matter. The precise involvement of Vice President Bush in the Iran-Contra affair, particularly its "Contra" aspect, still has not been fully clarified. For excerpts of the record, see "What Government Admits Secret Documents Say," The New York Times, April 7, 1989.
38. Elaine Sciolino, "The New No. 2: Heavyweight With His Guard Up," The New York Times, March 20, 1989. For the names of other early Bush

administration foreign-affairs appointees, see her article, "Bush Selections Signal Focus on Foreign Policy," The New York Times, January 17, 1989, and "Baker's Staff Incomplete 6 Weeks Into Bush Era," The New York Times, March 3, 1989.

39. The prediction is based on the inconsiderate treatment that Bush received from Kissinger when both men were serving in the Nixon and Ford administrations. For particulars, see Garry Wills, "The Unsinkable Kissinger Bobs Back," The New York Times, January 17, 1989, and Bush's own account in Looking Forward. When President Bush visited China in February 1989 and wished to show empathy with the U.S. Embassy staff in Beijing, he was quoted as saying: "I know something about surviving a visit from a President," he said. "We had one when I was out here before this was an embassy. And I was sure glad to see him go. And if that wasn't enough, we survived two from Henry Kissinger. Try that one on for size. You think we're bad, now, listen." Gerald M. Boyd, "Bush Reflects on a Return to China," The New York Times, February 27, 1989.

40. Bush had been a member of the Trilateral Commission and the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. Uncharacteristically, in 1978 he resigned his memberships, presumably owing to popular criticism of their elitist character and right-wing suspicions of their advocacy of one-world-government. Bush, Man of Integrity, pp. 20-21.

41. Bush, Looking Forward, p. 142.

42. Quoted in R. W. Apple, Jr., "Hands Across the Pacific," The New York Times, February 24, 1989.

43. Gerald M. Boyd, "Bush Says 'Common Ground Was Found' in Asia Trip," The New York Times, February 28, 1989.

44. Secretary Baker in a later speech, "A New Pacific Partnership: Framework for the Future," given to the Asia Society in New York on June 26, 1989, stated suggestively: "Clearly, the need for a new mechanism for multilateral cooperation among the nations of the Pacific rim is an idea whose time has come." Department of State Bulletin 89, no. 2149 (August 1989), pp. 64-66.

45. Bush attributed the defeat of his effort also to "a different kind of 'Dual Representation' policy--Washington's ambivalence on the question of recognizing Beijing--that had undercut the case we tried to make to save Taiwan." This was a reference to the secret Kissinger visit to Beijing and to the public announcement, "not long before the debate on Taiwan's status in the General Assembly," that President Nixon would visit China in 1972. Bush, Looking Forward, p. 116.

46. Ibid., pp. 111, 119.

47. Ethan Schwartz, "US Moves Toward Paying Its UN Dues," The Boston Globe, January 23, 1989. The United States, the UN's largest donor, traditionally has paid about one-quarter of the UN budget and nearly one-third of UN peacekeeping expenses.

48. Edward C. Luck, "Bush and the UN: What Comes After Dinner?" The Christian Science Monitor, February 15, 1989.

49. Bush, Man of Integrity, pp. 52-53.

50. R. W. Apple, Jr., "Bush's NATO Line," The New York Times, May 6, 1989.

51. Adam Pertman, "Bush Review Manacled Makers of Foreign Policy," The Boston Globe, March 22, 1989. For a somewhat tendentious critique of the idea that bureaucracies, rather than individuals, can be a source of creativity in foreign policy, see Henry A. Kissinger, American Foreign Policy (3rd ed.; New York: W. W. Norton, 1977), chap. 1, "Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy."

52. Text of Bush address to Joint Session of Congress, February 9, 1989, Department of State Bulletin 89, no. 2145 (April 1989), pp. 3-4.

