
Un diálogo imaginado sobre el Historicismo de José Ortega y Gasset: Posibles conversaciones con John Dewey, William James y Ferdinand Schiller”.

TESIS DOCTORAL

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Table of Contents

Resumen

General Introduction

I. Some Philosophy on the Importance of History and its Study

II. An Introduction to "Pragmatism"

Part One: Anti-Dualism in History and Nature: A Possible Dialogue between John Dewey and José Ortega y Gasset

Section I: Fundamentals toward a Philosophy of History

I. Introduction

II. Ortega and Dewey: Two Contemporaries

III. Biographical Backgrounds

IV. On Life

V. Defining Nature

VI. Ortega and Dewey: Anti-Dualism in History/Experience, and Nature

VII. Truth and Reality
VIII. On How We Think  
IX. The Process of Valuing  

Section II: Antidualism in the Philosophy of History  

X. Ortega and Dewey: History and Experience  
XI. Ortega and Dewey: Circumstances and Historical Products  
XII. Related Controversies  
XIII. Potential Resolutions to Controversies  
XIV. On History as a System  
XV. The Study and Definition of History  
XVI. Parts vs. Wholes in History  
XVII. Conclusion  

Part Two: Radical Empiricism and Unitary Duality in a Possible Historicism  

Dialogue between William James and José Ortega y Gasset  

Section I: Fundamentals toward the Philosophical Historicism in  

James and Ortega  

I. Introduction  
II. Biographical Backgrounds
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>III.</td>
<td>Defining Pragmatism per William James</td>
<td>263-276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV.</td>
<td>On Life, Self, and Circumstance</td>
<td>277-321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V.</td>
<td>Nature</td>
<td>323-345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI.</td>
<td>Unitary Duality</td>
<td>347-351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII.</td>
<td>On Perspective</td>
<td>353-357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII.</td>
<td>Truth and Reality</td>
<td>359-385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX.</td>
<td>Section II: On the Philosophical Historicism in James and Ortega</td>
<td>387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X.</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>387-395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XI.</td>
<td>History as Past, Present, and Future</td>
<td>397-407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XII.</td>
<td>Historical Perspectives</td>
<td>409-415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XIII.</td>
<td>History as the Evolution of Self and Circumstance</td>
<td>417-420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XIV.</td>
<td>The Study of History</td>
<td>421-443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conclusions</td>
<td>445-449</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Part Three: European Pragmatism's Principal Representative: Ferdinand Schiller |
| "On the Topic of the Historicity of Life" in an Imagined Dialogue with José Ortega y Gasset | page 451 |
Section I: European Pragmatism and its Principal Representative: Ferdinand Schiller  page 453

I. Introduction  pages 453-456

II. Historical Development and Context of European Pragmatism  pages 457-465

III. Ferdinand Canning Scott Schiller  pages 467-475

IV. Pragmatism, of "Humanism," per Schiller  pages 477-483

V. Truth  pages 485-502

VI. Reality  pages 503-519

VII. The Limited Freedom of Life  pages 521-531

Section II: On the Topic of the Historicity of Life  page 533

VIII. Introduction  pages 533-536

IX. Defining the Historicity of Life  pages 537-549

X. Ideas for the Study of History  pages 551-565

XI. Conclusions  pages 567-568

General Conclusions  pages 569-577

Bibliography  pages 579-598
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Resumen

¿Podría dialogar José Ortega y Gasset con el pragmatismo? Esta es la pregunta general que esta tesis intenta explorar. ¿Y por qué nos interesa este tema? Nos interesa porque es innovadora, puesto que cualquier vínculo entre Ortega y el pragmatismo es poco estudiado. La esperanza es que nos ayudará a entender parte de la filosofía de Ortega mejor, o por lo menos leerla con una perspectiva nueva. También, como resultado, en la otra dirección la exploración de este tema nos da otra posible interpretación distinta y raramente enlazada del pragmatismo; una que es más historicista, viendo donde se puede imaginar que hay posibles puntos de conversación sobre la filosofía de la historia sobre todo.

Pero en cada momento es importante enfatizar que nunca se trata de un estudio de influencia, comparación, o contraste, en ninguna dirección—es siempre, en todo instante, solamente un diálogo imaginario.

Toda esta exploración se enfoca en una parte concreta de filosofía: la historia. Esta tesis estudia el historicismo de Ortega, y especialmente su máxima de que "el hombre no tiene naturaleza, sino que tiene historia," analizando donde hay un posible diálogo con el pragmatismo (y también donde quizás hay más historicismo en el pragmatismo, pero en general el enfoque es en la filosofía de Ortega).

Antes de centrarnos en el historicismo, primero es necesario que algunos puntos de metafísica básica como el concepto de la naturaleza, la verdad, y la realidad sean examinados para ver como nos lleva donde hay más diálogo posible entre la filosofía de la historia de Ortega y la filosofía del pragmatismo.
Tres pragmatistas han sido seleccionados aquí para llevar a cabo esta conversación con Ortega. En las primeras dos partes el diálogo es imaginado entre Ortega y los dos pragmatistas con quienes discutiblemente tendrían una conversación más relacionada y fluída; los norteamericanos John Dewey y William James. En tercer lugar, la última parte investiga un posible diálogo con el representante europeo más reconocido como pragmatista, Ferdinand Schiller. Esta conversación imaginara también nos sirve como evidencia del alcance del pragmatismo en Europa, puesto que todas estas figuras son relativamente contemporáneas.

Una perspectiva nueva sobre la máxima orteguiana de que "el hombre no tiene naturaleza sino que tiene historia" es que podríamos interpretar esto en un sentido anti-dualista según lineas pragmatistas, añadiendo porque la naturaleza es la historia; tenemos historia y no naturaleza porque la historia contiene la naturaleza y así no nos niega que hay naturaleza, simplemente nos argumenta que la noción mejor; más global y apropiada, es la historia.

Todo relacionado con lo humano tiene historia, y por tener historia, esto nos implica un fundamento temporal. Por consiguiente, de nuevo según lineas más pragmatistas, decimos que nuestras historias y nociones de historia y con historia forman parte siempre de un continuo que va constantemente en movimiento del pasado al presente hacía el futuro. Es decir, en cada momento nuestra noción metafísica es un presente donde se encuentra el pasado con el futuro, puesto que rápidamente movemos al futuro y el presente se convierte en el pasado.

Pero cuando queremos estudiarnos a nosotros mismos, o nociones metafísicas y humanas como la verdad o la realidad, por ejemplo, lo más tangible que tenemos es el pasado. Siempre tenemos que tener en cuenta este principio fundamental en nuestros estudios de que todo forma parte de un continuo, con los puntos del pasado como lo más estudiable (incluso para los
pragmatistas quienes están centrados en el futuro en su instrumentalismo y funcionalismo, pero porque vivimos en vista al futuro, lo cual tampoco negaría Ortega porque esto no cambia el hecho de que el pasado es lo que podemos estudiar mejor, y más tangiblemente). Siempre tenemos que ver todo así como un continuo, igual como la idea de que no podemos leer páginas sueltas para entender un libro porque tenemos que leerlo por completo y en orden.

Otro punto importante más pragmatista en todo esto es el argumento de que todo es simplemente lo que pensamos que es; es decir, todo es como lo experimentamos ser. Esto es porque todo es canalizado por perspectivas individuales, ninguna siendo falsa ni verdadera ni absoluta, lo cual es concepto de orientación ortegiana en esta conversación imaginaria. Así vivimos; nuestros yo es existiendo anti-dualísticamente con y dentro de las circunstancias alrededor que nos da una cierta libertad limitado de escoger como nos movemos y a que respondemos—otra noción ortegiana. Esta interdependencia anti-dualística es clave en este estudio. También importante es como las nociones de la verdad, la realidad, o la historia, por ejemplo, son simplemente lo que pensamos que son, y nunca podemos saber cuando nuestras nociones coinciden con lo que realmente son—pero tampoco importa esto para los pragmatistas porque nos muestra e ilumina lo que pensamos y nuestras interpretaciones respectivas, lo cual es lo realmente importante en temas humanos. Así quizás dialogarían Ortega y estos pragmatistas.

En todo esto hay implicaciones importantes para el tema en concreto del estudio de la historia que podrían ayudar a mejorar la disciplina y su metodología. Por ejemplo, nos dice que la historia nunca puede ser estudiado por completo y nunca puede ser totalmente verdadera ni objetiva. También nos dice mucho sobre los historiadores; sus perspectivas, influencias, inclinaciones, etcétera, igual al tiempo en que se escriben los libros de historia (quizás más que la
materia y los detalles de la historia en sí). De nuevo: todo forma parte de un continuo, y así, no hay un fin, ni un comienzo—igual al estudio de esta tesis, o por lo menos esto es un objetivo.

Por último, hay que terminar aquí con una nota bibliográfica breve. Por las circunstancias de no poder consultar varios libros en inglés, hay algunos que he podido comprar en su versión electrónica, que tiene dos fuentes de citación; por página y por locación. En estos casos, en el primer uso, esto lo indico en la nota de pie de página, y en los siguientes usos de la referencia sigo señalando con el estilo normal de APA sin hacer más referencia de que es un libro electrónico.

En general, también hay que notar que hay varios libros añadidos en la bibliografía que muestran el incremento de estudios recientes sobre los temas explorados aquí. En las notas de pie de página, en primera instancia de la fuente pongo un poco más de detalle con los apellidos en mayúsculas, y en los siguientes usos indico simplemente autor, título, y página(s). Puesto que he usado el título en vez del año—una decisión que he tomado porque hay varios títulos del mismo autor en el mismo año, y si hubiera usado el año podría resultar confuso—de la misma manera, he seguido este orden en la bibliografía (poner el año al final) para que también las referencias completas vayan en el orden de autor y título.
General Introduction

I. Some Philosophy on the Importance of History and its Study

Why should we study history when it often seems as though history itself has shown us that humanity is generally most focused on being future-oriented?\(^1\) In fact, we often do not even live enough in the present, let alone consider sufficiently just how important the past really is. Yet every once and awhile we are reminded, nonetheless, of just how significant our "histories" are; for example, when we reflect on how far we have come, or a song reminds us of an important, influential day from adolescence, or we ponder how the day our children were born changed our lives forever. Still, on most days it seems we think more about what we are going to do this weekend, or what will be our next vacation, or even what we will do later in the day, etcetera, rather than what we are doing in this precise moment (any given present).

So if we generally often underestimate the power of influence of our own pasts, perhaps then we are even less 'motivated' to study the pasts of others; as in history as an academic discipline. At times it may ultimately feel as though it is useless, as it is past and done with. But it does remain a relatively popular field of study—why? Perhaps many simply find it fun and entertaining, more so, than useful, per se. Maybe. But in any instance in which this were the case, this could not be further from the truth. History is no less important than any other academic discipline.

Some colloquial examples will help demonstrate the real world, everyday importance of the study of history for everyone, regardless of the extent of interest (or disinterest) in the topic.

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\(^{1}\) An example of this is precisely pragmatism, in fact.
Interestingly enough, when one starts to type into Google, "why is it important to study..." the first auto-fill that comes up, at least on one attempt, was "...history," and then "...scriptures" second. ² In other words, clearly we really do undervalue and underestimate this academic discipline as evidenced by the frequency with which we question it, as it is thus one of the most questioned areas of study in regards to why bother —even more than religion.

Yet history is so fundamentally human—it is us! We are history! Those alive today are living history, those past on are past history, and our unborn grandchildren and great grandchildren, etcetera, are our future history! Yet we continually underestimate its value, importance, influence, and power. We may live in the present, most of the time with a future orientation, but most tangible is where we have come from; it is the past that has led us to where we are today, and what can be more concretely and substantially studied. Hence we are 'living history,' because the past is most certainly not exactly dead.

In truth, any time we want to know why something happened, or how something came about, we must look at history (at least as one element); even if recent, it must be something in the past. In order to truly understand the present, and begin to contemplate the possible, potential future, one must study history; this must be at least part of our study. Thus, the study of history helps us better understand—not fully comprehend, just better understand— the present and potential future.

Often a focus of the use of the study of history is on how it helps us learn to avoid problems of the past in the future, to put it generally. It must be added as an essential emphasis, however, that of course the study of history cannot necessarily always prevent the same errors

² Interestingly enough, when typing "anti-dualism" into Google, a published summary of the first part of this paper appears from the second page on.
and problems of the past, but it can at least certainly help in that endeavor. As often cited, doctors require our medical histories to better treat us, applying for loans and credit require background checks, sport coaches study past games to work out strategies, etcetera. The past is very useful, and it is 'used' everyday.

To continue with some everyday examples, some technology, on the other hand, becomes obsolete when "too old," and we cannot even replace parts to fix it—we must buy what is new, current, and up-to-date. In other words, incompatibility can sometimes make technology obsolete, and can then end its existence. However, in this contrary example, this does not mean that it is truly dead, for what is current we could not have without what was past. For example, computers may not have floppy drives anymore, but if we had not had those we would not have what we have today, such as CD, DVD and USB drives (and it continues to develop and change); one led to the other since technology also builds on top of itself and requires the history it has, and therefore essentially is. While the example here is that of technology, really everything has history.

These are thus some general, real-world examples of history and its role, application, influence, and power in everyday life—as it has essentially always been 'throughout history.' So what of the academic discipline of history—or more specifically narrow, the philosophy of history? As aforementioned, when we want to know why something happened, or how we came to be where, who, etcetera, we are today, we must look at the past for help in finding these answers, as least in part. The past is part of what causes and shapes the present, as well as leads toward the future.
History, therefore, helps us understand virtually everything, to phrase it bluntly yet arguably accurately. The study of history helps us understand humanity, human behavior, change, continuity, culture, society, identity, ethics and morality, politics—the list is virtually endless, and so important! The study of history, therefore, can aide in all other areas of study, as these concepts are so fundamental to our lives, and to humanity in general. And these concepts are also so hard to study and understand, and so unpredictable at times, which the study of history helps with, as well as the study of the philosophy of history.

Studying history also helps us become better critical thinkers, as we learn how to be better at searching for and finding patterns, environmental, social, individual contexts, and interrelated factors or elements in all this. History also teaches us respect through the preservation of the past and the heritages of our ancestors. History helps us preserve our memories. What parent does not want to commemorate and record every detail possible of the day their children were born? History therefore teaches us a little about human nature—perhaps not "truths" or "laws," but at least approximations to these, as it helps us at least better ponder humanity. History thus helps us learn more about ourselves—a major advantage indeed to the discipline considering that human beings are arguably often quite selfish by nature (and this is not always bad, per se). History, therefore, provides some lessons for the future, too.

Despite all this grand importance outlined here argued to be given to history as a study, unfortunately we must always also keep in mind that even if it is something relatively 'tangible,' it can never be perfected as a study. Hence where the importance of the philosophy of history

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3 As this is the first mention of the term "nature," it must be declared here at the start that while there are many different definitions, interpretations, and notions of "nature," such as biological, genetic, cultural, social, to reference just a few, the concluding argument that will be reached and emphasized here throughout will be that what nature always has is a historical character, element, or in a word, essentially nature.
comes in, as one example, because we can only posit that history helps, not solves, problems, quandaries, etcetera, which philosophizing about helps elucidate further. The philosophy of history, therefore, helps us improve the discipline of history itself, by posing questions and quandaries that lead us to better formulate how it is studied, because the academic discipline of history also poses a lot of problems. For example, what in history should we study? What kind of history should we study? Who should write and teach history? Etcetera. As the narrowed focus of the philosophy of history helps with, most of these questions cannot really be answered, at least not completely nor fully, but our asking them and pondering them helps us keep this limiting criteria in mind and therefore better ponder history through stronger critical thinking. What we can begin to establish through the philosophy of history, therefore, are what are some of the limitations of the study of history to prevent us from considering any possible conclusions, general laws or truths—these probably do not exist, though arguably again we perhaps have and can therefore reach approximations to them, at least.

Moreover, we can go a bit beyond just laying out some of the limitations. While philosophizing over how history can never cover all the spectrums, elements, details, or be entirely objective, etcetera—keeping this all in mind as part of our criteria for its' study helps us to be not only better historians, but it also helps us specifically to better understand that what we are studying is coming from this limitation; that what we are studying can perhaps teach us more about, for example, why it was recorded, the authors, its historical time context, rather than the actual contents themselves (the material recorded in and of itself), even if there is some overlap.

The philosophy of history, therefore, also remains undervalued as well, because this is neither the most popular nor commonly explored topic within the discipline of philosophy. What
is the use and importance of history; why is history and its study significant? What are the questions and quandaries we must propose, at least to improve history as an academic discipline? What are the limitations? What are some of the characteristics of the structure of history, and its study? Is history teleological? Etcetera. These are just a few more examples of some key questions explored within specifically the area of the philosophy of history to in part improve the general discipline of history, and even more generally, the study of humanity—this broader scope's aim is extremely important.

The disputed reality of all these undervalued, underappreciated, and underestimated arguments is one of the main motivations behind the following doctoral dissertation. What follows in this thesis is a narrowed exploration of one potential dialogue in all this, inspired by the philosopher of main focus José Ortega y Gasset's dictum that we are our histories—not because he was the first to say so, as by no means was he, but rather because of the way he said so and explored this, and because he is a philosopher who most certainly did not undervalue and underestimate the power of history. He is someone who in fact explored in depth history as well as the philosophy of history.

What follows will envision and analyze a potential dialogue of all that has been aforementioned, but in the specific area virtually unexplored of one narrowed investigation of the philosophy of Pragmatism and how it can possibly dialogue with Ortega's philosophy in this area of history and its meaning and purpose, thereby helping us hopefully better understand not just Ortega's philosophy, but also all the general arguments laid out here in this introduction about history, its importance, and how it should be studied, as we need concrete examples at times as well to help clarify our points—especially of the general ones such as those just outlined here.
Getting at the heart of this paper, we must begin by asking; was José Ortega y Gasset, in any way, a pragmatist in his historicism? This is a central question, but not answer, per se, that is addressed here, as what will be argued is that there is a possible conversational dialogue we can establish between some major pragmatist thinkers and José Ortega y Gasset's historicism, with the focus specifically on his polemical dictum that "man has no nature, only history." But as will be repeated throughout, given its great importance, it must be strongly emphasized that in no way is this study ever meant to draw parallels or similarities between the pragmatism in the three pragmatist thinkers explored here, John Dewey, William James, and Ferdinand Schiller, with José Ortega y Gasset.

The objective is to simply envision a possible, imaginary dialogue that Ortega might have with pragmatism and these three figures in an effort to study these topics in and of themselves without making any direct declarations of influence.

Further, another quandary addressed is the following: is pragmatism historicist in any ways? This is also a topic with little study. Therefore, this should also remain tenuous and the answers explored should also be viewed as simply again possible, imaginary dialogues on the topic.
II. An Introduction to "Pragmatism"

Pragmatism was a philosophical movement that originated in the United States in the 1870s. The term "pragmatism" was first coined by Charles Sanders Peirce. As William James, one of the three key pragmatists explored here explains in regards to the philosophical movement's history,

The term is derived from the same Greek word [pi rho alpha gamma mu alpha], meaning action, from which our words 'practice' and 'practical' come. It was first introduced into philosophy by Charles Sanders Peirce in 1878. In an article entitled 'How to Make Our Ideas Clear,' in the 'Popular Science Monthly' for January of that year Mr. Peirce, after pointing out that our beliefs are really rules for action, said that to develop a thought's meaning, we need only to determine what conduct it is fitted to produce: that conduct is for us its sole significance. [...] To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object, then, we need only consider what conceivable effects of a practical kind the object may involve--what sensations we are to expect from it, and what reactions we must prepare. Our conception of these effects, whether immediate or remote, is then for us the whole of our conception of the object, so far as that conceptions has positive significance at all."^4

Long considered primarily a very "American" philosophical tradition, although it was known and studied by some abroad, it has only recently been more recognized outside of the United States.

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^4JAMES, William: Pragmatism and the Meaning of Truth (Works of William James), p. 21. (Subsequently referred to as: Pragmatism.)
As its name suggests, pragmatism stresses the "pragmatic," or the "practical," in that, most tersely summarized, what matters most are the "practical results" for understanding something and its effect, most generally speaking. In other words, "inquiries," in a general sense, must be tried and tested before we can reach any possible conclusions about them. But given how many "tries" and "tests" are often needed, sometimes there are not enough that can be conducted, and so results and conclusions are tenuous; simply practical, likely possibilities.

Pragmatism emphasizes "experience." Very broadly speaking, what we understand and conclude is revealed to us through experience. Experience is an ongoing, continuous process of interaction between an individual and his or her environment (which as well shall continually see in great depth can converse with Ortega's additionally central dictum that "we are ourselves and our circumstances;" "yo soy yo y mi circunstancia"). As Dewey explains it, "Experience occurs continuously, because the interaction of live creature and environing conditions is involved in the very process of living." The subjects and objects are created and revealed in this progression and development. We cannot fully understand anything until we have had an experience with it. We should not, nor realistically can we ever hastily jump to any rash, tenuous conclusions, for everything needs to be discovered, explored, and learned about through specific and direct experience first. It is through our experience with something that we begin to possibly understand that something.

A fundamental statement that we can assume about pragmatism, therefore, although it is not directly stated in general in the philosophy, is that it emphasizes the importance of "history" both generally and literally speaking. This is a key assumption being made throughout this

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5 DEWEY, John: Art as Experience, p. 1.
dissertation; that pragmatism's use of term "experience" is used somewhat interchangeably with the term "history," especially when viewed in Ortega's conception of "history." We can begin to study something through analyzing its experience, or past history, so in this sense pragmatism is therefore perhaps inherently historicist. Hence as will be elaborated in great depth, this is an area where we can certainly create a possible dialogue with José Ortega y Gasset given his very historicist focus.

But pragmatism is also very forward-looking, or more specifically, it is "instrumental" because although we are using the past to search for understanding, the main objective is to learn something that we can apply to the future. This is termed "functionalism." Given this forward focus in pragmatism, the general "historicist" feature arguably prominently inherent in pragmatism is rarely addressed in current scholarship. This is a central thesis being argued here, and one which is based largely on the research of Colin Koopman who has dedicated much research to this specific topic. In 2009 Koopman published Pragmatism as Transition: Historicity and Hope in James, Dewey, and Rorty, in which he expounds on a central thesis that pragmatism is very much founded on what he terms "transitionalism," within which he includes the defining concept of "temporal structures and historical shapes." Key are the concepts of "temporality" and "historicity" in pragmatism in his thesis. In this book he divides pragmatist thinking in "three waves." First is the classical, traditional pragmatism of early figures such as James, Dewey, and Pierce. The second wave is that of the more contemporary "neopragmatists" such as Richard Rorty and Ruth Putnam. And third is what Koopman himself wants to propose: that of "Pragmatism as transitionalism" in which time and history are central - something that is also key in this dissertation here.
Tersely summarized, he argues, "Transitionalism emphasizes that we always find ourselves in the midst of historical and temporal transitions--we are in continuous flow."⁶ As he writes, "A renewed third wave of pragmatism is thus needful today for the continued vigor of the tradition itself."⁷ Indeed, given pragmatism's general focus on experience as fundamental to so much, this continuum is most certainly based on time and history, which these in certain ways can be understood as synonymous terms. As Koopman further explains in his defense of this position,

Historicism is in these three ways a central element in the pragmatist temperament. Yet despite these obvious ways in which pragmatism lends itself to a historicist way of thinking, this aspect of pragmatism is rarely given sufficient attention by commentators and philosophers today. From the pragmatist perspective, such lack of attention can hardly be dismissed as benign--for it means that pragmatists are not focusing their efforts on developing a central aspect of their own philosophy. This may lead to negative consequences both in terms of underdevelopment of the potentialities inherent in historicism and in terms of misconstruing the kinds of philosophical and cultural criticism fluid with the wider pragmatist vision. [...] It is also warranted, I believe, because a more energetic approach to pragmatism's historicism will enable us to more effectively deploy pragmatism for the historical, political, and philosophical uses to which we will put it in

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⁶ KOOPMAN, Colin: "Historicism in Pragmatism: Lessons in Historiography and Philosophy", p. 691. (Subsequently referred to as: Historicism in Pragmatism.)

⁷ KOOPMAN, Colin: Pragmatism as TRANSITION: Historicity and Hope in James, Dewey, and Rorty, p. 3.
coming years. In other words, pragmatists can do their work better as pragmatists if they pay more attention to the historicist themes central to their own way of thinking.\(^8\)

So Koopman argues that pragmatism, in a general sense, is inherently quite historicist, despite the fact that it is not generally considered a historicist philosophy, nor are any of its main philosophers much invested in the philosophy of history, at least not directly or explicitly. As he summarized it,

Pragmatists understand things as historically situated and temporally conditioned. [...] pragmatists theorize concepts such as truth and meaning in ways that prioritize historical context in our ascriptions of truth and interpretations of meaning. Another way of stating this point is as a kind of sociological observation: pragmatists are often described as attempting to reconstruct philosophy in light of evolutionary theory's emphasis upon contingent change, and this results in a thoroughgoing philosophical historicism.\(^9\)

As aforementioned, one of the fundamental reasons we can arguably consider pragmatism inherently quite historicist is for the emphasis placed on experience. As Koopman elaborates, this is because experience (which all pragmatists share a version of the anti-dualistic notion that 'what we think we know, what we think is real, what we think is true; what we think, in general, is what we experience it to be') is itself is naturally historicist in meaning and understanding. "Experience is not a thing, it is an event or a process," Koopman proposes. "Experience happens, takes place, is temporally shot through. Experience is not a presence with

\(^{8}\) Koopman, "Historicism in Pragmatism," p. 691.

\(^{9}\) Ibid, p. 690.
its own substantial identity--it is rather wholly constituted by its relations to past and future."¹⁰ Experience is conceptualized as always being a continuum, and as we shall see this is basically the same as history (history is not just the past, just as experience is not just the past or the present; both are past, present, and future—this is a key argument that will be reiterated throughout).

Again, although Koopman notes in his writings on this topic that not enough scholarship has been dedicated to this and the study of the historicism inherent in pragmatism in general, there are still, nonetheless, a few others who have researched and supported this view. In his article, "Historicism in Pragmatism: Lessons in Historiography and Philosophy," Koopman cites Joseph Margolis, who has also written extensively on pragmatism, as arguing the following:

Margolis's historicization of pragmatism is perhaps the fullest among the contemporary offerings in his work on a pragmatism which postulates "that the world is a flux, that thinking is historicized, and that selves are socially constructed or have histories rather than natures."¹¹

It is quite interesting that here explicitly he makes Ortega's statement: what we have are histories rather than natures, which is the central maxim explored here, and to which it is added to clarify that this is because man's nature is his history - hence the arguments for a potential dialogue between a 'historicist' pragmatism within the work of John Dewey, William James, and Ferdinand Canning Scott Schiller, with Ortega--all of which are of course topics little explored. As Koopman adds,

Joseph Margolis is a Professor of Philosophy from Temple University.
 [...] despite these observations of pragmatist transitionalism, this aspect of James's and Dewey's thought remains largely neglected in the literature on pragmatism. This is unfortunate just insofar as this neglect can act as an impediment to developing the important consequences of pragmatism's transitionalism.12

And this specific focus in study is recent, so perhaps it will only grow, as Koopman's book was published in 2009.

A few years prior in 2006 there was another study linking pragmatism with historicism, titled *Historicism: The Once and Future Challenge for Theology* by Sheila Greeve Davaney, which is another key book to support the possibility to at least imagine a historicist dialogue in pragmatism. As Davaney concisely asserts, to say that humans are historical means;

To be historical means that humans exist within the complex and interrelated matrices of natural and humanly constructed history. Humans always exist somewhere, in particular locales demarcated by distinctive languages, political and economic systems, geographies, myths and worldviews, rites and practices, forms of embodiment and social organization. Humans are human in specific and distinctive ways; there are no humans in general, only humans finely drawn in all their concreteness and particularity.13

This pragmatist conception of historicism in Davaney's argument can be envisioned to dialogue with many central tenets of Ortega's philosophy. In this aforementioned excerpt we find


13 DAVANEY, Sheila Greeve: *Historicism: The Once and Future Challenge for Theology*, p. 145. (Subsequently referred to as: *Historicism.*)

Please note that as there were several books unavailable either at all, or just in the English version, I have consulted several books in their electronic, Kindle versions. These books have been noted as such when first referenced, and subsequently either the Kindle location or Kindle page number is included.
the idea of nature being a part of history. We also find the concept that at every moment we live in interaction with our surroundings (like Ortega's \textit{yo soy yo y mi circunstancia}). And we find the concept of perspectivism in the argument that there is no \textit{one} perspective and that all are valid, making each individual particular and unique—as we shall see throughout all of these are central theses in Ortega's work. This will all be examined in great depth. And she continues describing her view of a pragmatist historicism that "humans as historical," "exist not in isolation but within the midst of interconnecting influences that constitute them in specific ways and to which they, as historical agents, contribute in turn."

In other words, this is why we are ourselves and our circumstances, to use Ortega's terms, because we exist in constant interaction, as she continues on the topic of pragmatist historicism,

> the recognition of historicity, with all its emphasis upon particularity and uniqueness, does not imply isolation but, rather, interconnectedness. Indeed, it is the ever-widening web of natural and historical relations that produces the very particularity and uniqueness of experience to which historicity points. Historical particularity does not entail a lack of reciprocal interaction between historical entities but, rather, complex and varied relations in ever-greater scope.

The existence of a nature, therefore, is not denied, but rather gathered into the concept and understanding of history; nature becomes historical, history is nature; "nature is no longer treated as without a history but as historical itself." This is, in fact, a very current trend

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textit{Ibid.}, p. 145.
\item \textit{Ibid.}, p. 146.
\item \textit{Ibid.}, p. 147.
\end{enumerate}
beginning to be more explored in pragmatism, as will be explained, which is the precise argument here on how to understand Ortega's maxim that man has no nature only history as being that man's history is his nature—hence the possible dialogue that can be envisioned between Ortega and pragmatist thought. As Daveney refers to,

Thus, importantly, in this version of contemporary historicism, history and nature are not viewed as antithetical, and the bifurcation of history and nature that characterized so much of both Enlightenment modernity and early historicism are now deemed as untenable. In the place of this long-standing bifurcation of history and nature, thinkers such as William Dean have called for, in a manner similar to Kaufman and McFague, an interpretation of our cosmic context as a participatory universe in which human history is naturalized and nature is understood as historical.17

And she continues,

Pragmatic historicism, therefore, stresses particularity without isolation, individuality, and uniqueness of time and place without assumptions of disconnection. And, perhaps most importantly, it extends the network of relations within which humans reside to include nature as a central component of such context.18

Now that this area of possible dialogue has been specified and clarified of the historical theme within pragmatism, we can move on to present the next topic in this imagined conversation. As aforementioned, in the case of Ortega, there is no need to search for historicism in his meditations, as he was admittedly quite the historicist. But the term "meditations" have

17 Ibid., p. 147.
18 Ibid., p. 147.
been used here as Ortega's objective was not to create a "philosophy of history" (as he himself declared), but rather perhaps a better term for it is "theory of history." In one sense, Ortega wanted to focus on meditations on life from a historical, historicist perspective. As Graham (a key author in this dissertation who will be introduced more formally ahead), succinctly proposed as a possible interpretation here, "At his best, Ortega could be designated a "theorist of history," who focused much less on patterns and causes and processes than on the nature of historical reality and historical knowledge--and on historical operations or methods."19 Further, Graham argued that Ortega's objective was to create a more "pragmatic" study and understanding of history; "What he wanted from historians was a more "pragmatic" kind of history, in a truly pragmatist sense of "useful" and "applicable" in other disciplines and activities, for politicians, philosophers, art critics, social scientists, and humanists."20 Again this concept of a pragmatist historicism in Ortega's work is precisely this paper's imaginary dialogue.

So again these are all areas of potential dialogue with Ortega, as will be explored in what follows in three instances of imaginary exchanges with Dewey, James, and Schiller. In this dissertation, specifically, again what is explored here is in regards to Ortega's historicist maxim that ‘man has no nature, what he has is history,’ which, as argued here, can be partly understood through a pragmatist basis of anti-dualism. The thesis here is that it is not that man has no nature, per se, rather that history is his nature because the two are anti-dualistic concepts; history is our nature because it is comprised of, as famously posited by Ortega, “myself and my circumstance.” And as shall be explored in great depth, one key reason why we can use the term "history" as

19 GRAHAM, John T.: *Theory of History in Ortega y Gasset: The Dawn of Historical Reason*, p. 11. (Subsequently referred to as *Theory of History*.) Graham is the author of a three-part series of books on Ortega y Gasset that focus, in part, on his theory of history and some of the possible pragmatist elements in his philosophy.

broader than nature, and therefore to encompass nature, is because history can imply anything "inherited," which can imply something bequeathed genetically, culturally, socially, environmentally; in other words, something more than just nature in the limited, traditional sense of the term. "History" is simply a better and broader term.

In the most general terms historicists agree that human beings live out of the heritages their histories have bequeathed to them; language, culture, interpretations of reality, practices, institutions, and so forth do not spring de nova, or from nothing, but emerge in particular times and places and change and are altered through complex histories of development. Any particular moment is always in some way the reworking, repetition, transformation, or creative departure from what has come before, and what has come before is also part of the ongoing flow of history.²¹

This comes from Davaney, who continues writing that in creating a pragmatist historicism, key questions that should be asked are as follows:

[...] pragmatic historicists ask, What are the repercussions of thinking, acting, organizing life in one way or another? What kinds of life are made possible by living out of one vision of reality rather than another? Who benefits from one set of practices or way of organizing our social lives and institutions? What is historically inhibited and what is nurtured and supported? How does one set of beliefs or practices cohere with another, and what are the ramifications of such cohesion or dissonance? On the most basic levels, what persons, values, and possibilities get to survive and flourish, and who dies, what

²¹ Davaney, Historicism, p. 148.
possibilities are lost, and which values disappear? These are the kinds of questions toward which pragmatic historicism points us.²²

In what follows in this analysis to understand how it could be argued that Ortega's maxim that man has no nature, only history, is because history contains his nature, first we will look at some basic metaphysical topics in each of the three parts, and then broadly historicism, all of which will be envisioned to dialogue with the pragmatism in these three individuals' thought.

The following are the threads woven throughout all three sections of this dissertation.

First, "experience" in pragmatism is an on-going, continuous process of interaction between an individual and his or her environment, which dialogues with Ortega's notion of "yo so yo y mi circunstancia." We live, understand, and exist along a continuum. We have experiences in the interaction of the self with circumstance. And this makes life one essentially lived in a "limited freedom" because while we have the freedom of choice in how we maneuver among our experiences, we cannot completely control the circumstances.

Next, "experience," which will be used often as fundamentally interchangeable with "history," exists along a continuum, which means that it is past, present, and future. But, "history" is the most tangible, as really everything is "historical" because the present is fleeting and becomes "history" almost as quickly as we say so, and the future is non-tangible of course, ultimately always a manifestation of the past (as is the present). But the future also plays a key role, nonetheless (although still being arguably "historical") in bringing the purpose to our

²² Davaney. Historicism, p. 157. And she continues, "Historicism, in this approach, is thus firmly linked to a pragmatism in which questions of human and natural flourishing in a contingent world move to the fore, displacing concerns about coherence with the past, correspondence to timeless truth, or adequacy to some supposed depth of human subjectivity" (Ibid., p. 158).
existence and historical study, since we have the goal to improve our futures through learning from the past.

But what is, history, exactly? For the purposes of this paper, a key part of this definition will be to always keep in mind that experience is the fundamental and important feature of history, since the goal here is to view history from a primarily and innovative pragmatist perspective. By defining history as a set of experiences, without specifying a start or end per se, we can avoid discrepancies as to whether or not to see history as monistic or pluralistic, for example. Rather, viewing and defining history as experience establishes two main, key features. First, this implies that our interaction, interpretation, and understanding of history is an essential interplay in what is history. Second, history as experience without a start or finish means that it must be seen as a continuum. This is not to say that there aren't potential, defining divisions along that continuum, but there is no ultimate or finite starting or ending points, thereby making history something alive and futuristic as well, and not just the past. While most traditional definitions of history tend to focus on this idea of an aggregate collection or record of past, and definitively closed events, this is not the idea being promoted here, as viewing history from a more pragmatist perspective, albeit infrequently defined as such, tersely summarized the argument here is that history is a continuum of the past, present and future of our experiences.  

In returning to the main threads of this dissertation, an additional strand is that life, therefore, is history, as life is the experience of life; life, reality, truth, experience, history, etcetera, is simply what we experience it to be. Hence, we have no nature, only history, because

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23 The Greek roots of the term "history," in fact, do not refer to something 'dead' either, as "histōr" refers to "learned, wise man," and "historia" is about "finding out narrative."
nature is contained within our history—this is another key fiber woven throughout in how so much that will be explored must be understood anti-dualistically.

A pause must be taken to briefly delve into this concept of anti-dualism, as this is a key feature of pragmatism, and one rarely associated with Ortega but that comprises a central part of this imagined dialogue's vision and argument. For example, bark on a tree can flake off as separately fallen pieces of a whole tree, making it, therefore, visibly separate from the roots connected to the ground, but we understand in its entirety to all be part of one tree as we generally think of tree when we think of bark, yet we can also use the bark for other things, such as making a fire. "Dualism" of course refers to two; for example, this could be in reference to the bark and the tree, monism versus pluralism, or Descartes' famous mind versus body distinction. Here the argument, however, as to how to understand anti-dualism is to simply define it as "not two;" anti-dualism does not mean "one," here it just refers to the argument that concepts such as the mind and body are simply more complicated, and this complication can be resolved by saying that it is both separate but connected (so, one and two—or more, essentially). In other words, there is a thing, and there is what we think that thing is, and these two concepts are separate, but interdependently and inextricably linked, though we cannot be completely sure of that connection's accuracy or specifics. Meaning, we know that the connection exists, we just cannot always confirm it, per se. So anti-dualism here is understood as the argument that a connection exists between two things, such as the mind and body, or a whole and parts, but they cannot be understood as separate in the first place without recognizing that one cannot exist without the other. We could not know what a part is without knowing what a whole is. The mind perhaps may separately tell us what the body is, but we would not know what the body is without the mind telling us, so since the two cannot be understood completely separately, they are
connected, again interdependently and inextricably, though they are two different things. And this is a great example of not being able to always confirm this, as this is still pondered in philosophy, but can certainly be strongly argued for.

Anti-dualistic again means not two, but neither is it one; rather, it is both, because though we know that this interdependent and inextricable connection exists, we cannot be certain of its specifics. We cannot confirm how to define when a connection coincides with whatever it is we are pondering. For example, to return to the classic dualism, there is the mind and the body, and there is what we think these two things are and how they are connected, and we know that there is some sort of connection, but we cannot be certain of how it is connected and whether or not our understanding of this connection and our conceptions of mind and body coincide with what they truly are.

While this may sound a bit empty at first, as it essentially says that we really cannot know much, generally speaking, this is only because what is important is not what something really is, but rather what we think something is. This is a very human-centered approach, as it argues that we and what we think is what is most important. And this is because for pragmatists in general, it is not the truthfulness of something that is important, per se, since we cannot really know that for sure, but rather how useful, practical, and applicable something is based on what we think it is. The value of something to a human being is important. Some understandings are simply more useful for the human race, and we should focus on pondering that rather than whether or not those understandings are actually accurate, truthful, in and of themselves. The goal of pragmatism generally is not really an end of inquiry, rather a focus is on pondering the usefulness of some thing or some belief. Inquiry goes on forever really, as inquiry exists
essentially along a continuum, just as history does, as will be elaborated on throughout this dissertation.

And to continue with this concept of anti-dualism, a next key argument is that we cannot really truly know metaphysical topics such as the truth, reality, history, etcetera, because there is what they are, and there is what we think they are, and we cannot know if they ever coincide, generally speaking. This is also because everything is manifested in individual perspectives, none of which are true or false, they are just what we can know. This, as we shall see, is key in Ortega's philosophy. One specific instance of this that will be explored is Ortega's maxim "yo soy yo y mi circunstancia," which will be argued here we can understand as comprising this intricate relationship of interdependency in this separate-but-united concept in which the yo and the circunstancias are different and distinct, but in his philosophy together they create our realities in every moment, as we are always living as ourselves among and interaction with our circumstances.

There are thus as many interpretations as there are perspectives (for example, of the truth, reality, history, etcetera). This applies, therefore, also to history.

As such, history is subjective, individual, and impossible to record entirely, or completely objectively, as it is anti-dualistic as well.

There is history, and then there is what we think it is and record it as, and it all will not ever fully coincide, nor in entirety.

But we can find some trends of trends, nonetheless. Everything is manifested in individual perspectives because all we understand as truth, reality, history, etcetera, arguably tell
us more about the perspective, and the time of that perspective, more than the contents themselves; in other words, everything is 'perspectival' and historical. Everything is constantly being re-studied and re-understood; as such everything is historical. And what matters most is the way we experience something, rather than the experience in and of itself, because it is what we can study.

And finally all of this must then be applied to creating a better and stronger methodology for the study of history, while keeping in mind of course this is all just an imaginary philosophical dialogue that should also be considered to proceed along a continuum as well, and as such remain unfinished. The goal here is to provoke and inspire more investigation into these relatively unexplored and little researched topics between pragmatism, historicism and the philosophy of José Ortega y Gasset.

It must be reiterated that again this is all simply an imaginary dialogue, and at no time are specific similarities being drawn (unless quoted as such by other authors, such as Graham cited previously). This is all just a study on some areas in which perhaps Ortega might have conversed with these three pragmatists. And because the goal is to envision a pragmatist dialogue in Ortega, many of the same topics will be revisited in all three parts with the three different pragmatists as continued evidence for the possibility to imagine this discourse within Ortega's work. In other words, in the effort to imagine how Ortega might be able to dialogue with pragmatism, we must look at three different pragmatists (so as to not be a study on just one imagined exchange), and by necessity, therefore, also many of the same topics, especially those fundamental to pragmatism and Ortega.
To recap the technical details: this way of elaborating a dialogue implies that the same topic or issue will be revisited throughout this paper in various moments of the "conversation," though there will be new, innovative nuances and interpretations added for each visit. First presented are the fundamental, foundational topics of conversation, from which each author's view will be explored in profundity, subsequently leading next to points of possible dialogue. Still, as has been declared, this is not a comparative study between thinkers. Nor is it a study that looks for the roots of these authors' work. This study is not one that asserts any possible direct mutual influences. Nor is this only a study of just the thought of Ortega, Dewey, James, or Schiller, in and of themselves. Nonetheless, to be able to imagine and create a possible dialogue among each of these three pragmatists with Ortega, we must base ourselves in their thought and work first, and in what other authors have had to say about it. So again the objective here is not to present and elaborate on the knowledge and understanding of their thought and work, per se, or in and of itself, but rather, it is more so about utilizing all this to develop and expand upon a possible dialogue, and from this point reflect and ponder more broadly the meaning that this can have for history, its study, and the philosophy of history, along with a specific area of Ortega's philosophy concretely.

Although the original purpose behind this thesis was to study Ortega and use pragmatism as a lens for new, and possibly better, ways of understanding his thought, during the process several additional discoveries have been made to also present some new lines of investigation about pragmatism itself, emphasizing the possibility of the inherent, yet perhaps largely ignored, concept of history. Thus, what has been developed is a possible dialogue between Ortega and Pragmatism, as well as new ways to understand Historicism and the meaning we give to the concept of history from a specifically pragmatist perspective; from within Pragmatism.
Part One:

Anti-Dualism in History and Nature: A Possible Dialogue

between John Dewey and José Ortega y Gasset
Section I: Fundamentals toward a Philosophy of History

I. Introduction

Why should we study history? Spanish Philosopher José Ortega y Gasset answered "Necesitamos de la historia íntegra para ver si logramos escapar de ella, no recaer en ella."24 If a central focus of the study of history, therefore, is to learn which have been errors we should avoid in the future, most fundamentally, then history is one form of study of humanity. But the combination of this focus on errors, and what is by necessity a subjective focus of human beings, means that it is by no means simple, easy, or perhaps even truly possible to formulate a systematic study for the discipline, such as that which we have developed for some other subjects, such as mathematics. It is essentially impossible to record history 'perfectly;' to document every second, every perspective, every connection, etcetera, from every event. So because it is, thus, so difficult to study, yet so important given that the subject matter is ourselves, our own species, its importance cannot be overestimated. Nor, therefore, can there be too much philosophical study on the meaning of history, how it relates to humanity, as well as how it should be studied and recorded, because of this virtual impossibility for the study of the study of history to truly ever end (this is a topic that will be explored at great length throughout this dissertation).

This was all of great interest and importance to Ortega, as he wrote volumes on these topics and issues on history. For this reason, inquiry into his thought on the meaning of history and how it should be interpreted is a challenging and precipitous task indeed. And perhaps even

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24 ORTEGA Y GASSET, José: La rebelión de las masas, p. 159. (Subsequently referred to as: Rebelión.)
particularly more exigent and formidable is the main attempt here to find a dialogue that
dialogues between these views of Ortega's with those of John Dewey (as well as with William
James and Ferdinand Schiller in the following two parts), a contemporary twentieth century
American Philosopher who not only wrote very little on the specific subject of history, but whose
general philosophical leanings are usually considered nowhere near those of Ortega's. Hence, in
developing a study between these two and their thought on history; most generally speaking, its
meaning, study, and relation to humanity, as declared from the start, what is proposed here is
simply a possible dialogue between the two thinkers in this first section (and two more possible
dialogues in the next two sections). Moreover, the focus here will also always be on how some
similar stratum in their diverse layers of thought (which not only is very different in many ways,
but even over the course of their own work shifted and changed themselves as true for many
thinkers in history of course), can be at least partially correlated as a way in which in some of
Dewey's thought can help us better understand that of Ortega's in some very specific
instances. Thus, here we have a conversational study, a dialogue, and not a comparison and contrast or
work about influences. Again as stated at the start, here the objective is simply to create a
possible dialogue between Ortega and Dewey that perhaps can help us better understand some
parts of Ortega's philosophy, and possibly provide new interpretations of his thought.

As specified in the introduction, the main instance of this that is explored here is in
regards to Ortega's historicist maxim ‘man has no nature, what he has is history,’ which, as
argued here, can be partly understood through a pragmatist basis of anti-dualism. Again the
thesis here is that it is not that man has no nature, per se, rather that history is his nature because
the two are anti-dualistic concepts; history is our nature because it is comprised of, as famously
posed by Ortega, “myself and my circumstance.” This will arguably dialogue smoothly, as we shall see, with Dewey given the strong element of anti-dualism in his philosophy.

And as we shall further see, neither philosopher negates that “preparedness,” or “nature,” influences our being and behavior, rather they are arguing, more importantly, that “plasticity,” or nurture, plays a greater role given that this encompasses “nature” when we relate Ortega’s application of “history” to Dewey’s use of “experience.”

Our “experiences” create our history, and interpretations as to the nature of them are not only potentially infinite, but they are just that—interpretations, which can also change over time. Hence, one of the central arguments developed here is that what we truly are is our history.

The first part of this potential, possible dialogue, or what we can call a sort of "conversational study" between Ortega and Dewey, focuses on the fundamentals in building a philosophical study on the subject of history, including general metaphysics on life, experience, nature, as well as on epistemology, truth, reality, and value. Also included of course in this first part is a brief biographical and philosophical background on these two thinkers.

The second part then will take all this study from the first part in an effort to find some possible cohesion and correlation between it all in the specific focus of the antidualism in Ortega's thought on history and human nature (as of course it is a study of humanity), as one part of how it should be studied and interpreted. The objective, therefore, is again to conclude how

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25 It is argued that Dewey perhaps wanted to change the term "experience" for "culture," as Hickman explains, "It is well known that Dewey came to question the use of the term experience and hoped to replace it with culture. [...] Nature, he presents this new term as an extension, not a rejection, of experience. "Experience" is a word used to designate, in a summary fashion, the complex of all which is distinctly human.... "Culture" includes the material and the ideal in their reciprocal interrelationships and (in marked contrast with the prevailing use of "experience") "culture" designates, also in their reciprocal interconnections, that immense diversity of human affairs, interests, concerns, values which compartmentalists pigeonhole under "religion," "morals," "aesthetics," "politics," "economics," etc., etc." (From: DEWEY, John: Unmodern Philosophy and Modern Philosophy, pp. 166-67). (Subsequently referred to as: Philosophy.)
Dewey (just as one potential source of course) can maybe help us better understand Ortega’s thought on history. Analyzed in the second section of this first part are their meditations on the instrumentalism of history, as well as on how it is defined and should be studied. Again, although these two philosophers are not frequently linked, a dialogue will be envisioned in the basic, Deweyen pragmatist antidualism, an elder of Ortega. And even though Dewey, unlike Ortega, wrote little on specifically the discipline of history, much of it was arguably indeed fundamentally historical, which is part of what is specifically less studied and more innovative here in this dissertation. Hence again in summary what will be explored here is a potential dialogue between the two important twentieth century thinkers.

On several occasions José Ortega y Gasset has said that “clarity is the philosopher’s courtesy.”26 His notion that “Man has no nature, only history” is no exception to this, as it is one of the most polemical yet fundamental concepts in what we should properly call José Ortega y Gasset’s “meditations” on history (for Ortega believes that a “philosophy of history” is a “misnomer”).27 Nonetheless, if we analyze the many philosophical and etymological meanings of the terms “nature” and “history” with those of Ortega’s, we shall find that again it is not that man does not have a nature, per se, but rather that man’s nature is his history because these two

26 See: ORTEGA Y GASSET, José: *Una interpretación de la historia universal*, p. 39. (Subsequently referred to as: *Interpretación.*) The quote in Spanish is as follows: “la claridad es la cortesía del filósofo.” This book is a series of lectures given by Ortega between 1948 and 1949. Dewey once said something similar about being a philosopher when he pondered the following questions for the evaluation of philosophical study: “Does it end in conclusions which, when they are referred back to ordinary life-experiences and their predicaments, render them more significant, more luminous to us, and make our dealings with them more fruitful? Or does it terminate in rendering the things of ordinary experience more opaque than they were before, and in depriving them of having in “reality” even the significance they had previously seemed to have?” (From: DEWEY, John: *Experience and Nature*, p. 7). (Subsequently referred to as: *Experience and Nature.*) (Originally published in 1925.)

27 The original quote in Spanish is as follows: "Llamar algo <<filosofía de la historia>> partía del hecho de que se tenía la idea más confusa de la filosofía y se pensaba que de todo puede hacerse filosofía. [...] Mas no hay tal filosofía de la historia” (Ortega, *Interpretación*, p. 26).
terms are anti-dualistic. In other words, man’s nature is history; history is our nature—this is Ortega’s notion of human reality.

El hombre, no tiene naturaleza, lo que tiene es historia; porque historia es el modo de ser de un ente que es constitutivamente, radicalmente, movilidad y cambio. [...] El hombre es hoy lo que es porque ayer fue otra cosa. ¡Ah! Entonces, para entender lo que hoy es basta con que nos cuenten lo que ayer fue.²⁸

Or, more succinctly, "lo único que el hombre tiene de ser, de 'naturaleza', es lo que ha sido".²⁹

So man or woman has “no nature” in part because each person is much more than just his or her “yo;” he or she is his or her yo y mi circunstancia and not an independent being, ontologically speaking.³⁰ This is our anti-dualistic human reality because the two can never be separated since they represent more so a continuum, as our lives are defined as “ourselves within our lives’ circumstances.”³¹ As Ortega argues, life is,

[…] constituida por dos dimensiones, inseparable la una de la otra y que quiero dejar destacadas ante ustedes con toda claridad. En su dimensión primaria vivir es estar yo, el

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²⁸ORTEGA Y GASSET, José: Obras Completas Tomo XII, p. 237.
²⁹Quoted in: RABADE, S: Ortega y Gasset, Filósofo, 62.
³⁰See: FERRATER MORA, J.: Three Spanish Philosophers: Unamuno, Ortega, and Ferrater Mora. (Subsequently referred to as: Spanish Philosophers.)
³¹In Ortega's meditations, "circumstances" is used in quite a general sense, as it is essentially every person, place, and thing that surrounds us. But most fundamentally, it is something "temporal" (hence, as we shall see, why 'man is his history'); "[...] la circunstancia no se compone sólo de cosas en sentido estricto, sino también de personas: la circunstancia es también sociedad humana, el mundo es también <<<mundo>>> en el sentido social" (ORTEGA Y GASSET, José: Unas lecciones de metafísica, p. 62). (Subsequently referred to as: Metafísica.)
Moreover, as Ortega consistently argues, life is not just ‘given to us ready-made;’ life is a drama that we find ourselves in. And in this “drama” we face certain circumstances unique to each one of us (though some can overlap with those of others). Ortega writes, "Cada hombre—y claro está, cada mujer—tiene su mundo o circunstancia que se parece más o menos a la del prójimo, pero que siempre tiene algunos elementos distintos" Each epoch brings with it a different set of circumstances, and in every moment each of us has to decide how to interpret them and what to do next. For Ortega, therefore, man is free in the specific sense that he can choose how he will react and who he is going to be. Man has a limited freedom, which is a topic that can be envisioned to especially dialogue smoothly with Schiller as we will see in the third part. This is why history, or what we can call human or man’s nature, is “permanente inquietud y mutación.” And this is part of why man has no nature because he simply has too many ‘possibilities’ to choose from. Life, according to Ortega, is a continual “quehacer,” as A. García explains in El laberinto de la razón: Ortega y Heidegger,

No tener naturaleza implica que el hombre no es cosa ni cuerpo, alma o conciencia, sino que el hombre es un drama, ser insustancial, nuevo homo viator, <<peregrino del ser>>.

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32 This Ortega repeats in many of his writings. As one example, see ORTEGA Y GASSET, José: En torno a Galileo, p. 71. (Subsequently referred to as: Galileo.)

33 Perhaps one here can think of Shakespeare’s idea of “all the world’s a stage.”

34 Ortega, Metafísica, p. 95.

cuya esencia consiste en querer ser lo que todavía no es, lo que convierte su vida en un continuo quehacer.  

History, therefore, is what man has, which would be his story of his ‘becoming.’ But to move toward the future, all we have to base our decisions on is our contemplation and interpretation of the past; “el hombre hace historia porque ante el futuro, que no está en su mano, se encuentra con lo único que tiene, que posee, es su pasado.” Thus, concisely stated, the past, or history, is man’s nature, “En suma, que el hombre no tiene naturaleza, sino que tiene... historia. O, lo que es igual: lo que la naturaleza es a las cosas, es la historia—como res gestae—al hombre.” In the English version this is succinctly translated as the following: “[...] the past is man’s nature.” Further, as discussed in the introduction, history is to be understood here as not just the past, but also the present and the future; as a continuum, thus in part how it can be our nature.

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As Graham argues, “It [Ortega’s “vital reason”] was something (un quehacer) for anyone or everyone (cada cual) to “do” in life, by using concepts as “instruments”—a viewpoint so pragmatic that it recalls Dewey” (From: GRAHAM, John: A Pragmatist Philosophy of Life in Ortega y Gasset, p. 164. (Subsequently referred to as: Pragmatist Philosophy.)

37 Ortega y Gasset, Galileo, p. 143.

38 See: ORTEGA Y GASSET, José: Historia como sistema, p. 48. (Subsequently referred to as: Historia.) (Originally published in 1941.)

39 ORTEGA Y GASSET, José: History as a System, p. 62. (Subsequently referred to as: History.) (Translated to English in 1941.)
II. Ortega and Dewey: Two Contemporaries

In order to further contemplate this and better understand what Ortega might have meant with his polemical phrase “man has no nature, only history,” as noted, explored here in this first section will be American contemporary John Dewey’s conceptions of his terms of “experience” and “nature,” as one source of potential exchange. It must be noted, however, that Dewey is of course not the only arguable possible source to relate here in regards to this idea that ‘man is his history’ in Ortega’s meditations, for we know that Wilhelm Dilthey in particular also had a significant impact on these subsequent general meditations on history of Ortega’s, as just one of the more studied examples. And this is of course not to mention that this general philosophical viewpoint that ‘humans are their history’ is certainly not new, neither to Ortega nor to Dewey. But again what is relatively unconventional and to some degree novel here is the attempt to find possible correlations between this philosophy of history with American pragmatism and Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset. And again additionally innovative here is to interpret the nature of history in Ortega’s thought to dialogue with Dewey's pragmatist conception of "experience."

There have been raised, nonetheless, arguments that in a general sense, the social thought of Ortega began with a pragmatist basis, in part, and had a subsequently consistent impact on his meditations. And pragmatism is defined by Dewey in one instance from 1922 as the following: “a “historical empiricism,” but with this fundamental difference, that it does not insist upon antecedent phenomena but upon consequent phenomena; not upon the precedents but upon the
possibilities of action.”⁴⁰ So there is a connection here of historicism (i.e., antecedent/precedent) even though the focus on is on the future (i.e., consequent/possibilities). And this possible pragmatist impact upon Ortega is particularly apparent in his meditations on history, as despite the lack of study on this there is arguably a connection here with historical research in Dewey’s vision of pragmatism, and as we shall see, in part specifically this instrumentalist and practical application of the study of the past for the future.⁴¹ Moreover, in further exploring this possible dialogue, one scholar has even gone as far as to consider Ortega even more “consistent as a pragmatist than Dewey.”⁴² As J. T. Graham argues, “It [Ortega’s “vital reason”] was something (un quehacer) for anyone or everyone (cada cual) to “do” in life, by using concepts as “instruments”—a viewpoint so pragmatic that it recalls Dewey.”⁴³

The research and work of Graham will be quoted frequently in this dissertation, as it is one of the very few direct studies between Ortega and pragmatism. However, given the lack of research and scholarship on this topic, it must be maintained throughout this thesis that these quotes are just arguments and not meant at any time to be considered any degree of declaration of fact or parallel. Furthermore, it must also be inserted as a note here that given fellow contemporary Spanish Philosopher Miguel de Unamuno's known interest in American pragmatism, this could arguably have been another means of exposure to this philosophical movement for Ortega. Given the newness of Graham's arguments, we cannot approach his work

⁴⁰ See: DEWEY, John and ed. McDERMOTT, John: The Philosophy of John Dewey Two Volumes in One: 1 The Structure of Experience 2 The Lived Experience, p. 50  (Subsequently referred to as: Philosophy of Dewey.) This book is a compilation of various works by Dewey.


⁴² Ibid., footnote p. 10.

⁴³ Graham, A Pragmatist Philosophy, p. 164.
yet as directly authoritative. This is all because again as noted, Ortega is not usually correlated in any way with American pragmatism. Though as Graham points out, perhaps part of the reason for this is that "[…] after 1898, for a young Spanish philosopher aspiring to a national chair of metaphysics, having professed publicly a close affiliation with James would probably have been fatal to his reputation and career."\(^\text{44}\) This is a strong and plausible argument indeed.

Ortega did once comment on pragmatism that it deserves "escasa estimación" ("small esteem"), and he declared that “el pragmatismo norteamericano se ha atrevido a proclamar esta tesis: 'No hay más verdad que el buen éxito en el trato de las cosas.' Y con esta tesis, tan audaz como ingenua, tan ingenuamente audaz, ha hecho su ingreso en la historia milenaria de la filosofía el lóbulo norte del continente americano."\(^\text{45}\) And while this is a negative view, clearly, it does demonstrate that he was at least somewhat read in pragmatism; this tells us that he did know enough of pragmatism to formulate a concluding opinion about it, to say the least.

So regardless of whatever the argued extent of this pragmatist correlation with Ortega may be, what most certainly cannot be denied is that Ortega, at the very least, read some pragmatist philosophy, for which we find evidence of within his own library of general books on American philosophy and pragmatism.\(^\text{46}\) Moreover, many of these two philosophers’ books were published almost contemporaneously.

\(^{44}\) Graham, *Pragmatist Philosophy*, p. 146.

\(^{45}\) ORTEGA Y GASSET, José: ¿Qué es filosofía?, p. 36.

While not many have linked Ortega with pragmatism, and especially with Deweyan pragmatism, J. T. Graham elaborates a great deal on his pragmatist basis in all the three books in his series on Ortega.

\(^{46}\) See: Graham, *Systematic Synthesis*, pp. xx-xxi, footnote 11, as well as Graham, *Pragmatist Philosophy*, p. 149, footnote II. Moreover, Graham argues that two of the anonymous articles in the *Encyclopédia universal ilustrada* on pragmatism and William James are likely to be in fact authored by Ortega (see page xix). Perhaps James had a
But most importantly, the topics being explored here in this first part are the possible imaginary conversations that can be drawn between American pragmatist John Dewey and Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset, regardless of when their books were published or whether or not any admission of influence or agreement was made. We can never know with certainty how long either of the two spent thinking, researching, and writing. We generally only have access to lecture dates (and still in this case we cannot know for sure how long was spent thinking about and preparing a lecture), and publication years. Even reference to their personal libraries is insufficient, for it is also possible that books were borrowed. Again this will be important to keep in mind throughout this dissertation: the reading here is simply a hypothetical dialogue.

The greater impact of all the pragmatists on Ortega’s thought, though Dewey was probably the next pragmatist in order of influence. In the entry in the Enciclopedia universal ilustrada on pragmatismo, there are some excerpts that appear to support this assertion that it was authored by Ortega. For example, in the section on the critiques of American pragmatism, it reads, “[…] it seems that the pragmatist has never asked why a belief drives us more than an other to action” [my translation]. The original quote in Spanish is as follows: “[…] parece que el pragmatista no se ha preguntado jamás por qué una creencia nos conduce mejor que otra a la acción” (Ibid., p. 1251). This could be identified with Ortega’s stern insistence upon the strength and power of beliefs, as there is a very important distinction in his philosophy between “ideas” and “beliefs,” as the latter are in a sense the former that become part of us. “Beliefs,” per Ortega’s meditations, are the bases of our lives, and they are thus the core of his “razón histórica.” As Ortega declares in his article, “Los <<nuevos>> Estados Unidos,” “The error of pragmatism does not lie in how pragmatism considers ideas as instruments, rather it lies in wanting to reduce the things which man has to have perceptibly and experimentally, that which is in his hands and present, minerals, plants, animals, and stars. […] If it were like this, life would resultantly be an easy task, perhaps determined with a certain fullness for milleniums” [my translation]. The original quote in Spanish is as follows: “El error del pragmatismo no radica en que considere las ideas como instrumentos, sino en que quiera reducir las cosas con que el hombre tiene que habérselas a lo perceptible y experimentable, lo que está a la mano y presente, el mineral, la planta, el animal y la estrella. […] Si así fuese, la vida resultaría faena fácil, tal vez resuelta con cierta plenitud hace milenios” (From: ORTEGA Y GASSET, José: Obras Completas Tomo IV, pp. 257-258).
III. Biographical Backgrounds

Before examining the philosophy of Ortega and Dewey, perhaps it is appropriate to first consider a bit of their biographies in an effort to at least in part better understand the time period in which they matured into the philosophers that they became. This is indeed important because, as argued here, we are our histories. Each individual is his "yo y mi circunstancia," and part of those circumstances; a main part of that history, is the historical time period in which they lived.

José Ortega y Gasset was born in Madrid on the 9th of May in 1883. This was a time which, especially his country, was on the verge of major transitions. The close of the nineteenth century brought Spain especially much political and cultural instability and conflict, which of course would have a tremendous impact on the thought of Ortega. Politically, the traditional monarchical model, and its fusion earlier in the nineteenth century with a parliamentary system, would come to be critiqued as no longer abreast of the times. While the rest of Europe gradually became more secular, Spain seemed to some to lag behind as considered by those, 'dragged down by the Catholic faith.' And this would be challenged as the close of the nineteenth century's new intellectual and scientific explorations would, in a general sense, now offer new systems of thought, thereby providing new ideas of reality, progress, history, life, just to cite a few, making Catholicism and Christianity no longer the sole authority on these matters. For example, there was Darwin and his studies on natural selection. There was also Hegel and his philosophical studies on the teleology of history in its movement toward an "absolute Spirit." Freud and his development of psychoanalysis must also be referenced, as well as Nietzsche and his proclamation of the 'death of God.' This would have a particularly important impact on the philosophy of Ortega, as central to much of his philosophy was his urging for Spain to move on a
path of "Europeanization;" for the country to modernize itself through political reform parallel to that in much of the rest of Europe. And this was also likely part of the reason that Ortega was motivated to do much of his collegiate studies abroad in Germany, which in his view was the defining nation in terms of progress and modernity within Europe at that time.

Culturally, this new arsenal of systems of thought, while in some instances created a thriving and creative intellectual environment, in others only led to further confusion and at times disillusionment. Given how long the Catholic faith had been the dominant foundation of society and culture, developing new structures of government, new visions of life, to reference a few, would take time, and Catholicism's loss of stature and authority would need to be compensated somehow. So during this time, therefore, the idea of the "historicity" of humans, humanity, and nations, would become redefined and important in new ways. And Ortega would be one of those key figures analyzing and redefining the meaning and study of history.

The end of the nineteenth century would completely redefine not only Spain's place and role in the world, but the country's national identity within as well. The nation's colonial and economic rise in the fifteenth century that eventually led to Spain being the greatest world power of its time would come to lose its last colony in 1898 at the close of the Spanish-American War (despite the gradual decline since the seventeenth century). This created a tension, a feeling of disillusionment, and a split among the intellectuals of the times in regards to how to alleviate and mend this new definition of Spain itself, as well as Spain's place in the world. Ortega was on the side of those who were known as the "europeizantes," seeing himself as a "prophet" of sorts who would lead the country into European modernization, as opposed to the "hispanizantes," who
thought that the opposite direction of focusing on regaining the roots of the traditions and culture of Spain was what was most necessary.47

Ortega received his college degree in philosophy in 1902 from the University of Madrid, though he had initially started with Law. Subsequently he went abroad to Germany for his graduate work, studying at the University of Marburg until 1908. In 1910 Ortega began teaching metaphysics back at the University of Madrid.

Ortega was a prolific writer, as the total of his works span ten volumes, which include not only many books, but also quite a lot of writing for various periodicals as well, some of which he had founded himself, such as España and El Espectador (Ortega came from a long line of journalists, in fact). From the start of the Spanish Civil War in 1936 until the end of World War Two in 1945, Ortega was a voluntary exile because of his support of the Spanish Republic, living abroad first in Argentina and then Portugal. After his return to Spain, he would continue writing of course, and in 1948 he founded the Institute of Humanities in Madrid. From then until the end of his life in 1955, Ortega would continue his writing and lecturing throughout the western world, traveling not only all around Europe, but also holding a conference in the United States as well.

Ortega ventured into many different topics and issues in his manifold of writings, covering almost every traditional area of philosophical study. But Ortega is perhaps most often known for his thought on razón vital, or the 'metaphysics of vital reason,' and his perspectivismo, or 'perspectival epistemology.' Most tersely summarized, in Ortega's thought every individual

47Hence the formation of the "generación del 98" as a result of this historical disillusionment, which led to the artistic and cultural exploration of an objective to "regenerate" Spain in art such as via Picasso, García Lorca, or in philosophy through figures such as Ortega and Unamuno.
ultimately has a unique perspective because each person's life is comprised of the distinct interactions between one's self and the circumstances that surround him or her ("yo soy yo y mi circunstancia"), so there is a constant dynamic and interdependent interaction between the self and our circumstances; people, places, things. And this is what defines each self's reality. Moreover, this also leads to each self's truths, which is therefore 'perspectival' because it arises from a unique point of view that results from this distinct interaction between self and circumstances for each individual. Hence we cannot say that any perspective is false, and what we can say is that they are each simply unique; a falsity is to say that any one perspective is absolute. Ortega's philosophy of course will be looked at in depth throughout.

American John Dewey was an elder of Ortega, born twenty-four years earlier on the 20th of October, 1859, in Burlington, Vermont. Having grown up in Vermont, he was influenced early in life by the region's congregationalism. He would, however, come to distance himself from Christianity in general. During the second half of the nineteenth century, for the most part the United States enjoyed a gradual movement toward greater prominence on the world scene, thanks in part, in fact, to the country's victory in the Spanish-American War (hence, for example, one possible explanation of many for why it is not always so easy to find much proof of Ortega having read much of Dewey's work, or of any American pragmatist, because of the general negative sentiment within Spain toward the United States). Reconstruction was in full force, but racism was still rampant in the southern United States especially. Overall the country appeared to be benefiting from its post-war integration. And the country was continuing to expand, as additional states such as Alaska and California were incorporated in the westward expansion. Industrialization was booming, railroads were expanding, cities were growing, and the "Gold Rush" in the west was also adding to increasing the wealth of individuals and the country as a
whole. Moreover, the dominant *laissez faire* attitude at the time toward work and the economy led to some monopolies that in turn created some social strife where workers rights were not being respected and gaps in wealth began to widen. The nation's defeat of Spain in the war of 1898 redefined the United States as the potentially next imperial and military power, though of course in ways that would be distinctively "American," as the general consensus was to remain separate and distinct from Europe despite the many shared heritages. Still, though it was not always effective or successful, the United States progressively promoted an "open door" policy with the world in regards to trading, importing, and exporting, which would be another means toward the country's prodigious economic growth during this time. This blossoming appeared to be contagious, as the second half of the nineteenth century witnessed the highest numbers of immigration that the country had yet seen. The United States became a country even more culturally diverse, which also, however, resulted in tensing further the race relations throughout the nation. This historical background on the United States mostly overlaps all the relatively contemporaneous thinkers explored here in this thesis.

John Dewey received his bachelor's degree from the University of Vermont in 1879, after which he first began a career as a high school educator. During this time his interest in philosophy began to grow, and two years later he decided to apply to Johns Hopkins University to pursue a degree in philosophy (though he would have much preferred to do so abroad, he could not afford it at that time). At John Hopkins Dewey studied with other important thinkers such as Pierce, Hall, and Morris, and he was particularly impacted by the Hegelian idealism in Morris's thought. In 1884 he received his Doctorate in Philosophy and subsequently began his career as a university professor, teaching at various schools, including the University of Michigan and the University of Chicago, but he would end up for most of his life teaching at
Columbia University in New York. While he was at the University of Michigan, he encountered the social psychologist George Herbert Mead, who played an important role in specifically Dewey's development on his philosophy on psychology. Dewey was strongly interested in social and political philosophy, and was involved in a number of key groups working to affect change in the United States, such as the NAACP (National Association of Colored People), The American Civil Liberties Union, the League of Industrial Democracy, the New York Teachers Union, the American Association of University Professors, and Jane Addams's Hull House. He was indeed a social activist. And he wanted to influence and develop a democracy that was flexible and adaptive to all the changes and tumultuous events that occurred during his lifetime.

Dewey would come to be considered one of the three founders of "American Pragmatism," though it must be noted that Dewey was never comfortable with that term to describe his philosophy; in fact, he preferred "empirical naturalism," "naturalistic empiricism," or "naturalistic humanism" to classify his work. To understand Dewey's philosophy, therefore, a basic foundation that needs to be applied is to use the term "pragmatic" rather than "pragmatism," because his emphasis, as we shall see throughout here, in a general sense, is often upon the consequences as an important part of experimentation. The concept of experimentation in general is key in pragmatism, because it implies that something can change, adapt, conform, as so many studies are essentially never finished, especially in the case of human studies. As Davaney explains, and in reference here to a specific historicist point of dialogue that will be envisioned with Ortega in further depth ahead,

Dewey's understanding of science and, in particular, of the scientific method did not interpret these as means to some new certitude but as thoroughly historical and finite
efforts at understanding. Claims developed out of the procedure of observation, theorizing, and experimentation are always open to criticism and revision. As conditions change, as values undergo revision, as the range of humane potential is enlarged or restricted, so too, will our human interpretations of them and our theories for improving them be open to question and alteration.  

Pragmatism in general does not really aim to find "ends of inquiry," as aforementioned it is more about the usefulness of our inquiries that interest pragmatists. Initially, Dewey's notion of experience was quite Hegelian in that he was first focused on empirical idealism, but as his work developed he came to deviate from traditional thought in this to one all his own in which he added several stages. First there is this basic immediate experience, and then there is "cognitive experience," which is the result of inquiry that arises when a problem is confronted in experience that we work to resolve. Cognitive inquiry, therefore, is a process in which we take all this reflection, and combined with knowledge we come to understand an integrated whole experience from these sources and problems of experiences that we are inquiring about. But it is important to note that in Dewey's philosophy, none of this is to say that any of this results in any absolute certainties, per se, as we shall see ahead in greater depth and specific examples, which is why he terms these 'results' to have only "warranted assertability." We create concepts, therefore, that are 'instrumental' because they help orient and guide us in the future; in our 'future experienced worlds.' Thus, also fundamental in his philosophy is the need to rid ourselves of the classical notions of dualisms because our knowledge is functional—such as, notions of experience and nature, because one is not independent from the other, but rather they interact, and they are developing.

48 Davaney, *Historicism*, p. 86.
As we shall also see, there is further a potential dialogue here with Ortega's *yo y mi circunstancia* in that Dewey argues that there is an interaction between the organic (such as human nature) and the environmental; "In its comprehensive function, experience denotes organic-environmental interactivity, and as a "double-barreled" term, in standing for both modes of experiencing and that which is experienced."⁴⁹ Dewey uses the term "organic" because as will be argued, he, and Ortega, essentially simply prefer to use other terms rather than "nature."⁵⁰ Neither denies the existence of nature, what they deny is the great emphasis on the traditional uses of the terms throughout history, and they are both essentially "re-defining" this. For Ortega, "history" is simply the better term. Along with "organic," Dewey also uses the expression "environmental" in place of "nature," which we can understand as involving one's *environmental circumstances* of the time, thus being another point of possible conversation with Ortega (in his *yo y mi circunstancia*).

In another instance, Dewey defines "experience" as essentially the process of experiencing and that which is experienced, and the "interactivity" between the two. As he explained, "experience" into certain ways of experiencing and into certain subject matters experienced, the former constituting the organic components that dominate in an interactivity while the latter are environmental factors that enter most directly and conspicuously into the interactivity undergoing analysis."⁵¹ As he further goes on to explain, this is a "genetic-functional" method in which all is placed in context via inquiry, which consists of the interactivities of life, and that is both temporal and spacial in a continuous manner. By using the


⁵⁰ Dewey, in fact, wrote at great length on this, which has been newly discovered and can be found in the book *Modern and Unmodern Philosophy*.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 5429-5431.
verbal conjugation of experiencing; the present progressive, he is highlighting the present yet uncompleted character of the process of experience; hence the idea that it is a continuum. And he also says the things experienced, which emphasizes both a somewhat solid and past notion. So here we also find a possible point of dialogue with Ortega in noting the historical element in this, as "experience" is also a form of 'experiencing of the experienced, or the past,' as for Ortega, our past is what makes us; we are our histories.

This of course is a central topic for an imagined conversation between the two that will be explored in great depth. And further for Dewey, this all then leads to creating whatever will be the future focus. As a clear and concise example, in one instance he references the process of a child touching a hot stove, and learning as a result not to do it again in the future. A child will not continue to touch a hot stove because the child went through the experiencing of pain from heat, of the experienced, the burn. This will all be explored further in more detail ahead.

Returning for a moment to the biographical backgrounds, what follows will briefly reference the contemporaneity of the two figures, which is relevant to lend more credence to this investigative work. It was during the first half of the twentieth century that both philosophers did most of their writing, as John Dewey passed away in 1952, and José Ortega y Gasset in 1955. In regards to major works (considering both were prolific writers), Dewey published his first book in 1887, and Ortega in 1914. Respectively, their final books were published in 1949 and 1950 (though there were of course posthumous publications of both). Nobody alive during this time, anywhere on the globe, could have escaped being influenced in some form or another by the numerous significant events during this period. There was the Great War that consumed much of

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52 “Only because the heat-pain quale enters into the same circuit of experience with the optical-ocular and muscular quales, does the child learn from the experience and get the ability to avoid the experience in the future” (From: Dewey, Philosophy of Dewey, p. 138).
Europe and the United States from 1914-1918. Next the so-termed "Spanish flu" during the year following the end of the war took more lives than the total lost in the First World War, spreading further darkness and depression around the world (and soon to be followed by yet more; the Great Depression and then the Second World War). While many in the west lived a brief period of bliss during the "roaring twenties," especially in the United States, this would soon come to a crashing halt with the Great Depression that started in the United States after the crash of the stock market in 1929 spread like wildfire around the globe, bringing economic recession and misery to many countries.

Spain also enjoyed, nevertheless, some periods of relative harmony from the latter part of the nineteenth century to 1923, when the monarchy was restored and some significant economic growth was experienced. But neither Spain nor the United States were able to avoid more war in the twentieth century, however, as the former fought a bitter three-year Civil War from 1936 to 1939, and the latter abroad in both World Wars (not to mention also the Spanish Civil War, as the "Abraham Lincoln Brigade," as they were known, was a relatively small group of under 3,000 Americans sent to help defend the Spanish Republic against the Fascist/Nationalist rebellion led by Franco). In the end, however, a dictatorship was subsequently installed in Spain under General Francisco Franco (the end of which Ortega was never able to witness). Also after the Spanish Civil War, regionalism became even more intense, as Catalan and Basque separatist movements strengthened.

For the most part, the United States, on the other hand, despite the humanitarian losses in the two World Wars, was able to bounce back mostly, especially economically, and fairly rapidly given all the wartime industry production, and the nation continued its rise toward being a world
power started during the close of the nineteenth century. Though this is all of course just a brief sketch of the first half of the twentieth century in Spain and the United States, it was under these circumstances that Ortega and Dewey were doing most of their writing, and as argued here, because we are our histories, it is important to consider of course, among other elements, the historical period we live in because it defines a significant part of us.
IV. On Life

So both Ortega and Dewey lived through some of the most tumultuous periods that the world has witnessed in the past several centuries (in fact, the twentieth century is classified as one of the most violent to date; more people were either killed or allowed to die in the twentieth century than any other before). Of course this had an especially significant impact on their views on life in general; the meaning of life, and living life. And this is of course fundamental to understanding the more broad 'history' since 'we are our histories,' as will be explored in great depth. As we shall see, there are various points of possible dialogue between the two philosophers in regards to general metaphysics. Most succinctly, we can summarize this similarity to be that Dewey's notion of "primary experience" correlates with Ortega's concept of "mi vida" (my life) in certain regards.

In Dewey's philosophy there are two types of experience. First there is "primary experience," which is essentially the basic interaction we have with some thing, whatever it may be, in the environment. And then there is "secondary experience," which is essentially our process of reflection and deeper thought, exploration, and enquiry, in regards to that primary experience. Or, tersely stated, secondary experience tries to clarify primary experience. And this is of course a central part of 'life,' or 'living,' for Dewey; 'having experiences with things per our own experience of things.' "[...] things are what they are experienced as being; or that to give a just account of anything is to tell what that thing is experienced to be," declares Dewey.

53 187 million is the specific estimate. Since 1914, there were about 127 wars and major conflicts in the short twentieth century.
throughout his earlier philosophy.\textsuperscript{54} This process is necessary because we cannot simply have an experience with something without also reflecting on it for that experience to have any use, value, repercussion, etcetera. In other words, as he describes it,

An experience has pattern and structure, because it is not just doing and undergoing in alternation but consists of them in relationship. To put one's hand in the fire that consumes it is not necessarily to have an experience. The action and its consequence must be joined in perception. This relationship is what gives meaning; to grasp it is the objective of all intelligence.\textsuperscript{55}

And he adds that it continues to be subjectively pondered, valued, and therefore remembered in an individual sense; "The scope and content of the relations measure the significant content of the experience."\textsuperscript{56} And though we are speaking here of "remembering" in a general sense, we can apply this to the specific case of historical memory.

For the first couple decades of his career, more or less, Dewey was indeed quite the idealist in his philosophy. But again Dewey would come to distinguish his thought from anything purely idealist given his focus on breaking with traditional dualisms, and thereby creating his own antidualistic notion in which there is our experience and then there are our interpretations of that experience; there is experience, nature, and then there is our interpretation of those, which are in constant, dynamic interaction, antidualistically. So although Dewey was initially quite influenced by Hegelian idealism, he would come to take this a step further, adding his distinct

\textsuperscript{54} Dewey, \textit{Philosophy of Dewey}, p. 245.
\textsuperscript{55} Dewey, \textit{Art as Experience}, p. 9
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., p. 9
antidualistic notion uniting a dynamic interaction between what we experience as our experience, and our experience itself. Further, as a concise, summarizing definition of what we saw earlier, Dewey's "experience" can be understood as "experiencing the experienced." This is what he termed a "genetic-functional" interactivity that has temporal and spatial continuity. And he specifically mentions that this continuity is maintained as a "life history," which is another point of possible dialogue with Ortega and his emphasis on how what defines us is how we are our histories, as we shall continue to see.

For Ortega, the most basic reality of man is simply life and to live; "la situación del hombre es la vida, es vivir". And life itself is fundamentally disorientation, confusion; life is about being lost and trying ('trying' being the key word here) to be 'oriented;' "es propio de la esencia humana estar el hombre radicalmente desorientado." Ortega posits all this quite frequently and consistently in many of his writings. As in this instance, Ortega answers,

¿Qué es, pues, vida? No busquen ustedes lejos, no traten de recordar sabidurías aprendidas. Las verdades fundamentales tienen que estar siempre a la mano, porque sólo

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57 "Because everything experienced is determined by interactivity of organic-ongoing conditions, everything inquired into and discussed belongs in a field or situation. Fields and/or situations possess spatial and temporal togetherness of the existences and events which constitute them. They are extensive and enduring. "Togetherness" as used here covers what is often named by the words connections and relations, and interconnections and relationships" (From: Dewey, Unmodern Philosophy and Modern Philosophy, p. 5444-5446).


60 Ibid., p. 27.
así son fundamentales. [...] Vida es lo que somos y lo que hacemos: es, pues, de todas las cosas la más próxima a cada cual. [...] La vida es lo que hacemos y lo que nos pasa.\textsuperscript{61}

And it is very important to note that what he means by emphasizing, as in the aforementioned excerpt, the 'present tense' aspect of life, this is because, as he posits, both the past and the future only have a "reality" in the present, because we 'remember our past' and 'anticipate our future' in the 'now.' This is an important point of potential dialogue with pragmatism, as we shall see in all three sections of this thesis. As he writes,

Pero la vida es siempre un <<ahora>> y consiste en lo que ahora se es. El pasado de su vida y el futuro de la misma sólo tiene realidad en el ahora, merced a que ustedes recuerden ahora su pasado o anticipen ahora su porvenir. En este sentido la vida es pura actualidad, es puntual, es un punto –el presente–, que contiene todo nuestro pasado y todo nuestro porvenir. Por eso he podido afirmar que nuestra vida es lo que estamos haciendo ahora.\textsuperscript{62}

Here we find yet another point of possible conversation with Dewey, who in the following excerpt notes this idea of temporal, continuous process defining life as the accumulation of the past exhibited in the present's focus toward the future (to describe it tersely) "living is a temporally ongoing process, both a manifestation of the process a leading into next manifestation."\textsuperscript{63} In other words, the basic characteristics of this are the following: life is a

\textsuperscript{61} Ibid., pp. 34-35.
\textsuperscript{62} Ibid., p. 35.
\textsuperscript{63} Dewey, \textit{Philosophy}, p. 5482
continuum ("living is a temporally ongoing process") in which the present is the manifestation of the past ("the process") with a focus on the future ("leading into next manifestation").

For Ortega, we basically begin in shock of 'being born.' We are in a sense thrown into this world, 'free to be,' but within the limits of the 'circumstances' surrounding each one of us, some unique, some shared with others. But again it must be reminded here that a circumstance is not a reality that exists outside of our "yoes," rather it exists in interaction with our yoes. Ortega explains this very clearly on many occasions, as in the following excerpt: "Dentro de la enorme circunstancia que es el mundo, podemos movernos con cierta libertad, podemos ir y venir, viajar, emigrar; pero no podemos escapar a su círculo total inexorable."64 So we only have "cierta libertad," which is a topic that arguably converses with pragmatism, especially that of Schiller's interpretation of the movement, which we will see in the third section of this thesis.

And as he continues, the following helps clarify in part why we are, therefore, "our history;" "La vida deja un margen de posibilidades dentro del mundo, pero no somos libres para estar o no en este mundo que es el de ahora. Sólo cabe renunciar a la vida, pero si se vive no cabe elegir el mundo en que se vive."65 In other words, one of our 'limitations' is the year and time period we are born into. Of course this is something we cannot control but that nonetheless plays a very important role in our lives. And in another lecture he adds, even more directly and clearly, "La circunstancia o mundo en que por fuerza existimos no es sólo un aquí determinado sino que es una determinada fecha. Vivir es existir aquí y ahora [...] La vida es siempre un lugar y una fecha –es lo contrario del utopismo y el ucronismo–, o lo que es igual, la vida es, por sí misma,

64 Ortega, Metafisica, p. 62.
65 Ibid.
histórica." Again it must be reiterated that history here is not meant to refer just to the past, rather it is a continuum of past, present, and future. History is a place and a date, as Ortega notes, but really it is also a continuum of places and dates; history, being the past, present, and future, is the accumulation of different points of specific and finite places and dates along that continuum. History is an anti-dualistic concept in this sense, as it can be both definitively specified places and dates, but within a larger set of more of these; there are separate points but that must exist along a continuum among others. In other words, this is the basic notion that there are parts and a whole, which although separate ideas, one cannot be understood, and therefore exist, without the other; they are interdependent.