53. This is an important, and highly debatable, historical proposition, which is obviously too monocausal. To be sure, George F. Kennan, in his classic statement of the "containment" strategy in Foreign Affairs (July 1947), did assert that the United States "has it in its power to increase enormously the strains under which Soviet policy must operate, to force upon the Kremlin a far greater degree of moderation and circumspection than it has had to observe in recent years, and in this way to promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power." George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950 (New York: Mentor, 1951), p. 105. This teleological element of Kennan's strategy--which the historian John Lewis Gaddis terms "behavior modification"--lately has attracted increased attention. For Gaddis's interpretation, see his Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 37, 49, 71. The Kennan behavior-modification strategy is being heavily credited with causing the recent dramatic changes in the Soviet bloc. It is at least conceivable, however, that, as Kennan's biographer Anders Stephanson suggests, containment "served no purpose other than that of deepening Moscow's glacial isolation." In such a case, any subsequent "thaw" would occur despite containment, rather than because of it. Anders Stephanson, Kennan and the Art of Foreign Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989), p. 106.

54. Text of Bush address and Texas A & M University, May 12, 1989, Department of State Bulletin 89, no. 2148 (July 1989), pp. 16-17. The most notable programmatic feature of Bush's speech was his revival of President Eisenhower's 1955 "Open Skies" plan, for mutual surveillance by the United

States and the Soviet Union of one another's territory by unarmed aircraft. This would enable the United States better to test the extent of Moscow's policy of "openness."

55. Dan Rostenkowski, "Gramm-Rudman? Let the Ax Fall," The New York Times, October 13, 1989; Phil Gramm and Warren B. Rudman, "We Made a Commitment," The New York Times, October 25, 1989.

56. Thomas Oliphant, "The Last Cold War Defense Budget?" The Boston Globe, November 17, 1989. For specific recommendations of reductions, by a former senior U.S. Defense Department official, see Lawrence J. Korb, "How to Reduce Military Spending," The New York Times, November 21, 1989.

57. Göran Ohlin, quoted in Leonard Silk, "Budget Woe Goes Beyond Gimmicks," The New York Times, November 10, 1989.

58. Stephen Kurkjian and Adam Pertman, "Bush Says He Won't Impose Further Sanctions on China," and Thomas Oliphant, "The Wrong Message to Beijing," The Boston Globe, June 9, 1989.

59. President's statement, June 3, 1989, Department of State Bulletin 89, no. 2149 (August 1989), p. 75.

60. Winston Lord, a former U.S. Ambassador to China and, interestingly, a former assistant (and disciple) of Secretary of State Kissinger, reflected: "If this had happened 10 or 20 years ago, one of the key items we'd all be discussing is whether the Soviets are going to take advantage of the situation. But of course there's no sign of the Soviets doing that at all." The primary concern of American policy toward China now ought to be "the human dimension," he urged. "I don't think this regime's going to be around for very long, and you want to start speaking to those who will be there in the future." Fred Kaplan, "Changed Times on the China Watch," The Boston Globe, June 12, 1989.

61. Quoted in George J. Church, "Saving the Connection," Time 133, no. 25 (June 19, 1989), pp. 30-32. A revealing secret analysis for China's leadership in the Neican Xuanpian (Internal Reference Selections) issue of September 13 suggested that the United States had little leverage over China because it was afraid of (1) forcing China into hostile isolation, (2) pushing China into the embrace of the Soviet Union, (3) destroying China's evolution toward capitalism, (4) quarreling with China and thus letting Japan, West Germany, and South Korea into its market, to the detriment of American business, and (5) weakening China so that it could not check Japan, complicating thereby the process of stabilizing the Asia-Pacific region. For these reasons ("five fears"), the U.S. government was subordinating human rights--supporting the Chinese democracy movement--to protecting "the Chinese-American relationship." Nicholas D. Kristof, "Strained U.S. Ties Reported in China," The New York Times, October 5, 1989.