As Ortega metaphorically alludes to often, it is as if life is about being lost at sea, shipwrecked, and therefore becomes a "problem that we need to solve." In this sense, this in fact is the same for Dewey; "Life, for Dewey, is a series of problems or a series of disequilibrations and recoveries." This notion specifically dialogues more smoothly perhaps with Dewey than any of the other pragmatists explored here. For Ortega, life is about always having to decide what we are going to be, and what we are going to do. Hence Ortega's frequent commentaries that the "radical substance" of life is "insecurity" (and hence our being in a sense 'shipwrecked' in his metaphor). We are attentive to our 'circumstances' in our need to "fish" and decide between them; to decide which we will choose, which directions we will take, etcetera. As Gray helps clarify to support this thesis's imagined dialogue in his intellectual biography on Ortega, as well as correlating this to Dewey, "Life, he was wont to say, comes at us "point blank," demanding

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66 Ibid., p. 95.

immediate response. In this, Ortega was closer to William James and John Dewey than to Plato, Leibniz, or Kant."\(^{68}\)

And also important in all this is to note that "my life" is not the same as "me" or "I" in Ortega's philosophy, because our "me," our "I," is just one part, as our circumstances make up the other part of what in sum is "our life." Meaning, there is always some sort of interaction with our surroundings, even if it is just "I am sitting in a room," for example, because rarely are we 'doing nothing' (and, in fact, Ortega also talks about the dangers of boredom frequently). The "I" and the "sitting in a room" are separate but united essentially antidualistically as "yo" and "circumstance" respectively. Dewey of course also very often argues that in life we are always in interaction with our surroundings, given, as we shall continue to see, his strong leaning on the malleable, social aspect of human behavior and its influences; "Everything that exists in as far as it is known and knowable is in interaction with other things. It is associated, as well as solitary, single."\(^{69}\) In general this is an important point of envisioned discourse with all the pragmatists explored here. In another excerpt he further describes this clearly, "'The reactions of man in this world and his experiences in it are the subject matter of individual psychology. The second world which confronts man is social. He lives in a community of people. [...] By his biological make-up man is destined to be a social creature.'\(^{70}\) So here Dewey describes two different worlds; an individual one, and a social one, which can arguably converse with Ortega's yo (individual) and his circumstancia (social) worlds. As Dewey expert Hickman defends, "We live our entire lives

\(^{68}\) From: GRAY, R.: *The Imperative of Modernity: An Intellectual Biography of José Ortega y Gasset*, p. 144. (Subsequently referred to as *Imperative of Modernity.*)

\(^{69}\) Ortega, *Experience and Nature*, p. 175.

in association."\(^{71}\) So this can plausibly correlate with Ortega's notion of "yo soy yo y mi circunstancia," as Dewey confirms the same idea that we are very much our interactions with all that is external to us, yet we are also individuals.\(^{72}\) And this also has an important historical element, as professor Dr. Greeve Davaney supports the arguments being made here (and who is an author uniquely versed on this notion of "pragmatic historicism"),

Dewey espoused an anthropology that stressed that humans are bio-social beings who are in continual interaction with their natural and historically developed worlds. From the earliest beginnings of human existence humans were forced to adapt to and respond to the conditions of these intermingled worlds. For Dewey, the insights of evolutionary science and historicism supported this version of human life as dynamically interactive and as developing and changing in relation to the contexts and conditions within which it is found.\(^{73}\)

Again it must be reiterated that because these are new and innovative associations, these supporting quotes throughout this thesis are not meant to be considered definitive but rather they are meant to lend strength to the goal here to imagine a possible dialogue. The argument that there is an important historicist element in Dewey's philosophy is key in proposing that there is a dialogue that we can imagine between him and Ortega. In this aforementioned quote Davaney supports this possible exchange with Ortega on the topic of our being our histories because our nature is contained within our histories, the latter being a broader and better term, therefore. And

\(^{71}\) Ibid., p. 419.

\(^{72}\) As we shall also continue to see, though it may not seem this way at times, Dewey does not negate individualism, generally speaking.

\(^{73}\) Davaney, *Historicism*, p. 84-85.
she also supports there possibly being a dialogue on how that exists within the dynamic of ourselves and our circumstances, all of which can be summed up in the following excerpt of this; "continual interaction with their natural and historically developed worlds."  

In a lecture from *Unas Lecciones de Metafísica*, Ortega reminds his students that "Yo espero que a estas alturas ninguno de ustedes confunda ya esa realidad que cada cual llama «su vida» con su yo. Yo no soy más que un ingrediente de mi vida: el otro es la circunstancia o mundo."  So Ortega is not entirely deterministic of course, because life "[...] no me es dada hecha. Lo que me es dado al serme dada la vida es la inexorable necesidad de tener que hacer algo. [...] Lo que me es dado, pues, con la vida es quehacer. *La vida da mucho quehacer.*"  So life is "not given to us ready made," and therefore we each "have to make of it what we will." We are obligated to make subsequent decisions in life," but within a limited spectrum of options, as he says very clearly, "[...] hay la errónea tendencia a creer que las formas de la vida son ilimitadas." In fact, the thing "given to us," is the "need to do something with our life." We need to "decide who we are going to be," and in "every instant," we have "various possibilities to choose from." As he argues quite clearly, "La vida, en efecto, deja un margen de posibilidades

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74 Ibid, p. 84.

75 Ortega, *Metafísica*, p. 78.

76 Ibid., p. 56.

77 Ortega, *Interpretación*, p. 28. Ortega frequently cites the following idea in many of his writings and lectures: "La vida no es dada —mejor dicho no es arrojada o somos arrojados a ella—, pero eso que nos es dado, la vida, es un problema que necesitamos resolver nosotros" (Ortega, *Metafísica*, p. 39). In another excerpt he states, "Dentro de la fatalidad de vuestra circunstancia sois libres; más aún, sois fatalmente libres porque no tenéis más remedio, queráis o no, que escoger vuestro destino en la holgura y el margen que os ofrece vuestra fatal circunstancia" (Ibid., p. 95).

78 "[...] mi vida—, no me es dada hecha. Lo que me es dado al serme dada la vida es la inexorable necesidad de tener que hacer algo" (Ortega, *Metafísica*, p. 56)

79 See Ortega's *Unas Lecciones de Metafísica* for many citations of this.
dentro del mundo, pero no somos libres para estar o no en este mundo que es el de ahora.”

Again we do not choose, for example, in what year we are born, or in which country, etcetera, as we cannot "[...] escapar a la circunstancia, está confinado en el mundo.” Nonetheless, because there are so many combinations of the 'limited' choices that we can make (so therefore almost seemingly "unlimited" in this sense), each person is still, nonetheless, in some ways unique; "el yo de cada cual es único," both in who he or she is, in part, and in the decisions he or she makes (even if within some of the same circumstances as others).

So to phrase it quite plainly, these two views of Dewey and Ortega on life as these basic, fundamental starting points of ourselves and our surroundings, combined of course with the decisions we make, can dialogue, as also argued by Dewey expert David Hildebrand in his book on Pragmatism,

It should be noted that this notion of "primary experience" (and the PSP it entails for philosophy) is not held exclusively by Dewey. In various works José Ortega y Gasset refers to it, perhaps more lucidly than Dewey, as "radical reality" and "my life." This radical reality is where all metaphysics--indeed all inquiries--start. [...] Ortega makes clear, as I believe did Dewey, that this reality is "basic" and "ultimate" in a way that is crucially different from most other traditional metaphysical accounts.

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80 Ibid., p. 39.
81 Ibid., p. 64.
82 The quoted Spanish is from: Ibid., p. 65.
83 From: HILDEBRAND, D.: Beyond Realism and Antirealism: John Dewey and the Neopragmatists, p. 119. (Subsequently referred to as: John Dewey and the Neopragmatists.)
This is a particularly important excerpt for this thesis since it is one of the few directly linking Dewey and Ortega. As Hildebrand also writes more directly, he argues that this is "[...] what Dewey called 'primary experience' and what Ortega called 'my life.'"\textsuperscript{84}

Ortega writes, "La realidad de mi yo es, pues, secundaria a la realidad integral que es mi vida; encuentro aquélla -la de mi yo- en ésta, en la realidad vital. Yo y la circunstancia formamos parte de mi vida."\textsuperscript{85} To return to the briefly aforementioned example of being in a room, which is used in various instances by Ortega, we must read this anti-dualistically. When we are in a room, that room is part of our 'circumstance;' it is part of the 'other part of our life.' Since 'our life' is 'yo y mi circunstancia,' the other part, therefore, is our 'yo.' Our 'yo' is distinct from the room, and that room, or that part of our circumstance, does not make up part of us, but that circumstance, along with all the others (for example, it could be country, year, etc.), does make up another part of us, because 'our life' consists of our 'yoes' being concerned, addressing, and working with the totality of the circumstances that surrounds us. That is why we would say something along the lines of "I am myself sitting in a room" because sitting in a room describes part of the individual's reality of course in that moment; I am myself, and I am myself sitting in a room. There is each of ourselves, then there is the world, which is there separately, but which we each also are forming, and/or form, a small part of—so the two are connected anti-dualistically. And in this example, the room is one of the circumstances that makes up part of our totality; the room is part of our 'circunstancia' in what we are in sum as yo y mi circunstancia. In other words, in a general sense, while they are separate concepts, that which 'makes us up' in sum/totality cannot be understood without both the 'yo' and the circumstances.

\textsuperscript{84} Ibid., p. 125.

\textsuperscript{85} Ortega, \textit{Metafísica}, p. 78.
This notion can be understood using as a metaphor what happens when we throw a rock into a pond. This metaphor will be important to keep in mind throughout this dissertation. A rock can represent an individual; a "yo," and the ripples that result upon impact can be understood as the "circumstances" in that rock's, or individual's, 'life.' If we were to toss a second rock into the pond, meaning a second individual, and if it lands somewhere near the other rock we will see how some of those ripples overlap with those of the first rock, whereas some do not, showing how some of our circumstances overlap with those of others, and some do not. And each rock and its set of ripples is still, nonetheless, unique and singular (hence we have both individual and shared realities). The "rock," or the "yo," represents the core part of each individual, and which is unique as it stands out in its own form and as the center; the rock, or the "yo" is the one part of life truly 'each ours.'

This metaphor is especially useful here also because Ortega often describes life as a 'shipwreck within circumstance,' similar in the sense in which a rock is somewhat 'stuck' when tossed into a pond, and in which the rock or an individual needs to find a way out; we need to re-orient ourselves on a path that fulfills one of leading an 'authentic life' according to Ortega (an 'authentic life' is one that fits with what should be our calling, our vocation, per Ortega's thought). Life is a problem, therefore, which is confronted in the form of some specific circumstances, and life is about solving these problems, to speak simply here. Ripples result from the action of tossing a rock into a pond, just as a person brought into this world will also be brought into specific circumstances. The rock (yo) and the ripples (circumstances) are separate entities, but when tossed into a pond, they are dynamically linked interdependently; that is, antidualistically, since they will occur together (those ripples will not occur without the rock tossed into the pond, and vice versa). And because this action will always result in ripples, a rock
or person therefore cannot escape his or her ripples, or circumstances, when 'thrown into the world,' and this is precisely what defines his or her "life;" the "yo," or the rock, and the "circumstances," or the ripples - hence, per Ortega's thought, life is this radical reality of "yo soy yo y mi circunstancia."

As Ortega explains,

Nuestra vida, según esto, no es sólo nuestra persona, sino que de ella forma parte nuestro mundo: ella --nuestra vida-- consiste en que la persona se ocupa de las cosas o con ellas, y, evidentemente, lo que nuestra vida sea depende tanto de lo que sea nuestra persona como de lo que sea nuestro mundo. Ni nos es más próximo el uno que el otro término: no nos damos cuenta primero de nosotros y luego del contorno, sino que vivir es, desde luego, en su propia raíz, hallarse frente al mundo, con el mundo, dentro del mundo y sumergido en su tráfago, en sus problemas, en su trama azarosa. Pero también viceversa: ese mundo, al componerse sólo de lo que nos afecta a cada cual, es inseparable de nosotros. Nacemos juntos con él y son vitalmente persona y mundo.⁸⁶

This indeed parallels how early in his philosophy Dewey refers to experience as being fundamentally 'what we think it is' in that there is an inextricable connection with one's surroundings, and that there is our "me" that can experience things in a unique way, and fundamentally daily our life is comprised of these such experiences with what is around us. Dewey writes, "[...] experience is experience, or what it is. [...] go to experience and see what the

⁸⁶ Ortega, Metafísica, p. 78. In another excerpt Ortega similarly explains his view here that "Yo no soy mi vida. Esta, que es la realidad, se compone de mí y de las cosas. Las cosas no son yo ni yo soy las cosas: nos somos mutuamente trascendentes, pero ambos somos inmanentes a esa coexistencia absoluta que es la vida" (Ortega, Metafísica, p. 160). Arguably there is an anti-dualistic dialogue here.
thing is experienced as."

So, as Hildebrand concisely argues, citing another area where we can envision a potential dialogue, "Ortega's description of "my life" and "radical reality" accurately reflects the nominal sense Dewey intended for "experience" [...]"

The envisioned exchange between Ortega's 'my life' as 'I and my circumstance' with Dewey's "experience" is stated in the following excerpt, in which Dewey affirms that the "congeners, life and history," are "processes of experiencing," and as aforementioned, he continues, "It is significant that "life" and "history" have the same fullness of undivided meaning. Life denotes a function, a comprehensive activity, in which organism and environment are included." Similarly, for Ortega life as radical reality in the form of "yo soy yo y mi circunstancia" is summarized in his theory of racio-vitalismo; 'life is being I and my surrounding circumstances'—this is Ortega's razón vital, or vital reason. Racio-vitalismo, therefore, is not about "pure reason," it is about "vital reason." Ortega makes an important distinction here that separates him from any notion that is too rationalistic or idealistic; life must have reason, but reason must also be malleable and flexible. Hence Ortega surpasses these traditionally held views to declare that life is perspective. Each individual has his or her own perspective, and never is any one the only true, or false, perspective. There is no one, absolute perspective or point of view. An individual's perspective is just one reality of many, and a reality itself is one perspective of many. Therefore, every reality has infinite perspectives. And this is also why


90 "La razón pura no puede suplantar a la vida: la cultura del intelecto abstracto no es, frente a la espontánea, otra vida que se baste a sí misma y pueda desalojar a aquélla. Es tan sólo una breve isla flotando sobre el mar de la vitalidad primaria. Lejos de poder sustituir a ésta, tiene que apoyarse en ella, nutrirse de ella, como cada uno de los miembros vive del organismo entero" (From: ORTEGA Y GASSET, Jose: *El tema de nuestro tiempo*, p. 149). (Subsequently referred to as: *Nuestro Tiempo.*)
Ortega next declares that life is history, because life is this change, development, peculiarity, and because we 'go into history to get to life,' broadly described. Moreover, per Ortega's thought life's vital trajectory is not predetermined; we need to make our lives.

So here once again we return to the fundamental idea that we are our histories. And again this is an anti-dualistic relationship—in this case, organism and environment, which are two separate yet inextricably linked parts that comprise "our life." Again, while we are often free to make decisions as to the interactions we have with our environment, there are still, nonetheless, limits to and within our environments. There are limits that we have no control over (such as the year we are born in), and in part as such our environment is generally more powerful in shaping and influencing those interactions. Hence, as shall be elaborated throughout, we can at times think of this as the following: nurture (environment) nurtures our nature (organism). This is part of why what we are is our history, though this does not negate that there is a nature—again, our history is our nature; our history shapes, includes, and influences our nature (history historicizes our history, which is our nature). As Dewey argues, "what is experienced," therefore, "is a manifestation of nature."91

Hence, again, the following excerpt of Ortega's parallels the philosophy of Dewey in that we must read his "yo soy yo y mi circunstancia" anti-dualistically, as for both philosophers in this case life cannot exist nor be understood without the interaction it has with its surroundings. The two are separate identities that are still, nonetheless, inextricably linked; "[...] la circunstancia o mundo, es completamente heterogénea a mí. La circunstancia es lo otro que yo, y

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estar yo en ella equivale a estar fuera de mí, en elemento extraño." 92 We cannot separate ourselves from some thing else without that some thing else; without that distinction. We are each our unique selves, so everything 'not us is completely distinct from us.' If we enter into a room, that room is of course therefore completely dissimilar to and separate from us, and we become that 'me in the room,' but not per se 'me that is a part of that room,' but rather it is better understood, per Ortega's thinking here, as 'me in that other thing which is not me, not my "yo" (but that is part of "mi life" in that moment).' But, that 'other thing' still forms part of our life, nonetheless, at least in that period of time we are there, despite it being distinct from ourselves. It is part of our description because, for instance, "I am standing (for example) in a room;" this is separate but connected in an anti-dualistic sense. 93 The room, being in the room, is part of our circumstance of that period of time. Because again, as Ortega argues, "circumstance" is "la otra parte de mi vida." 94 So again "one's life," in this case, can be understood as "he or she is one" and at the same time "one who is also one in a room." As he writes,

La vida es, esencialmente, un diálogo con el contorno; lo es en sus funciones fisiológicas más sencillas como en sus funciones psíquicas más sublimes. Vivir es convivir, y el otro que con nosotros convive es el mundo en derrerdor. No entendemos, pues, un acto vital, cualquiera que él sea, si no lo ponemos en conexión con el contorno hacia el cual se dirige, en función del cual ha nacido. 95

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92 Ortega, Metaphysics. p. 71.

93 See "Lección V" in particular for an explanation of all this in Unas Lecciones de Metafísica.

94 Ibid., p. 78.

95 ORTEGA Y GASSET, José: Obras Completas Tomo III, p. 291. (Subsequently referred to as Obras Completas III.)
Given that the social environment, our surroundings, are so important in these two philosophers' views on life, this essentially implies, again, that there are some limitations in life. In other words, society is a type of general circumstance, and within society are various circumstances, but we must remember here that per Ortega's thought these are all just some of many. Concisely stated, again we are free to choose among some of those, but within the limitations that surround us. We can also think of this as a "radical unitary duality," as Graham argues, and anti-dualistic,

The unity of Ortega's philosophy would be lost, if it were simply a developing "one-two" sequence of "stages" that are not finally a "unitary duality" of self and circumstance as basic life-reality and also of vital reason and historical reason as a "philosophy of life."

The textual context is both consistent with and pregnant with this meaning: "two in one."96

The idea of "two in one" is here anti-dualistic; there are separate parts (two) that also comprise one; the parts cannot be understood without the whole, and vice versa, so they are interdependent; they are separate but united ant-dualistically. "Radical unitary duality" is the term that Graham developed to specifically explain this proposition that Ortega's philosophy is in these areas anti-dualistic. And therefore these are areas where we can imagine a dialogue with pragmatism.

Most fundamentally, for Ortega man is his life, and life is simply history; 'man does not have nature, what he has is history.' He writes,

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96 Graham, Pragmatist Philosophy, p. 351.
 [...] la realidad específicamente humana–la vida del hombre–tiene una consistencia histórica. Esto nos obliga a <<desnaturalizar>> todos los conceptos referentes al fenómeno integral de la vida humana y someterlos a una radical <<historización>>. Nada de lo que el hombre ha sido, es o será, lo ha sido, lo es no lo será de una vez para siempre, sino que ha llegado a serlo un buen día y otro buen día dejará de serlo."97

As we shall continue to see throughout, therefore, life is history, because nothing in life is motionless, static, argues Ortega; "La vida de cada cual –no la biológica, sino la biográfica– es un organismo donde nada es inerte: todo lo que en ella se hace se hace por algo y para algo, queramos o no," and because man has no nature.98

As we shall also continue to analyze, Dewey strongly emphasized throughout his writings the malleable, flexible, and plastic characteristic of humanity. One of "life's" most basic characteristics, therefore, is that again it is "temporal;" hence yet again why 'man is his history.' Ortega further clarifies that "[...] si nuestra vida consiste en decidir lo que vamos a ser, quiere decirse, que en la raíz misma de nuestra vida hay un atributo temporal: decidir lo que vamos a ser, por tanto, el futuro.99" Ortega's insistence here upon the focus on the future is quite pragmatist. And in the other direction, we find historicity emphasized in Dewey's argument here that "all natural existences are histories," because our nature is our history.100 Hence there is a

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97 ORTEGA Y GASSET, José: Obras Completas Tomo V, p. 538.

98 ORTEGA Y GASSET, José: Obras Completas Tomo IV, p. 580.

99 Ortega, Metafísica, pp. 42-43.

100 Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 163. Ortega often also emphasize the importance for one to lead an "authentic life," which would be following, most fundamentally, one's basic vocation. But clearly because of Ortega's emphasis on humans being their histories, there is also an important element of education, of course. And this is also something that Dewey shares, as Campbell explains, "Because of our potential for learning, however, these
future orientation in our historicities, enabling us to indeed envision a dialogue here between Ortega and Dewey.

experiences can also be a process of growing, of uncovering connections and relationships, of finding more meaning” (Campbell, *Understanding John Dewey*, pp. 62-63).
V. Defining Nature

Thus, also essential in appropriately pondering these two philosophers' views on life is understanding what *it is not*, and as has been introduced, clearly what it is not is *only* "nature." Again, what is being argued here most centrally are the possible areas of dialogue between Ortega and Dewey in this first section in an anti-dualistic reading to help us better understand how *what we are is our history, not our nature, because history is our nature*. To begin this section it must be declared that whatever the definition or inclination in the notion of "nature" (meaning, for example, whether it is a biological, genetic, or cultural one, to name just a few examples), the concluding argument that will emphasized at all times is that nature always has a historical character, element, or essentially, *nature*.

As has of course been noted, while Ortega directly states at times that man does not have nature (rather what man has, and is, is his history), what is being developed here is that again neither philosopher is really denying, per se, that there is a nature, rather what Ortega especially is arguing is that 'history' is much more important, influential, and in fact also contains our nature, which is why again we can instead posit that fundamental in this is that *our nature is our history*. As Lasaga Medina concisely explains,

> Que el hombre no tenga naturaleza, no significa que no tenga una identidad suficiente como para poder ser pensada de acuerdo a las capacidades lógicas de la razón humana (no hay otras), sino que esa identidad es histórica, lo que significa que tiene que ser
comprendida <<al paso>> o mientras pasa, viniendo de algo y yendo hacia algo: como genesis y proyecto.\textsuperscript{101}

In the following argument of Davaney's we find support for this imaginable specific point of conversation with Dewey in that history is really what is most significant, and the existence of the concept of "nature" is not being entirely denied either; "Dewey presented a naturalized and historicized version of human existence. Humans live within the matrix of nature and human history."\textsuperscript{102} The argument here is the same as in this thesis that history contains our nature, as they are anti-dualistic concepts, which Davaney here describes as a type of "matrix."

For Ortega, as aforementioned, man is never born with a "prefixed or imposed image of what he is going to be." Rather, as we saw, what is always characteristic of life, and throughout life, is that human beings are born with the "freedom to choose what he is going to be."\textsuperscript{103} Hence again the more important term "history," in the form of circumstances, environment, etc. over "nature." As must be repeated since it is central here, our "nature" is our history, in part simply because our history contains our nature. Dewey relatedly argues that fundamentally our history contains our nature, though he uses the term "experience" here, which as we will continue to see can be used almost somewhat interchangeably for history in these specific senses; "nature and experience are not enemies or alien. Experience is not a veil that shuts man off from nature; it is a means of penetrating continually further into the heart of nature."\textsuperscript{104} Moreover, as another

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\textsuperscript{101} LASAGA MEDINA, J.: José Ortega y Gasset (1883-1955) Vida y filosofía, p. 151. (Subsequently referred to as: Ortega: Vida y Filosofía.)

\textsuperscript{102} Davaney, Historicism, p. 91.

\textsuperscript{103} Ortega, Interpretación, p. 12.

\textsuperscript{104} Quoted in: SHOOK, J. R. and MARGOLIS, John: A Companion to Pragmatism, p. 189.
\end{flushleft}
noted area of potential conversation, Dewey's 'experience' is of oneself and ones surroundings, or we could say *yo y mi circunstancia*, as Davaney defends, this is part of "[...] his vision of historical and social human beings who are always embedded in both communal and natural contexts and whose potential for humane existence depends upon and contributes to these interrelated webs of existence."105

In one instance, Dewey defines nature as follows: "[...] Nature is an environment only as it is involved in interaction with an organism, or self, or whatever name be used. Every such interaction is a temporal process, not a momentary cross-sectional occurrence."106 So we must read this anti-dualistically; nature is a separate entity, but it also cannot exist without interaction, (phrased quite generally and plainly). As Hickman argues, for Dewey "nature is treated as culture and human beings are understood as involved in the cutting edge of an evolving nature."107 Nature is not static, it is *evolving*. We can think of this in part as "nurture nurtures nature." This idea is resonated in the following excerpt from Dewey: "The reactions of men to their natural environment are colored and determined by the social milieu which has bred them. In turn their reactions to one another are limited by their biological and psychological nature."108 Hence why Blau (another of the few scholars who have research the historicist connection in Dewey's work) makes the following conclusion on this: "Dewey shared with these other "genetic social scientists' the view that the process of human social evolution is a two-way street, that

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It must be noted that Dewey's focus on this is narrowed in his efforts to re-define and improve democracy in its applications and methods, thus this is an area of deviation within this imagined dialogue.


108 Ibid., pp. 5068-5069.
there is a reciprocal adaptation of men to their social environment and of the environment to the needs of men."\(^{109}\)

In other words, the social milieu is foremost in shaping human behavior, with one's nature playing a role in how that plays out within the environment. As we shall also see, this can converse with Ortega's idea of "yo soy yo y mi circunstancia" as fundamental is the "interaction" aforementioned by Dewey. In the following example, Dewey uses the term "organic" to refer to nature, and in which he not only notes a historical element in this, but that it is an ongoing process: "In short, the temporal continuum of life-activities, when it is analyzed and described in terms of organic and environmental factors, must be regarded as continuous reciprocal doing-undergoing."\(^{110}\) Moreover, those interactions, as he says, are temporal; we can assume that this implies that they are also historical. As Sidney Hook explains as support of this in regards to Dewey's definitions of nature, “La <<naturaleza>> de una cosa no es algo cerrado por, para y en sí misma, sino algo que, igual que todo lo que tiene un desarrollo en el tiempo, adquiere nuevas propiedades como resultado de los diversos modos en que el organismo actúa sobre ella.”\(^{111}\)

So again here we can see how "nature" is a "temporal sequence," or, it is historical; our nature is our history, our history contains our nature. As Alexander adds in the comprehensive companion book to Pragmatism to the discussion, "Dewey views "Nature" or "Existence" as a temporal continuum of processes exhibiting certain "generic traits" (such as stability and


\(^{110}\) Dewey, Unmodern Philosophy and Modern Philosophy, pp. 5308-5309.

\(^{111}\) From: HOOK, Sidney: John Dewey. Semblanza intelectual, p. 59. (Subsequently referred to as: Semblanza.). Although the original version of this book is in English, the only copy I could consult here in Spain was in Spanish, so I am keeping the quotes in their 'consulted version' as such.
precariousness, qualitative immediacy, relational mediation, etc.) occurring in different ways on each of these plateaus."112 Here nature is not denied, as genetic traits are mentioned, but again they are simply under the broader umbrella of "history." This is why Dewey argues that social phenomena are "historical," and of course social phenomena influence who we are and our behavior quite significantly (as we shall continue to see throughout, Dewey strongly emphasized the greatly influential role of "nurture" in life); "[...] social phenomena are historical, or of the nature of individual temporal sequences."113

In Dewey's philosophy, for example, one cannot be "fully human" when not viewed from within human society.114 Upon the first reads of this, one is inclined to make the assumption that he is saying that there is essentially no individuality because there is no nature. After all, he has been recorded as saying that outside of a person's social ties, he or she is essentially 'nothing.' But we also just saw how there is still an acceptance argued for nature in the traditional sense of the term, as for instance in genes. But as will be elaborated throughout, this is essentially a matter of significance and priority because Dewey does not negate per se that a person is also an individual, or that one has a nature, it is more so that a person's social connections, dependencies, etcetera, are more significant in regards to influencing and shaping a person in his or her view; their behavior, or life. As Campbell, another expert on Dewey, explains in support of this idea so concisely and clearly, "My own view is that his vision of a reconstructed individualism is in no way blind toward or unaware of or insensitive to individuality. Dewey does not overlook the

112 Shook, A Companion to Pragmatism, p. 191.
114 "[...] no one can be fully human outside of human society>> " (From: TILES, J.E.: John Dewey: Critical Assessments Vol. I, p. 7). (Subsequently referred to as: Critical Assessments Vol. I.)
reality of diversity; but his concern is always with how it can contribute to the common good.\textsuperscript{115} In other words, very much along the pragmatist line, it is that Dewey emphasizes more often the instrumental aspect of human life and nature. Nurture nurtures nature because nurture is more influential.

So again, none of this is to say that there is \textit{no} nature; history/experience and nature just must be read anti-dualistically, as there is still an "[...] unique individuality in virtue of which it is a historic and social fact," as Dewey affirms in another instance.\textsuperscript{116} Put another way, he posits, "[...] nature is an affair of affairs, wherein each one, no matter how linked up it may be with others, has its own quality."\textsuperscript{117} So here Dewey is further recognizing individuality and a type of nature. As Sleeper concisely explains in support of this, "Dewey does not wish to deny the intrinsic nature of things; he merely argues that such intrinsic natures can be known only by means of their extrinsic qualities. And these are what are clearly not fixed in advance of inquiry or independently."\textsuperscript{118} In other words, one of Dewey's objectives here is to elaborate on the connections between experience and things; between how we experience things, and things in and of themselves in existence.

Further, Blau also interprets this concept of nature as an "affair of affairs" in the following way in which it is connected to nature as Ortega proposed,

\textsuperscript{115} Campbell, \textit{Understanding John Dewey}, p. 54. It is important to note that this idea of the "common good" relates to the distinct political compromise that Dewey had, being from a more social-focused democracy, whereas the politics of Ortega's country had more of a European liberal model influence.

\textsuperscript{116} This he affirms seemingly contrarily at first. Dewey, \textit{Philosophy of Dewey}, p. 410.

\textsuperscript{117} Dewey, \textit{Experience and Nature}, p. 97.

\textsuperscript{118} SLEEPER, R.W: \textit{The Necessity of Pragmatism: John Dewey's Conception of Philosophy}, p.121. (Subsequently referred to as: \textit{Necessity of Pragmatism}.)
History, then, has a place, central but not exclusive, in the instrumentalist version of experimental thinking. In a sense, it may be said that history not only has, but must have, a place, that human history is the human aspect of natural process. For Deweyan metaphysics, nature is an affair of beginnings and endings, or processes that have a starting-point in time and a finishing-line in time.\(^{119}\)

Again, there is a thing, and there is our experience with that thing and our subsequent understanding of that thing, but we cannot know if this all ever coincides. What we can know is simply what we think we know. Theoretically, therefore, we can speak of a "thing" or an experience independent of our experience with that thing or experience, but we cannot be certain of its true nature or existence. That thing, as we shall see throughout, could be history; there is plausibly history independent of the person(s) narrating that history, but we cannot be certain if they coincide correctly, truly, or at all really—this is pragmatist anti-dualism. And again while this may sound empty at first, it is not meant to, it is just meant to emphasize that what ultimately really matters is what we humans think and the value, usefulness, that we place on some thing, experience, historical event, whatever it may be, rather than the independent existence, nature, or truth of that thing in and of itself. So there is not a denial of some thing's independent existence; it is not being declared that there is or is not such a thing, rather the argument is that this is simply not the important question; what we should be focusing on instead is what we think of that thing and its existence, or the different answers we may provide to this question (but not whether or not there is one, true answer). In other words, we should not ask "what is A" or "does A really exist, and what is that existence". We should ask instead "why do we think A is this" and "why, how is this useful to us". This is the basic pragmatist notion of the truth and inquiry;

the goal is not to discover truth or come to the end of inquiry, because while this may be possible, this is not what the pragmatist is searching for, as the pragmatist is investigating and pondering the conclusions we (as humans) come to on some thing rather than that thing in and of itself. Pragmatism is about studying which of these conclusions are more practical, useful, and rational to us, and why. Inquiry is endless really, therefore. Pragmatists, most colloquially phrased, want to explore the possibility of a better life (in the future) through contemplating our justifications, values, rationalizations, etcetera, but without stress on there being one best life.

As we have seen and will continue to see throughout in different ways, there is a possible anti-dualistic dialogue with Ortega's notion of "yo soy yo y mi circunstancia" because Dewey references that there is uniqueness to each individual, but one that also exists in interaction with surrounding circumstances. And, as he adds later, together these interactions, or 'affairs,' create our histories; "An "affair," Res, is always at issue whether it concerns chemical change, the emergence of life, language, mind or the episodes that compose human history."\textsuperscript{120} The following reasoning from Hickman lends support for this, "Dewey understands individuals to be unique histories or temporal continuities of behavior."\textsuperscript{121}

Again, one way to summarize this is to argue that "nurture nurtures nature." In other words, again this must be understood anti-dualistically; meaning, there is our nature, and then there is the nurture surrounding us, and nature is exposed, developed, as a result of its interactions with the 'nurture' around us. Nature, in regards to how we define and re-define it, cannot exist without that interaction with nurture. In Dewey's thought, therefore, nurture plays a

\textsuperscript{120} Dewey, \textit{Experience and Nature}, p. 111.

\textsuperscript{121} Dewey, \textit{Philosophy}, pp. 235-236.
more significant role; "[...] Dewey's claims about a nature both plastic and hard-setting and dependent on a social environment not only for its shape but for how long it can retain any of its plasticity."¹²² Nature, therefore, does not start closed or fixed, so it is therefore certainly not understood by him in strictly the traditional, classic sense of the term. As Alexander further supports,

Specifically, Dewey maintains that nature is a creative or emergent process, and he regards various metaphysical, epistemological, and axiological distinctions as functional relationships rather than as oppositional dichotomies of the sort that have led to the "dualisms" prevailing in philosophy [which of course the latter was something he was very much against]¹²³

The argument here is that Ortega also did not really deny that there was not a nature for human beings, but rather he emphasized that it depends more so on history, and therefore similarly is not closed or fixed. This he says very clearly in the following excerpt: "El hombre no es natural, no tiene naturaleza, no está adscrito a un ser fijo, es... infinito en posibilidades."¹²⁴ After all, Ortega did emphasize that we are each "yo y mi circunstancia." In one instance Ortega refers to nature as "identity," writing that "man has no nature, that is, no identity" because, as Dewey also argued as did Ortega, nothing is fixed and predetermined when we are born, other than for Ortega perhaps our freedom to choose 'what we will do, who we will become,' etc.,

within the certain possibilities and limitations that surround us. And Ortega further posits that, "El hombre, señores, no tiene naturaleza sino que tiene historia. La historia es el modo de ser un ente radicalmente variable y sin identidad. [...] Al hombre no se le puede identificar. Es un Arsenio Lupin metafísico>>>, and key in this, he continues, "Y el método para entender lo que es la vida humana que es la realidad radical es no la razón pura, sino la razón histórica, la razón ultra-eleática." So again history is key in all this; in understanding human life and reality.

For Ortega, in one sense and definition nature is *things*. Nature is body, soul, spirit, all of which man is not entirely. These 'things' that make up nature are simply interpretations that we each create. As he writes,

La naturaleza es una interpretación transitoria que el hombre ha dado a lo que se encuentra frente a sí en su vida. [...] Porque el hombre no tiene naturaleza. El hombre no es su cuerpo, que es una cosa; ni es su alma, psique, conciencia, o espíritu, que es también una cosa. El hombre no es cosa ninguna, sino una drama [...] Todas las cosas, sea las que fueran, son ya meras interpretaciones que se esfuerza en dar lo que encuentra.

Because our interpretations and subsequent understandings of nature change throughout the course of history, it is perhaps precisely those changes, therefore, that say more about 'nature' than any possibly attainable inherent qualities themselves. Hence what we are, more so, is our history, such as in this case for example, 'the history of our changing interpretations of nature.'

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125 From Ortega, *Obras Completas IX*, p. 556, and in English, *Historical Reason*, p. 117.

126 Ortega, *Obras Completas IX*, p. 557.

This dialogues with Pragmatism's aforementioned objective to focus more on the why and how we think some thing rather than the what of that thing. As Pedro Cerezo Galán elaborates,

Si el hombre tuviese una naturaleza, un ser fijo como lo tienen el mineral, el vegetal, y el animal, podríamos saber de una vez para siempre lo que significaban sus comportamientos; pero como no hay tal, el hombre en cada época pone su vida a finalidades diferentes más o menos nuevas, finalidades que él mismo ha inventado y que son la convención o supuesto tácito de sus actuaciones y ocupaciones.¹²⁸

Our interpretations change over time; they are historical. Nature is historical. "Nature" indeed must be understood anti-dualistically, as it is an interpretation, and it is also (likely, though this is not the goal to discover here) some thing on its own, and neither phenomenon could exist without the other despite being simultaneously separate concepts that we may not ever know when they overlap correctly. Burón González clarifies this in support in the following excerpt:

[...] la naturaleza, desde el momento en que la consideramos como <<categoría>> del pensamiento, como concepto, como idea, --y esa consideración es un momento esencial de toda reflexión no ingenua de la realidad-- adquiere una movilidad que aparentemente estaba excluida de la misma idea. Pero al mismo tiempo, en la categoría <<naturaleza>> se expresa el momento de independencia respecto de la actividad social, aquello sobre lo que se ejerce la actividad y, puesto que es transformada [...] por ende, también categoría

¹²⁸ CEREZO GALÁN, Pedro: La voluntad de aventura, p. 306. (Subsequently referred to as: La voluntad de aventura.)
con pretensiones <<totalizantes>> desde el momento en que sin su referencia no sería posible pensar la historia.\textsuperscript{129}

Hence again this, in part, pragmatist correlation specifically for this thesis's purposes between Dewey and Ortega in general in their anti-dualistic views of history and nature being separate yet connected. The ways in which, therefore, 'man is not his nature, rather he is his history because his nature is his history, and his history contains his nature,' will continue to be elaborated in what follows. This final point is summarized concisely in the following additional support of this argument from Burón González, "De lo visto hasta ahora cabría deducir que, en el interior del hombre al menos, todo lo natural es histórico aunque siga siendo naturaleza. [...] naturaleza e historia se exigirán la una a la otra cada vez que se mencionen."\textsuperscript{130} And this is also supported by Lasaga Medina when he writes that "[...] el pasado es siempre el límite absoluto de lo que el hombre puede llegar a ser en el futuro. Ahora bien, su naturaleza humana (biológica y psicológica) pertenece a ese pasado: la Naturaleza es el pasado absoluto de la Historia, algo que el hombre no puede cambiar."\textsuperscript{131}

\textsuperscript{129} BURÓN GONZALEZ, Manuel: \textit{La historia y la naturaleza: ensayo sobre Ortega}, p. 32. (Subsequently referred to as: \textit{La historia y la naturaleza}.)

\textsuperscript{130} Ibíd.

VI. Ortega and Dewey: Anti-Dualism in History/Experience, and Nature

Both Dewey and Ortega appear to share the belief in anti-dualism relating to these concepts of fundamentally history and human nature. If we substitute Dewey’s key word in his philosophy, “experience,” for Ortega’s “history,” then we have a similar construction; ‘man has no nature, only experience, because nature is man’s experience.’\(^{132}\) Hence, while much of Dewey’s writing was not about specifically the discipline of history, much of it was arguably fundamentally historical in character. Moreover, because we can understand that his term "experience" can also mean "history," the former being a topic he wrote copiously about, then we can apply this anti-dualism, a key feature of Dewey’s general philosophy. “Experience” is often used basically synonymously as “history” in both philosophers’ writings, in fact, as in the following example from Ortega: “[…] resulta que la vida es constitutivamente experiencia de la vida.”\(^{133}\) This is another important thread that must be weaved throughout; how for Ortega life is experience of life, something that certainly could be imagined to dialogue with pragmatism in not only this use of their term "experience" but in its noted progressive aspect. And a similarly concise definition of Dewey’s term “experience” can be understood as this anti-dualistic conception of Ortega’s nature and history, or what Dewey, commenting on the position of James, calls “life and history” in “experience;”

[…] experience is what James called a double-barrelled word. Like its congeners, life and history, it includes what men do and suffer, what they strive for, love, believe, endure,

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\(^{132}\) As J.E. Tiles explains succinctly in his book *Dewey*, “What Dewey wanted was a vocabulary that would not be read as committed to the dualistic interpretation of the relation of experience to nature” (See: TILES, J.E.: *Dewey*, p. 113). (Subsequently referred to as: *Dewey.*)

\(^{133}\) Ortega, *Historia*, p. 43.
and also how men act and are acted upon, the ways in which they do and suffer, desire and enjoy, see, believe, imagine—in short, processes of experiencing.”

So as with Ortega’s use of the terms “nature” and “history,” Dewey’s “experience” and “nature” cannot be separated or exist without the other; they are not dualistic. “[…] ‘life’ and ‘history’ have the same fullness of undivided meaning.”

Perhaps it should be noted that Dewey developed these terms ten years prior to the cited definitions of Ortega’s (the former published *Experience and Nature* in 1925, and the latter published *Historia como sistema* in 1941, and *Galileo* in 1947, which are two key books on Ortega’s meditations on history). Life and history are anti-dualistic concepts. “Dewey suggests that temporal quality and historical career are the marks of everything that exists and are the essence of their individuality,” explains Richard Bernstein in support here in reference to Dewey’s assertion in 1940 that “everything recorded is an historical event; it is something temporal.” In other words, again nature is man’s experience, which is also essentially his history. As Sidney Hook adds, “Ser un ser humano es estar ya en interacción, es ser alguien que tiene experiencias. Estas experiencias indican lo que la naturaleza es aquí y ahora.”

We have experiences in the interaction of the self with our circumstances, we could insert here. Moreover, “la experiencia humana es ella misma natural.” So again experience is natural; experience is our nature. These are anti-dualistic

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135 Ibid., pp. 8-9.


138 Ibid., p. 155.
concepts, as James Campbell also supports, “For Dewey, neither experience nor nature is primary in itself, and neither can be understood fully without the other.”

Dewey says this most clearly himself in the following extract also from 1940: “my theory of the connection of experience with nature— as itself an historical outcome or ‘end.’” Or, even more succinctly, Dewey declared earlier in 1925 that, “all natural existences are histories.”

Some of the key qualities of Dewey’s “nature” include not being something fixed or predetermined because “experience” shapes and defines what our “nature” is in each moment that we have experience(s). So in Dewey’s philosophy, one cannot separate experience from nature because experience gives nature its meaning through our own empirical understanding and conclusions of the nature of an experience. The idea here is that a thing essentially has no meaning (or nature) until we have an experience with it and decide what it is, its' (the thing's meaning), or that meaning (for instance of the experience) is or at least could be. So we define and experience what “a” (and this is key here, not “the”) nature of any thing or event is. This is why Dewey argues that “Objects are possessed and appreciated, but they are not known.” As has been discussed, it is not about the existence of some thing or event, it is about the meaning we attach to some thing or event. Also related to this Dewey writes, “Any immediate object then

139 See chapter titled “Dewey and the Realists” in Tiles, Dewey.
140 Campbell, Understanding Dewey, p. 77.
142 Dewey, Experience and Nature, p.163.
143 Ibid., p. 131.
becomes for inquiry, as something to be known, an appearance. To call it “appearance” denotes a functional status, not a kind of existence.”\textsuperscript{144} So, as he elaborates,

[…] experience is of as well as in nature. It is not experience which is experienced, but nature—stones, plants, animals, diseases, health, temperature, electricity, and so on. Things interacting in certain ways are experience; they are what is experienced. Linked in certain other ways with another natural object—the human organism—they are how things are experienced as well. Experience thus reaches down into nature; it has depth. It also has breadth and to an indefinitely elastic extent. It stretches. That stretch constitutes inference\textsuperscript{145}

Here we find a very clear application of Dewey's belief in antidualism, as the above excerpt demonstrates a clear challenge to the previously dominant Cartesian dualism prevalent in philosophy. Hence, concisely stated, we cannot genuinely know some thing or event, per se; “Truth and falsity are not properties of any experience or thing, in and of itself”.\textsuperscript{146} Rather, what we can study and ponder is how something is experienced in our own interpretations of that very experience; we can have a unique and direct experience with some thing and a resulting interpretation. We experience some thing, and then we interpret that experience, but along pragmatists lines we must add that what is important is to ask why and how we make that interpretation (rather than whether or not that interpretation is true or false in and of itself). Again the pragmatist goal is not an end of inquiry as to whether or not our interpretations of an

\textsuperscript{144} Ibid., p. 137.

\textsuperscript{145} Ibid., p. 4a-I.

\textsuperscript{146} DEWEY, John: The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and Other Essays, p. 95. (Subsequently referred to as: Influence of Darwin.) Originally published in 1906.
experience coincide correctly with the true nature and definition of that experience or thing, rather the objective is to ponder what we think and why we think that, as well as why it is useful or valuable for us to think that. And this is because generally we cannot confirm when what we think we experience is actually what we experience; we cannot generally know the true "nature" of our experience per pragmatists. So again there is a denial of being able to know "natures;" the denial is not of its existence, it is just of our being able to pinpoint exactly "true natures" because again what we can know is just what we think we know. This is the difference between experiencing something and interpreting that experience; it is not about knowing that experience and that we are experiencing an experience, it is about our own interpretations of that experience; the funneled interpretations via our perspectives is what we can ponder, not the nature of that experience in and of itself separate from our experiencing of them and in their "true independent natures." Again, perhaps there is a "true nature" but we cannot confirm what this may be, we can only ponder what we think and interpret that true nature to be; it is simply what we experience it to be, or at least this is what is tangible and what we can investigate.

This connects with Ortega's perspectivism, and the idea that there is no true or false perspective. As aforementioned, per Ortega the only fallacy is to say that there is one, absolute perspective. Each individual has a perspective and each person is, therefore, a point of view. We cannot know or understand our experiences, realities, objectively, but rather we see them always in perspective and through our circumstances. This is a key area that will be revisited throughout this dissertation in imagining a pragmatist dialogue in Ortega's work. As shall be explored further in what follows, these similarities in Dewey and Ortega, therefore, can help us better understand Ortega's notion of the infinite perspectives of truth and reality, but not, therefore, of
truth or reality itself. So as there is no one absolute perspective, as we will also see, there is no one truth, or no one reality.
VII. Truth and Reality

Moving forward, we must also look in more depth specifically at the concepts of the "truth" and "reality" in both philosophers' writings. In what follows there are some parts repeated to re-emphasize their importance while bringing a slight nuance to how we may possibly be able to especially better understand part of Ortega's philosophy.

As we just saw with the notions of experience and nature, similar constructions can be made in regards to interpreting the truth as anti-dualistic. Concisely stated, neither philosopher seems to insinuate that there is no truth, per se, but rather, there is the possible, potential truth, and then there is what we think is the truth, and we cannot necessarily, at least always, know if they ever coincide. This is a bit similar to the way that neither philosopher directly negates that there is no nature, but rather that mainly we simply cannot quite understand it, get to it, completely; there is nature, and then there is what we think nature is. So again the same can be said for the truth; there is truth, and then there is what we interpret and think of as the truth. The latter here is what is important to contemplate from the pragmatist perspective, and the resulting value and usefulness we place on those thoughts and interpretations. The truth and what we think is the truth need to be interpreted anti-dualistically here, because even though one cannot exist without the other, they are, nonetheless, still separate concepts because we cannot really, truly know if, how, when, or whether they can overlap. While it may be possible that the two coincide, resulting in 'truly knowing what the truth is,' this is something that essentially we might not ever even be able to know or recognize with certainty when we do. There is no way of really, "truly" being able to tell if they overlap correctly; hence, tersely affirmed, the "truth" must always be considered, at least, tentative, provisional, and not certain. Again, as Ortega similarly
declared, there are no true or false perspectives, and there is no one, absolute perspective. And "truth," therefore, is an (one of many) articulation of the total sum of individual (or social, cultural, etc.) perspective(s), points of view, and similarly not absolute. Here again neither philosopher is entirely relativist nor absolutist.

In this specific point perhaps the dialogue would proceed a bit more smoothly with Schiller's notion on the truth, as elaborated on in the third section, because of Ortega's focus on individual perspectivism and Schiller's inherent humanism at the center of his philosophy, whereas Dewey and James arguably are more broad in their views on the truth (by not narrowing it always to something so humanistic/human-centered). For Schiller, it is all about what we think some thing is (to put it plainly), whereas for Dewey and James, although this is still central of course there are also important influential factors to consider outside of the individual human being. That said, this last point, conversely, would dialogue more smoothly with Ortega's yo y mi circunstancia, as he, too, recognized the importance of external factors to humans as well; the circumstances surrounding us. As shall be explored, Schiller did not deny the role of this of course, it is just that his philosophy is more appropriately termed "humanism" because of his greater emphasis on humanity at the center. But for the moment, what should remain clear is that there are pieces of dialogue that we can envision between all these thinkers, some areas more smoothly than others. In fact, in one sense perhaps it can be argued that Ortega resolves these discrepancies by putting it all together in recognizing that we are central as individual human beings amidst a limiting set of both internal and external circumstances in which the ways we react and interpret all this is determined by our individual perspectives.
Dewey generally does not use the word "truth" in his philosophy, rather he created his own term; "warranted assertibility." Dewey concisely argues that rather than truths there is trueing, or "warranted assertibility." As McDermott, another expert on Dewey explains in regards to this, "He prefers the adverb "truly" to the abstract noun "truth," but perhaps it can be said that what he points to are our attempts at "trueing."\textsuperscript{147} And this is because "Dewey wanted 'truths,' even if reliably tested, to be treated as tentative, hypothetical, fallible, and in no way transcending specific verifications."\textsuperscript{148} We cannot describe or understand anything truly, other than as how we experience it to be, in Dewey's philosophy. In other words, truth, just like experience, or life and history, reality, is simply what we experience it to be. This is the conclusion Dewey makes; that again what we do know is that 'we know what we experience that we know.'

But it must be noted here again that this does not imply pure idealism. While Dewey initially in his philosophical career adhered quite closely to idealism, he would come to add quite a bit of naturalism, arguing that it not just that reality is what we experience it to be, but he eventually added that this was further undergone and confirmed via interactions between an individual and his or her environment, and which can lead to sometimes "trueing." During the period from 1884 to 1903, Dewey essentially supported idealism, or the idea that our ideas are our only realities, before he came to read this more anti-dualistically by eventually concluding that along with this realism is involved as well; that there is also a real, true reality, even if we


\textsuperscript{148} Tiles, \textit{Dewey}, p. 140.
may not be able to know which or what that is. So in actuality, there are all sorts of "truths." As he writes,

That the truth denotes truths, that is, specific verifications, combinations or meanings and outcomes reflectively viewed, is, one may say, the central point of experimental theory. Truth, in general or in the abstract, is a just name for an experienced relation among the things of experience: that sort of relation in which intents are retrospectively viewed from the standpoint of the fulfillment which they secure through their own natural operation or incitement. [...] Truth per se and in se, of which all transitory things and events—that is, all experienced realities—are only shadowy futile approximations.

The "truth" is primarily, therefore, about the conclusions we make as to the relationships between experiences and things experienced. Thus, we can only say with certainty, per early Deweyan thought, that, "Hence if one wishes to describe anything truly, his task is to tell what it is experienced as being."

Furthermore, there is arguably an historicist element in Dewey's concept of "warranted assertibility" and the idea that there are no "universal, absolute truths," a point defended in the following excerpt from Davaney's book on the history of historicism, and one which can arguably therefore be conversable with Ortega;

Dewey challenged the interpretation of philosophy as the formulation of universal truth and repudiated the dualisms embedded in such a quest. In their stead he articulated a

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151 Ibid., p. 241.
thoroughly historicized interpretation of philosophy and human inquiry as the finite and human attempt to grapple with the problematics of concrete human existence.\textsuperscript{152}

And as Professor Mougan also supports, "Dewey realiza un consideración que es a la vez sistemática e histórica" in regards to his notion of the truth.\textsuperscript{153} Ortega had some very similar views on the concept of the "truth," and in particular, in regards to this notion that truth is, basically, as with Dewey, what we experience it to be (most generally phrased), and for this reason there are essentially many 'truths'. Ortega proclaimed that there are 'diverse degrees of the truth.'\textsuperscript{154} And this is in part because, as he says, "Una idea es verdadera cuando corresponde a la idea que tenemos de la realidad."\textsuperscript{155}

Ortega also writes that "Para ser verdadero el pensamiento necesita coincidir con las cosas, con lo transcendente de mí [...]."\textsuperscript{156} The first point made by Ortega in these excerpts is that we consider something truthful when it coincides with reality, but in the second he argues that our interpretation is transcendental, separate, and beyond the thing we are interpreting. In other words, the first emphasizes the interpretation of some thing and the second the correspondance of that thing (and what it really might be) with our interpretation. This of course is in part the classic idealism versus realism dilemma in philosophy. But Ortega was neither a realist nor an idealist, something which he tried to make very clear in his writings. His emphasis on

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\textsuperscript{152} Davaney, \textit{Historicism}, p. 83.

\textsuperscript{153} MOUGAN RIVERO, Juan Carlos:“El carácter práctico de la verdad: J. Dewey” in \textit{Revista Laguna}, 16, p. 75.

\textsuperscript{154} See: ORTEGA Y GASSET, José: \textit{Ideas y creencias}, p. 24. Here Ortega argues that there are "grados diversos de la verdad”. (Subsequently referred to as \textit{Ideas y creencias}.)

\textsuperscript{155} Ibid., p. 29.

\textsuperscript{156} Ortega, \textit{Nuestro Tiempo}, p. 102
"interpretation" comes from the perspectivism central in his philosophy. And the "correspondance" refers to when we decide something is "truthful." In other words, this is just as Dewey argued that truth is determined by this relationship (the correspondance), but Ortega consistently adds to this emphasizing that ultimately this process is done via individual perspectives. This means that this correspondance could be discovered, interpreted and reached differently and at different points based on individual perspective. The argument here is that correspondance is simply the moment we decide something is true, but the path we take to get to that moment will vary by individual as will when exactly this moment occurs along that path (we should see this path as a continuum of time). So this path will be navigated and determined by individual perspective per Ortega. This is also the case in Dewey's argument, but again perhaps his view is a bit broader in that individual perspective does add to helping determine that path and the defined moments along that path (such as when we stop and decide we have reached the point that something can have 'enough' history and background corroborated to be considered "truthful"), but it also adds to our selection and study of the consequences (some of which are of course external to us) that define that correspondance to corroborate something as "truthful." This is because Dewey emphasizes that it is the matching consequences (and more so real-world applications, therefore, and something more "practical"), that are key in our understandings and interpretations of the "truth" (but still, it must be reminded that the "truth" does not really exist for Dewey because he calls it instead "warranted assertibility"). Meaning, a divergence here is that for Dewey consequences are key (though Dewey does note the role of perspective, too), and for Ortega, perspective is key, but both would arguably dialogue on the defining moment in our conceptions and formulations of the truth being the point of correspondence noted. Moreover, these roles of consequences and perspectives are not incompatible, they are just different
emphases, but neither thinker would negate the existence of the roles of these both in this process of what we could call "truing," they just diverge a bit in which they focus on in their philosophies.

Dewey argued that the "truth verifies consequences," as he writes, "Like knowledge itself, truth is an experienced relation of things, and it has no meaning outside of such relation."¹⁵⁷ For pragmatists such as Dewey, therefore, we should refer here to "justification" rather than the truth or the verification of the truth. Justifications and "warranted assertibility" is really what our goal should be about, because we cannot truthfully confirm the truth. What is important is simply why and how we reach and make those justifications, and not whether or not they are accurate, credible, or truthful in and of themselves. Again what is important for the pragmatist (even more than how we came to create and define those justifications) is especially the future application of those justifications.

For example, if the answer to a question, speaking very generally here, is demonstrated literally and 'enough' (whatever that requirement may be), then we say something is "true." Hence the importance of 'consequences' in Dewey's philosophy here, which is of course quite instrumentalist. Correspondence is not just with past consequences, therefore. For the pragmatist, correspondence is particularly important because of its potential future applications. In pragmatism, the past history of correspondence between consequences simply starts this process. Part of this is because the more our consequences come to be confirmed as corresponding in the future, the more we consider something to be "truthful." The truth needs to be constantly re-

¹⁵⁷ That is, no real meaning that we can get to. Dewey, Philosophy of Dewey, p. 185.
affirmed and re-corroborated in order to survive and to continue to last into the future, in other words, so this entire process must continue to proceed into the future.

Thus for both philosophers, there is a futuristic element in their views on what is 'the truth' given that it is something that must be demonstrated, validated, verified, and of course this means in the future. The important critique must be noted here, however, that what we are talking about is predicting the future, which of course we cannot always do; we cannot always know if our predictions are going to be realized and verified. This is, in fact, a central critique of instrumentalism and essentially anything too forward-looking and consequentalist in general. But this is not to say, however, and as we shall see, that either philosopher does not recognize this of course that we can never know all consequences in advance.

We can also posit that there is an objective here to create a link of sorts between what is real and what is ideal. And perhaps for Dewey, the more agreement there is between individuals in regards to having the same or similar meanings concluded based on experienced relations, then the closer something is to being 'true' (but not necessarily absolutely true of course). Dewey writes, "The best definition of truth from the logical standpoint which is known to me is that of Pierce: 'The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented by this opinion is the real'"158 Nonetheless, just because he says that this is, in his opinion, the 'best' definition of the truth does not mean that he necessarily completely agrees with it, of course. But to put this plainly, it is a way to simply be more 'realistic' and bring philosophy down from too lofty and abstract a position; this makes philosophy more tangible, practical, rational, sensible, or in a word, pragmatic.

158 DEWEY, John: Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, p. 343. (Subsequently referred to as Logic.) (Originally published in 1939).
Ortega, even more so than Dewey, seems to insinuate that there are indeed truths (but then, again, there are also what we think are truths, and we may not always be able to know for sure if they ever coincide, though there will be times that we think they do—this also must be read in an anti-dualistic manner). Moreover, given that for Ortega the "truth" is the articulation of the total sum of individual perspectives, points of view, then the more perspectives that we take on and incorporate, the closer we get to these possible, potential "truths." For example, if we are trying to get as close as possible to any truths about a mountain (to use an example that simply has a multidimensional shape to ponder), we should integrate as many perspectives possible from as many positions and therefore points of reference, analysis, as possible. We are not going to see the 'whole picture of the mountain' looking upon just one side of the mountain; we need to look from all sides. And Ortega differs a bit in that he does not rely nearly as much on the instrumentalist notion in understanding the process of "trueing." Hence the aforementioned direct critique of Ortega's that pragmatists "[...] se ha atrevido a proclamar esta tesis: <<No hay más verdad que el buen éxito en el trato de las cosas>>." In other words, while for Ortega the truth is what we experience it to be, as it is for the American pragmatist Dewey, there is yet a bit more to this for Ortega; he still arguably leans toward there really perhaps being something more solid and that may be even tangible in the form of truth that we should strive toward discovering, or at least we can say the truth can be true for an individual, if not in general. In other words, while the pragmatist generally argues that we cannot ever confirm or therefore know the "truth" completely, for Ortega this ultimately does not really matter because something can simply be very true, or 'true enough,' for an individual in his or her own mind (hence his emphasis on perspectivism). The individual mind is what is more important for Ortega. It is possible that

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Ortega would agree and dialogue on this concept of there being no *real, true* truths, but it is essentially a mute point for him because not all recognize this or understand things to be this way, and because for some they really completely believe in certain truths, to phrase this all plainly, and this of course varies by individuals. Truth does truly exist in the minds of some (again whether that truth they believe in is actually really a truth does not matter). This is like the classic debate among different religions or between the religious and the non-religious; we cannot prove the existence, or non-existence, of the Catholic God versus Allah for Muslims, for example, but this does not matter to those who really, truly believe in their God, whichever their deity may be. Some people simply truly and completely believe in the truth of their deity and others do not, or others have a different God or Gods. Thus, what is important to contemplate for Ortega is our individual perspective(s) because this is the point from which we see and understand things such as the truth, whereas for the pragmatist the focus is more specifically on the applications and repercussions in the past, present, and future (even if ultimately determined and selected from an individual perspective) that the truth has in the process of the correspondence of "truing." But again the point of possible dialogue between Ortega and the pragmatists could be that our focus should not be on whether or not something is *truly true*. This is because for Ortega it just simply can be for some and not for others, but this does not tell us whether or not something is actually true because this disagreement cannot be resolved. And for the pragmatists this is because this just depends on a certain number of practical applications corroborating and maintaining our beliefs on the truth of something but not verifying with absolute certainty the truth of a truth. So rather to speak generally we should think about how, why, and when, for example, that we think something is true (again not whether or not it is really true).
The following excerpt by Álvarez Gómez, referencing some direct material from Ortega, supports this argument of where, exactly, this dialogue could occur in a pragmatist notion of the rejection of a confirmed *true truth* but with his divergence in his lack of emphasis on instrumentalism in this (since Ortega instead focuses on perspectivism);

Condición para ello [la 'utilidad máxima que reporta la verdad'] es que la verdad sea pura y simplemente verdad, en lugar de <<hacer de utilidad la verdad...yo he buscado en torno, con mirada suplicante de naúfrago, los hombres a quienes importase la verdad, la pura verdad, lo que las cosas son por sí mismas, y apenas he hallado alguno.\(^\text{160}\)

While Dewey generally only emphasizes that truth is just what we think it is, again Ortega accentuates that this, in and of itself, really does make something a so-called "truth," at least for that individual or during that time period, but not in terms of being a 'true veracity' in a constant and general sense. Hence, as shall be elaborated further along, the notion that "the will is real, but the willed is not;" or, rephrased, we could say that 'our belief in the truth is true, but the belief of the truth itself, or simply the truth itself, may not be true.'\(^\text{161}\) Perhaps this is part of the reason why a core part of Ortega's meditations here are quite individualistic; "El punto de vista individual me parece el único punto de vista desde el cual puede mirarse el mundo en su verdad. Otra cosa es artificio."\(^\text{162}\) And he continues, "[...] cada hombre tiene una misión de verdad. Donde está mi pupila no está otra: lo que de la realidad ve mi pupila no lo ve otra. Somos

\(^{160}\) ÁLVAREZ GÓMEZ, Mariano: *Unamuno y Ortega la búsqueda azarosa de la verdad*, p. 212. (Subsequently referred to as: *Búsqueda de la verdad*.)

\(^{161}\) ORTEGA Y GASSET, José: *Meditaciones del Quijote*, p. 226. (Subsequently referred to as: *Meditaciones del Quijote*.)

\(^{162}\) Ortega, *Obras Completas II*, p. 18.
Again, every individual has and is a perspective, and a perspective is just one vision of reality, and just one reality itself. A perspective can never be true or false. Perspective is the means to be of the real and also the means to get to know some of the real, again at least for the individual if not generally. Life, reality, is perspective. Every reality, therefore, has infinite perspectives, each of which are neither true nor false, and again the only fallacy is to say that one is absolute—each is simply "true" for the individual seeing it but maybe not in and of itself. But this should still all be understood anti-dualistically, nonetheless, as Lasaga Medina explains, and as such establishing again where the possible point of dialogue with pragmatism is,

<<Verdadero>> significa entonces dos cosas: primero, significará <<de acuerdo con las cosas>>, que acierta o desvela lo que hay, que la idea capta realidad; y en segundo lugar, significará <<verdadero en y para mí>>, es decir, auténtico. El sentido final de la verdad en Ortega es verdad como autenticidad. Ambos significados no se pueden separar: el primero depende absolutamente del segundo.\(^{164}\)

Dewey does appear to coincide in the notion that truth is ultimately, in the end, a personal endeavor and conclusion. As Shook proposes in what follows, the ultimate test in "trueing" comes from the individualist perspective.\(^{165}\)

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\(^{163}\) Ibid., p. 19.


\(^{165}\) This is an example of the dichotomy that while Dewey emphasizes the social, interactive perspective, this does not mean that he completely rejects the individualist notion.
[...] the individual mind serves as the test of any potential new known truth. *Truth, in short, from a psychological standpoint, is agreement of relations; falsity, disagreement of relations...It follows from what has just been said that the mind always tests the truth of any supposed fact by comparing it to the acquired system of truth.* [The italics represent Dewey's words.] [...] in this last quotation Dewey declares that the psychological standpoint must take the individual's own internal coherence to be the final criterion and definition of truth.166

It is because of this that we can also understand why there are so many different truths and realities, because as Ortega proclaims "algo es verdad para mí cuando para mí es verdad en sí."167 This definition of the truth is arguably quite pragmatist indeed, because here, essentially, *my experience transforms my reality, my truth.* Here we can say that what is "truth" is what is experienced to be truth; meaning, to be quite pragmatist in the choice of words here, *practical consequences of my experiences lead to my conclusions on my truths.* And each one of us is unique in certain ways, he continues, "Cada individuo es un órgano de percepción en algo distinto de todos los demás."168

And as we shall see in various instances that should be at least briefly noted here, Dewey's insistence on a community of investigators being necessary for getting closer to, broadly speaking, 'what might be real' (but not right on target of course) perhaps this dialogues smoothly with Ortega's notion that the more perspectives we gather, the closer we can get to


168 Ibid., p. 444.
what might be real; the more people, therefore, to combine the two in dialogue, the more 
authentic and truthful our interpretations and conceptions of reality, without of course ever being 
able to confirm their complete accuracy, precision, or truthfullness.

In one instance Ortega uses an example of a centaur, arguing that while a centaur may 
not be real, our imagining it to be real is real; "[...] el centauro no es un ser real – lo real de él es 
la imagen o trozo real de nuestra alma en que lo imaginamos él es un ser imaginado, un ser 
fantástico o de la fantasía." Once again, our "will to real something" is real, but that 'real' 
willed may not always necessarily be real. It must be noted, nonetheless, that there is a still a 
social element in all this stemming from the concept of "yo y mi circunstancia," as Álvarez 
Gómez clarifies,

[...] cada dimensión de la realidad está intrínsecamente conexionada con las demás–dado 
que son dimensiones de una y la misma realidad que en ella se explicita–y puesto que 
todas y cada una de ellas está enraizada en la realidad, la captación de cada una de 
ellas en un ejercicio de visión remite a otras en proceso interminable, cuyo 
sentido, sin embargo, es la detectación de la realidad misma bajo una de sus formas.

Thus, Ortega proclaimed, "Las cosas –hemos dicho– no son verdad ni falsedad, ni 
verdaderas ni falsas; verdadera y falsa sólo puede serlo la conciencia de las cosas, el pensar las

169 Ibid., p. 376. Don Quijote is a great example of this, and one in which Ortega does speak of in many of his 
 writings. Throughout the novel, Don Quijote was always seeing the world differently than everyone else, and 
resultantly many of the characters considered him to be crazy. Nonetheless, he believed so strongly in what he saw 
that the idea is one cannot necessarily say it was not true for him, Don Quijote, per se, even if nobody else always 
saw the same. Hence, generally speaking, the 'will' of what we individually see, for example, is real, but the 'willed,' 
or the external world, manifestation, because it may be seen as different by different people, is 'not real,' or at least 
we cannot always necessarily prove per se that one's interpretation is 'truer' than that of another.

170 Álvarez Gómez, Búsqueda de la verdad, p. 217.
cosas. Y no todo pensar."\textsuperscript{171} Put another way, here Ortega adds that it is the judgment of thinking one's judgment is the sole correct one which must be considered false (but not one's judgment in and of itself, per se, because neither veracity nor falsity can be \textit{completely proven} of any single one of them); "Las cosas no pueden ser ni verdaderas ni falsas. [...] quien es falso es el juicio del sujeto que juzgó [...] La falsedad no es de ese querer, sino de quien pensó que aquel querer era un querer real y no ficticio."\textsuperscript{172} It is also recognized by Ortega that we cannot necessarily know if what we think is the truth and what is the truth coincide, as he clearly declares in this excerpt, "[...] ni poseemos todas las verdades ni podemos poseerlas todas. No es la verdad quien es relativa al hombre sino el número y clases de verdades que podemos poseer."\textsuperscript{173} Still, again he does seem to insinuate that there are "truths;" "Toda verdad en especie contiene ciertos elementos genéricos de verdad [...]"\textsuperscript{174} This is all clarified concisely in the following excerpt from Lasaga Medina, in reference to la razón histórica as well, which lacks any a priori notions, idealism or Kantianism, rather,

\[ [...] \text{la razón se vuelve rigurosamente empiricista, más que el empiricismo anglosajón, que no es sino un <<idealismo>> prudente regalado por lo que llaman <<hechos>> y pragmática: el objeto de la razón es aprender la verdadera realidad, lo que ha ido haciendo y pasándole al hombre en las estructuras espacio-temporales en que se da el vivir humano. Esa <<realidad>>, que no es racional, reside y se deja aprender por lo que denomina Ortega <experiencia de la vida>>, que es un tipo de saber preconceptual, \]

\textsuperscript{171} Ortega, \textit{Obras Completas XII}, p. 429.

\textsuperscript{172} Ibid., p. 410.

\textsuperscript{173} Ibid., p. 442.

\textsuperscript{174} Ibid., p. 373.
muy difícil de transmitir, y que consiste en la decantación intuitiva (o relexiva) de las experiencias vividas.\textsuperscript{175}

One example that comes to mind here to illustrate all this would be that of the transition from the belief that the earth was flat to that of it being round. When it turned out that Christopher Columbus and his explorers did not 'fall off the earth' as had been expected, the "truth" about the shape of the globe changed. Prior to this, the great majority were generally convinced that the earth was flat, just the same as how today we are certain that the world is round; in other words, essentially given this belief, this conviction, it was, arguably, just as much of a "truth" then as it is now. This is why, as we shall see, what is important to consider in all this is, as Ortega proclaimed, that what changes are not truths, \textit{per se}, rather \textit{truths in the minds of people}. The truth can change in the minds of not just individuals, but within entire societies, or for specific historical epochs. Hence, what is important here is not that something is true or false, necessarily, but rather it is what is inside the minds of people and \textit{what they think is} true or false that is important (instead of a truth or falsity in and of itself). And because this is something that changes, that gives it a historicity. "Entiende cada época lo que para ella es la verdad," argued Ortega.\textsuperscript{176} And later he adds, "El descubrimiento de una verdad, es siempre un suceso con fecha y localidad precisas."\textsuperscript{177} This Ortega posits consistently in his writings, as in this additional example from \textit{Una interpretación de la historia universal}, "Verdad es lo que ahora es verdad, y no lo que se va a descubrir en un futuro indeterminado."\textsuperscript{178} Thus, the truth is also \textit{historical}. At

\textsuperscript{175} Lasaga Medina, \textit{Ortega: Vida y filosofía}, pp. 150-151.

\textsuperscript{176} Ortega, \textit{Obras Completas III}, p. 310.

\textsuperscript{177} Ibid., p. 313.

\textsuperscript{178} Ibid., p. 25.
first glance this appears to proceed in a different direction from Dewey in that there is in this
greater emphasis on the historical interpretation of the truth rather than on pragmatist
instrumentalism and its more forward-focused approach.

One possible analysis on Ortega's view here is that the reason he argues that truth is what
is true right now is because the truth is historical in that it is true for a historical time period;
historical epochs have their own truths, so again the truth is historical. We can still imagine a
dialogue with pragmatism in this because pragmatists would simply take this a step further and
add that within that historical period (even if they do not use this specific phrase generally to
describe this), whichever "truths" are consistently tested and demonstrated to be consequentially
useful, valid, and therefore true during *that* period, are the ones that come to be defined as
"truths." And this is further based on the pragmatist assumption that this corroborating process
will continue to be useful, justified, and applicable in the future. In other words this process must
be continued into the present and extend into the future if something is going to continue to exist
as a believed "truth" (note the need to use the phrase 'believed truth' to emphasize the argument
of the inability to consider it more than a "warranted assertion" in reference to "truth" to use
Dewey's notion). Ortega would possibly jump in here to dialogue adding in his thought that in
certain time periods there can be ideas and then beliefs that simply come to function 'best.' In
general this specific topic of something being "functional", as has been noted, is where we can
really imagine a dialogue with pragmatism. And as shall be further elaborated ahead, this is what
shapes our views on reality, this also being historical and dependent on that historical moment in
reference. Thus while the pragmatist may not generally use the term "historical" in their
interpretation of the "truth," this certainly is something that they arguably would be open to
dialoging on. And while Ortega focuses on the past, because the history of something is what determines and defines its nature, or at least our understanding of its nature, the pragmatist in general tends to focus on how what is really important, nonetheless, is the future impact. Even if we cannot predict the future, in pragmatism generally the future is what matters in our life, one reason being because we cannot do anything about the past, since it is done with, but we can do something about the future, since it has not arrived yet. While the past may be the most defining features of our presents, the present is still ultimately ephemeral because we are always moving forward into the future. This movement forward is what matters, therefore, but understanding what moved us prior is found in the past, making the past important as well, just in a different way. In one sense the past is the explanation and the future is the application, and that explanation helps us not only understand that application, but it is what needs to be consistently and continually demonstrated and validated in the future. We can insert "truth" here into this imagined dialogue and argue that the past explains why a "truth" came to be, but it can only remain a "truth" when this continues to be further corroborated in the future and so its continued existence depends on the future. As shall be discussed ahead as well, Ortega says that sometimes our truths are our beliefs, and that we are our beliefs; they form a part of us. In order to form a part of us, these beliefs need a history of validation, thus being again a point of dialogue with pragmatism. And of course these two points meet in the present, which is yet another reason that this all must be viewed along a continuum. So these two focuses can presumably coalesce, further advancing this thesis's purpose to imagine a dialogue between Ortega and pragmatism.

Dewey emphasized that what is not most important is whether something is true or false, rather what is significant to ponder is what we think of as true and false; why we think that, how that affects us, how we reached that conclusion, etcetera. To think is to act. To think is, for
example, to consider a problem and propose a solution. We have to see consequences, and thinking has to include action, per Dewey's instrumentalism. We do need to view the past, but we also have to look toward the future. Again Dewey, as a pragmatist, leans more toward instrumentalism than Ortega of course. As Sidney Hook explains,

[...] las cosas no son ni verdaderas ni falsas; tampoco los estados mentales, sean lo que sean, son verdaderos o falsos. Sólo es verdadero o falso los que nosotros afirmamos de una forma significativa sobre ellas. Son, por tanto, las consecuencias de lo que hacemos las que determinan si nuestro discurso es verdadero o falso.\textsuperscript{179}

Part of this is because again there are so many possible combinations of interactions leading to various versions of what we think is the truth, and of all these 'experiences' there is subsequently what we esteem to be the most important, credible, useful, etcetera. So, also imperative to consider here is what we value most, as shall be elaborated further ahead.

Ortega said that "the world is doubtful, but my doubting is not," and as he further elaborated, "[…] diríamos que cuando dudo del mundo hay con absoluta realidad: yo dudando y el mundo dudificándome, inyectándose a presión su dudosidad, como entra el lubricante en el automóvil. […] Diremos que cuando dudo hay: yo que dudo y el mundo embromándome."\textsuperscript{180} So truth and error are, in this sense, also anti-dualistic. In other words, one key way to move toward possibly discovering the truth for Ortega, or at least in part understanding where our notions of the truth come from for Dewey (as again the objective is to create a potential dialogue in an effort to hopefully better understand some of Ortega's philosophy in particular), is in interpreting

\textsuperscript{179} Hook, Semblanza. p. 63.

\textsuperscript{180} Ortega, Obras Completas XII, pp. 187-88.
and concluding what are not truths. Ortega, in fact, says very directly that "[...] tenemos que llegar a la verdad por la duda [...]". And in another excerpt he adds to this that this anti-dualistic reality of truth and falsity, in fact, is essentially what makes it possible for there to be something such as the 'truth:'

[...] quien dice <<no hay verdad>>, <<dudo que poseamos verdad>> o como quiera que esto sea expresado, piensa en la verdad y la distingue de la falsedad y no admite que esos dos sentidos sean uno mismo. La verdad del principio de identidad es condición para que la duda tenga sentido. Yo no puedo dudar mi duda si aquello de que dudo no es algo idéntico a sí mismo y distinto de cuanto no es ese algo. [...] En rigor, la duda es imposible sin la admisión de un mundo literalmente infinito de verdades.

In other words, the idea here is that any discussion on the truth, whether it be on what it could be or could not be; any evidence or doubt that might arise, still, nonetheless, creates some proposition as to the idea of the 'truth.' Gray explains this argument quite clearly in the following remarks:

Taking issue with the skeptical position that we can have no certainty of the existence of truth, Ortega argues that they very reference to "truth" – even in the assertion that we cannot know whether or not it exists – implies a notion of what it is. Genuine doubt, as distinguished from a complacent skepticism, is seen as a sign of the ongoing quest for clarification. (Hence the appearance of "nodal problems" in the sciences is a healthy sign.) The possibility of doubt arises from our belief "in a realm containing literally an

181 Ibid., p. 415.
182 Ibid., pp. 427-428.
infinite number of truths," namely, a world in which each individual person's perception makes that claim that things are as he believes them to be. [...] Truth itself, Ortega argues, is not relativistic, although that portion of reality which each person is able to illuminate with his focus of attention is necessarily so [...].¹⁸³

Note how we can envision a dialogue here with Dewey in claiming that Ortega thought that "each individual person's perception makes that claim that things are as he believes them to be" because they are what we experience them to be; our experience of something is via our perspective—this an example of the conversation we can imagine.

Dewey proclaimed that "[...] not error but truth is the exception."¹⁸⁴ Dewey's emphasis is on our notions of the truth being a result of experiment; "truth" is an outcome of inquiry that is experimentally explored. Hence, as aforementioned in the explanation provided from Hook, 'things' are true or false depending on how we deem them to be true or false per the consequences they create, again per instrumentalist Deweyan thought. And because there are as many interpretations as there are consequences, there are equally that many resultant notions of the "truth," which is, therefore, the exception. While Ortega may not generally emphasize the consequential (instrumentalist) notion in all this, he does similarly aver that "[...] la verdad de las ideas se alimenta de su cuestionabilidad."¹⁸⁵ So again most fundamentally what we can see here in regards to how these two philosophers might correspond in dialogue is in the position that our notions of the truth rely very much on our notions of the non-truth, and one key is questioning

¹⁸³ Gray, Imperative of Modernity, p. 103.
¹⁸⁵ Ortega, Ideas y Creencias, p. 31.
both essentially, in a general sense. Hence again anti-dualism in another sense; the truth is also discovered and understood via the non-truth. This, in fact, is a particularly clear example of anti-dualism because it unites two opposites as one, because one "opposite" cannot be defined and therefore understood without its other "opposite," though they must still also be separate things to be "opposites" (i.e. "separate but united interdependently anti-dualism"). To apply the example of the truth here, what is considered the "truth" cannot be understood without a defining feature being what it is not/what is not the truth, but they are of course separate concepts that must exist interdependently, or anti-dualistically, because one cannot exist without the other, which is how they are united. But they are still separate concepts.

For both philosophers, therefore, what is also important is the application, and possible applications (the concept of "application" being quite pragmatist indeed), of the truth. As Hook explains in regards to Dewey, "[...] una idea es verdadera si, como resultado de llevarla a cabo—como resultado de un experimento—somos capaces de verificar ciertas consecuencias especificables que se siguen de creer en ella."186 However, while for Dewey these relevancies have to do with how they are experimentally applied in terms of 'confirming consequences in the future,' Ortega emphasizes more so that this is more about the value and worth we attach to these applications, either as individuals, or as a group, or depending (especially) on the historical epoch, etcetera. Specifically for Ortega, this emphasis on 'value and worth', or the part of this anti-dualistic interpretation which is 'that which we think is the truth' is rooted in creencias (beliefs).

186 Hook, Semblanza, p. 64.
The difference between *ideas y creencias* (ideas and beliefs) in Ortega's philosophy is central to much of his thought. Tersely explained, for Ortega we *have* ideas and we *are* our beliefs. The two are related in that some ideas become beliefs, which can become so latent within us that we are not always even aware of them; they simply become part of us. To return to and use a very simple example of Ortega's, we do not think about nor question that there are walls that enclose us in a room.\(^{187}\) When we are inside a room or building, we are 'latently' convinced that there are walls that surround us – it is a belief. And between these beliefs that we have there are some that become the 'truth' for us, as Ortega explains, because humanity

[...] tiene que inventar el mundo. La mayor porción de él la ha heredado de sus mayores y actúa en su vida como sistema de creencias firmes. Pero cada cual tiene que habérselas por su cuenta con todo lo dudoso, con todo lo que es cuestión. A este fin ensaya figuras imaginarias de mundos y de su posible conducta en ellos. Entre ellas, una le parece *idealmente* más firme, y a eso llama verdad. Pero conste: lo verdadero, y aun lo *científicamente* verdadero, no es sino un caso particular de lo fantástico.\(^{188}\)

Ortega classifies truth as "fantasy" here because the truth is often just our beliefs, and he himself cites at the start of this excerpt, we must "invent" our worlds. We sometimes inherit beliefs, or truths. As we have seen in this specific point of truth being 'fantastical and invented by man' basically there would arguably be an imaginable dialogue with pragmatism because it denies not necessarily the existence of the truth but rather at least our inability to get to the truth.

\(^{187}\) See: *Unas lecciones de metafísica*.

Again thus why Dewey does not use the term truth and instead uses "warranted assertibility" in much the same way that Ortega essentially refers to "beliefs" instead of truths.

In some recently recovered texts of Dewey's there is a concept of beliefs that can converse with that of Ortega's, as apparent in the following excerpt: "His beliefs are social beliefs; they are of import because of this fact. Moreover, beliefs are serially as well as contemporaneously told and shared. They become traditions, and there are no traces of any form of mankind so primitive as not to reveal him possessed of traditions." And for Dewey, the experiences, of course, are what create and shape these beliefs; "The experiences which lay deepest hold upon one, to use common parlance, are those that most deeply affect organic factors-attitudes, dispositions, habits-upon which formation of subsequent situations depends." So our experiences, or our histories really, can create beliefs that become traditions, and which become a part of us essentially in the form of attitudes, habits, dispositions, etc. and shape subsequent situations, or again subsequent histories. Beliefs, as so much here, are also historical. And beliefs are a type of truth.

But in this emphasis on our beliefs being our 'truths' for Ortega we also find an important difference that must be noted from Dewey. For Dewey, there is something more "experimentable" in this, in the sense of their being manifest in our lives specifically (but not in terms of their "veracity"), than for Ortega. For Dewey truths are, as aforementioned, "experimentally determined as the outcome of inquiry," whereas for Ortega it is more about the value we place on a truth, albeit latently, that is simply generally a belief of ours. This is why for Ortega "[...] la posesión de la verdad, es, como la posesión de Dios, un acontecimiento que no ha

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189 Dewey, Philosophy, pp. 562-564.

190 Ibid., pp. 5513-5514.
acontecido ni puede acontecer en «esta vida».”

This example serves well here since God cannot be proven or disproven experimentally, but this does not take away from it being a truthful belief for the religious. As Ortega says in direct critique of pragmatist thought,

El error del pragmatismo no radica en que considere las ideas como instrumentos, sino en que quiera reducir las cosas con que el hombre tiene que habérselas a lo perceptible y experimentable, lo que está a la mano y presente, el mineral, la planta, el animal y la estrella. […] Si así fuese, la vida resultaría faena fácil, tal vez resuelta con cierta plenitud hace milenios.”

Again his example of God as truth is certainly a good one to back up his case, since God cannot be proven to exist or to not exist, but that ultimately does not matter in his argument because some people either believe so completely in God or do not that it does not matter for him or her if their "truth," whichever it may be, can be proven. Those who are religious believe in God, period, and atheists do not, period. It is like his perspectivism; it is not that one truth is true or false, there are multiple truths and falsities and the one certain falsity is to say that there is only one truth just like the falsity of saying that there is only one perspective—but then again couldn't one say this was one "truth" in and of itself, or one falsity in and of itself? Perhaps that is a topic for another dissertation, as both Ortega and pragmatists would likely dialogue in response saying that what matters ultimately is what we each individually thinks matters, to phrase it generally. What matters ultimately is how each one of us answers that question and believes that answer to be.

\[191\] Ortega, Nuestro Tiempo, p. 127.

\[192\] Ortega, Obras Completas Tomo IV, pp. 257-258.
Further, since for Ortega beliefs are not conscious (we are not conscious of them until they are challenged), we essentially install ourselves in them, and they become sub-conscious. They must go through a process of transformation from ideas and subsequently remain as beliefs without any challenge to them, so they exist along a continuum. This is also something that makes them 'historical' in part as something temporal. If there is some kind of crisis that brings the belief (or beliefs) to the surface by putting it into question, or when it no longer serves us or matches our realities, for example, we become conscious of it. But until then, so long as they are not challenged, they continue to exist as such. A pragmatist dialogue here would probably add that they must be continuously verified and corroborated as such, experimentally, and perhaps Ortega would agree, but this is not something he specifically mentions (maybe simply by omission), focusing instead on how a crisis plays a key role in making a belief most known. But the argument could also be made that the omission of a challenge is one form of a corroboration perhaps for the pragmatist. Meaning, something can be tested not only in finding evidence and proof as to it being 'valid' and proving it, but also the lack of finding evidence and proof to disprove and invalidate something is also important—similar to the example of not being able to prove or disprove the existence of God (which does not matter because what matters is what the individual believes—this is pure "Ortegian perspectivism"). This, too, is perhaps a topic for another dissertation. But as another specific point of possible dialogue with pragmatism here for this thesis's purpose, when there is a rupture in that continuum it must be fixed and continuity must be restored. And Ortega would add such as with another new or refined belief, but again specifically a dialogue could be found in a shared view of needing to see this as a continuum. This is a topic that will be explored further in the section on 'how we think' but that needed to be noted here briefly.
For Ortega, since the truth can come in the form of our beliefs, we are not necessarily always even aware of them, as they can be latently present and part of us, whereas for Dewey (and true to the pragmatist view) we generally test them directly, consciously. So Ortega appears to differ here in that experimentation is not always an option. Moreover, Ortega appeared to argue against the pragmatist idea of the truth that, as he avers, the essence is found in how it is 'useful' (once again his distinction in not being as instrumentalist as Dewey). "[...] esa filosofía pragmatista que descubre la esencia de la verdad, de lo teórico por excelencia, el lo práctico, en lo útil," writes Ortega, then adding, "[...] cuando se trate de buscar lo verdadero tenderemos a confundirlo con lo útil. Y esto, hacer de la utilidad la verdad, es la definición de la mentira."\textsuperscript{193}

But, as concisely argued by Graham in reference to Ortega's views, there was one sense in which he was, nonetheless, a bit instrumentalist; "In one way or another, he always upheld truth and right as absolutes per se, even though they were thus unattainable by human effort or experience. Still, he too was committed to the utility and practicability of truths and rights relative to life."\textsuperscript{194}

As discussed, per Ortega our beliefs are considered valid during the time in which they permit us to, in a sense, install ourselves into reality because they match that reality or the perspective we have of that reality. And when this ceases to be the case; when our beliefs no longer match up properly with reality and thus rise to the latent surface to be judged, this arguably gives Ortega's concept of "beliefs," or "truths" (since for him some "beliefs" can become our "truths") a sense

\textsuperscript{193} Ortega, \textit{Obras Completas II}, pp. 15-16. And this focus too much on the "useful" takes away from the truth's essential historical character, per Ortega; "La 'adquisición' de las verdades —si se quiere la 'adaptación del sujeto a la verdad'—, es un proceso histórico, un fenómeno biológico. Pero el pragmatismo habla universalmente de una 'adaptación de la verdad al sujeto' y esto es lo que carece de sentido. La verdad no puede ser relativa a la condición de un sujeto, sea individuo o especie. No hay una verdad para éste o para el otro. Esa verdad así condicionada sería nombre del error. Cuando el sujeto cree haber llegado a una verdad, cree haber superado su condición subjetiva y haber tocado un universo absoluto, indiferente a toda relatividad del individuo o especie. Algo es verdad para mí, cuando creo que es verdad en sí, y no al revés" (Rabade, \textit{Ortega y Gasset: Filósofo}, p. 76).