62. Peter Grier and Gary Thatcher, "China Debacle Shows US-Japan Ties Are Key," The Christian Science Monitor, June 15, 1989.
63. Lawrence S. Eagleburger, statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, May 3, 1989, Department of State Bulletin 89, no. 2148 (July 1989), p. 49.
64. Excerpts from President Bush's address to the UN General Assembly, September 25, 1989, The New York Times, September 26, 1989.
65. At the end of August 1989, the United States owed the UN regular budget \$491.1--more than two-thirds of the total \$688 million in outstanding dues. It also owed \$254.1 million of the UN bill for peacekeeping, which had doubled during the past two years. Paul Lewis, "U.N. to Open Session in an Optimistic Mood," The New York Times, September 19, 1989.
66. Flora Lewis, "The Return of History," The New York Times, November 11, 1989. She quotes an observation by the French philosopher André Glucksmann that "getting out of Communism is getting back into history."
67. President Bush's address before the Polish Parliament, Warsaw, July 10, 1989, and Action Plan for Poland, Department of State Bulletin 89, no. 2150 (September 1989), pp. 24-29. Maureen Dowd, "For Bush, a Polish Welcome Without Fervor," The New York Times, July 11, 1989.
68. President Bush's press conference in Paris, July 16, and remarks in Leiden, July 17, Department of State Bulletin 89, no. 2150 (September 1989), pp. 17-21, 47-49. Peter S. Rashish, "E.C. Moves to Diplomatic Center Stage," Europe: Magazine of the European Community, no. 290 (October 1989), pp. 14-15.
69. President Bush, statement and question-and-answer session, Brussels, May 29, 1989, Department of State Bulletin 89, no. 2149 (August 1989), pp. 16-18; "Here We Go, On the Offensive," Time 133, no. 24 (June 12, 1989), pp. 28-31, 34; James M. Markham, "Bush's Arms Plan Sets the Alliance On a Bolder Course," and Leslie H. Gelb, "Mr. Bush's Leap Toward Leadership," The New York Times, June 4, 1989; Lawrence J. Goodrich, "Avoiding Accidental Confrontation," The Christian Science Monitor, June 13, 1989; "Start Deferred Could Be Start Denied," The New York Times, September 13, 1989.
70. Jack W. Germond and Jules Witcover, "Contra Out Should Please Bush," The Boston Globe, August 13, 1989.
71. Clyde H. Farnsworth, "Mexican-U.S. Pact Reached on Trade and Investments," The New York Times, October 4, 1989.
72. Quoted by Clyde H. Farnsworth, "U.S. Cautions Europe on Protectionism," The New York Times, October 6, 1989.

73. "The Passive President," editorial, The New York Times, September 17, 1989.
74. Thomas L. Friedman, "Baker, Defending Policy, Details 'Creative' Response to Gorbachev," The New York Times, September 20, 1989; "Vision Problems at State . . .," Time 134, no. 13 (September 25, 1989), p. 22.
75. "The Saltwater Summit," Time 134, no. 20 (November 13, 1989), pp. 32-35; Maureen Dowd, "2 Days in December," excerpts from Bush news conference, and "The Summit: Just a Photo Op?" The New York Times, November 1, 1989.
76. Thomas L. Friedman, "Handling Gorbachev: A Debate Among Skeptics," The New York Times, November 2, 1989; Stephen Kurkjian, "Bush Hails Changes, Looks to Summit," The Boston Globe, November 23, 1989. Alluding to the fashionable end-of-history controversy, Bush observed in his Thanksgiving message: "This is not the end of the book of history, but it is a joyful end to one of history's saddest chapters."
77. "It Rhymes with Malta," Time 134, no. 20 (November 13, 1989), p. 35; Thomas L. Friedman, "Handling Gorbachev: A Debate Among Skeptics," The New York Times, November 2, 1989.
78. Kurkjian, "Bush Hails Changes, Looks to Summit."
79. Allan R. Gold, "Global Warming Means New Global Politics," The New York Times, November 14, 1989.
80. Henrikson, "The North Atlantic Alliance as a Form of World Order"
81. Robert Pear, "Confusion Is Operative Word in U.S. Policy Toward Japan," The New York Times, March 20, 1989.
82. President Bush address in Mainz, May 31, 1989, Department of State Bulletin 89, no. 2149 (August 1989), p. 39.