\textsuperscript{194} Graham, \textit{Pragmatist Philosophy}, p. 183.
of "utility" and "functionality;" meaning, how much exactly that they match our realities. In other words, perhaps Ortega's aforementioned critique of pragmatism was the result of too narrowed an interpretation of the pragmatist use of the term "useful," when really in pragmatism it is meant to be applied in a broader sense; it is not meant to be just practical, to reference the term used in Ortega's critique, as it is also meant to be broadly simply used or "applicable." Taking this into account we thus can argue another point of possible dialogue with pragmatism. Moreover, in regards to Ortega's view that it is specifically a crisis situation that arises to call a belief into question and brings it to the latent surface, arguing that new ideas are thus resultantly formulated (and some of which would eventually convert to new beliefs or "truths"), would dialogue with the following interpretation of Dewey's definition and version of "instrumentalism:" "Dewey called his pragmatism by the name of "instrumentalism" to signify the purposive use of ideas as instruments for reconstruction of an unsatisfactory situation".195

Moreover, as cited previously, for Dewey there are essentially as many interpretations of any possible truths as there are consequences that appear to validate any notions of the truth (since this is more about direct inquiry and experiment), whereas for Ortega in a sense there are as many truths as there are circumstances that influence the beliefs that define us, that make us, and that lead to "truths" via as many perspectives as we have. Again we each have and are a perspective, which is what gives us our knowledge, and no one perspective is absolute, true, or false, as they all provide an infinite number of windows to reality, truth. And since there are so many possible 'truths,' therefore, this is why we can never really be sure of them, which is one area in which these two philosophers do coincide in that we cannot really say with absolute

certainty what is a truth strictly in and of itself. As Hook concisely explains in regards to Dewey's philosophy; "[...] las consecuencias de cualquier juicio son infinitas, en tanto que las consecuencias que pueden ser actualmente verificadas son finitas, de modo que de ningún juicio podría afirmarse su verdad."\textsuperscript{196} Hence, we can say, nonetheless, that for both philosophers (any ideas of) 'truths' cannot be "absolute," but they are certainly more than just opinions. In Dewey's philosophy, given the experimentation involved, and the study of their consequences and any possible patterns that might verify a notion of a truth, they may not be total and complete, but they are more than estimation and guess.\textsuperscript{197} Again we must note the possible dialogue in Dewey's insistence on a community of investigators with Ortega's emphasis on gathering as many perspectives as possible to get closer, though never right on target, to accuracy and precision.

Both Dewey and Ortega seem to also concur that man longs for the truth, no matter how it may possibly be (tentatively) reached. Dewey writes,

Its plaintive recognition of our experience as finite and temporal, as full of error, conflict and contradiction, is an acknowledgment of the precarious uncertainty of the objects and connections that constitute nature as it emerges in history. Human experience however has also the pathetic longing for truth, beauty and order. There is more than longing: there are moments of achievement.\textsuperscript{198}

It must also be noted here Dewey's similar emphasis on the historical quality in all this, once again, highlighting the central argument in all this that we are our history because our

\textsuperscript{196} Hook, \textit{Semblanza}, p. 66.

\textsuperscript{197} Ibid., p. 70

history contains and is our nature. Again, given the imaginable dialogue here that it is next to impossible to 'truly prove the veracity of a truth' (an over-emphasis is warranted here), there is also a similar relational dialogue we can imagine between the two philosophers in terms of there also needing to be an anti-dualistic reading of truth and error.

As mentioned, truth cannot be (tentatively) stated without its 'error.' So again perhaps this direction is taken by both philosophers because since it is so difficult, if even possible, to truly know what the truth is, perhaps we should at times focus, in part, on what is not the truth. As cited, Ortega proclaimed that "la verdad de las ideas se alimenta de su cuestionabilidad." And this is all because perhaps, again, what they are both insinuating here is that what is important is to ponder the application of our 'ideas of the truth' more so than trying to truly discover any truths. As Dewey similarly proclaimed, "Timeless laws, taken by themselves, like all universals, express dialectic intent, not any matter of fact existence. But their ultimate implication is application; they are methods, and when applied as methods they regulate the precarious flow of unique situations."\(^{199}\) Again this is also because of the inherent anti-dualism here in that the truth cannot be understood without the non-truth, and vice versa, being thus separate but connected interdependently in our complete understanding.

Even more fundamentally, for Dewey and Ortega the constructions we build of our notions of the truth relate to their philosophies of general metaphysics, and their views on the concepts of "reality" and "what is real," most fundamentally because essentially our reality is our truth in their views. John T. Graham, in his book, *A Pragmatist Philosophy of Life in Ortega y Gasset*, dedicates an entire chapter to elaborating on the ways in which his "metaphysics was

pragmatist" but he does reference how in his view it is more of a Jamesian metaphysics rather than a Deweyan perspective, something therefore explored in detail in the second part of this dissertation.  

To see how this relates to "reality," in Ortega's meditations one definition of the "truth" is that it is the inquiry into reality. Similarly Dewey posited that "the truth and the realness of things are synonymous." Here both appear to converse smoothly, as Ortega also posited that the two are synonymous in that they are both rooted in our 'beliefs.' Ortega declared that truth is picking between beliefs; "Esa necesidad, ese haber menester o menesterosidad de decidir entre dos creencias, es lo que llamamos <<verdad>>," and then he adds, "[...] la realidad, plena y auténtica realidad, no es sino aquello en que creemos, y nunca aquello que pensamos." What we believe and what we think are distinguished in that for Ortega some of our beliefs become our "truths" as they become part of us, literally. For Ortega, the difference between believing and thinking is essentially that the former can occur without the other; a belief is something that is a latent part of us, so that we do not always think about consciously. We think about ideas, for example. "Creencias son todas aquellas cosas con que absolutamente contamos aunque no pensemos en ellas. [...] automáticamente nos comportamos teniéndolas en cuenta." So there is something automatic and basically mechanical for Ortega in how we believe. We count on our beliefs in a way that is so integral to our beings that we do not generally question them, nor are

200 Moreover, as he himself says, "Proof' of Ortega's basic pragmatism is, of course, in part necessarily subjective" (Graham, Pragmatist Philosophy, p. 145).

201 See: Gómez Álvarez, Búsqueda de la verdad.


203 Ortega, Obras Completas VIII, p. 288.

204 Ortega, Ideas y Creencias, p. 42.
we even aware of them (except under specific crisis circumstances that may arise and bring the beliefs into question). Further, Ortega explains that as opposed to ideas, in which there is an "impassable distance" between the real and the imaginary, with beliefs we are "inseparably united" which is why he argues that we are our beliefs.

And how, exactly, for Ortega then do some beliefs turn into truths? To answer this we must keep in mind the historical nature of everything for Ortega. In his philosophy, the "firmest beliefs" are the ones that become "truths." He writes, "Entre ellas [creencias/beliefs] una le parece idealmente más firme, y a eso llama verdad." And he goes on to recognize that, nonetheless, we cannot confirm the "true veracity of a truth" essentially, being yet another point of possible dialogue with pragmatism; "Pero conste: lo verdadero, y aun lo científicamente verdadero, no es sino un caso particular de lo fantástico." And so next we must ask, which are the "firmest;" what makes a belief "firm"? The answer to this is that which is consistently "firm" without question in our daily lives throughout a period of time; history (or at least until a crisis occurs to bring it into question). This is part of the reason why Ortega says that most beliefs have been inherited. And by "firm" we can assume 'firmly matching our reality.' Ortega writes, "Tal es la firme creencia en que estamos y por eso nos es la realidad, y porque nos es la realidad contamos con ello sin más, no nos hacemos cuestión del asunto en nuestra vida cotidiana." This point of a firm belief becoming a truth via a consistent and progressive corroboration in the past can dialogue with pragmatism, even if it focuses on just the past - but that is just for understanding that "firm belief," or truth, today, and how it came to be our current belief, as what

205 Ibid., p. 38

206 Ibid., p. 37

207 Ibid., p. 44.
is not to say that this process does not simply continue into the future, thereby dialoguing even more smoothly than it appears at first glance with pragmatism?

And Ortega further includes that "sus creencias no son la única realidad." So essentially, again, Ortega and Dewey both posit that reality is mainly generally what we experience it to be, just as with the truth. For Ortega, "reality" is what we call "world," and "world" is interpretations of circumstances. Ortega posits that "la realidad o el ser consiste en las cosas y su conjunto que llamamos mundo. [...] mundo, como interpretación de la circunstancia, como sistema de nuestras convicciones. [...] lo que verdaderamente hay, la realidad, lo que es: es el Mundo." We simply experience something to be real, which is not to say that there is necessarily any "proof," per se, that it is "real." As Dewey posits relatedly, "The world as we experience it is a real world. But it is not in its primary phases a world that is known, a world that is understood, and is intellectually coherent and secure." Dewey writes, "Reality is what it is for the conscious knower" and "reality is how we experience it;" hence, as we have seen, "meanings can be infinitely combined" for Dewey in regards to what we conclude is real, or what we conclude is reality.

When Ortega proclaimed that "the will is real, but the willed is not," here perhaps we can also add, as with the truth, 'reality is not real, but our vision of reality is real,' for example. And this is because the ultimate, "radical reality" is that of each individual per Ortega's thought, so it

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208 Ibid., p. 289.
209 Ortega, Metafísica, p. 130.
210 Quoted in: Campbell, Understanding John Dewey, p. 75.
211 Dewey, Experience and Nature, p.166.
is not that there is *no* reality, rather there are "too many realities" for there to only be one absolute reality.\(^{212}\) They are all true for the individual; the individual perspective—this follows the same logic as with Ortega's perspectivism.

As in the aforementioned quote of his, Ortega proclaimed synonymously that "Lo fingido no es real; es decir, lo que hay de real en lo fingido es el acto que lo finge."\(^{213}\) So Ortega posits, as does Dewey, that there are essentially infinite manifestations of visions in this; "[...] la realidad, como un paisaje, tiene infinitas perspectivas, todas ellas igualmente verídicas y auténticas. La sola perspectiva falsa es esa que pretende ser la única."\(^{214}\) So, this must be repeated: for both philosophers, we essentially make our own reality (but again it must be noted here that this does not imply pure idealism on the part of either philosopher, as we make our own reality, but within limitations surrounding us; i.e., our 'environment' broadly speaking, or in Ortega's terms, our 'circumstances'). As Graham argues, Ortega "[...] agreed 'for a moment' to 'become a pragmatist' by admitting that the will creates its object via conceptualization as an 'instrument.' In fact, he had soon quietly accepted a version of that idea, and he became a 'pragmatist' for good."\(^{215}\) Of course here Graham goes as far as to categorize Ortega as a

\(^{212}\) Albeit perhaps not quite as much, Dewey did also recognize the importance of considering the individual, as apparent in this extract in which he explains that "Pragmatism and instrumental experimentalism brought into prominence the importance of the individual. It is he who is the carrier of creative thought, the author of action, and of its application" (quoted in: Shook, *A Companion to Pragmatism*, p. 61). This is concisely summarized by Jackson in *A Companion to Pragmatism* in the following passage: "Dewey's concern for the rights of the individual took the form of celebrating: (1) the potency of refined intelligence; (2) the robust naïveté of common sense; (3) the plasticity of human nature; and (4) the ideality of subjective freedom. All four of those individual "goods" Dewey looked upon as being ideally exercised in the service of one or more of the world's social "goods" or cultural accomplishments, which included familial relations and friendships, the arts, the sciences, democratic governmental arrangements, and the varied institutions of civil society in general" (Ibid., p. 65).

\(^{213}\) Ortega, *Obras Completas XII*, p. 431

\(^{214}\) Ortega, *Nuestro Tiempo*, p. 149.

\(^{215}\) Graham, *Pragmatist Philosophy*, p. 149.
"pragmatist," which is not the intention of this paper, but it is used as support for this thesis's goal to at least imagine a dialogue with pragmatisms.

But as with the truth, there are the same key differences between Ortega and Dewey in the roots of these metaphysics. Ortega writes, "Realidad es precisamente aquello con que contamos, queramos o no." In other words, our beliefs make up our reality, as we can see here, because of Ortega's specific use of the term "count on," which is what he consistently uses to describe beliefs; that we simply count on them because they are us. And Ortega elaborated,

Conste, pues, que lo que solemos llamar mundo real o <<exterior>> no es la nuda, auténtica y primaria realidad con que el hombre se encuentra, sino que es ya una interpretación dada por él a esa realidad, por tanto, una idea. Esta idea se ha consolidado en creencia. Creer en una idea significa creer que es la realidad, por tanto, dejar de verla como mera idea.

Thus, while for Ortega reality, as with the truth, is more about our creencias (beliefs), of which we are unaware since they are latently part of us, for Dewey the emphasis here is more on simply what we experience, consciously or unconsciously. A significant influence for Ortega on our interpretations of what is real and what is reality have to do with the circumstances we find ourselves in (again "yo soy yo y mi circunstancia" needs to be remembered here). Dewey, of course, is more pragmatist in this, and a significant influence for Dewey here is in regards to how our interpretations of what is real and what is reality rest primarily upon how they are ‘useful,’ or

216 Ortega, Ideas y Creencias, p. 31.

217 Tersely stated, as we saw, "Verdad y falsedad son cualidades de las creencias" (Ortega, Obras Completas XII, p. 431). So in a sense we generally latently believe that our beliefs are true.

218 Ortega, Ideas y Creencias, p. 48.
in how they are "instrumental," such as in regards to consequences (as his pragmatist reliance upon instrumentalism has been noted on several occasions). But Ortega appeared to also argue at times in this regard as to how some reality or some thing's usefulness played an important role in this. As Graham argues, "[...] Ortega had extended his search for life-reality beyond metaphysics even into a metahistory that was meant to be pragmatically 'useful' for life and for the human sciences."219 This relates to the aforementioned explanation of how certain beliefs are firm enough to become "truths," as they are consistently corroborated over time, or history, to be as such, which gives even Ortega's "truths" a certain type of "utility;" that of "firmness." So again this importance of a process is still a point of possible dialogue between Ortega and pragmatism.

Where we can further arguably envision a dialogue, again, is in how we need to still read these metaphysical issues anti-dualistically. Meaning, there is what is (potentially) real, and then there is what we think is real, and again we cannot necessarily know if they ever coincide. While these are two separate concepts, one cannot, nevertheless, exist without the other, as demonstrated to be the case with the truth. Hence, both agree, most fundamentally, that the subject of reality is human life. Our reality, therefore, is our truth. But again, none of this can be understood, validated, proven with complete certainty. In a very general sense, all that we have is

219 Graham, Pragmatist Philosophy, p. 172. Yet this is precisely, in fact, something that Ortega also criticizes in regards to the 'truth,' in reference to the pragmatist views on this specifically, as we saw: "[...] esa filosofía pragmatista que descubre la esencia de la verdad, de lo teórico por excelencia, el lo práctico, en lo útil. [...] cuando se trate de buscar lo verdadero tenderemos a confundirlo con lo útil. Y esto, hacer de la utilidad la verdad, es la definición de la mentira" (Ortega, Obras Completas Tomo II, pp. 15-16).

According to Ortega, "La 'adquisición' de las verdades —si se quiere la 'adaptación del sujeto a la verdad'—, es un proceso histórico, un fenómeno biológico. Pero el pragmatismo habla universalmente de una 'adaptación de la verdad al sujeto' y esto es lo que carece de sentido. La verdad no puede ser relativa a la condición de un sujeto, sea individuo o especie. No hay una verdad para éste o para el otro. Esa verdad así condicionada sería nombre del error. Cuando el sujeto cree haber llegado a una verdad, cree haber superado su condición subjetiva y haber tocado un universo absoluto, indiferente a toda relatividad del individuo o especie. Algo es verdad para mí, cuando creo que es verdad en sí, y no al revés" (Rabade, Ortega y Gasset: Filósofo, p. 76).
what we think we have. We cannot really know reality or what is real. As Hook explains in reference to Deweyan philosophy on, for example, 'an imagined totality,' such as the universe, "Nunca podemos alcanzar esa totalidad de existencias y posibilidades completa y global que muchos metafísicos han considerado el sujeto de juicios verdaderos o falsos." Similarly, as has been noted, Ortega postulates that one person's beliefs are not the only reality, and that there are many realities. Nonetheless, again Ortega's emphasis is that it is the individual perspective that we can understand best.

La realidad, precisamente por serlo y hallarse fuera de nuestras mentes individuales, sólo puede llegar a éstas multiplicándose en mil caras o haces. [...] Pero la realidad no puede ser mirada sino desde el punto de vista que cada cual ocupa [...] La realidad, pues, se ofrece en perspectivas individuales.

This is, in fact, the same idea of Ortega's that 'man has no nature, what he has is history,' in that it is not that we do not have a nature, per se; there is our nature, and then there is what we think is our nature, and again we cannot know if they coincide–again the anti-dualistic reading must be emphasized. But as we have seen, for Ortega what we think is our truth, or our reality, or in this case our nature, depends in part on our circumstances, and specifically our history in a very general sense of the word; our families, our historical epochs, our nations, our cultures, etcetera. We cannot know when in general beliefs really do truly coincide with "truth," not to

220 Hook, Semblanza, p. 149.

221 As demonstrated, this is the same for viewing how we see the "truth," as Ortega argues, "El punto de vista individual me parece el único punto de vista desde el cual puede mirarse el mundo en su verdad" (Ortega, Obras Completas II, p. 18).

222 Ortega, Obras Completas II, p. 19.
mention that these are all "historical." As Ortega posits, "La realidad auténtica [...] es puro enigma."223 And as he explains in more detail,

Para topar con esta realidad auténtica en su efectiva desnudez fuera preciso quitar de sobre ella todas esas creencias de ahora y de otros tiempos, todas esas teorías, las cuales son no más que interpretaciones ideadas por el hombre de lo que al vivir encuentra, en sí mismo y en su contorno.224

Because we can really only say that truth and reality are simply what we think they are, we can similarly also only say that nature is what we think it is; "No tenemos más remedio que decir, por ejemplo: el ser del hombre consiste en no-ser, en la falta o hueco de ser; o bien, la naturaleza humana esta constituida por no tener una naturaleza o consistencia fija."225 Whether we are referring to the different ideas here of circumstances in Ortega's case, or consequences in Dewey's perspective, the related point in all this is that there are simply too many possible interpretations and combinations of interpretations, so we really cannot be completely certain of the truth, reality, nature, etcetera.

Hence Ortega's emphasis and reliance on history as the one thing that we do have to understand these concepts of the truth, reality, human nature; we can really only begin to contemplate all this by reviewing all that we have thought is truth, reality, human nature throughout history, rather, more so, than any of these in and of themselves. In order to study what could be possibly true, real, human nature, we need to look back upon history, because

223 Ortega, Ideas y Creencias, pp. 45-46.

224 Ortega, Obras Completas XII, p. 197.

225 Ortega, Ideas y Creencias, p. 80.
history has defined what these are in our minds; our interpretations of these have changed and therefore have depended on the moment in time in which their interpretations were formulated. As Gray supports, "Touched by the apparent power of ideas in history, he proclaimed that things are more what our sensibility makes of them than what they may be in themselves." Hence, this is why we can say that in one sense what we can say we do have is reality, human nature, or truth for a specific historical period;

    Esto da a las verdades una doble condición sobremanera curiosa. Ellas por sí preexisten eviternamente, sin alteración ni modificación. Sin embargo, su adquisición por un sujeto real, sometido al tiempo, le proporciona un cariz histórico: surgen en una fecha y tal vez se volatilizan en otra. Claro es que esta temporalidad no las afecta propiamente a ellas, sino a su presencia en la mente humana.

    Dewey similarly argues that, events, for example, historical events, also have a double meaning;

    Events when once they are named lead an independent and double life. In addition to their original existence, they are subject to ideal experimentation: their meanings may be infinitely combined and re-arranged in imagination, and the outcome of this inner experimentation—which is thought—may issue forth in interaction with crude or raw events.

226 Gray, Imperative of Modernity, pp. 105-110.

227 Ortega, Obras Completas VII, p. 281.

228 Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 166.
Truth, reality, nature—these cannot be understood fully, and even in an effort to gain a partial comprehension, for both Ortega and Dewey some thing cannot be fully some thing (albeit a truth, reality, human nature, etc.) unless we have some sort of experience with it; unless we create a 'history' with it, to connect a possible dialogue here (Ortega would be inclined here to use the word "history" and Dewey "experiences" or "interactions," though in this regard they are in part almost interchangeable). And the principal difficulty in this is the fact that these potential and possible experiences are numerous. As Ortega argues, "La verdad, lo real, el universo, la vida –como queráis llamarlos–, se quiebra en facetas innumerables [...]" 229 But again we must remember this must all be contemplated in an anti-dualistic manner—again neither of these philosophers ever leans entirely either toward idealism (that some thing exists because we think it exists; because of our thought of existence), or realism (that some thing exists in and of itself), rather it is more so an anti-dualistic relationship between the two, as both describe truth, reality, human nature, to cite a few of the key metaphysical themes explored here. 230

But again, per Ortega's meditations, it is not the truth, or reality, human nature, etcetera, that changes, but our interpretations of them that change, which is therefore significantly dependent on history. As he declared, "La historia es un largo panorama de brazos que empuñan

229 Ortega, Obras Completas II, p. 19.

230 Nonetheless, Ortega at times does appear to lean a bit further toward an individualist view in all this, more so than Dewey, even though this is not to say of course that he does not deny the "circumstancial" influence (again, yo soy yo y mi circunstancia), but this is primarily in his earlier publications. For example, as we saw, in 1916 he wrote that "El punto de vista individual me parece el único punto de vista desde el cual puede mirarse el mundo en su verdad" (Ibid., p. 18.). And he continued, as must be noted here again, "La realidad, pues, se ofrece en perspectivas individuales" (Ibid., p. 19).

So, as Ferrater Mora explains, here Ortega initially was quite individualist in this, perhaps even a bit of an idealist; "[...] Ortega takes it as a fact that individual perspective is the only way of seizing reality and, therefore, of formulating universal truths" (Spanish Philosophers, p. 149). Later, however, Ortega seems to insinuate that a human life is not the only or most important perspective, reality, etc., but it is the most basic, not to mention his rejection of both an idealist and realist perspective in all this.
cada uno su verdad –y la verdad de uno lucha con la del otro.”231 As in the aforementioned example of once believing the world to be flat versus round, this is as Ortega's refers to generally, an example of a "[...] verdad eterna que cada tiempo ha vivido.”232 As elaborated,

Hemos de representarnos las variaciones del pensar no como un cambio en la verdad de ayer, que la convierta en error para hoy, sino como un cambio de orientación en el hombre que le lleva a ver ante sí otras verdades distintas de las de ayer. No, pues, las verdades, sino el hombre es el que cambia y porque cambia va corriendo la serie de aquéllas, va seleccionando de ese orbe trasmundano a que antes aludimos las que le son afines y cegándose para los demás. Noten ustedes que es éste el a priori fundamental de la historia. ¿No es ésta la historia del hombre?233

Therefore, here we find another part of history that can be studied: the changing concepts of the "truth" (or "reality," or "nature," etc.) in the past. As Ortega posits,

[…] todas las épocas y todos los pueblos han gozado su congrua porción de verdad, y no tiene sentido que pueblo ni época algunos pretendan oponerse a los demás, como si a ellos solos les hubiese cabido en el reparto la verdad entera. Todos tiene su puesto determinado en la serie histórica; ninguno puede aspirar a salirse de ella, porque esto equivaldría a convertirse en un ente abstracto, con íntegra renuncia a la existencia.234

231 Ortega, Obras Completas XII, p. 415.
233 Ortega, Obras Completas VII, p. 284.
234 Ortega, Nuestro Tiempo, pp. 146-147.
So again fundamentally it is the study of history that is a focus here, and why, in a general sense, this is so emphasized in Ortega's meditations, as in that which is central in this thesis; 'man has no nature, what he has is history.' History and the study of history is what we can rely on to simply see how we have understood concepts such as the truth and reality (but not in terms of necessarily reaching an understanding of them in and of themselves, per se, as Ortega simply emphasizes that what we can do is study how we have interpreted and understood them)—hence again another explanation for why 'man has no nature, what he has is history.' And Dewey appears to share this view as well that what we can study here is history; and specifically, what is useful here is history, per his comments in the following excerpt from Experience and Nature; "Just because nature is what it is, history is capable of being more truly known—understood, intellectually realized—than are mathematical and physical objects."235

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VIII. On How We Think

To proceed even more profoundly fundamental in all this we should also examine how both Ortega and Dewey view the process of 'how we think'. Dewey, in fact, wrote extensively on this subject, given he is well known for his philosophy on education. While Ortega did not focus as much as Dewey on this topic, we can still indeed find some important points of possible dialogue in their epistemological theories. And this is an important topic because in order to understand how we come to view and think of truth, reality, history, nature, etc., we need to also consider how our process of thinking and understanding perhaps functions in the first place.

What is thinking, what does it mean to think, and why do we think? As we shall see, in the answers to these questions by both philosophers we find more potential dialogue than differences. As with the other topics explored here, we must also consider the concept and process of thinking anti-dualistically. For both philosophers, essentially our 'being' and our 'thinking' are anti-dualistic; while they are separate, one also cannot exist without the other. In the case of Ortega, as Ferrater Mora explains, 'Descartes' principle Cogito ergo sum ('I think, therefore I am') must be replaced by a more basic principle: Cogito quia vivo ('I think, because I live')."236 Important here is again the idea that we are so often confronted by problems and doubts in life, as for Ortega life is essentially 'problematic,' so in these instances we need to 'think' to search for solutions and ways out of dilemmas, all of this being said of course in a very general and plain sense. As Ortega posits, "La verdad es que no existo porque pienso, sino el contrario, pienso porque existo, porque la vida me plantea crudos problemas inexorables."237

236 Ferrater Mora, Spanish Philosophers, p. 159.

237 Ortega y Gasset, Obras Completas Tomo IV, p. 587.
As we have seen, in Ortega's thought, we have ideas, and we are beliefs. Our beliefs and ideas are historical in that generations are somewhat defined and classified by their beliefs and ideas. Between epochs and as a result of crises, we must think; we must think specifically to create new ideas, and once these new ideas become consolidated and established, they become beliefs. This is also how we get out of periods of crisis. Beliefs are also emphasized in Dewey's philosophy, as he notes that "For all philosophy as reflection upon existing beliefs operates both destructively and constructively." Dewey used the term "shock" to describe a "crisis" in this same way of not necessarily literally "crisis," but moment of 'significant change.' And this leads to a possible dialogue with Ortega in the following excerpt from recently uncovered works of Dewey: "When groups having different traditional beliefs come into close intercourse with one another, there is a shock which makes belief an object of attentive observation."

For Ortega, an idea is "truthful" when it functions, when it is functional, which indeed sounds quite instrumentalist per Deweyan leanings. Also similar is the need to create a continuity in experience per Dewey's thought, and the rhythm that Dewey also sees in experience being a constant dynamic of conflict and resolution. Perhaps the specific word choice is a bit different, but ultimately there is a possible dialogue here between Ortega and Dewey. For Ortega, "Crises" make one question their beliefs and look for new ideas to replace those now outdated and invalid beliefs; meaning, beliefs that are no longer applicable or useful in the world, in reality. For Dewey, thinking is a process of restoring continuity when its flow has been interrupted or hindered; when there has basically been a "crisis" in experience. As Blau interprets it, "Dewey

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239 Ibid., p. 565.
called his version of pragmatism by the name of "instrumentalism" to signify the purposive use of ideas as instruments for reconstruction of an unsatisfactory situation."\(^{240}\)

Dewey argues that "[...] it is not we who think, in any actively responsible sense; thinking is rather something that happens in us."\(^{241}\) In other words, thinking is not a natural process in terms of being spontaneous, according to both philosophers; rather, it is something more so that we develop in regards to its process. Dewey also posits that "Thinking is not a case of spontaneous combustion; it does not just occur on "general principles." There is something specific which occasions and evokes it" and that "[...] we learn to think well, but not to think."\(^{242}\) Ortega also emphasized that thinking is something we can develop and strengthen; "ninguno [método de pensar] le es regalado [...] tiene que irlos inventando el hombre."\(^{243}\) Moreover, this notion of improving on processes of thinking is another example of a "nature" we are not born with, but again that rather we grow and reinforce—hence again why Ortega would argue that man has no nature but rather has history. Ortega declares,

Tal vez no hay injusticia mayor que atribuir a la <<naturaleza humana>>–<<naturaleza>> es el conjunto de lo que nos es regalado y que poseemos a nativitate–el inmenso repertorio de procedimientos intelectuales que el pobre ente llamado


\(^{241}\) DEWEY, John: How We Think, pp. 11 and 28.

\(^{242}\) Ibid., pp. 11 and 24.

\(^{243}\) Ortega, Obras Completas V, p. 530.
And a common reason we 'develop' this is, according to both philosophers, for functional reasons, which here is another instance in which we can make a bit of an instrumentalist connection from Dewey to Ortega (though, in this example, this is quite a given of course) – there is an 'end purpose' to our thinking; we think in order to try to understand. Ortega says that we think to "averiguar lo que las cosas son." And he continues, "Lo único que el hombre tiene siempre es la necesidad de pensar, porque más o menos está siempre en alguna duda." And of course there are times in which we think, therefore, to clear doubt and solve problems, generally speaking; "Pensamiento es cuanto hacemos –sea ello lo que sea– para salir de la duda en que hemos caído y llegar de nuevo a estar en lo cierto." So this is about reinstating beliefs when other beliefs fail by searching for new ideas that, by functioning or being useful, later become beliefs and allow us to install ourselves in reality anew, and the crisis(es) is (are) resolved. Further, as Ferrater Mora concisely explains in regards to the process of thinking to arrive at 'reason;' "Ortega's repeated assertion that reason must always be conceived as something functional in human existence. Again thought is not something that man possesses and accordingly uses, but something that he painstakingly brings to existence because he needs it." Once again we find this pragmatist notion of the "functional" as a point of possible exchange.

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244 Ibid.

245 Ortega, Obras Completas V, p. 529.

246 Ibid., p. 530.

247 Ibid.

248 Ferrater Mora, Spanish Philosophers, p. 160.
As we know, a key aspect of Dewey's philosophy is instrumentalism (and one which we cannot usually tie so similarly to Ortega, but it seems to here in this specific example of the processes of thinking), so Dewey of course also argues that there is an 'end purpose' when we think; we think for functional reason(s), as he writes, "We think in order to grasp meaning."\(^{249}\) But one difference here is that while Ortega emphasizes the need to 'clear doubt' and 'solve a problem,' for Dewey it is functional more so in the generalized sense that we can carry any knowledge possibly gained from thought into future experiences, because as we have seen, and will continue to see, much of Dewey's philosophy is pondered from the perspective of 'experience,' whereas for Ortega much of his philosophy is pondered from the perspective of 'history' (though of course as we will also continue exploring, these two concepts are still points of possible dialogue, nonetheless, in both philosophers in many regards when they are almost synonymous). As we shall see throughout, Ortega is still, nonetheless, quite focused on the role of the 'future' in this specific example. Moreover, Ortega's thought here could converse in that thinking, for example, occurs when we ask about the nature of things, which leads to conocimiento, or knowledge, as we shall also continue to see, as one form of thought that is meant to give things a sort of meaning. Lasaga Medina provides an interesting argument on this; "[...] cuando lo que hacemos para orientarnos es preguntar por la naturaleza de las cosas, su resultado es conocimiento [...] El conocimiento es una de las formas del pensamiento, la forma de dar a las cosas un ser y una estabilidad o consistencia que ellas por sí mismas no tienen."\(^{250}\)

\(^{249}\) Dewey, *How We Think*, p. 94.

\(^{250}\) Lasaga Medina, *Ortega: Vida y filosofía*, p. 175.
Dewey argues that we really understand something when we can carry it over to a new experience. There are important differences of course in Dewey's philosophy on thinking versus knowing. Early in his book *How We Think*, Dewey lays out the following basic definition of thinking as "that operation in which present facts suggest other facts (or truths) in such a way as to induce belief in the latter upon the ground or warrant of the former." Thinking begins, as he explains, when we are confronted with a 'forked-road' situation—hence there being something specific and not spontaneous in thinking. Thinking, therefore, entails searching for and testing possible conclusions and solutions for example. So 'complete thinking' must involve concrete observations. Knowledge or lack thereof is thus what incites thinking, because knowledge is 'peculiar combinations' as he says in regards to attempting to understand the meaning of objects and events, while looking at them as both parts and wholes. Thinking is the start of this path toward knowledge, but generally as we walk toward and reach more knowledge, we usually continue to find more forks in the road. As he adds, we do not think actively rather it happens in us. This is all, of course, a very brief discussion—Dewey's philosophy on thinking is quite complex and involves many different steps and forms in the processes between thinking and knowing. Here it is just touched upon as simply a partial piece of the larger imaginary dialogue being constructed.

As Scheffler interprets concisely, referring to a specific case of thinking,

[...] the essential ingredient in acquiring knowledge is the perception of relations, especially the relations between our actions and their empirical consequences. [...] To

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251 For more on this, see: Dewey, *How We Think*, p. 77.

achieve a grasp of relations, we require experience and the ability to store what is learned from experiences.\textsuperscript{253}

So as Scheffler proposes, we must 'do' in order to 'know' in Dewey's philosophy. Dewey's emphasis on "experience," and his stress on applying it to the future, is still "historical" in the sense that, as he writes, our sources for solutions in regards to how we carry that into the future are found in our past experience(s) and knowledge. As Hickman argues as well, knowledge is "[...] always embedded in ongoing historical processes."\textsuperscript{254} Moreover, Dewey argues that one kind of "thought" is belief, and some beliefs can "[...] [...] become traditionary. They give rise to doctrines which, inculcated and handed down, become dogmas."\textsuperscript{255} This indeed is another area of dialogue, therefore, with Ortega's defining characteristics of his use of the term "belief," as we have seen (i.e., as something latent within us, and quite the defining source of our 'truths,' 'realities,' etcetera). In fact, as aforementioned, just the same Ortega theorizes that many beliefs are handed down and inherited, adding to their historical nature and character; "La mayor porción de él la he heredado de sus mayores y actúa en su vida como sistema de creencias firmes."\textsuperscript{256} Moreover, here we find the "historical" emphasis again in this. Furthermore, both philosophers appear to overlap in the sense that often in this form of thinking our objective is, as

\textsuperscript{253} SCHEFFLER, Israel: \textit{Four Pragmatists A Critical Introduction to Peirce, James, Mead, and Dewey}, p. 197.

This helps us understand why Dewey was uncomfortable with the term "pragmatism," in fact, to describe his philosophy, as he himself at one time said he would prefer "empirical naturalism," "naturalistic empiricism," or "naturalistic humanism."

\textsuperscript{254} Dewey, \textit{Philosophy}, p. 441.

\textsuperscript{255} Dewey, \textit{How We Think}, p. 118.

\textsuperscript{256} Ortega, \textit{Ideas y creencias}, p. 37.
Dewey avers, "[....] real or supposed knowledge going beyond what is directly present," and similarly Ortega argues that "Pensar es descubrir lo oculto."  

One possible end to thinking is knowledge, of course, which is another topic that both philosophers appear to perhaps be able to dialogue on—but not all thinking ends in knowledge, as we can all agree. If thinking is for Ortega about the movement or attempt toward the inquiry into the being of things (not the things themselves), then knowledge is that inquiry, specifically. As Ortega concisely defines it, "Conocer es averiguación del ser de las cosas." And he continues, "[...] el conocimiento antes de empezar es ya una opinión perfectamente determinada sobre las cosas: la de que éstas tienen un ser. [...] es simplemente una creencia." Similarly, Dewey argues that, as with the process of thinking, "All knowledge, all science, thus aims to grasp the meaning of objects and events." And he continues,

We think in order to grasp meaning, but nonetheless every extension of knowledge makes us aware of blind spots and opaque spots [...] Increase of the store of meanings makes us conscious of new problems, while only through translation of the new perplexities do we understand or solve these problems. This is the constant spiral movement of knowledge.

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257 Ibid., p. 5.
258 Ortega, Obras Completas IV, p. 580.
259 Ortega, Obras Completas V, p. 531.
260 Ibid., p. 532.
261 Dewey, How We Think, p. 93.
262 Ibid., p. 95.
So once again we can see here that we cannot necessarily always confirm that our knowledge is 'correct,' as Ortega insinuates that knowledge is primarily opinion, and Dewey suggests that it often leads us to see 'what we have yet to understand.'

As we shall continue to see, this is all important as well for understanding the main topic here, the meaning and study of history, as a discipline of knowledge. Thinking, and the acquisition of knowledge, is yet again instrumental for Dewey; it is focused on consequences and it is forward looking. However, as is emphasized throughout, we cannot look forward to the future without also looking back to the past; i.e., history. As Campbell so concisely infers here,

The function of thinking is to contribute to a life that is forward-moving, carrying with it all that matters from the experiences of the past and the present. We can never hope, moreover, to leave these experiences behind. The finished and done with,' Dewey writes, 'is of import as affecting the future, not on its own account: in short, because it is not, really, done with.' We are moving forward and carrying with us possibilities for improving our future lives. One of these possibilities is intelligent action, a possibility that reflective thought gives us for addressing our new situations. 'We do not merely have to repeat the past, or wait for accidents to force change upon us. We use our past experiences to construct new and better ones in the future.'

This indeed could dialogue with Ortega's infamously quoted "Necesitamos de la historia íntegra para ver si logramos escapar de ella, no recaer en ella," which, it must be reminded, by

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263 Tersely stated, Ortega argues, "Todo conocimiento lo es desde un punto de vista determinado" (Ortega, Nuestro Tiempo, p. 147).

264 Campbell, Understanding John Dewey, p. 61.
necessity has a future orientation to it because when else would we not "fall again" other than in the present and the future, more likely (since the present is really quite fleeting and becomes past as we say it, as been repeated), as he reminds us?265

Moreover, the process of acquiring knowledge itself is 'historical' more so than something 'natural' in the traditional sense of the term, which is something both philosophers appear to correspondingly emphasize (hence again why the better term is to say that something has "history" rather than "nature"). Dewey writes,

We do not approach any problem with a wholly naïve or virgin mind; we approach it with certain acquired habitual modes of understanding, with a certain store of previously evolved meanings, or at least of experiences from which meanings may be educed. If the circumstances are such that a habitual response is called directly into play, there is an immediate grasp of meaning. If the habit is checked, and inhibited from easy application, a possible meaning for the facts in question presents itself. No hard and fast rules decide whether a meaning suggested is the right and proper meaning to follow up. The individual's own good (or bad) judgment is the guide.266

In other words, there is a 'historical inheritance' involved in the potential development, process, and acquisition of knowledge, though Dewey's emphasis here is more so on specifically social conditions, albeit established over time/in the past. Still, fundamentally knowledge is historical. Ortega of course is even more clearly explicit about the importance of 'history' in all this, as he writes, "El conocimiento no es una operación <<natural>> y, afuera de ello,

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265 Ortega, Rebelión, p. 159.

266 Dewey, How We Think, p. 84.
inexusable del hombre, sino una <<forma de vida>> puramente histórica a que llegó –que inventó– en vista de ciertas experiencias y de que saldrá en vista de otras." But still, Dewey did directly declare that "[...] all knowledge is historic." So here again we find this common thread interlaced throughout this dissertation of the historicism that can possibly dialogue in pragmatism, and the pragmatism that can arguably converse with Ortega's work in this general imagined dialogue.

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267 Ortega, Obras Completas V, p. 537.
268 Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 163.
IX. The Process of Valuing

This anti-dualistic tendency for there to be two interconnected sides to concepts such as the truth, reality, history and nature, etcetera, can also be arguably applied, in part, to Ortega and Dewey's partially correlated concepts of "value" and the process of "valuing." This is because again something that we can actually study are the different values we have had (generally speaking) because this process is also "historical." Meaning, there may be or could be an inherent value to some thing, but what we can really only study somewhat directly is the value we place on that some thing. So again there may be a value to some thing, and then there is what we think is that value (which can change over the course of history), and we cannot necessarily always know if they coincide correctly. And this, as we shall see, is also fundamental to pondering history and the study of history, for it is in part through this process that we deem what is important to record and study in the first place.

For Ortega we cannot always discover true, inherent values of some thing, whereas for Dewey the process of valuing is again meant to be functional in that it will, in part, help us determine what type of society we want to shape and build in the future.

Ortega writes,

Una cosa no es, pues, un valor, sino que tiene valores, es valiosa. Y esos valores que en las cosas residen son cualidades de tipo irreal. [...] Cada objeto goza, por tanto, de una especie de doble existencia. Por una parte es una estructura de cualidades reales que podemos percibir; por otra es una estructura de valores que sólo se presentan a nuestra
capacidad de estimar. [...] A veces nos es perfectamente conocida una cosa en sus elementos reales, y, sin embargo, somos ciegos para sus valores.²⁶⁹

For Ortega we cannot necessarily always really, truly know inherent values. Dewey correspondingly argued that "[...] to take into account the reason for liking and enjoyment concerns the cause of the existence of a value, and has nothing to do with the intrinsicalness or nature of the value-quality, which either does or does not exist."²⁷⁰

Describing how we feel about something is not necessarily the same, per Deweyan thought, as describing its value (or at least we cannot know for sure if it could be). Value, according to Dewey, is to judge the value of a feeling, which a 'feeling' he describes as a 'fact for the person who declared it.' Here we can see how Dewey can be a bit individualist, despite his frequent leaning toward general social influence. In other words, Dewey also describes this as the difference between, for example, "prizing" something and "appraising" something, respectively speaking. Once again here what he emphasizes is the instrumentalist aspect of judging the value of something based upon consequences, "to call an object a value is to assert that it satisfies or fulfills certain judgment," Dewey argued.²⁷¹

To reiterate, perhaps what is most pertinent here and what we can envision Dewey and Ortega possibly dialoging on is to take into account more so what we consider to be "valuable" rather than what are truly a 'thing's values.' Our systems of value and considerations of what is valuable change throughout history, and so these changes, shifts, alterations, etcetera, perhaps

²⁶⁹ Ortega, Nuestro Tiempo, pp. 120-121.
²⁷¹ Quoted in: Campbell, Understanding John Dewey, p. 129.
say more about the concept of values and the process of valuing than inherent qualities in and of themselves. And this is not to mention that this is indeed something we can study; these transitions over the time behind us. As Dewey metaphorically phrases it, "values are as unstable as the forms of clouds [...] The things that possess them are exposed to all the contingencies of existence, and they are indifferent to our likings and tastes."272

This is clearly what Dewey argues is of significance here; studying and critiquing these temporal movements of, in some instances, changing definitions and categories of values, as he declares, "[...] the important consideration and concern is not a theory of values but a theory of criticism; a method of discriminating among goods on the basis of the conditions of their appearance, and of their consequences."273 Of course being so very much his own type of pragmatist, Dewey emphasizes the instrumentalist aspect in all this; the importance of analyzing generally the repercussions in that the value of some thing generally resides in its consequences—again in this specifically he differs a bit from Ortega.

It must be noted again, however, the important critique here that any reliance on consequences must by necessity be forward-looking of course, which also resultantly means predictive. In other words, there is a need to at times therefore predict the future, which of course we cannot always do; we cannot always know if our predictions are going to be true. Therefore, essentially what we are talking about here are hypotheses. But Dewey does recognize of course that we can never know all consequences in advance, and as Campbell adds in argument to lend support to this idea, "To point this out, however, does not mean that we do not care about

272 Ibid., p. 132.

273 Dewey, Philosophy of John Dewey, pp. 327-328. In another instance Dewey is quoted as tersely and directly stating that "[a]ny theory of values is perforce entrance into the field of criticism" (Quoted in: Campbell, Understanding John Dewey, p. 131).
potential ends. It means that [...] with a self-conscious method of inquiry we can uncover and foster the values necessary for living in the course of living.\textsuperscript{274}

Ortega, not of course being a self-proclaimed type of pragmatist, may not accentuate the instrumentalist perspective here of effects and outcomes, but he does share that what we can study most directly is what we think are values; what we think is 'valuable,' rather than what really truly are values or what makes something valuable (logically). Ortega for example notes that we create over time pre-existing systems, structures, definitions, to cite a few examples, in regards to our processes of valuing that prejudice essentially this progression and development. Like so much else, values and valuing are historical. Even more importantly, as he argues, "Pero hay una razón más poderosa para convencernos de que nuestra visión de los valores es independiente de que los veamos o no en la realidad. Y es ésta: ningún valor se da en las cosas con pureza y plenitud."\textsuperscript{275}

Thus not only is this all correlated at least in part, having an anti-dualistic tendency, with pragmatism (of course in the case of Dewey, but also in that of Ortega), once again, but it also relates to why we can most safely say that what we have, and what we are, is our history, rather than nature. But this must be said without disregarding of course again that there can be a nature. What is most tangible for study is the general evidence that we can find when we sift through the annals of history in our ever-changing views on all that surrounds us and all that we think and understand surrounds us; the value we place on some thing; our understanding of life, nature, and reality; what we consider to be the truth; etcetera. Our values and what we consider valuable are ever-changing, so what we can and should study (because it is what defines us best), is the

\textsuperscript{274} Ibid., p. 62.
\textsuperscript{275} Ortega, Ideas y Creencias, p. 148.
history of those changes—which are part of our histories in general. What we value to be important to record (of and in history) and study, in fact, in the philosophy here, can say more about ourselves individually, and humanity, human nature, than that which we are recording. Hence, once again, another reason why what we are is our histories. As we shall continue to see, indeed these notions can be understood to potentially dialogue in certain ways in both philosophers, though Dewey as we know is more inclined to use the term "experience" whereas Ortega uses more directly that of "history."
Section II: Antidualism in the Philosophy of History

Now that some basic philosophy has been elaborated in the fundamental parts to building a philosophy of history, the next step that will be explored here in this second section is the actual potential construction of this; in elaborating more specifically on its relation to human nature as history, its meaning, as well as how it can and should be studied. But again the focus here throughout is on how Dewey is just one possible source of many to imagine a dialogue with in regards to hopefully helping us better understand Ortega's meditations on history and human nature in an attempt specifically to further grasp the meaning behind his infamous declaration that "man has no nature, rather he has history." Here, therefore, again what we have is just a potential dialogue between the two thinkers. Some explanations and arguments will be repeated, but again with the focus narrowed on the philosophy of history.
X. Ortega and Dewey: History and Experience

As aforementioned, in Ortega’s first book in 1914 he posited that the will is real, but the willed is not; “[...] la querencia es real, pero lo querido es irreal.”276 As we saw here Ortega is arguing generally that the will is real only for the individual doing the willing, but not necessarily for anyone else because neither the rationality nor the irrationality of a will can be demonstrated, at least most certainly not mathematically, scientifically, or logically. So a person’s will is neither true nor false; it is simply believed to be true for that individual, but not necessarily always, consistently so in the external, general ‘world.’ Perhaps it is agreed upon with some, and others not, but that is not what matters; what matters is what is in the mind of the individual. Hence, what is ‘real in the world’ is a person’s will, which has been constructed upon knowledge gained in the past, as Ortega argues that man becomes who he is through his past; through his experiences and his experiments, as elaborated in the following quote from 1941: “[...] va acumulando ser –el pasado—: se va haciendo un ser en la dialéctica de sus experiencias. Esta dialéctica no es de la razón lógica, sino precisamente de la histórica [...]”277 So once again, man is his history. As Dewey also argues, "For life is no uniform uninterrupted march or flow it is a thing of histories, each with its own plot, its own inception and movement toward its close, each having its own particular rhythmic movement; each with its own unrepeated quality pervading it throughout.”278

276 Ortega y Gasset: Meditaciones del Quijote, p. 226.
277 Ortega, Historia, p. 48.
278 DEWEY, John: Art as Experience, p. 1.
It must be noted, however, that as we shall see, while Ortega links, generally speaking, our ‘understanding’ with essentially the individual as an artist of his own life, for Dewey this is applicable more so to his vision of the progress of science. Nonetheless, as noted, in this aforementioned quote from Ortega he specifically uses the term "experience" (which as we know is central in pragmatism), where he defines history in terms of a "dialectic" and by logic an accumulation also of "experiences." So what is important for Ortega is our will and how we see something, as well as how we experience something, which are certainly points in which he could dialogue with Dewey considering in both instances we can summarize this general notion by saying experience is what we experience it to be, just as will and the manifestation of our will is what we will it to be.

Further, Ortega’s emphasis on the general functional and practical aspects of knowledge gained from the past clearly dialogues with Dewey’s instrumentalist perspective on experience and even the study of history. As aforecited, Graham argues to the extreme that Ortega, “[…] agreed for a moment to “become a pragmatist” by admitting that the will creates its object via conceptualization as an “instrument.” In fact, he had soon quietly accepted a version of that idea, and he became a “pragmatist” for good.”

Dewey argues that for something to be considered “an experience” (or part of a history), there must be something learned as a result (even if it does not necessarily end up being part of “knowledge” as he defines it). Just the same, the study of history is “instrumental,” or useful, when it yields practical applications for the future, as Dewey averred, “intelligent understanding of past history is to some extent a lever for moving the

279 Graham, Pragmatist Philosophy, p. 149.
present into a certain kind of future." This helps elucidate how it is possible to reconcile the use of the past with a focus on the future, being two opposite directions. As Blau concisely proposes on this;

How was it possible for Dewey to bring together in his philosophy both the genetic thinker’s historical concern for the past and the pragmatist’s concern for the future? As far as Dewey was concerned, there was no conflict at all between these two ways of looking at our problems; they supplemented each other, instead of being at war.

Dewey’s definition of experience also dialogues with Ortega’s definition of history because of the aforementioned reference to essentially ‘indefinite’ possibilities in our potential interpretations of our experiences and their nature, as we saw in the following extract: "Experience thus reaches down into nature; it has depth. It also has breadth and to an indefinitely elastic extent. It stretches. That stretch constitutes inference." So again key here is how we interpret and assign meaning to some thing, rather than any actual potential meaning, in and of itself, of an object or an event. Therefore, again, more than understanding nature in and of itself, what we can focus on instead is the interpretations and meanings we attach to nature. (What is important, again, is not whether they are right or wrong, but rather simply what we think they are; what those interpretations are; what we think is right or wrong; etcetera.) And this is because experience and history, as well as specifically what we decide they come to tell us about "nature," are endless processes of an infinitely possible number of combinations in conclusions.

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280 Quoted in: TILES, J.E.: John Dewey: Critical Assessments Vol. IV, p. 63. (Subsequently referred to as: Critical Assessments IV.)


282 Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 4a-I.
Graham cites, while quoting Ortega,

[...] we know that 'man has no nature,' but a history of 'variations' instead, for his 'being' is becoming. 'Man who is not, goes on making himself in the dialectical series of his experiences.' Therefore, because of his historicity, 'the only thing we can know of man is what he has been.' The past constrains the future.283

While traditionally “nature” is meant to be understood as something fixed and biological, as such it would be understood as definite and closed (meaning, that there is only one true truth and reality to some thing when referencing its "nature"). But by considering it something “indefinite” in both Ortega and Dewey's thought in terms of our infinitely possible interpretations (i.e., we are our history, not our nature, because our nature is our history), this means that we have gone beyond just the predetermined or genetic connotation of the term “nature” and have included the endless possible ways in which we can attach meaning to "nature” depending on the individual, and of course on the “circumstances” in which they live (to borrow Ortega’s term for different albeit at times overlapping situations each individual finds him or herself in; i.e., “history”). And this is part of the reason why Ortega argued in 1941 that “Así se explica que el mundo sea para cada época, y aun para cada hombre, algo distinto.”284 As A. García concisely proposes, as further support here, “[…] en tanto soy historia es a la vez la

283 Graham, Pragmatist Philosophy, p. 350.

284 ORTEGA Y GASSET, José: Meditación de la técnica y otros ensayos sobre ciencia y filosofía, p. 50. (Subsequently referred to as: Técnica.)
experiencia vital siempre en proceso que se va haciendo a sí misma [...].” In other words, better we should simply use the term "history" instead of nature.

\footnote{Regalado García, Laberinto, p. 212.}
XI. Ortega and Dewey: Circumstances and Historical Products

Ortega’s emphasis on the importance of one’s unique “circumstances,” from his renowned "yo y mi circunstancia," which are in part “historical,” can dialogue with Dewey’s philosophy.286 Per Deweyan thought, the problems we encounter, and the resources that we have to address them and everything else in life, can only be understood in their historical context, or as “historical products.” As J.E. Tiles clarifies, another expert on Dewey, “Problems do not arise in isolation but in historical contexts, and one must grasp the relevant features of the context to meet them.”287 And as Ortega similarly posits, “Pero la experiencia de la vida no se compone sólo de las experiencias que yo personalmente he hecho, de mi pasado. Va integrada también por el pasado de los antepasados que la sociedad en que vivo me transmite.”288 So history is not just our personal history, but also the history that surrounds us and the history that comes before us—this is further example of the social part of our realities, and the importance of the circumstances that surround us. As Gray supports,

Like Benedetto Croce and R.G. Collingwood on the Continent and Charles A. Beard, Carl Becker, and John Dewey in the United States, he emphasized that history was written from the present to account for one's current situation in its dimension of temporal depth. More, that depth, achieved through a historico-logical connection with all

286 As quoted, Davaney concisely argues, “Dewey espoused an anthropology that stressed that humans are bio-social beings who are in continual interaction with their natural and historically developed worlds. From the earliest beginnings of human existence humans were forced to adapt to and respond to the conditions of these intermingled worlds. For Dewey, the insights of evolutionary science and historicism supported this version of human life as dynamically interactive and as developing and changing in relation to the contexts and conditions within which it is found” (Davaney, Historicism, pp. 84-85).

287 Tiles, Dewey, p. 17.

288 Ortega, Historia, p. 44.
that man had been, was the only one available to modern men, who could no longer invoke a timeless "essence" or "soul" bestowed upon them from above.\textsuperscript{289}

Moreover, perhaps here we can also imagine part of a dialogue in Ortega’s use of the term “circunstancia” for Dewey’s “historical career,” or essentially the accumulation of historical products, which the latter is defined as “a series of interactions whose uniqueness consists of the way in which the individual responds to encountered conditions.”\textsuperscript{290} For Dewey, history is very much cultural and social. As Grigoriev also posits, quoting Dewey on this,

To see ourselves as human, according to Dewey, is to see ourselves as part of history; for without a sense of history in which we are caught up even at this very moment, social phenomena, on Dewey’s view, lose "the qualities that make [them] distinctly social.” The historical dimension of human life, then, is irreducible.\textsuperscript{291}

While Ortega defines the state of being of individuals as “yo y mi circunstancia” as a “drama,” Dewey describes human experience similarly, albeit as a “movie.” As Tiles explains, “We are invited to think of human experience as unfolding before each individual in his or her private cinema, where any involvement in the (ongoing) scripting of the plot or design of the set is wholly irrelevant to that experience.”\textsuperscript{292} So we are simultaneously both actors and spectators in

\textsuperscript{289} Gray, \textit{Imperative of Modernity}, p. 252.


\textsuperscript{291} GRIGORIEV, Serge: "Dewey: A Pragmatist View of History," 179.

\textsuperscript{292} Tiles, \textit{Dewey}, p. 126.
our own narratives in Dewey’s argument. History, which is on a fundamental level the study of humanity, is also similarly compared to cinematography in Ortega’s writings; “La historia, en efecto, es, en una de sus dimensiones, cinematografía. [...] cambia en cada generación y aunque cada uno de ellos sea quieto, como lo es cada fotografía de la película, su sucesión da un movimiento.”

To return to Dewey’s concept of “experience,” as aforementioned, this cannot exist alone because it cannot not have meaning alone, in and of itself without examination. We experience an experience, because we must directly experience and then interpret that experience for it to have a meaning (in other words, while it is possible that an experience may have a meaning in and of itself, it is only after we have an experience with it; with that experience, that we can propose what we think is that meaning, and we can never really prove beyond a reasonable doubt what that meaning really, truly is—just what we think it is). As he said, “The fact that something is an occurrence does not decide what kind of an occurrence it is; that can be found out only by examination.”

This is because, again, as basic to Dewey's early philosophy, “[...] it is only the occurrence that is explained, not the thing itself.” So this is also why Dewey emphasizes the empirical method as a way to truly shed light on any fundamental characteristics of “experience” when investigating our experience of experience. And this is again why we are simultaneously actors in and spectators of our lives. As experiences can also be understood as “historical

293 And here we can also similarly reference Shakespeare, though continuing with the quote, “All the world’s a stage, and all the men and women merely players; they have their exits and their entrances; and one man in his time plays many parts, his acts being seven ages” (From: As You Like It).

294 Ortega, Galileo, p. 183.


products” for Dewey, a dialogue can be imagined here with Ortega, since for the latter everything is historical. If experiences are historical products, then also the study of history is the study of experiences. Part of our empirical method is a study of the past as we form our meanings of nature. So this interpretation provides a way to not just understand history (experiences), but also how to study it (via our experiences). Meaning, part of what the study of history reveals is how we have experienced experience(s) in the past. The study of history does not reveal the nature of an experience in and of itself, rather it exposes what we think was that nature of that experience(s).
XII. Related Controversies

Upon the first reads of Dewey's definitions of experience and nature they appear contradictory, as he seemingly posits, albeit rarely, that there is also something “biological” present, which would imply something fixed and predestined.\(^{298}\) And as we shall see, this is similarly polemical with Ortega. For example, in his 1925 book \textit{Experience and Nature}, Dewey states, “In mathematics some variables are constants in some problems; so it is in nature and life.”\(^{299}\) Yet he also seemingly contradictorily avers later that “nothing in nature is exclusively final.”\(^{300}\) So in truth Dewey’s ideas of nature and experience are not meant to be purely genetic, or more generally, completely deterministic in any way. Rather, it can be said more broadly that there are some rhythms in human nature that become manifest in human history, but as we shall see they are perhaps best understood as very general ones—we can find some trends of trends, but in sum life itself is not entirely predetermined as in the genetic, or religious, sense of the word because in genetics and religion we find at least the belief of absolutes.\(^{301}\) We cannot prove or disprove that 'things' are fixed or invariable, but this is not what matters, because what is key is what we think of as fixed or not fixed. To use Ortega's key word, what is important is our perspective. And that perspective can interpret that something is fixed, invariable, logical, but

\(^{298}\) See: Tiles, \textit{Dewey}, 104. Again it must be reminded here that despite the varying meanings, readings, and understandings of "nature," the concluding argument that will always be emphasized here is that there is always a historical character, element, or essentially nature, to nature.


\(^{300}\) Ibid., p. 120.

\(^{301}\) Some examples of this can be found in Dewey's \textit{Experience and Nature}, as in the following: “There is no action without reaction […] Whatever influences the changes of other things is itself changed” (p. 73).
this is only *truly true* for the individual(s) that hold that perspective, and it does not make it true always, absolutely, as well as in and of itself.

As Rabade proposes in the case of Ortega, <<lo histórico tiene su peculiar naturaleza y, por lo mismo, su peculiar lógica. La realidad histórica tiene su anatomía propia, su estructura jerárquica, sus leyes internas de subordinación y dependencia>>.\textsuperscript{302} So ‘existence is not arbitrary;’ we can see how history is shaped by human nature, but human nature, experience, and its interaction with nature are essentially infinite in combinations and interpretations—this, in fact, in and of itself, is a *trend of trends* we could say.\textsuperscript{303} This is why an interpretation, or meaning of something, exists, literally, because of the potential for interpretation it has, as Dewey says, “Things have potentialities or are instrumental because they are not Being, but rather Being in the process of becoming.”\textsuperscript{304} Again, this also is a further *trend of trends*.\textsuperscript{305} Nature, therefore, is really *not* something entirely fixed then, again in part also because we cannot prove or disprove that it is or is not, as Dewey writes,

The only way to avoid a sharp separation between the mind which is the centre of the processes of experiencing and the natural world which is experienced is to acknowledge

\textsuperscript{302} S. Rabade, *Ortega y Gasset, Filósofo*, p. 138.

\textsuperscript{303} See: Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, p. 76.

\textsuperscript{304} Ibid., p. 123. Here one might reference Nietzsche’s similar proto-idea of individuals living their lives in a process of “becoming who they already are.”

\textsuperscript{305} As we saw earlier that Hook explains in reference to Dewey’s philosophy here, “La <<naturaleza>> de una cosa no es algo cerrado por, para y en sí misma, sino algo que, igual que todo lo que tiene un desarrollo en el tiempo, adquiere nuevas propiedades como resultado de los diversos modos en que el organismo actúa sobre ella” (Hook, *Semblanza*, p. 59).
that all modes of experiencing are ways in which some genuine traits of nature come to manifest realization.306

This is a clear example of Dewey’s anti-dualism because as he argues here, if it were not for that interaction between experience and nature, there would be no possible interpretations or conclusions on nature. As Sleeper clarifies,

Generic form is indeed what makes knowing possible, but it is the very precariousness of such forms as we know them that makes continuing inquiry necessary. The real world is a changing world, a relational world, not one of fixed potentialities and permanent possibilities.307

And Sleeper continues, citing the following quote by McDermott,

The setting is the interaction of the human organism with nature or with the environment. Nature has a life of its own, undergoing its own relatings, which in turn become what we experience. Our own transaction with the affairs of nature cuts across the giveness of nature and our ways of relating. This is how we experience what we experience. Dewey was a realist in the sense that the world exists independent of our thought of it, but the meaning of the world is inseparable from our meaning the world.308

Therefore, in Dewey’s philosophy experience is a manifestation of nature, just as the study of history reveals ‘trends of trends’ of humanity, but neither of which can ever be

307 Sleeper, Necessity of Pragmatism, p. 125.
understood in a complete and fully objective manner—hence also his use of the word “some genuine traits of nature come to manifest realization.” And ironically one of these 'traits' is our inability to prove or disprove other traits. And another such trait is that we can find some trends of trends. And though it may sound minor, trends of trends still can tell us plenty. As Grigoriev proposes on this topic in regards to a possible reading of Dewey's historicism in all this;

It is not that history is off-limits because its subject matter—human nature—defies being known on the terms of natural science. On the contrary, because human "nature" is, at any given point, largely constituted by history, our inquiries into the pervasive cultural and social aspects of human life cannot succeed unless the methods of natural sciences are supplemented and informed by a historical perspective. Such is the first consequence of Dewey's cultural naturalism.\(^{309}\)

Further, an additional such trait is that ultimately what we can know is our perspective on what we think that trait is, and we cannot prove or disprove the 'genuiness' of that trait in and of itself. Human nature, in Dewey’s argument, is plastic and shaped principally by one’s social environment. Similarly, Ortega supports this idea of the plasticity of humanity, arguing that man is an ‘infinitely plastic entity;’ an “entidad infinitamente plástica.”\(^{310}\) Ortega, therefore, appears to share the belief that one's surroundings play a more significant role than an individual in influencing one's acts, behaviors, or events, etcetera.

Pero en la vida del hombre, el contorno es más poderoso que el hombre, precisamente porque una de sus partes—el futuro—no está ahí. Y el futuro es infinito no ya en tiempo


\(^{310}\) Ortega, Historia, p. 39.
y en cantidad, sino en calidad. [...] Por eso el hombre necesita reducir la infinidad o ilimitación del mundo en que se encuentra viviendo a la dimensión finita y limitada de su vida. Es decir, tiene que forjar un escorzo finito de la infinitud.\textsuperscript{311}

But as we shall continue to see, a key difference here is that arguably Ortega’s view is still, nonetheless, a bit less social and more individualist than Dewey’s. While Dewey considers the general concept of time to be something both made up of a process and a product, because there is something much more social in ‘having experiences’ for Dewey, for Ortega what we have is history, and our history is in part comprised of our set of circumstances that, although they can overlap with those of others, in sum they can make up a distinct, unique set for each individual. Perhaps this seemingly subtle yet important difference between the two can be found in the choice of two different verbs; for Dewey, it is more so that we \textit{are} our histories, whereas for Ortega it is also true that we \textit{are} our histories, but we also \textit{have} history. In other words, to \textit{be} our histories implies something a bit more malleable and therefore holds a greater emphasis on the social aspects, whereas to \textit{have} history can imply something more solid and individualistic. If we \textit{are} history then there is more process involved, whereas if we \textit{have} history then there are also some aspects that are finished and closed, at least in our perspective (hence again Ortega’s \textit{yo y mi circunstancia}; we are ‘individually and socially incessantly and progressively in the making’). As Helm proposes in relation to Dewey’s vision on this, “Human individuals do not have histories while themselves remaining essentially unchanged: they are histories.”\textsuperscript{312}

\textsuperscript{311} ORTEGA Y GASET, José: \textit{Obras Completas Tomo IV}, pp. 589-590.

\textsuperscript{312} Tiles, \textit{Critical Assessments IV}, p. 311.
Nonetheless, there is still a dialogue here; namely, that what is more important to consider is a human’s history than an idea of a human being’s nature.

In general, argues Dewey in 1938, “There are no absolute originations or initiations or absolute finalities and terminations in nature.” His perspective, therefore, is that we are each shaped by our experiences and we are not born with a “core self” that we can ever truly get to and understand. Here Dewey goes even further than Ortega, because “[a]part from the ties which bind him to others, he is nothing;” meaning, to compare to Ortega’s “soy yo y mi circunstancia,” in Deweyan philosophy an individual only has the “circunstancia” to study, and we cannot truly reach and understand any core “yo.” There is, as he says, a “continuity of experience with nature,” and this is what leads us on our path of “becoming.” In fact, the use of the “present progressive” tense here of the verb “to become” specifically is key, as it illustrates how there is a malleable quality to this since it encompasses both the present and the future, which of course are inherited from the past; “[…] the present situation is not located in and confined to an event here and now occurring. It is an extensive duration, covering past, present, and future events.” Again “everything” (which of course includes all experiences),

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313 Dewey, Logic, p. 221.
314 This is of course quite problematic given the general critiques of determinism. For example, if behavior is innate, then it is fixed and unmalleable. This also means that ‘society is not always to blame.’ But the contrary insistence cannot be entirely proven or disproven either; if we are born, conversely, as “clean slates,” this means, for example, that problems can then in fact be blamed on society, and that human beings are indeed malleable. Which is true and which is false? We cannot answer this with complete certainty of course.
315 Quoted in: Campbell, Understanding Dewey, p. 53. This is, in fact, a main critique of Dewey’s philosophy; that as a result he is at too far of an extreme by not acknowledging more individuality in people.
“recorded is an historical event,” declared Dewey in 1940. As Dewey affirms, the “human individual is himself a history” because of his or her “particular development in time.” Hence, everything is comprised of a temporal quality that add up, creating what Dewey calls a “historical career,” which as we saw Bernstein defines as, “a series of interactions whose uniqueness consists of the way in which the individual responds to encountered conditions.”

Thus, nature can never be entirely “fixed” because it can never be fully understood; “to exist is to be in process, in change” because nature is “an indefinite congeries of change.” Because nature changes, this is part of why we cannot come to define or understand it. What we think and understand nature to be changes over time (it is historical), so what is tangible for study are those specific changes; what our perspectives on nature have been, historically. So while we may not be able to validate or invalidate, prove or disprove, the conclusion(s) of our perspective(s), we still have our perspectives, and we can still study what we think we have thought.

Perhaps a specific example would serve well here to clarify this. We may ask, is the human race by nature violent? In beginning to ponder the answer to this question, we may start by looking back at history. Throughout history, we have fought wars; it seems that in general humanity has committed violent acts since the beginning of our time. What about today? Humans still commit violence. Can we reasonably predict in the future that the human race will continue to act and behave violently at times? Perhaps we would all, unfortunately and regrettably, agree that the answer to this is yes. There have been wars throughout history, there

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319 Ibid., p. 230.

320 Ibid., p. 224.

321 Quoted in: Campbell, *Understanding Dewey*, p. 79.
have been wars and violent conflicts fought recently, and there are threats of more to come in the future. But does this prove that humans are by nature violent? It absolutely does not prove it. Nor does it disprove it. It is very possible that we are, but again we cannot prove, or disprove, this. Historical study is how we can best ponder this, but it does not provide completely objective and absolute answers. An historical analysis of this of course demonstrates that we certainly think we are violent by nature and that we can have what we could call 'violent perspectives' in both how we commit violence and in how we think we commit violence, but this cannot be proven or disproven to be true in and of itself as part of our nature. For example, not everyone commits violent acts under all the same circumstances. An historical analysis would reveal that in some ways we have become less violent, and in others more violent. For instance, we may have banned chemical weapons that are globally "agreed" upon to be inhumane, but that does not necessarily actually stop all from using them. Today we may not partake in the atrocious human gladiator competitions of Ancient Rome, yet in the United States the most innocent of individuals, children, are murdered in school. But here I digress.

The point to this discussion is that knowing the answer to this question is not the objective for these two thinkers, being again a point of possible dialogue, rather what we think are those answers is what we can study, and this is what is, therefore, the goal of our philosophy here. To phrase it plainly, the aim is to think about all that we have thought about, the conclusions we have reached, and our perspectives. It is not to find absolute nature(s); part of the aspiration is to map out and contemplate our history of perspectives, what they have told us, how they have in turn shaped our realities, our truths, our histories, etcetera. We can figure out what we have thought over time; what our perspectives have been, so that we can safely study. This does not mean that we should not study topics and issues such as whether or not we are violent, it
just means that we should always keep at the forefront of our minds the limitations of studying such subjects, and that what is tangible in contemplating all such matters is what we have thought are to be those answers throughout time. What is tangible are our perspectives and our histories/experiences. So, to return to the maxim under study in this paper, again it is not that man does not have a nature, per se, it is that there is no way to fully get to it, interpret it, or understand it, not to mention that our understanding of it can also change with time. Again what is important, and what we can get to, is what we think it is; what our perspective on it is.

Nor can we ever completely and genuinely understand our experiences that create our personal histories, argued Dewey, because again it is “only the occurrence that is explained, not the thing itself.” And this is why we do not have a 'core self,' a 'yo,' that we can ever get to completely and understand entirely—this is, again, not to say necessarily that there is not one, per se, but rather if there is we could never be able to see it or reach it, entirely or objectively.322

This is similar, as we shall see further along, to how Dewey argues that history is (unfortunately, inevitably) studied; there is an objective past, but each historian gives his or her own view of it, just as each individual interprets his or her own personalized nature based on his or her experiences—perhaps there is a core “nature,” but again we cannot ever get to it because our social environment and how we interpret and react to all within it shape what we come to see consciously or unconsciously as our ‘nature.’

The general debate (which is still present today of course) over the impact of nature versus nurture (or “preparedness” versus “plasticity” to use perhaps the most modern terms) is one of the specific polemics in all this, and specifically of Ortega’s maxim, “el hombre no tiene

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Throughout Ortega’s writings we find several hints of a certain degree of reliance or belief in the role of biology and genetics in shaping a person’s life and what he or she does during it; in influencing their “drama” that unfolds over the course of his or her life. For example, one of the most important philosophies Ortega developed is his theory on the division of society by generations in which fundamentally we find a sort of “predetermination” that would therefore imply something genetic given his clear lack of belief in a religious type of predetermination. In Ortega’s thought, societies are ‘naturally’ divided into docile, obedient masses, and superior, preeminent minorities. Moreover, Ortega often uses the term “raza,” or “race” in a manner that implies “nature” in the modern sense of the word. For example, he wrote in 1922 in regards to the history of his nation, “[…] uno de los defectos más graves y permanentes de nuestra raza: la ausencia de una minoría selecta, suficiente en número y calidad.” One reference to this is the Visigoth period of Spanish history, in which Ortega argues that the “blood” passed on over the generations from this “unsuccessful race” of people, and the resultant lack of a feudal period is part of what explains the then current state of masses in revolt and social invertebracy that he describes exists in his contemporary Spain (This is from España invertebrada, published in 1922)—hence the role of “nature” is also most certainly present at least to some degree in Ortega’s meditation-al philosophy. So again neither philosopher denies nature, but rather the argument here is that history is a better word choice that encompasses nature and more. Again, all that we can be sure of in regards to nature is what we

323 Ortega was clearly an agnostic so it is certainly easy to rule out any form of religious determinism, at least in his own personal views, not including any general meditations on humanity.

324 ORTEGA Y GASSET, José: España invertebrada, p. 124. (Subsequently referred to as: España.) Originally published in 1922.

think it is, and what we have thought it is (hence the importance of history again). We cannot prove or disprove nature in and of itself. As José Ferrater Mora explains in his book Three Spanish Philosophers,

Ortega has often shown a predilection for biological science [...] He has thus even seemed prone to consider ‘life’ from the point of view of biological impulse [...] It is beyond doubt, however, that he would not accept a biological interpretation of knowledge, however difficult it proves to lay down a theory of knowledge free from biological commitments without purging it at the same time of a biological terminology.326

How can we demystify and resolve this 'denied predilection' apparent in Ortega? To return for a moment to the example of pondering a specific trait of human nature, that of violence, again perhaps Ortega, or anyone for that matter, would believe in his or her gut, instinctually, that we are violent; that violence is indeed a part of human nature. But again we cannot make this conclusion with absolute, invariable certainty because we cannot prove or disprove the nature of being violent in and of itself, as discussed. We can demonstrate that over time, over history, we have been violent. We can argue that we are, and that we have violent perspectives (we can individually say "I think human beings are violent by nature," for example, but we cannot speak for everyone else and all the other perspectives; we cannot make that statement for all otherwise it would be a faulty 'sweeping generalization'). We can argue that our perspective is that we are violent. We can study that over history our perspectives have been that we are violent. We can study the occurrences of violence over the course of history. But we

326 Ferrater Mora, Spanish Philosophers, pp. 150-51.
cannot go into natures such as if human beings are violent, we can only go into what we think are our natures or what we think are the answers to such quandaries. This is again part of what makes us history, not nature, to always return to this thesis's main maxim under study. And this is one way to imagine why Ortega or Dewey could arguably have a predilection, whether slight or not, for genetics, for instance, because again very possibly many people believe that there are certain ways people are 'born' to be, whether they openly admit this or not, but that does not make it right or correct. For instance, this could refer to some people having the perspective that some people are 'born to be violent by nature.' We may believe that human beings are by nature violent, but just our believing this does not make it so in and of itself, it only makes it so for the one individual believing this (and, if applicable, for as many individuals together believing this). But again this is all that really matters; what we think are the answers rather than the answers themselves, because we shape our realities, truths, etcetera, accordingly. Again, it is our perspective that matters. Whatever we believe to be so is ultimately what we can study, and therefore what is important. As noted on several occasions, Ortega concisely summarized this notion in how "the will is real, but the willed is not."

That said, still Ortega has been known to also make such clear comments as the following in contrast to any degree of biological or genetic determinism, which he labeled a “perennial error;” “[…] error perenne […] de creer que el hombre es sustancialmente el organismo biológico—cuerpo y alma—con que el hombre vive.”\textsuperscript{327} As aforementioned, life, or history, is a continual “quehacer,” which implies that man is not necessarily “fixed.” A man “without nature” is a malleable being. Again we must emphasize the anti-dualism as a possible interpretation here; biological nature is not our essence, as we are not defined by a biological nature, neither for

\textsuperscript{327} Ortega, \textit{Galileo}, p. 95.
Dewey nor for Ortega. For Dewey, there is an anti-dualistic continuum between the natural in a biological sense for instance, and the social/human. And for Ortega, any biological conception of nature for human beings is just one possible perspective.

But more generally speaking, as both philosophers imply that our lives are, at least in part “historical products,” on a fundamental level this in and of itself also implies to a certain extent an “inheritance” of sorts. This would involve something predetermined, even perhaps in a “genetic” sense, thereby being another key way in which we can resolve this apparent philosophical dilemma by saying that we are indeed our ‘genes’ (without being able to get much more specific than that) but we are also much more, as we shall continue to see. More so what we are talking about here is a historical re-interpretation of genetics, rather than genetics in and of itself. In other words, more important here is a history of genes rather than the genes themselves. We can say that we inherit something, we can even venture to say what that something is, but that does not make it true, or false. That does not prove, or disprove, that some thing. It is just our perspective. But we can at least more safely argue that we inherit something; that we are historical, but without going further per se. So also key is what we think to be that history, what we think are our ‘genes,’ and what we think to be the 'power of our genes' rather than the genes in and of themselves.
XIII. Potential Resolutions to Controversies

As has been discussed, one of the controversies that at first glance is a bit challenging to resolve is whether or not Ortega and Dewey reside more on the side of nurture or on nature in the classic debate as to which influences more the progression of life and behavior, though most often it indeed seems to be the former. For Ortega, “life is a drama” and it is “not given to us ready-made,” which of course appears to be contradictory to the aforementioned possible biological and genetic determinism also present at times in his meditations (since it implies there not being something that we are 'born with;' since life is not given to us 'ready-made'). But ways in which this can be resolved have been outlined at length, showing that ultimately, because of what can actually be 'demonstrated' literally, the social and interaction side of the debate carries more weight arguably for both philosophers. In the case of Dewey, Tiles offers the following concise interpretation of how Dewey views this matter: “[…] human minds are not constituted as individual things prior to their entering into natural (including especially social) relationships.”

And this can dialogue with the following excerpt of Ortega's from 1941, showing how again ultimately for both the nurture side is more influential (both because they believe it simply is, and also because that is what we can study a bit more tangibly and directly since as has been discussed we cannot really get to "nature"): “El hombre es una entidad infinitamente plástica de la que se puede hacer lo que se quiera. Precisamente porque ella no es de suyo nada, sino mera potencia para ser <<como usted quiera>>.”

Here Ortega insinuates very clearly that there is nothing necessarily ‘fixed’ about ‘man.’ Even our interpretations and understanding of genes can

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328 Tiles, Dewey, p. 129.
change (i.e., the history of genes), at least at this moment—hence the *nurture nurtures nature* conclusion. In other words, *even if we thought we knew* what the nature side of the classic debate was, that view might change, making our interpretations on nature historical as well, and based on our perspective at the time. "Nature" and what we think it is, is historical. Hence again why what we have is history, not nature, since history is the determining and influential factor. Moreover, a key part of Ortega's philosophy to reiterate here is that this also relates to why "perspectivism" is so central and important in his theory, because since we shape our realities, truths, etcetera via our perspectives (what is fundamentally important is simply our perspective and how we each think, understand, interpret, etcetera), this makes our viewpoints both individualist and dependent on the moment in which they are formed, making perspective historical as well. This, therefore, makes history, or time, really the key starting force in all this—and yet again why what we have is history; we are historical beings.

Ortega further writes,

> Yo no digo que en cualquier instante pueda hacer de sí cualquier cosa. En cada instante se abren ante él posibilidades limitadas; limitadas precisamente por lo que ha sido hasta la fecha. Ésta es la única limitación concreta que el hombre tiene: su pasado. Pero si se toman, en vez de instante, todos los instantes, no se ve qué fronteras pueden ponerse a la plasticidad humana.\(^{330}\)

Again Ortega is expressing a point that will be especially elaborated in the section dialoging with Schiller, but suffice to say for the moment that contemplating humanity as having "limited freedom" is one way to understand how there can be something deterministic and

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natural in our lives, but that ultimately does not shape us at least as much as forces external to us. We do have some history that is inherited, which means there is something that we are 'born with' and that we cannot change that we are born with that, so there is some nature that we can contemplate somewhat directly and tangibly. But while this may condition us, it does not determine us. This is not only because forces external to us are more powerful, but also because by being aware and conscious of that past we inherit, we can adapt and respond accordingly, or however we each see fit, and differently; we have this power in how we choose to respond, hence again our 'limited freedom.' And this is again how we can resolve how there can be a bit of nature that we can contemplate while being more on the nurture side of the debate.

The degree of Ortega’s apparent reliance on history and on the social environment for influencing and shaping an individual appears to be close to the extent of Dewey’s, albeit perhaps not quite as extreme given Ortega’s “yo” y mi circunstancia. Thus, in an effort to clarify this further, to reiterate perhaps what Ortega meant in his definition of ‘nature’: man is not simply a “natural thing” but rather primarily a product of each individual’s own interpretation, which is similar to how Dewey terms applying a “meaning” to something. (And this is of course constructed over time, making us more so our histories.) As Ferrater Mora explains in reference to Ortega’s analysis of man’s existence largely as a set of interpretations,

Man needs to know himself and his circumstances. He needs, accordingly, an idea or an ‘interpretation’ of the world. This is the primary sense of the expression ‘Man must have his own convictions.’ For what is “‘a man without convictions’ is a non-existent entity.”

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331 Ferrater Mora, Spanish Philosophers, p. 160.
This again is part of Ortega's perspectivism in that we each have our own unique perspectives. As has been cited, Ortega writes, “La naturaleza es una interpretación transitoria que el hombre ha dado a lo que se encuentra frente a sí en su vida.” One example of something “natural” for Ortega is literally a ‘physical, mathematical thing’ that humanity has applied and defined, but that also changes because of how our definitions can also continue to be altered and developed. Humanity cannot be completely understood via physical and mathematical reasoning. An individual is not just a “thing,” therefore, as must be reiterated he writes, “Porque el hombre no tiene naturaleza. El hombre no es su cuerpo, que es una cosa; ni es su alma, psique, conciencia, o espíritu, que es también una cosa. El hombre no es cosa ninguna, sino una drama [...].”

This is, in fact, repeated consistently in Ortega’s writings, that “el hombre no es su alma y su cuerpo, sino su vida,” which we can arguably think of as ‘el hombre no es su naturaleza, sino es su historia.’ Hence, nature here is defined as soul and body, and history is defined as simply life. Thus, each person is more so the mere interpretation of those physical, and non-physical, ‘things;’ all that encompasses them and all that surrounds them—hence again the frequently cited central tenet in Ortega’s philosophy, “yo soy yo y mi circunstancia.” In other words, there are multiple circumstances, perspectives, and not one sole reality, nor one exclusive perspective on reality, as we saw in the first section in detail.

332 Ortega, Historia, p. 36.
333 Ibid., p. 37.
334 Ibid.
335 Ortega, Galileo, p. 81.
336 “We are not a ‘thing’ but the person who lives a particular and concrete life with things and among things. […] It would be a gross mistake to suppose, therefore, that our life is solely determined by the external environment or by our character” (Ferrater Mora, Spanish Philosophers, p. 166).
Again, this indeed parallels Dewey’s idea that we give a meaning to nature, not the meaning because nature is, as he says, a “transitory interpretation” since only the occurrence of some thing or event and not the thing or event itself can be explained. Moreover, "transitory" implies "time," or history, so we could argue that interpretations are historical as well. Each individual is, in sum, a ‘different perspective,’ even though some of a person’s circumstances can coincide with those of others in Ortega’s theory (for example, with those of others of the same generation, those united by family, region, etc.). The reality of each individual is simply more complex because it is composed also of a set of such distinct circumstances that no two of us will ever ‘see’ the exact same thing (unless we are speaking of a similarity of certain circumstances that coincide specifically via a close relationship of two or more individuals). Individual interpretations cannot be “natural things” because they cannot be physically or mathematically proven real or unreal, true or false (as aforementioned about a person’s will being the only ‘real thing’); they are simply the unique perspectives and interpretations of that person’s circumstances of being. So again in saying that one is more than just his or her nature, this does not necessarily negate that he or she does not have a nature—it is saying that he or she is much more than just his or her nature. As Ferrater Mora argues in regards to Ortega’s philosophy here,

Life exists in an ‘environment,’ a word that has, of course, biological connotations but also sociological and even ontological ones. In another passage the philosopher writes that the biological notion of life is only a segment of a much broader concept and therefore cannot be reduced to its somatic meaning.337

And he adds,

337 Ferrater Mora, Spanish Philosophers, p. 152.
The word ‘life’ has therefore a very broad meaning, certainly not only a biological meaning. As a matter of fact, it has a double meaning: a biological and a spiritual one. These two meanings appear often as mutually exclusive. [...] But on neither side are we permitted to conclude that each time the biological side exercises its rights spiritual claims must be withdrawn and vice versa. Although extreme separate poles, they belong to the same world and they often counterbalance each other.”\(^{338}\)

Man is the interpretation of that nature, and all those natural and non-natural things under which they subsist. So, again ultimately perhaps we find here a resolution to the aforementioned critiques; really man does indeed have both nature and history for Ortega because man’s nature is his history.\(^{339}\) Life is a “gerundive, not a participle” and “man is the entity that makes itself;” “man is the novelist of himself,” stipulates Ortega in the English translations (to not disrupt the lingual flow here).\(^{340}\) Again, this further resolves the aforementioned critique of possibly some degree of determinism especially in Ortega’s philosophy because a person’s history, in a general sense, can also imply a person’s “genetic” history. And as Dewey concisely stated, “The human individual is himself a history”\(^{341}\) just as Ortega once said that a man is a historical being; “un

\(^{338}\) Ibid., p. 154.

\(^{339}\) As Ferrater Mora elaborates, “[…] freedom is not something we are endowed with but something we really are. […] Freedom is so absolute in human life that we can even choose not to be ‘ourselves,’ namely, not to be faithful to that innermost self of ours which we have given above the name of personal destiny. Our freedom, however, will not decrease owing to the fact that our life becomes inauthentic, because freedom is precisely the absolute possibility of reaching or not reaching the inner ‘call’ sustaining our lives” (Spanish Philosophers, pp. 168-69). Hence the argued combination here of “nature” and “nurture” in Ortega’s philosophy.


ente esencialmente histórico.” So again one way this can be resolved is to recognize that it is not that Ortega or Dewey is saying that an individual has no nature, rather that the combinations between an individual’s nature and his or her circumstances, and the meanings to these arrangements that can be applied, are virtually limitless. So in this sense an individual in part forms a history for him- or herself that is the total sum of all this. As A. García proposes in regards to Ortega’s meditations on this, “Aunque el sujeto de la historia no sea el espíritu absoluto, sino el hombre individual mortal y finito, la suma de experiencias históricas del hombre y las posibilidades de nuevas y futuras experiencias introducen un elemento de infinitud en la realidad humana.” More so than a core “being” in Ortega’s thought there are stories, histories of being, for each individual. By including nature into Ortega’s thought on the meaning and significance of “history,” we are therefore further resolving the dilemma posed by Ortega’s apparent leanings toward biological and genetic determinism at least at times, as again it simply becomes one factor among many others. And so this is why it is not that a person has no nature, but rather that a person’s nature is just a starting point of sorts for what will be interpreted and combined with circumstances; this is related to the idea of “yo y mi circunstancia,” to create an infinite set of possibilities that define man’s nature, which is his history.

342 Ortega, Galileo, p. 172.

343 Regalado García, Laberinto, p. 231.

344 Regalado García avers, in reference to Ortega’s thought here, “[…] no hay un ser como tal, sino sólo ensayos de ser” (Ibid., p. 231).
In the case of Dewey, in order to resolve these critiques we must also similarly recognize that man does have a nature, but specifically it is the interaction between a man’s nature and the environment which might potentially bring any natural characteristics to manifestation. Particularly, therefore, most important is the social atmosphere which essentially ‘powers’ the appearance and expression of our innate tendencies, which Dewey often refers to as “unlearned activities.” “In short, the meaning of native activities is not native; it is acquired. It depends upon interaction with a matured social medium” he writes.\textsuperscript{345} Meaning, we do have genes that can or at least have the potential to activate behavior and influence our acts, but their manifestation and/or solidification in personality and behavior depends on the push forward they might receive from our external world and how they might be reinforced, negatively or positively. Here, in fact, Dewey was quite precocious, as he was essentially referencing some fundamentals of neuroscience which would come after his time considering that the aforementioned quote comes from 1922\textsuperscript{346}, as Jerome Popp elaborates on in great detail,

If we overlay Dewey’s analysis of innate behavior, or what he preferred to call “unlearned activities,” with contemporary neuroscience, we see that these unlearned activities were acquired through inheritance, and their activation produces social consequences, which, in turn, cause some synaptic connections in the brain to become more active, while many others are inhibited.\textsuperscript{347}

\textsuperscript{345} DEWEY, John: \textit{Human Nature and Conduct}, p. 65. (Subsequently referred to as: \textit{Human Nature and Conduct}.) Originally published in 1922.

\textsuperscript{346} Dewey, in fact, passed away a year before the discovery of the description of DNA by Watson and Crick.

\textsuperscript{347} POPP, J.A.: \textit{Evolution’s First Philosopher: John Dewey and the Continuity of Nature}, p. 40. (Subsequently referred to as: \textit{Evolution’s First Philosopher}.)
Basically what Dewey proposes, we could say, is that “nurture shapes nature.” Hence the importance of “experience” or “history,” which is why both share this antidualistic theory that what we have is experience or history, because that is what shapes and therefore truly is our “nature” since it also contains our nature. The term "inheritance" can imply both environmental inheritances as well as genetic inheritances; the environmental can come from society, culture, family, and the genetic can also come from society, culture, and family, which is why again "nature" would be a limiting term and "history" is better since it encompasses all of this. As aforementioned, we logically also inherit history.

There is an important distinction to reference here between Dewey’s concept of “impulses” and “habits,” for the former essentially refers to our nature; or innate tendencies or “unlearned activities,” and the latter signifies what we consolidate and reinforce depending on the environmental response we receive. Both Ortega and Dewey argue that it is not so much about “instincts” in our behavior, but rather we have in Dewey’s case “impulses,” or which Ortega terms “needs.” Ortega wrote in 1941, “[…] el hombre no vive, en definitiva, de sus instintos, sino que se gobierna mediante otras facultades, como la reflexión y la voluntad, que reobran sobre los instintos.”348 Dewey averred prior in 1922, “Man is a creature of habit, not of reason nor yet of instinct.”349 One way to understand this is to be reminded of how this can relate to nature and nurture when we categorize instinct as part of our nature and add again that 'nurture nurtures nature.' We can insert that Dewey's term of "habit" is a way of "nurturing." For Dewey, we can argue that we sometimes habitualize certain impulses. And for Ortega, reflection and will

348 Ortega, Historia, p. 22.
re-work some of our instincts. Both of these interpretations are fundamentally two different ways of saying that nurture nurtures nature, demonstrating that it can be argued that there is a nature, but it is not as tangible nor as powerful as nurture.

In Ortega’s historical meditations, throughout history humanity has made the changes, in general, that it has because of necessities, and not because of instincts; needs such as to eat, to drink, and most importantly, to ‘live well.’ Life, history is “a system of necessities,” a “necessity of necessities.” Ortega’s emphasis on needs moving history can dialogue with Dewey’s heed that we fundamentally manage our “learned activities” based on the history of responses they receive; meaning, based on the needs we define over time as to which should be manifest and which should not. In Ortega’s meditations, in a slightly different sense, this means that progressively over time we, hopefully, become who we truly are; with any luck our “nature,” in a sense, comes to the surface and we fulfill whatever may be our “true vocation,” as Ortega labels it; “[…] cada hombre, entre sus varios seres posibles, encuentra siempre uno que es su auténtico ser. Y a la voz que le llama a ese auténtico ser es lo que llamamos <<vocación>>. […] sólo se vive a sí mismo, sólo vive, de verdad, el que vive su vocación, el que coincide con su verdadero <sí mismo>>.” During this non-static process, therefore, the construction is our being.

It must be noted here, conversely, that this is not so different than the Darwinian development of “natural selection” that was becoming particularly prominent during both of these philosophers’ lives (Dewey was born, in fact, in 1859, the year of publication of The Origin of the Species) in the sense that we have, at times, “adapted” over the course of history in

350 See pages 24 and 25 in: Ortega, Historia.

the ways which we have come to believe better “suit us.” The influence of this on Dewey is well summarized in the following excerpt from Blau:

There were, I have suggested, two chief strains in Dewey’s mature thought. One, by which he came legitimately as a member of the generation most directly affected by Darwinism, was genetic, concerned with the question how things come to be what we experience them as being; in the broadest sense, historical. The other, to which he came legitimately through what he derived from his study of William James, was pragmatic and instrumentalist, concerned with the question where things are tending and what we can do to direct their course to ends that seem to us most desirable. James had described the pragmatic attitude as "the attitude of looking away from first things, principles, categories, supposed necessities; and of looking towards last things, fruits, consequences, facts." Still, man is ‘infinitely plastic’ according to both philosophers because of our ability to learn and develop from our experiences; from our histories. Ortega declares in a set of his lectures from 1948-49 compiled in Una interpretación de la historia universal, “El hombre, en cambio, cuando empieza a existir no trae prefijado o impuesto lo que va a ser, sino que, por el contrario, trae prefijada e impuesta la libertad para elegir lo que va a ser dentro de un amplio

352 For example, one need only think of the technology we have developed over the course of human history, or instances of barbarism throughout history and how this has changed (for instance, from the ancient Roman gladiators to public hangings, to the United States being the only country in the Western world that maintains capital punishment).


354 Again this is another instance of how something can be "plastically biological, genetic," which may sound contradictory but really is not when looked at from a "historical" point of view; meaning, even Darwin's work can be viewed as "historical" in that it is also about a history of genetic changes, and it is not just about the genetic changes in and of themselves.
horizonte de posibilidades.\textsuperscript{355} We know today that many genes are not literally destined to become manifest (with few known exceptions such as the gene for Huntington’s disease), rather many depend primarily on the environment’s response. And this is perhaps really fundamentally what Ortega and Dewey are saying here, albeit a bit ahead of their time. Again, both philosophers imply that our lives are at least in part “historical products,” and on a fundamental level this in and of itself also implies to a certain extent an “inheritance” of sorts. And this would still, nonetheless, involve something predetermined, even perhaps in a “genetic” sense.

\textsuperscript{355} Ortega, Interpretación, p. 12.
XIV. On History as a System

In this, however, we still find another interconnected and seemingly contradictory theme in both philosophers; namely, this idea that experience/history can also essentially have a nature (because nature is our experience/history), yet it is not entirely “systematic.” But in the sense that there is not something systematic, what is meant here is in terms of a scientific or mathematical logic, since the only “system” is that which we need to define as a “human system.” So concisely stated, what is meant here is that history is systematic only in the sense that it is consistently simply a representation of human nature—not a tangible human nature of course, but fundamentally further beyond what we can grasp is our nature, which is our history.\textsuperscript{356} In other words, a prediction we can make about the course of events today that will become tomorrow’s past is that they will stem from and simply display at least some of human nature, as a sort of ‘trend of trends’.

Further, for Dewey there is something "systematic" in the way that historians create categories, periods, epochs, etcetera. As another Dewey expert Phillip Deen proposes, referring to Dewey's historical study of philosophy, it "[...] periodizes time and, like other historians', it contains an agenda. Periodizations make claims about history's pivotal moments and arcs, and predict where it is headed, for good or ill."\textsuperscript{357} And he continues,

Dewey's philosophy of history is then not oriented to recount simply what happened, but to stage a critical intervention into that history, to introduce a change in existential

\textsuperscript{356} This is the basic lesson of history, as Dewey argues in Human Nature and Conduct, “[...] the diversity of institutional forms and customs which the same human nature may produce and employ” (p. 79).

\textsuperscript{357} DEEN, Philip: "Pragmatist Historiography" in Unmodern Philosophy and Modern Philosophy" in European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy V, 1, p. 137.
conditions going forward. By producing a selective narrative, he is hoping to provoke a certain interpretive model in the reader and thereby clear the way for a better future.\textsuperscript{358}

As Dewey is a pragmatist there is something more "systematic" in the study of history—not history itself per se, but rather its study—than for Ortega. The first step of the process; the collection of historical data, is perhaps what is most systematic for Dewey. Undoubtedly Ortega would have an agreeable dialogue on this as well. It is in the final step, which is also the relevant one; the interpretation, that is especially \textit{not} systematic because it is 'perspectival,' to use Ortega's term, and hence this could arguably be a strong point of conversation between the two. It is important to briefly be reminded here that there are various forms of "history" when we speak of "historiography." There is, for example, the organization of history into periods, epochs, eras, centuries, years, etcetera—the temporal properties of history—that can be systematic, or at least proposed as such (because there could still be a difference between what two individuals define as the periodization of history). There is also the humanistic study of history, and, for example, how history is our human nature; how history is a display of our human nature. There is also the issue of how to study history; how to interpret, for example, the different periodizations that are proposed. These all need to be accounted for in a philosophy of history. Deen offers a concise interpretation of this in the following excerpt:

Much like the natural scientist or engineer, the historian collects data and proposes hypotheses that are tested in the course of future experimentation. It is not enough to

\textsuperscript{358} Ibid., p. 137.
collect information about past events, but they must also present an interpretation of those events which sets them in relation to one another and to the present.\textsuperscript{359}

In other words, historical data itself is perhaps systematic in that it is collected and as past \textit{things}, we do not generally question metaphysically whether or not one of these \textit{things}, events, etcetera, actually happened. However, our interpretation of that thing is certainly not systematic, as we shall continue to see. As Deen concisely adds, "Historical inquiry may discover fixed facts, but it does not transform them into facts."\textsuperscript{360}

Moreover, as Dewey argues, we know that experience will change, but what we cannot know for sure is how it will change; "That an experience will change in content and value is the one thing certain. How it will change is the one thing naturally uncertain."\textsuperscript{361} This is another very broad feature of what is systematic in the course of history; that changes occur, but beyond that we can say no more with certainty.

Hook proposes that for Dewey, also systematic in the study of history is that there are tangible effects that historical things, events, people, etcetera, have, in the present at least. There will also be impacts in the future of course, and there might even be a continuity in those effects stretching from the past into the future, but the future situation can only be predicted without absolute certainty of course. But his being a pragmatist, when this potential of stretching into the future exists, this is what gives that 'historical element' we could call it so much weight of importance.

\textsuperscript{359} Ibid., p. 133.

\textsuperscript{360} Ibid., p. 134.

Pero la cuestión clave es precisamente ésta: que los medios forman parte ellos mismos de la serie de los efectos que llegan hasta aquí y continuarán dando lugar a la historia del evento; que son una parte específica de su <<naturaleza>> como lo son otras tantas cosas; y que necesitamos un experimento para determinar qué efectos del acontecimiento del pasado tienen todavía que tomarse en cuenta en el presente o en el futuro antes de que podamos adquirir un conocimiento genuino de ese rasgo específico del pasado.362

Hence also the problematic nature of the general colloquial dictum, “history repeats itself”; it is not that history repeats itself, literally, but rather that it simply consistently displays at least some of the same fundamentals of human nature in its trends of trends. In an example of this, Dewey elaborates on wars throughout history, positing that, “History does not prove the inevitability of war, but it does prove that customs and institutions which organize native powers into certain patterns in politics and economics will also generate the war pattern.”363 Concisely stated, Dewey argues, “War is thus seen to be a function of social institutions, not of what is natively fixed in human constitution.”364 So, as this example illustrates, we as humans are not destined to “repeat the history of war,” for example, as if it were something inevitable that we do not learn from, but rather the pattern is simply that there is a conflictive and combative part of humanity that manifests itself throughout history at times in the form of war (as also discussed earlier on the topic of any possible 'nature of being violent'). And as this comes from a chapter titled “Changing Human Nature,” clearly there is not something “inevitable” in this, as traditionally implied in the maxim “history repeats itself.” Because as Dewey argues, the root of

362 Hook, Semblanza, p. 70.
363 Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 82.
364 Ibid., p. 81.
this has partly to do with motive (while it is not required for action, it can lead to action when combined with judgment of consequences), so perhaps there is a way to channel motive into something more pacific, thereby disproving that war is always inevitable, for example. “[…] when we want to direct his activity that is to say in a specified channel, then the question of motive is pertinent,” writes Dewey.\textsuperscript{365} This also serves as another clarification of a possible answer on Dewey's behalf that we could imagine to the question proposed earlier as to whether or not human beings are violent by nature.

Moreover, history is not destined to be repeated, because we have the power in how we interpret and apply history, historical events, historical figures, etcetera, to the present and potential future. Our motive is that interpretation of history, since history is selective, because it is perspectival and written from a specific perspective(s). We shall continue to expand on this topic of how the recording of history can never be fully objective, as historical documentation is historical in and of itself. In other words, our motive can shape our interpretation, which can influence the present and future potential impact of the events of history, for example. The following quote from Deen includes a succinct proposal on how to construe this:

Dewey's history of philosophy is then not oriented to recount simply what happened, but to stage a critical intervention into that history, to introduce a change into existential conditions going forward. By producing a selective narrative, he is hoping to provoke a certain interpretive model in the reader and thereby clear the way for a better future. […] the historian's selective interest is futural. Dewey is not writing a critical

\textsuperscript{365} Dewey, \textit{Experience and Nature}, p. 84.
history out of a pure concern to report the events, but because it makes way for a naturalistic culture of inquiry, a democratic community that attends to experience.\textsuperscript{366}

Furthermore, history is a continuum, so there is no “complete rupture on the one hand and mere repetition on the other.”\textsuperscript{367} There is a continuity with our experience in history as it extends from the past, into the present, and beyond to toward the future. This is because experience (or history) exists along a continuum, as Dewey summarizes this, "Because of continuous merging, there are no holes, mechanical junctions, and dead centers when we have an experience. There are pauses, places of rest, but they punctuate and define the quality of movement. They sum up what has been undergone [...]."\textsuperscript{368} This is also why history itself is historical, because it exists along a continuum, and also why the act of recording history is historical in itself as well. It is very important to keep this idea in mind of how history is a continuum because as Dewey urges it must be studied as such, and not as individual pieces of data; it is about sequential periods of time and not finished events or absolute points/moments in time. These are important, key pieces to building a strong philosophy of history. And our understanding of history is constantly changing because “as culture changes, the conceptions that are dominant in a culture change... History is then rewritten.”\textsuperscript{369} Blau offers a good explanation of this in the following excerpt, also quoting Dewey:

Thus we can account for the necessity of rewriting history in every generation by the recognition that, as cultures change, the questions that they have to ask of their pasts also

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\textsuperscript{366} Philip Deen, "Pragmatist Historiography in Unmodern Philosophy and Modern Philosophy," p. 137.

\textsuperscript{367} Quoted in: Tiles, Critical Assessments IV, p. 67.

\textsuperscript{368} Dewey, Art as Experience, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{369} Dewey, Logic, p. 233.
change, and "new standpoints for viewing, appraising and ordering data arise." Each present has a new past; today's past could not have existed a century ago, because today's questions, today's conceptual structures, and today's sources of information and techniques for discovering and validating data did not exist a century ago. "The writing of history is itself an historical event. It is something which happens and which in its occurrence has existential consequences." History records hypotheses as to the meaning of a past; the hypotheses themselves influence the course of events and modify the future. Thus we come again to the inter-connection of past, present, and future in a course of events, a continuity of beginnings and endings. "The past is of logical necessity the past-of-the-present, and the present is the-past-of-a- future living present."\(^{370}\)

As Alexander also adds in further support of this, "[...] the past is not merely repeated but transformed. The fundamental feature of nature and experience is transformation, and this is accomplished by the emergence of new features that may reconstitute the old order."\(^{371}\) This in itself is a trend of trends. Larry Hickman suggests that Dewey “rejects all claims that there are inevitable laws operative in history.”\(^{372}\) Simply put, instead Dewey's goal with historical study and inquiry is to find ways to "better humanity." And again in all this we see how there is no explicit denial of an existence of a nature, but there is a complex emphasis on it being something 'changing.'


\(^{371}\) Shook, A Companion to Pragmatism, p. 190.

\(^{372}\) HICKMAN, Larry: John Dewey's Pragmatic Technology, p. 158. (Subsequently referred to as: Dewey's Pragmatic Technology.)
Ortega shares this idea that history does not repeat itself, though it may display some ‘trends of trends.’ This is clear in the following excerpt declared in a series of lectures in Lisbon 1944, and it should be noted that this was after Dewey’s *Logic* (published in 1939), *Experience and Nature,* (published in 1925) and *Human Nature and Conduct* (published in 1922): “Ninguna situación real, y esto quiere decir concreta, se repite en la historia. Pero en toda situación histórica hay un cierto esqueleto o conjunto de factores, componentes abstractos de ella, que son idénticos a otras situaciones ya vividas por el hombre en otros tiempos.”\(^{373}\) This is fundamentally the same idea Dewey proposed in the aforementioned example of a war pattern in humans, but not its inevitable repetition. And as he further explains more generally,

> **THERE** are, therefore, common patterns in various experiences no matter how unlike they are to one another in the details of their subject matter. There are conditions to be met without which an experience cannot come to be. The outline of the common pattern is set by the fact that every experience is the result of interaction between a live creature and some aspect of the world in which he lives.\(^{374}\)

As Lasaga Medina posits, citing Ortega,

> [...] no pretende imponer a la historia una determinada lógica, los *a priori* de la razón pura, sino <de encontrar en la historia misma su original y autóctona razón. Por eso ha de entenderse en todo su rigor la expresión "razón histórica". No una razón extra-histórica que parece cumplirse en la historia, sino literalmente, *lo que al hombre le ha*

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\(^{373}\) Ortega, *Obras Completas XII*, p. 296.

pasado, constituyendo las sustantiva razón, la revelación de una realidad transcendente a las teorías del hombre y que es él mismo por debajo de las teorías.\(^{375}\)

And as Sleeper explains, this is a very similar argument proposed by Dewey:

[...] Dewey insists that it is not that the same event happens over and over again: each event, or existence—Dewey uses these terms interchangeably—is qualitatively both similar and different from each other event. So what recurs is not the same event, but the same kind of event. It is in this sense that kinds, like particular objects, are contingently experienced.\(^{376}\)

Dewey's aforementioned example of the war pattern also serves well here, along with the previous discussion on whether or not human beings are by nature violent. War is not destined to be repeated in the exact same ways, but there are certain 'patterns' in humans, culture, society, that may make it more likely to occur. This again is something that we can study; something that may be a bit systematic. As Dewey clarifies, the method behind historical study can be a bit systematic as the sciences are, as it is the content which makes it distinct. There are certain patterns, or kinds, we can find, but not inevitable traits that we can prove or disprove. As Blau supports here, quoting Dewey as well,

Historical reconstruction begins, as does scientific inquiry in Dewey's view, with a question: "The writing of history is an instance of judgment as a resolution through inquiry of a problematic situation." Once the problem has been set, the historian, like the

\(^{375}\) Lasaga Mediina, *Ortega: Vida y filosofía*, p. 150.

\(^{376}\) Sleeper, *Necessity of Pragmatism*, pp. 146-147.
laboratory investigator, begins to collect data, not arbitrarily or at random, but with specific reference to the question posed at the outset. More than this, in the collection of data, the investigator must be guided by a set of hypotheses, a "systematic conceptual structure," that serves as a preliminary basis for selecting, or rejecting certain data. The data selected must be confirmed.\footnote{Blau, "John Dewey's Theory of History," p. 98.}

Again, as do our historical studies, similarly our interpretations of “nature” also change.

For Dewey, man’s being is essentially temporalistic. All human activities, be it the pursuit of the good, the true, or the beautiful, bear the impress of some unique temporal existence. Our tensed mode of speaking in which we refer to our unique temporal perspective, is a mirror of nature’s unique temporal perspective, since, as Dewey has emphasized, every natural existent \textit{is} a process of becoming.\footnote{Tiles, \textit{Critical Assessments IV}, p. 82.}

Hence, to repeat: every thing and every occurrence is temporal, so man has no fixed nature, rather man has time, or history, which parallels Ortega’s ‘man has no nature only history’ because their nature is their time, or history, as they are connected, united, in an anti-dualistic manner.
XV. The Study and Definition of History

The study of history, which is therefore also the anti-dualistic study of human nature and history (as both agree that history is the study of, to put it perhaps too blunt, the changes and variations of humanity), thus should be considered and contemplated in the same way; it is not something that is “fixed,” but rather it is constantly shifting upon new studies conducted on the same topic throughout the progression of time that build upon one another. And the study of history is also historical itself. Ortega declared, “[…] el vocablo <<historia>> queda afectado exclusivamente a la historia de las cosas humanas.379 Dewey proclaimed that the purpose of the study of history was “a deepening appreciation of social life.”380 Further, as Deen proposes in the following concise conclusion on Dewey's objective with historical study, it: "[...] looks to the future, toward the democratic culture that is synonymous with a culture of inquiry. [...] that clears the way for a naturalize[d] account of knowing that, Dewey hoped, would produce a richer and more humane community.”381 This resonates with Ortega's plea noted on several occasions that ‘we need history in order to make sure we do not fall back into any errors of the past.”382

In Experience and Nature, Dewey raises the example of the discovery of America to illustrate this point further. As he explains, while the Norsemen are sometimes argued to have been the first to discover America, he adds that regardless of whether or not they actually landed

379 Ortega, Interpretación, p. 97.
380 Quoted in: Tiles, Critical Assessments IV, p. 61.
381 Deen, “Pragmatist Historiography in Unmodern Philosophy and Modern Philosophy”, 138. It must be noted that here Deen in this specific quote references Dewey's history of western philosophy, but this general concept can also be argued to be applied more broadly to history in general.
382 For reference, this quote noted is the following: Necesitamos de la historia íntegra para ver si logramos escapar de ella, no recaer en ella” (Ortega, Rebeliòn, p. 159).
on the continent’s shores, since no “meaning” was changed at that time, such as a newly drawn map of the world, no real alteration resulted.

Moreover, we have to assume that there is "historical data" that has simply been lost (such as in a fire or a natural disaster, as a couple examples), so that data certainly will not be able to impact subsequent meaning. We can only use, for example, data that has survived, or data that was selectively picked to survive. This was a key limitation that Dewey noted, as also referenced by Blau,

Although the data that enter into the evidence for any historical judgment are matters that can be referred to the past, they must exist, in the form in which they are used, in the present. They must be observable by the historian. "Where the past has left no trace or vestige of any sort that endures into the present its history is irrecoverable. Propositions about the things which can be contemporaneously observed are the ultimate data from which to infer the happenings of the past." Historical narrative is an inferential reconstruction of the past from presently-existing data. The range of possible material for the reconstruction of any particular segment of the past is limited by what has survived into the present.383

Again, this is why meaning, nature, history, is endless because “In some degree, every genuine discovery creates some such transformation of both the meanings and the existences of nature.”384 As we have seen, we must apply a meaning, because without that, whatever the issue, thing, or event in question is therefore is really non-existent per Deweyan thought --this is a very

pragmatist concept. “Event is a term of judgment, not of existence apart from judgment,” posited Dewey, again emphasizing that we can only judge, but not fully know. And this meaning can apply not just to the present impact and how later history books are written, but also the future of course as well, since there is a continuity in meaning also. As Deen more broadly interprets this, Dewey did not just want history to ‘report mere occurrences,’ rather "[...] history is a practically engaged, value-laden practice that arises against its background cultural tensions and assumptions and is inevitably oriented toward a desired future. It identifies problems and hopes to resolve them by proposing and testing hypotheses / interpretive frameworks.”

This is why Dewey has compared the study of history to science, because studying history entails not just the collection of historical data, but the reading and interpretation of that data as well. And of course being an instrumentalist pragmatist, again the final step in the process of analysis is finding good use and application of what was learned to create better futures. Blau summarizes this possible reading agreeably in the following excerpt in which he also quotes Dewey:

The data of history can be considered as corresponding to the data gathered by an experimental scientist. Just as the scientist 's work is not completed by the collection of data, so the work of history is not completed by gathering information about the past. The scientist must next propose an hypothesis, an interpretation of the data; so, too, must the historian. Reasoning shows the scientist what the further consequences of his hypothesis may be, and his work is not complete until he has tested his hypothesis by discovering

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whether the predicted consequences do, in fact, follow." [...] "Similarly, the interpretations of the historian are to be carried forward into the future by reasoning, then tested and validated in practice, and used, it may be, by what might be called social engineering as a method of controlling the social environment." 387

Moreover, “meanings” can often be reinterpreted and redefined over the course of time. Even in just looking at the concept of “dating” something in historical annals, logically speaking per Deweyan thought, there is nothing absolute in this either, for this changes depending on the moment of speaking—as in the example he cites, “yesterday” means something different today than it does tomorrow, for instance—it all varies depending on the specific temporal sequence we define. Furthermore, we must also take into consideration the ‘future’ here, as Dewey urges, for often as we are interpreting, recording, and constructing any given “history,” it must be “confirmed” in the future, consequently being dependent on ensuing events as well. 388 For this reason the future is also essentially “historical.” Hence, in Dewey’s proposed method of studying history, we must remember that it is about the course of events (plural), and not just a single event, which as we shall see further ahead relates to Ortega’s parallel emphasis on looking at the parts and very importantly its whole.

Thus, this anti-dualism in history and nature, or experience and nature, respectively speaking between Ortega and Dewey, can also be found in their definitions of history in and of themselves. As we have seen, similarly between the two philosophers, history is a continuum; it


388 “Upon the whole, the trustworthiness of our reconstructions of personal past experience is so repeatedly confirmed by the course of ensuing events that we come to depend upon them without applying special tests” (Dewey, Logic, p. 227).
is not just the past, it is also the present and the future. “The past event has left effects, consequences, that are present and will continue into the future,” proclaimed Dewey.\textsuperscript{389} As Tiles explains in regards to this Deweyan postulation, “The lesson he wanted to draw was that the object of a judgment about the past should be seen not as the past event by itself but as ‘a past-event-having-a-connection-continuing-into-the-present-and-future.’”\textsuperscript{390} So again history does not have an end or a beginning; it is a continuum that is constantly being built, layer upon layer.

*History is historical.* Dewey writes: “Yet the thing which is a close of one history is always the beginning of another, and in this capacity the thing in question is transitive or dynamic.”\textsuperscript{391} This is a notion that James expressly declared as well, as we shall see in the next section. And this is what we could call 'systematic' in history, but only in the sense there is a "history which is a succession of histories" as a 'trend of trends.'\textsuperscript{392} So as with the interpretation of any thing, they are endless, and therefore each do not have a meaning in and of itself, just as with any reading of history, as it is a “[...] means to weaving together otherwise disconnected beginnings and endings into a consecutive history. Underlying “reality” and surface “appearance” in this connection have a meaning fixed by the function of inquiry, not an intrinsic metaphysical meaning.”\textsuperscript{393} Again, the consequences and consequential meanings are what are important and what change 'things.' The consequences produced in history, and the meanings we interpret from those consequences—that we selectively and subjectively study and interpret, re-orient, and

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[389]{Quoted in: Tiles, *Dewey*, p. 131.}
\footnotetext[390]{Ibid., p. 133.}
\footnotetext[391]{Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, p. 100.}
\footnotetext[392]{Ibid.}
\footnotetext[393]{Ibid., p. 139.}
\end{footnotes}
change—impact the present and future, as well as our view of that past later (as in the future). In other words, a mass of the continuum is altered. To put this into less abstract language: let us imagine that we find an event in history that has long had the same basic interpretations and beliefs as to how it occurred and the consequences it had, such as that already cited of the discovery of the Americas by Christopher Columbus, and now let us imagine that we have just discovered this long held recording to be false; for example, that really the Norsemen discovered the Americas. This new interpretation would change our view on the ethnic, societal, and cultural roots of the people of the Americas, for example. This new reading of history would change the next history books produced and the next history taught in the schools. So it would change the past in terms of our understanding of the past. It would change our present history books, and the ones written in the future to reflect those changes—not to mention that further study on this entirely new construal would yield additional and more in depth study, further altering our understanding of this event and its repercussions in history, of the past, present, and future. And in general, whichever are the conclusions we read in historical study, it all forms part of a continuum in which there are only pauses essentially but no stops of complete rupture, as Dewey explains it, "Experiencing like breathing is a rhythm of intakings and outgivings. Their succession is punctuated and made a rhythm by the existence of intervals, periods in which one phase is ceasing and the other is inchoate and preparing."394 Here again, however, we have to assume that we can synonymously replace the notion of experience with history in order to envision this thesis's dialogue.

394 Dewey, Art as Experience, p. 20.
As we have seen, one key point to the study of history in Deweyen instrumentalism is to apply it specifically to the future. As Deen presents this idea: "The purpose of such engagement with the past is not to put it in a museum exhibit as proof of our ability to catch it, or to hold it up as a treasure to be admired, but to see how study of history is instrumental to a desirable future." This is how Dewey defines his very discipline of pragmatism in its connection to the study of history and its practical applications; “Pragmatism, thus, presents itself as an extension of historical empiricism, but with this fundamental difference, that it does not insist upon antecedent phenomena but upon consequent phenomena; not upon the precedents but upon the possibilities of action” (1922). This, logically, is a conclusion that would be agreed upon by all, as we have seen Ortega also referenced that the study of history helps us avoid errors of the past, and so of course it also helps us shape better future. Hence, as put forward by Alexander, this allows us to

[...] cease to see the universe as a room filled with fixed, named "objects" and replace it with unfolding and interacting histories whose actualities are set within a wider field of possibilities. When projected into the future, we come to think in terms of what things can become rather than what they presently are. When read against the past, we may understand present events in terms of their origins and how their history affects their current mode of existence, whether for good or ill.

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395 Deen, “Pragmatist Historiography in Unmodern Philosophy and Modern Philosophy,” p. 133.


397 Shook, A Companion to Pragmatism, p. 190.
And Dewey considers this an important change in perspective in the study of history, as we will see both Dewey and Ortega (as well as the other two pragmatists examined here, William James and Ferdinand Schiller) emphasized a need to shift the focus of the study of history as it had been traditionally too focused on the past and not enough on studying and applying what it means for the future. It is not just about compiling data from the past and learning from that data, per Deweyan thought on history, it is also about further applying those lessons to create a better future; to actually utilize that knowledge in the future. And this of course is entirely reasonable; the past is simply the past and inept if there is not something we can learn from it and find in it to apply to the present and the future. As Dewey writes, “The past is the past, and the dead may be safely left to bury its dead. There are too many urgent demands in the present, too many calls over the threshold of the future, to permit the child to become deeply immersed in what is forever gone by.” But, that is perhaps in reference to the past in and of itself (considered as an object or content, and not as an inextricable part of a continuum), but it does live on in the future, as he later writes, "Through habits, attitudes, dispositions, skills, formed in the process of interactivity with definite actual environmental conditions, past environmental conditions become conditions that continue to operate in future life-situations in

398 Quoted in: Tiles, Critical Assessments IV, p. 64. As we shall see in the third section, Schiller said something very similar; "The past is dead and done with, practically speaking; its deeds have hardened into facts, which are accepted, with or without enthusiasm; what it really concerns us to know us how to act with a view to the future. And so like life, and as befits a theory of human life, Pragmatism faces towards the future" (Schiller, Studies in Humanism, p. 123).
which they are not directly there-and-then involved.” And again this means that fundamentally there is nothing fixed, and everything remains in the “process of becoming.” As he writes,

And this change in point of view is almost revolutionary in its consequences. […] when we take the point of view of pragmatism we see that general ideas have a very different role to play than that of reporting and registering past experiences. They are the bases for organizing future observations and experiences.

Thus, history is indeed useful, but mainly because it can potentially liberate us from our detrimental precedents and it can be applied in a practical sense to the future, which is again pure Deweyan instrumentalism. And the study of history is important because it helps provide us with “a deepening appreciation of social life,” as Dewey emphasizes.

As previously mentioned that Ortega famously declared similarly later in 1930, “Necesitamos de la historia íntegra para ver si logramos escapar de ella, no recaer en ella.

Ortega similarly argues that history is really a continuum, as apparent by his stress on how man’s being “progresses” (i.e., we can assume there is a dialogue here in the sense of the aforenoted "process of becoming") in the following excerpt from 1941:

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399 Dewey, Philosophy, p. 5319.

400 Dewey writes, “Pragmatism thus has a metaphysical implication. The doctrine of the value of consequences leads us to take the future into consideration. And this taking into consideration of the future takes us to the conception of a universe whose evolution is not finished, of a universe which is still, in James’ term, “in the making,” “in the process of becoming,” of a universe up to a certain point still plastic” (Dewey, Philosophy of John Dewey, p. 50).


402 Quoted in: Tiles, Critical Assessments IV, p. 61.

403 Ortega, Rebelión, p. 159.
Las experiencias de vida hechas estrechan el futuro del hombre. Si no sabemos lo que va a ser, sabemos lo que no va a ser. Se vive en vista del pasado. [...] Ahora bien: del hombre es preciso decir, no sólo que su ser es variable, sino que su ser crece y, en este sentido, que progresa.”

Thus, in Ortega’s meditations on the study of history, its principal usefulness is found in how it is used to understand the present through speaking of not only the past, but perhaps again more importantly how through that we might be able to see part of the future; “[...] en las cosas humanas no solamente se trata de que tienen un pasado y tienen un futuro, como el mundo físico, sino que están hechas, en su presente, de pasado y futuro,” he asserted toward the end of the 1940s. As he also said prior in 1947, “Recordamos el pasado porque esperamos el futuro y en vista de él.” Further, as another example of this Ortega writes, “[...] entonces la vida de cada cual es profecía constante y sustancial de sí misma, puesto que es esencialmente, queramos o no, anticipación del futuro. Y cuanto más auténtica sea nuestra conducta vital, más auténtica será la predicción de nuestro futuro.” And this is also, in fact, specifically how Ortega defines a “historian;” “Schlegel solía decir que un historiador es un profeta del revés, pero yo sostengo que eso implica también que el profeta es un historiador a la inversa, un hombre que narra por anticipado el porvenir.” Clearly, therefore, there is some forward-looking instrumentalism in Ortega's philosophy, being thus a point of possible conversation with pragmatists such as Dewey.

404 Ortega, Historia, pp. 48-49.
405 Ortega, Interpretación, pp. 99-100.
406 Ortega, Galileo, p. 143.
407 Ibid., p. 185.
408 Ibid., p. 184.
As aforementioned, it is said that the life of each individual has no nature in part because it is a continual “quehacer.” This appears to be correlated to Deweyan instrumentalism because it is essentially primarily forward-looking. As Lasaga Medina concisely puts it in reference to one part of life, our "yo;" "El yo es proyecto, futurición." As A. García supports, linking this directly in the following quote to pragmatist thought, “[…] Ortega infiere que la vida no tiene ni principio ni fin, un poco como decir que pragmáticamente el hombre es eterno en tanto quiere serlo […].” Our true essence, therefore, is our history, which is continually being made, told, and defined, in a ‘past-present-future’ being. This concept of seeing ourselves as history, as a continuum, is arguably quite pragmatist indeed as well, and it will thus be revisited throughout all three sections. As A. García continues, this is in part a “[…] manifestación pragmática de la temporalidad en tanto se constituye como un continuo advenir, una perenne procreación de futuros.” History, therefore, becomes narration; a story that essentially has no beginning or end, as he continues, “De ahí la meta de Ortega de construir una razón histórica fundamentada en la narración, no en inducir o deducir, sino <<lisamente en narrar>>.” Generally speaking, this is in part why Ortega posits that, simply stated, history attempts to understand human events, behavior, phenomena, etcetera, rather than explain them; "En vez de explicar, la historia trata de entender.” And Ortega's use of the verb "to try" here is also perhaps because of the argument for anti-dualism inherent in this in that we cannot really get to the core of history because we cannot know for sure when our perspectives and resultant interpretations match up precisely and correctly with any true natures of history; we can only understand what we think we understand.


410 Ibid., p. 235.

411 Ibid.

and we cannot explain with absolute, irrefutable certainty. "Entender," or "understand" implies that there is an individual perspective present in this, making it not absolute. To "explain" is the "what," and "understand" is the "why," essentially, so the latter also implies more of the pragmatist instrumentalism of adding in pondering where we are going as well via our history. The "why" is interpreted from the present as to how we got to the present, where we are in the present, and again where we are going in the future.

But there is yet another fundamental problem in the study of history, which is addressed by both Dewey and Ortega; the idea that no history can ever be recorded in an absolutely objective manner. And this is, therefore, another awareness that needs to be added to alterations in the way history is interpreted and recorded, as all thinkers in this dissertation coincide in, as most would agree on. As Dewey argues,

[…] with respect to means for understanding social events, we are still living in a pre-scientific epoch […] With respect to information and understanding of social events, our state is that on one side of an immense number of undigested and unrelated facts, reported in isolation (and hence easily colored by some twist of interest) and large untested generalizations on the other side. The generalizations are so general in the sense of remoteness from the events to which they are supposed to apply that they are matters of opinion, and frequently the rallying cries and slogans of factions and classes. They are often expressions of partisan desire clothed in language of intellect. As matters of opinion, they are batted hither and yon in controversy and are subject to changes of popular fashion.413

As Deen concisely interprets this notion of Dewey's, "History is not and cannot be the recounting of facts by unbiased spectators, as historians are inevitably concerned agents within history."\(^{414}\) Again this few would likely disagree with.

In his general philosophical theories on “inquiry,” as we saw, Dewey emphasizes that in general a study begins with a problem. One kind of important "crisis" for Dewey is a fracture in the continuity of experience. When this happens, there resultantly arises the need 'to think' in order to reconstruct continuity; to gain a new sense of the present and re-evaluate the past, present, and future. We need, therefore, to reconstruct a history. Albeit philosophical, historical, or any other inquiry, it begins with a problem that determines the subsequent development of the study. But the main concern of Dewey’s here is that the individual doing the inquiring will always inevitably be influenced by whatever are his or her present circumstances (the use of the term so prevalent in Ortega's philosophy is logically intentional here); whatever are the dominant principles, forms of study, ideas, etcetera, at that time. As Thomas Neill explains, quoting Dewey,

And, ‘as culture changes, the conceptions that are dominant in a culture change… History is then rewritten.’ Thus as the present changes, Dewey holds, the significance of past events also change. History will therefore ‘always be rewritten” since, ‘as the new present arises, the past is the past of a different present."\(^{415}\)

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\(^{415}\) Tiles, Critical Assessments IV, p. 66.
History is cultural and history is personal, because what it certainly is not, is objective. History is subjective. There are specific concerns, reasonings, and resultant interpretations from differing societies, cultures, and individual historians, which therefore create different frameworks from which to select out specific historical data to record, study, interpret, and insert into the continuum of what are set into our annals of history books. Perhaps it must be noted that for Dewey historical bias is most influenced and swayed by culture, but proposing this argument is not the objective of this thesis, rather the goal is to demonstrate how he might possibly dialogue with Ortega in this broader notion of history being subjective.\footnote{Still, that said, as a side note, perhaps going specifically into this Dewey would probably emphasize the cultural influence, whereas Ortega would likely underline the generational weight in this.}

And when interpretations of social events are investigated and reported from a disconnected moment in time; when they are too remote, then Dewey argues they are opinions.\footnote{See: Dewey, Philosophy of Dewey, pp. 691-92.} To study some thing or event as if it were a sole, complete existence in and of itself is to take it “unreflectively,” as Dewey argues.\footnote{See: Philosophy of Dewey, p. 501 and Human Nature and Conduct, p. 79.} This idea of a lessening ability to grasp history the further back we go, such as because of lost sources, changing geographies, natural disasters, etcetera, is logical of course.

This Ortega also frequently criticizes, as aforementioned, as in this example in which he refers to the "historical sense" ("sentido histórico") of his day that "Hemos perdido la propensión de buscar a toda costa la continuidad entre los fenómenos, y donde hallamos que éstos se resisten a ser unificados, los dejamos pulcramente separados, sin molestarlos."\footnote{Ortega, Obras Completas III, p. 309.} It must be briefly
reiterated here the indirect link with Ortega's theory on ideas and beliefs. To confront a crisis in our established beliefs we develop new ideas that re-establish the continuity in our historical experiences in a process that is in part influenced by his theory of generations. Ortega's generational theory applied here is as follows: in each generation there are certain ideas more prevalent than others, and which we resultanty select out because they 'function well' and they are 'useful,' to tie in a dialogue with pragmatism here, and that come to be deemed so integrally important that they are then installed as "beliefs" by that generation and for the next to come. Thus, the crisis ends because continuity is restored. So in reviewing history we learn about which ideas came to be considered particularly significant to convert to beliefs for the following generation(s) (among other lessons of course).

And Dewey wrote in 1939,

*All historical construction is necessarily selective.* Since the past cannot be reproduced *in toto* and lived over again, this principle might seem too obvious to be worthy of being called important. But it is of importance because its acknowledgment compels attention to the fact that everything in the writing of history depends upon the principle used to control selection. This principle decides the weight which shall be assigned to past events, what shall be admitted and what omitted; it also decides how the facts selected shall be arranged and ordered. Furthermore, if the fact of selection is acknowledged to be primary and basic, we are committed to the conclusion that all history is necessarily written from the standpoint of the present, and is, in an inescapable sense, the history not
only of the present but of that which is contemporaneously judged to be important in the present.\textsuperscript{420}

There are many different ways in which history is selective. Historians of the past select specific historical data, because there are traditions or certain historical data deemed particularly and consistently important to maintain on record. This can be decided by the individual(s) or by the culture and society of the time. Again, history is historical. There is historical data that is particularly and individually pertinent to the historian(s) exploring and interpreting their specific historical inquires, and then doing the historical recording. To use Ortega's term, there is perspective in all this that individually siphons out specific selections of historical data. As Deen proposes, to lend further support to this interpretation of Dewey's philosophy on all this, "Clearly, the historian does not study everything simultaneously, but instead makes judgments that some events were more central than others. Whether a specific event lies at the center or the periphery is dependent upon the interpretive framework and practical concerns of the historian."\textsuperscript{421} And as Deen further reminds us, even though one may argue that historical events, for example, \textit{just are} and cannot be altered by a historian, the subsequent judgments and interpretations of that history, history in general, as well as the resultant decisions on what is recorded and what is not (even if at times not consciously determined), is indeed influenced by the individual historians.

Blau also offers a good proposal on Dewey's theory on selective history in the following excerpt, starting by quoting Dewey again:


\textsuperscript{421} Deen, \textit{Pragmatist Historiography in Unmodern Philosophy and Modern Philosophy.}, p. 133.
"All historical construction is necessarily selective." History is not the reliving of the complete past; this is impossible. At most, it is the reconstruction of a segment of the past from a present perspective, with an eye to control of future possibilities. There are, Dewey suggested, three operations of selection that enter into the writing of history. First, there is a selection that was made by the people of the past, because their judgments of value led to the preservation of one type of record rather than another; the historian, by and large, is limited by what the value-preferences of the people who are his subjects preserved. Second, there is a selection that is made by public memory, that is to say, by tradition; what folk memory allowed to survive has remained available for the historian, and this was determined by the value-preferences of the times subsequent to those of which the historian writes. Finally, there is a selection for which the historian and his own age are responsible; the problems, the data, and the hypotheses used to organize the material are all of the age of the historian. The simultaneous co-presence of these three groups of selected preferences suggest that three different pasts and three different presents enter into the construction of an historical synthesis. An event that enters into a written history is not what it was before. "As soon as the event takes its place as an incident in a particular history, an act of judgment has loosened it from the total complex of which it was a part, and has given it a place in a new context, the context and the place both being determinations made in inquiry, not native properties of original existence."\textsuperscript{422}

Moreover, for obvious reasons, the ‘most accurately’ (not the accurately, for it can never be entirely accurate, objective, or absolute) recorded history would be that which is recorded

“contemporaneously.” But even then, Dewey reminds us of several factors that prevent the objective recording of any history, in any moment, because, and this he emphasizes that yet again, “All historical construction is necessarily selective.” As he concisely declares, “The notion that historical inquiry simply reinstates the events that once happened “as they actually happened” is incredibly naïve” (not that many would disagree with Dewey here, of course, for it certainly would be quite naive). But again none of this is meant to necessarily undervalue the discipline of history, it is just to present some key drawbacks that we should work on and focus on to avoid. As Hickman argues,

All histories are selective. Facts are relevant only to the inquiry at hand. This is not to say that history is whatever we make it, but that the historian is always swept forward by an evolving tradition in which the present leads us to alter what we take to be the critical precedents. In good pragmatic fashion, ever-developing consequences change the meaning of the original event. So our past depends on our image of the present and future.

This position Ortega clearly shares in a general sense when he insisted in 1947 that

Es preciso que la historia abandone el psicologismo o subjetivismo en sus más finas producciones actuales andan perdidas y reconozca que su misión es reconstruir las condiciones objetivas en que los individuos, los sujetos humanos han estado sumergidos.

423 Ibid.

424 Ibid., p. 236.

425 John Dewey, Philosophy, pp. 441-444.
De aquí que su pregunta radical tiene que ser, no cómo han variado los seres humanos, sino como ha variado la estructura objetiva de la vida.\footnote{Ortega, \textit{Galileo}, pp. 74-75.}

Per Deweyan thought, first, there are decisions made about the importance of past events; which should be explored and recorded, and which should be ignored. Also important to consider is how they should be organized. Ortega would arguably dialogue with him in this, arguing that the ‘thought’ of any given time forms part of the aforementioned “circumstances.”\footnote{“[…] lo que podemos llamar \textless-el pensamiento de nuestra época\textgreater{} entra a formar parte de nuestra circunstancia, nos envuelve, nos penetra y nos lleva” (Ortega, \textit{Galileo}, p. 72).}

Second, all history can be written from one “present,” and different “presents” may decide on the aforementioned criteria differently. Again Ortega would likely have an exchange with Dewey in this perspective, albeit generally speaking, when he avers, “[…] en cada época preocupan más unas cosas que otras.”\footnote{Ibid., p. 73.} There are different presents, because there are different, individual perspectives that create different realities, and therefore different interpretations of all that, including of course history. As Deen offers further support for Dewey’s shared view on this, Dewey’s “[…] theory of history holds that value-free, objective reporting of past events is ultimately impossible. Rather, historical writing is inevitably a history of the present and shot through with our concerns and judgments.”\footnote{Deen, “\textit{Pragmatist Historiography in Unmodern Philosophy and Modern Philosophy.}” p. 131.}

Third, memory in general is selective. And this is not to mention that the further back in history we go, generally the harder it becomes to study and interpret the past, as Ortega reminds us, “[…] noten ustedes que es esencial a la perspectiva histórica —como a la visual— ir
The author of history will have his or her own personal preferences; his or her own selective memory that will add to the bias of the recorded history. But especially important, Dewey contends, the subjectivity of the greater public at the time the history is written is what will especially influentially predispose the elaboration of any history, for it is the audience of the recorded history whose interests matter most (or else of course the historian(s) would fail in his or her endeavor to spark and gain attention if he or she does not reach out and respond to the interests and predispositions of the audience, logically). It is the memory of the greater public which is most enduring, but of course selective as well, along with the bias of the individual historian. As Deen further supports this idea here, "History is not and cannot be the recounting of facts by unbiased spectators, as historians are inevitably concerned agents within history." And he continues, because what is recorded is because it is "useful" and "valuable" as well;

[...] histories are selective. Some events are picked out as data while others are not on the expectation that those selected events will prove worthwhile in ongoing inquiry. [...] For the pragmatist historian historical inquiry is then necessarily value-laden and selective rather than Objective and value-free. This does not take place in a vacuum. Behind historians and their inquiries is a broader social context that directs why they inquire. [...]
The historian does not work from outside of culture, but from within one shot-through with cultural problems and inherited cultural frameworks 432

Fourth, Dewey also reminds us that the actual writing of history is historical itself. This is because the historian in a sense directs history by the way he or she selectively picks out historical data to study, interpret, and record. As he explains, “[…] the writing of history is itself a historical event. It is something which happens and which in its occurrence has existential consequences.” 433 This is because history essentially has a “double meaning” because the actual act of recording history leaves its own imprint and can subsequently change the future course of events, as well as the contents themselves. As a particularly poignant example of this, Dewey references the reactions to such books of historical analyses as those written by Karl Marx; the reevaluation of history and its future direction has an, as we know, revolutionary impact on economic and political systems around the world, the repercussions of which are still present of course.

And finally, a fifth key concept is that the historiographer starts with an inquiry/problem, which he or she tries to subsequently understand and organize, and this means that he or she will create and focus on a specific “historical career,” which as we have seen for Dewey implies a “course and cycle of change.” 434 But the problem with this final dilemma, argues Dewey, is that this results in history being enclosed into something that starts and ends, which essentially history never does; it is erroneously dividing up history into “parts” or “wholes,” whereas again these should be considered anti-dualistic concepts for which history is unequivocally both the

432 Ibid., pp. 134-135.
434 Ibid., p. 236.
parts and the whole as a continuum—as we shall see in greater detail, this is an important principle for both philosophers. The example just provided of Marx serves well here to demonstrate this, as even if in many places Marxism has been refuted as being a theory better on paper than in practice, nonetheless its repercussions are still being felt and there are still political and economic elements of his theory in practice in some places in the world.
XVI. Parts vs. Wholes in History

Ortega posits that an “intelligible historical field” is a whole and not just its parts, because as has been repetitiously emphasized, history is a continuum; “[...] la cosa, cuando es una realidad parcial, no termina en sí misma, sino que continúa en otra, y comenzar por aislarla es correr el riesgo de amputarla, dejándonos fuera acaso lo más importante de ella.”435 This is because logically “history” is not just about one, solitary individual, for example, even when retelling the story of an important historical figure, but rather it is also about the collective social circumstances in which a person lived (this also relates to the notion of yo soy yo y mi circunstancia). As Ortega writes, “La historia no se ocupa sólo de tal vida individual [...] cada vida está sumergida en una determinada circunstancia de una vida colectiva.”436 Hence, the study of history should,

[…] deja de ser la simple averiguación de lo que ha pasado y se convierte en otra cosa un poco más complicada—en la investigación de cómo han sido las vidas humanas en cuanto tales. Conste, pues, no lo que ha pasado a los hombres—, ya que, según hemos visto, lo que a alguien le pasa sólo se puede conocer cuando se sabe cuál fue su vida en totalidad.437

435 Ortega, Interpretación, p. 66.
436 Ortega, Galileo, p. 82.
437 Ibid., p. 66.
Thus, in order to understand today, we must look back upon all of the past because, “Si una cosa es parte es ininteligible mientras no la referimos al todo cuya es [...].” Ortega also pleads that we must do, “[...] exactamente lo mismo que hicimos con la hoja [the metaphor he uses in this lecture], y recuerden que fue ella, la hoja, no una reflexión nuestra, quien guió nuestra mirada haciéndola emigrar hasta llegar a ver el árbol todo. Pues algo parejo es menester hacer con toda realidad histórica.” This is because history evolves—history does not end, as both Ortega and Dewey argue—history is a constant process of becoming as we have explored.

[…] quien quiera ver un ladrillo necesita ver sus poros y, por tanto, acercarlo a los ojos, pero quien quiera ver una catedral no la puede ver a la distancia de un ladrillo. Nos lo exige el respeto de la distancia. Cada cosa nos impone una determinada distancia si queremos obtener de ella una visión óptima. […] el historiador miope que no sabe desprenderse de los detalles es incapaz de ver un auténtico hecho histórico, y nos da gana de gritarle que la historia es aquella manera de contemplar las cosas humanas desde la distancia suficiente para que no sea necesario ver la nariz de Cleopatra.

So Ortega’s proffer here is that, to reiterate, an historical analysis should be done from all distances, and in his day he critiques the historian’s tendency of only looking closely from one specifically near scope. Just like life, history can only be told "entirely" (i.e., meaning only all that has occurred up to the present time, but not of course in a general sense). History is like a song, “[...] la canción de la historia sólo se puede cantar entera—después de todo, como la vida

438 Ortega, Interpretación, p. 65.
439 Ibid., p. 43.
440 Ibid., p. 66.
de un hombre sólo se entiende cuando se cuenta de su principio a su fin.”. Here by "fin," or "end," what he means basically is "all the totality possible." In other words, in this we also find antidualism in that we cannot understand via one distance without also looking from other distances; or, put even more plainly, one distance is unique, but also cannot exist without the other distances, in part because they are points of comparison that define the other as individual.

In reference to how the "óptica histórica" (or "historical perspective") should be, Ortega advocates that "Tenemos que distanciarnos del prójimo para hacernos cargo de que no es como nosotros; pero a la vez necesitamos acercarnos a él para descubrir que, no obstante, es un hombre como nosotros, que su vida emana sentido" (and Ortega earlier in this writing refers to how human facts indeed do have sentido, or sense).

Dewey proposed a perspective that would dialogue here in 1939 when he said,

It is absurd to suppose that history includes events that happened up to yesterday but does not take in those occurring today. As there are no temporal gaps in a historically determined sequence, so there are none in social phenomena that are determined by inquiry for the latter constitute a developing course of events. Hence, although observation and assemblage of materials in isolation from their movement into an

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441 Ortega, *Galileo*, p. 144. Ortega also used the metaphor of history as a novel; we must read every chapter to be able to understand it. As explained in the introduction to *En torno a Galileo*, “[…] la historia es como una novela, de la que hay que leer todos los capítulos anteriores si queremos entender el último, el que nos afecta” (p. 26). Again in general, as he writes, "[…] la historia no se puede contar más que entera” (p. 189).

eventual consequence may yield “facts” of some sort, the latter will not be facts in any social sense of that word, since they will be non-historical.443

The specifics (dates, figures, etcetera) within historical annals are not history, in and of themselves, argues Dewey. Concisely stated in 1939, Dewey claimed “[…] a single trait is only the beginning of a description; it is an incomplete description.”444 But neither is a defined “whole” course of events since history is again essentially a continuum that does not really end because the future is essentially also historical. “Annals are material for history but hardly history itself,” he writes, but nor can history be written “en masse.”445 Therefore, we cannot only divide up history into the past, present, and future, but we shall see it as that, and, as Dewey argues, ”[…] the past-of-the-present, and the present is the-past-of-a-future-living present. The idea of the continuity of history entails this conclusion necessarily.”446 There is history as ‘movement toward something’ in effect.447

Dewey provides a very illustrative ‘metaphor’ of sorts for this when he ponders the act of simply pointing at something and asking, “what is that?” The act of merely pointing, and the use of the indiscriminate “that” obviously provides no clues as to how to even begin to answer the question. Such is the situation for researching and analyzing history in either closed parts or abstract wholes; in other words, again we find here an anti-dualistic perspective on studying and

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443 Quoted in: McDermott, Philosophy of Dewey, p. 411. Here Dewey has placed quotes around “facts” because this is really an example of what he terms in his philosophy as “warranted assertions.”


445 Ibid., p. 234.

446 Ibid., p. 238.

447 “There is no history except in terms of movement toward some outcome, something taken as an issue” (Ibid, p. 238).
viewing history from its parts and its wholes because the two exist as separate but interconnected.

Again both Dewey and Ortega, therefore, were calling for a shift in the methodology of the study of history. As Ortega urges, similar to the aforementioned position of Dewey that the annals of history in and of themselves are not history, that because of this we need

"[…] nuevas bases la metodología de la historia, y esperar que esta admirable ocupación humana llamada <<historia>> deje de ser un cuento o, a lo sumo, una técnica maravillosa —admirable, imprescindible, respetabilísima, pero… una técnica y nada más—, y llegue a convertirse de verdad en una ciencia."

This he demanded in a lecture in Buenos Aires in 1940.448

Ortega criticizes what he interprets in his day as a “lack of historical awareness,” because “man owes everything to his past.” Again, as Ortega famously said, and which therefore must be repeated to wrap up this sub-section, “Necesitamos de la historia íntegra para ver si logramos escapar de ella, no recaer en ella.”449 And so to summarize and conclude, why is history and its study important for Dewey? Perhaps Blau summarizes the answer to this best in the following excerpt:

The study of history, conceived in the light of Deweyan philosophy, is instrumental to the future. We do not merely, in the manner of the elementary student, learn history; nor do we, in the manner of the conservative, learn from history. Instead, we employ history

448 Ortega, Obras Completas XII, p. 178.

449 Ortega, Rebelión, p. 159.
as a means of changing human life. "Concrete suggestions arising from past experiences, developed and matured in the light of the needs and deficiencies of the present, employed as aims and methods of specific reconstruction, and tested by success or failure in accomplishing this task of reconstruction, suffice." Past, present, and future are woven together in the fabric of creative intelligence."\(^{450}\)

And as he also adds concisely, "We do not merely have to repeat the past, or wait for accidents to force change upon us. We use our past experiences to construct new and better ones in the future. The very fact of experience thus includes the process by which it directs itself in its own betterment."\(^{451}\)

And finally, to further connect this all to reconciling Ortega's maxim that we have no nature, only history, because history is our nature, Blau offers a further interesting interpretation on how Dewey sees this in the following additional excerpt: "Human history may be understood, entirely and without residue, in natural, rather than supernatural terms. What distinguishes human history is that it is the history of conscious beings, who are able to be aware of themselves as involved in processes of history."\(^{452}\)


\(^{451}\) Ibid., p. 95.

\(^{452}\) Ibid., p. 96.
XVII. Conclusion

As history is, most tersely stated, the study of the course of humanity, then undoubtedly this is a discipline of utmost importance since it impacts every one of us. Yet it is also true that there is no great value in a traditional structure as simply a recording of the past unless we take our compilation of annals and study it profoundly in an effort to learn something about ourselves, and our world around us; where we come from, why we are where we are today, and where we are going. History should be a guide of sorts, and even though we cannot say for sure if there is something teleological in the ‘may be partially guided’ path we are on, we can most certainly say that humanity has made alterations over the course of history at least in part in an effort to adapt to our needs and desires. Just how much we have changed, or whether or not we have truly changed, in our core, may be to some degree up for debate—no longer are we the barbarous ancient Romans throwing each other into what was then considered the ultimate entertainment of human beings dueling to the death, but today in some countries we still impose the death penalty for heinous crimes, for example, which for some is considered barbaric. We have passed through all sorts of political systems and technological stages that arose depending on the needs and desires of the time, because we have been able to see how much these needs and desires vary and define subsequent human history. Nonetheless, it is indeed still hard to say where we will go next, even when, for example, we analyze our current dilemmas in our ‘appetites’ regarding what we are deficient in and long for.

Before we can conduct our analyses, we need these different developments of meditations or philosophies on history to gear us toward good, effective, at least questions and quandaries, or hopefully criteria and methodology, to consider before we begin and apply our
historical study. And hence the importance of the contributions of these two philosophers in adding to and enlarging the landscape of what should and can comprise the study of history. And while these two philosophers are generally rarely united in their philosophical thought (not to mention that they were split by a ‘very large ocean,’ especially then in philosophy since American pragmatism was not very popular in Europe in general at the time), and although John Dewey did not write nearly as much on the specific topic of history as José Ortega y Gasset, there is, nonetheless, a possible dialogue that we can imagine, as has been elaborated, in this specific connection in the anti-dualistic relationship between history and human nature as a most generalized key contribution to the field of historical study when also other dimensions are analyzed, such as their metaphysical and epistemological viewpoints. And of course this can also help us better understand both Ortega's philosophy, and also new takes on American Pragmatism.

Therefore, the intention here, as it is for the two parts that follow, has been to elaborate a potential dialogue between these two philosophers, rather than draw any hard-lined, exact similarities between them. The effort here has been to focus on Ortega's at times confusing maxim of "man has no nature, only history" from a Deweyan anti-dualistic perspective in an attempt to clarify more on what he might have been arguing with this, while also drawing some correlated examples on more fundamental levels, to make this possible conversation between the two even stronger, such as on the metaphysics of life and reality, as well as going even further to the root in regards to how we think and the process of valuing. Also explored here has been the basic philosophical definitions on behalf of both thinkers in regards to history, experience, and nature, while tying all together as well in regards to what this all means for the discipline and study of history in a general sense.
One of the main, overarching conclusions, therefore, has been that perhaps we can read and interpret some of Ortega's philosophy to better understand it from an anti-dualistic vision and position indeed (which could have been in part inherited from specifically Dewey, but the idea here is just to imagine how they could converse on these matters rather than speculate on this). And again the objective with this was to better understand what Ortega might have meant in part with his fundamental dictum that man has no nature, rather man has history.

Thus, in sum, in both of these philosophers we have seen how there is a complex, anti-dualistic dynamic between history, which are our unceasing experiences, and nature—because history is our nature. Neither of these philosophers are strictly on the “nurture” side of the debate in regards to what influences and shapes human nature and consequently human history, though they both esteem this to be the factor with the most clout—but precisely because our history contains our nature, as it is our nature; our history is our nature and everything else in our surroundings, and everything else that defines our circumstances. And in this we have an initial basis for our development of the study and discipline of history, which we will continue to contemplate and build in what follows. Hence the etymological roots of the term “history” from the Greek, which means essentially ‘inquiry and knowledge gained from investigation’—"history never dies," as Ortega said; history really never truly and completely ends, nor does the study or philosophy of it.⁴⁵³

⁴⁵³ Quoted in: GARCÍA CASANOVA, Juan Francisco: Ontología y sociología en Ortega y Gasset, p. 33.
Part Two

Radical Empiricism and Unitary Duality

in a Possible Historicist Dialogue

between William James and

José Ortega y Gasset
Section I: Fundamentals toward the Philosophical Historicism

in James and Ortega

I. Introduction

As was the case with Dewey, linking José Ortega y Gasset and William James's thought in a possible dialogue is a difficult endeavor. Not only is there very little direct evidence of Ortega having read and studied the elder James either, even if Ortega had any contact with James's (or Dewey's) work, it is unlikely that he would have necessarily admitted doing so given the particularly strong negative view of the United States in general in Spain during most of Ortega's lifetime, as we saw. As aforementioned, Ortega did make some commentary in regards to pragmatism in general, albeit very little, which would nonetheless imply that he was at the very least familiar with Dewey and James (two of the American philosophical tradition's forerunners). And as will be elaborated in great depth in this section, while there might not be much in the way of direct, pragmatist theory in Ortega's work, there is arguably a pragmatist dialogue that can be created between James and Ortega, just as was the case with Dewey and Ortega.

By necessity some areas and quotes will be revisited from the first section of this dissertation, as many of the same building metaphysical topics will be explored toward better understanding and constructing a philosophy of history here. And since Dewey and James were both contemporary American pragmatists, there are certainly areas of interest and study that overlap between the two as well in this effort to construct an imaginary dialogue with Ortega y
And again this potential discourse will be expounded here as a means to help us better understand not just some of Ortega's general philosophy and especially his theory of history, but in particular the focus here will be again on his maxim that "man has no nature, only history."

As noted before, losing the War of 1898 to the United States left a bitter sentiment in Spain towards all that represented the so-called "yankees" in the early twentieth century, as would be the case in any country, because it was not only a war that was lost, but also Spain's very last remaining colonies as well. The defeat represented the loss of the final vestiges of their powerful imperialist and globally domineering past, leaving understandably an unfavorable view of the United States' politics, and especially in the case of this paper's purpose, the nation's philosophical trends of the time. The door on this period's Spanish golden age had been shut by the United States, so understandably it would not have been accepted, nor necessarily expected, for the Chair of Metaphysics, José Ortega y Gasset, at the main university in the country's capital to confess any leaning toward American pragmatism. As Graham proposes, "[...] after 1898, for a young Spanish philosopher aspiring to a national chair of metaphysics, having professed publicly a close affiliation with James would probably have been fatal to his reputation and his career."

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454 This is also the case for the third section on Schiller, though less so because of his added European perspective and his distinct outlook on pragmatism (calling it instead "humanism"). And for this reason, many of the repeated quotes will be placed instead in footnotes in this and the following sections as quick reference.

455 GRAHAM, John: A Pragmatist Philosophy of Life in Ortega y Gasset, p. 146. John Graham is a Professor of History at the University of Missouri-Kansas City.

Perhaps Ortega essentially had somewhat contradictorily both contempt and esteem for the United States. In his book The Revolt of the Masses he explicitly explains how the "Yankees" are a quintessential example essentially of the "mass-men," which in certain respects is, in his view, an 'inferior class' (mainly intellectually speaking rather than economically). Yet in his arguments for a more united Europe he often also uses the United States as a guide and model.
Again this was commented on in the section on Dewey, but it is interesting to revisit this here to better understand and incorporate James's position in all this. Furthermore, in a general sense American pragmatism, and especially the brand attached to James, can certainly threaten religious belief in absolute truths and realities, something so ingrained in much of European history and culture—Spain being of course no exception to this. In brief, pragmatism and pragmatic analysis essentially yield only incomplete truths; variable "truths," or as we saw as Dewey so succinctly described it, "warranted assertibility." And this of course conflicts strongly with any sacred, eternal, and absolute truths one has in religion. James said that "[...] the absolute truth will have to be made," which at first glance of course seems to conflict with religion in that it requires proof to be obtained (something also very pragmatist), something which cannot always be directly achieved in regards to religious topics. Religion essentially involves unattainable elements, as it primarily relies on faith. Pragmatism (generally speaking), being fundamentally a practical, tangible, instrumentalist, and functionalist philosophy can diverge in

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456 But without going into great depth on religion here, given that this strays from the main focus here on historicism, this was erroneously interpreted especially in the case of James, as he did elaborate on ways in which his pragmatism could coexist and coalesce with religion. Succinctly explained, this is because in Jamesian pragmatism, one can argue that what is important in reaching the "truth" is that, in very simplistic terms, "the truth works," which certainly can fit with religious beliefs, as we can say that religion is "truthful because it works for the religious." This resonates with the earlier discussion in the first part on Ortega's insistence that "the will is real, but the willed is not," or at least it cannot be proven true or false. As James Campbell explains, quoting that in James's, pragmatism's "only test of probable truth is what works best in the way of leading us, what fits every part of life best and combines with the collectivity of experience's demands, nothing being omitted." It is in this context that he further notes, "if the hypothesis of God works satisfactorily in the widest sense of the word, it is true" (CAMPBELL, James: "One Hundred Years of Pragmatism" in Transactions of the Charles S. Pierce Society, Vol. 43, No. 1, p. 9).

Although James does offer a strong argument on how religion and pragmatism can coexist, it is, nonetheless, hard to fully assimilate given the noted phrases here such as "probable truth," "works best," "fits best," and "works satisfactorily," given these are essentially open-ended, non-deterministic terms, something which cannot be used in the most fundamental, strictest sense in religion. There is no such "probable truth" in religion and for the religious of course, just "absolute truth." This topic of truth of course will be explored in greater depth further ahead, as it was with Dewey, but momentarily this has been raised because it provides an additional case for why pragmatism would be a bit threatening as well as often unaccepted, or at least externally, within a religious country as Spain at least especially during the time of James and Ortega.

this sense with religion, given that vitally the latter is all the opposite; it is faith-based, intangible, and deterministic, whereas pragmatism requires hard facts and concrete, substantial elements.  

But none of this is to say that pragmatism was nonexistent in Europe in the twentieth century, as we shall see in the third part of this dissertation it arose in various figures in Europe, but most strikingly in the philosophy of Ferdinand Schiller. And various studies are continuing to be developed on the arrival and assimilation of pragmatism in Europe, even if the arguments for the degree to which it had an impact varies. As Professor Pinilla from the University of Alcalá supports, "Y dígase que aun siendo un fenómeno estadounidense, el pragmatismo fue mucho y..." 

458 For this reason there are many passages in which James appears to disregard religion as having no place, therefore, in philosophy. For example, he writes, "There are two lives, the natural and the spiritual, and we must lose the one before we can participate in the other" (JAMES, William: Varieties of Religious Experience, a Study in Human Nature, p. 96). However, he did, in fact, write quite a lot on the topic, but again this of course is a discussion that will be kept brief here given that in this instance it does not relate to the main focus in this dissertation on historicism. This supposed 'rejection' of religion should not have been the ultimate interpretation, as he did also offer ways to reconcile the two (that is, Jamesian pragmatism and religion). In his book, Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature, while in some instances he does appear to discount religion virtually entirely, at other times he elaborates on ways in which religion can coexist and coalesce with pragmatist philosophical life by not really denying religious life one way or the other. James writes, "[...] to find religion is only one out of many ways of reaching unity; and the process of remedying inner incompleteness and reducing inner discord is a general psychological process, which may take place with any sort of mental material, and need not necessarily assume the religious" (Ibid., p. 100).

So, as Linda Simon explains, in her chapter titled "Active Tension" from 100 Years of Pragmatism: William James's Revolutionary Philosophy, quoting James as well, that "For James, pragmatism had a particular relevance to religion, and offered a way to reconcile science with metaphysics (P, 31). It served, he said, as "a happy harmonizer of empiricist ways of thinking, with the more religious demands of human beings" (P, 39). It allowed for the possibility of God" (STUHR, John: 100 Years of Pragmatism: William James's Revolutionary Philosophy Kindle Edition, p. 174. (Subsequently referred to as: 100 Years of Pragmatism.)

Stuhr is the Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and American Studies, Department Chair of Philosophy at Emory University and editor of 100 Years of Pragmatism: William James's Revolutionary Philosophy.

The following quote of James describes how pragmatism, nonetheless, can coexist, to a certain extent, with religion: "If theological ideas prove to have a value for concrete life, they will be true, for pragmatism, in the sense of being good for so much. For how much more they are true, will depend entirely on their relations to the other truths that also have to be acknowledged" (McDermott, The Writings of William James, p. 387).
bien discutido —y asimilado— en Europa."  

However, given some of these polemical elements of the philosophical movement, uncovering a lot of possible impact and influence beyond the United States’ borders into Europe can be a bit more challenging at times. Moreover, it can also be argued that rather than being an "American" version of pragmatism, instead what might have developed abroad was more a form of "European pragmatism" specifically (arguably, for example, this was especially true for the other major Spanish philosopher of the time, Miguel de Unamuno, and again this we shall see in greater depth in the third section of this dissertation of an imagined dialogue with the British Philosopher Ferdinand Schiller).

Nonetheless, despite all these factors giving pragmatism little hope of success in much of Europe, and especially Spain (with arguably the possible exception noted of Unamuno), a century later we can search for and tell a different possible side to the story. Today pragmatism is studied more in Europe, and not just in current scholarship, but also in reference and reflection to philosophy during the twentieth century. Some, such as Livingston in the following quote, even goes as far as to argue that this is perhaps one of the most influential philosophies to develop in the past century in general: "I want to argue that William James and John Dewey are better guides to the end of modernity than Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger, who still reign as the court poets of the so-called linguistic turn." Livingston, in fact, as he continues here, specifically references Ortega, who we do know was an avid reader of Heidegger, and who as we have seen did at times blatantly and openly criticize pragmatism—despite some arguable parallels, such as an end to modern subjectivity. Livingston writes,  

459 PINILLA SEOANE, Julio: "Una invitación a la lectura de Ferdinand Canning Scott Schiller" in ISEGORÍA. Revista de Filosofía moral y Política N.º 41, julio-diciembre, p. 254.

460 Stuhr, 100 Years of Pragmatism, p. 144.
I enlist José Ortega y Gasset, a close reader of Heidegger, to ask why that accomplishment has not been adequately acknowledged—which is to ask why Heidegger's version of an end to modernity has kept its accreditation. At this stage of the argument, the critics of pragmatism, who invariably emphasize that metaphors of money, commerce, and credit disfigure the philosophical discourse of James and Dewey, turn state's evidence and make my case for pragmatism.\footnote{Ibid., p. 144.}

The "case" of his that he is referring to is, therefore, "that the original American pragmatists revolutionized twentieth-century European philosophy by determining or reshaping the intellectual agendas of Edmund Husserl, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Emile Durkheim, Georges Sorel, Jean Wahl, and Alexandre Kojeve."\footnote{Ibid., p. 144.}

It could be argued then that pragmatism's reach in general into Europe has been underestimated. But this is perhaps a topic for another dissertation. Here that reach has been narrowed to specifically the Spaniard José Ortega y Gasset. As Graham suggests and supports, "After Unamuno, Ortega was the first notable Spanish thinker to absorb in part the "practical" and "useful" philosophy of the Yankees--into his metaphysics, as well as his phenomenology, existentialism, historicism, and philosophy of life."\footnote{Ibid., p. 144.} Of course as Graham also reminds us here, "proof" of Ortega's pragmatism is in part subjective of course, but as he adds,

As I investigated more fully, I discovered numerous connections, similarities, and basic identities, so that definite influence and dependence seem much more plausible than mere
"coincidence" for Ortega and James. And the dependence extends from Ortega's idea of philosophy to his metaphysics and "beyond" to his work in history and the other human (social) sciences.464

But at the very least, a potential pragmatist dialogue can be imagined between specifically William James's and José Ortega y Gasset's philosophies, as was envisioned with John Dewey, because in part we are simply reading their philosophies for themselves.

As aforementioned, attempting to connect, to any degree, pragmatism in general with Ortega's philosophical thought and works is quite challenging and infrequently addressed in current scholarship. Yet of all the pragmatist figures, it is arguably with William James that we can create the strongest possible pragmatist dialogue with Ortega. But as noted in the section on Dewey, again the objective here is to discuss a potential dialogue rather than directly declaring "influence," or "direct similarities," for example, between José Ortega y Gasset and William James. Thus, while specific "proof" of study of the latter by the former is indeed possible, the aim here is to show how there could possibly be a channel of communication of sorts between the two thinkers and their work—in mainly just reading their work for what it is. In other words, the goal is to see where we can imagine a dialogue, principally to understand Ortega and his writings better, regardless of any specific "proof," and also in part to possibly read some of pragmatism in a new way. And again the specific focus in Ortega's writings will be on trying to better understand Ortega's historicism and his maxim that "man has no nature, only history."

That said, we do still have some specific evidence of some of James's works in Ortega's library. Specifically from James he owned the two volumes of The Principles of Psychology, as

464 Ibid., p. 145.
well as *The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy, A Pluralistic Universe*, and *Pragmatism: A New Way for Some Old Ways of Thinking*. And this is course just representative of the books he owned, because as aforementioned there is no way to know for sure what he might have borrowed or read elsewhere.\(^{465}\) Graham also reminds us of bibliography entries citing James in Ortega's work. In his suggestion, "These dates suggest that pragmatism interested Ortega most from around the time he became a philosopher until about 1930, which years fit well enough with my hypothesis and other evidence. This list is assuredly incomplete, for he probably read most of James."\(^{466}\) As needs to be repeated for its important emphasis, the quotes that will be used from Graham must be read as *hypotheses*, as he himself mentions here, as the connections explored throughout this dissertation are not only new and little researched, but also since they are difficult to make they must be considered 'hypothetical.'

So, in returning to the main focus here, fundamental in creating a pragmatist dialogue within specifically Ortega's maxim that "man has no nature, only history," is to again read this anti-dualistically; history is our nature, because the two exist as separate entities that are inextricably linked. As Livingston argued, proposing a dialogue here between James and Ortega,

James has neither ignored nor repudiated modern subjectivity and its attendant dualisms; he has instead contained them within his more inclusive account. This is an achievement that José Ortega y Gasset could, and perhaps should, have appreciated. He is the philosopher who insisted that "our newest concept has the obligation to explain the old ones, it must demonstrate that portion of truth which they contained," and who declared,

\(^{465}\) This information was gathered by John Graham, who cites the courtesy of Señora Soledad Ortega to permit him to peruse Ortega's personal library.

\(^{466}\) Graham, *Pragmatist Philosophy*, p. 147.
in 1928, that "our era both needs and wants to move beyond modernity," the historical moment whose "basic principle" was the Cartesian "idea of subjectivity." He is also the close reader of Heidegger who hoped that the conceptual movement beyond modernity was already under way in his own thinking, which was of course shaped by a three-year stint in Marburg: "But suppose that this idea of subjectivity which is the root of modernity should be superseded, suppose it should be invalidated in whole or in part by another idea, deeper and firmer. This would mean that a new climate, a new era, was beginning."467

Moreover, as will continue from the first part, this call for a "new beginning" was a central part of specifically Ortega's historicism.468 As we saw in the section on Dewey, he wrote at length on his plea for re-conceptualizing and redefining how we study and apply the discipline of history.

A first step that must be taken here is to situate James within the general pragmatist framework of anti-dualism. A fundamental explanation of how James's philosophy is anti-dualistic in a pragmatist sense can be found in his discussions comparing and contrasting monism and pluralism, and the resulting conclusions he reached. Monism, argued James, is not a correct world view because it is too closed and rigid; the world is not one complete whole without separate parts. But while fundamentally, arguably, James leans more on pluralism, he is

467 Stuhr, 100 Years of Pragmatism, p. 155.

468 This is among other areas he called for change in, such as a united Europe and a new university system, just to cite a few additional examples.
not a strictly pure pluralist either. There are both unities and separate identities, generally speaking, that need to be upheld in the world and our views and conceptions about the world.\textsuperscript{469}

This anti-dualistic perspective on how two or more things can be one and separate at the same time will again be key to keep in mind throughout this entire dialogue presented here. As James declared, in the world, "There is neither absolute oneness nor absolute manyness from the physical points of view, but a mixture of well-definable modes of both. Moreover, neither the oneness nor the manyness seems the more essential attribute, they are coordinate features of the natural world."\textsuperscript{470} And he added, "[...] total unity is the sum of all the partial unities [...] To sum up, the world is 'one' in some respects and 'many' in others."\textsuperscript{471} As James explains here, there is "unity," which is the "sum" of the "partial unities," or the separate parts that also have "unity" in and of themselves; so again separate yet connected interdependently. And as we shall see, this applies to everything, including, for example, events, as in a chronological timeline of history. History is a continuum, along these lines, that does not have a start nor a finish. There are individual events, and then there is the continuum of events in sequence; separate but united simultaneously, or anti-dualistically, like the threads of a rope (each separate thread together makes up the rope)—the concept we also saw in Dewey. History, as we shall continue to see throughout, therefore, must be approached and understood, in part, in this way: as anti-dualistic (and in pragmatism in general, considering it is not usually tied with any form of historicism).

\textsuperscript{469}A simple example to clarify this is that of a married couple; they are certainly "united as one couple in matrimony," yet they are also two individuals, a unique male husband, and a unique female wife (in the traditional definition of marriage of course). For example, my husband and I make up one family of Mr. and Mrs. Escobar, yet we are also the separate (but again united) Mr. and Mrs., but the titles of which represent binding matrimony. Concept from: TALISSE, Robert: \textit{Guides for the Perplexed: Pragmatism}, p. 101. (Subsequently referred to as: \textit{Guide for the Perplexed}.)

\textsuperscript{470}McDermott, \textit{The Writings of William James}, p. 264.

\textsuperscript{471}Ibid, p. 266.
But this continuum that is history of past, present, and future is *in the sense that we construct of it, and how we connect experiences as such.*

Whereas there is no doubt about Ortega's emphasis on the importance of history and its study, James's did not explicitly write very much on the topic of history (as we saw neither did Dewey, and hence the lack of study of a "pragmatist historicism"). But as pragmatism in general has, arguably, some historicist fundamental elements, William James is no exception to this. As supported by Davaney,

When James turned to this concrete world of experience, he found a historical world. In his work *A Pluralistic Universe* (1909), James proclaimed, "I am finite once for all, and all the categories of my sympathy are knit up with the finite world as such, and with things that have a history." The world of finite creatures is the historical world in which there is nothing, including God, which "is great or static or eternal enough not to have some history." This focus on the world of finite reality led James to argue for letting go of categories such as the absolute and philosophical perspectives such as idealism and rationalism that ignore the fundamental historicity and finitude of existence. Thus, he called for "exorcising the absolute" that "de-realizer of the only life we are at home in," and for developing an empirically minded philosophical outlook appropriate to human historical existence.' [...] It is in relation to how we know the world and how we should understand our ideas about the world and our experience that James sounded his strongest historicist note.472

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472 Davaney. *Historicism*, p. 70.
To reiterate as very important to support the imagined dialogues in this dissertation: the concept of "continuum" must involve time, and the "past time" of a continuum is essentially history. Experiences are had and accumulated over a continuum; "past experiences" are historical. Therefore, again logically it would follow that there is quite a historical emphasis and dependence in pragmatism.

What is "experience"? Experience, in its basic definition, involves the accumulation of knowledge from direct, tangible participation and observation. "Experience" thus implies time in that it is the accretion of events and knowledge over time. That said, experience can only happen in the past and the present, or the present-soon-to-be-past—and there is also a present-soon-to-be-future as well. Hence the historical connection here, in part. And hence why this is so important for this paper, given the goal to create a potential pragmatist dialogue in specifically the area of historicism in Ortega's philosophy.

But again most importantly the objectives here involve not only the search to better understand these thinkers and their work for what they were in and of themselves, but also more specifically to apply new ideas to the study of history (a discipline whose importance cannot be overestimated, as it is a study of humanity), and the philosophy of history, with a specific narrowed focus on Ortega's dictum that man has no nature only history.

Moreover, as was the case with Dewey and Ortega, James and Ortega were relative contemporaries (and in the third section we will see Schiller as well), and thus arguably sometimes parallels can be made, in a general sense, in trends simply as a result of overlapping historical periods. Certainly Ortega would agree with this given his emphasis on 'our being our histories,' and in his philosophy on "generations" that is about how those of the same generation
are more similar, regardless of culture, society, ethnicity, etcetera (than those of different generations from the same country, for example; in other words, age brings people closer together to relate more strongly than anything else they might share). And as noted it does so happen that historically there are some years in which their lives overlap. Few would disagree that there is more "understanding" between those of similar ages (versus those of very different ages, and that closeness in generation can create more understanding than those even sharing the same country but being of very different ages, language being a main hindrance to really being able to demonstrate this better)—and this is something that only becomes increasingly true with the further globalization and global interconnectedness that we have in a modern day. As Graham tersely argues,

Some of the similarities between James and Ortega may be coincidence, and probably several of them are [...] for both minds were working on similar problems from similar principles, and both searched widely for inspiration, often in the same sources. [...] But not all, nor even most, of the similarities are coincidences—especially not for views on philosophy.473

Moreover, since "life is history," then biography is very important for both philosophers, as we have seen is the case for Ortega, and how Richardson reminds us was also true in James's mind, "James once observed that one should know the biography of a philosopher in order to understand his work."474

473 Graham, Pragmatist Philosophy, p. 162.

But again the same analysis would be made nonetheless, even if this historical overlap were not the case, as a goal here is mainly to read their works simply for what they are, though also while taking into account specific evidence found in their biographies and personal libraries (because again this is something that Ortega deemed so important; narration, 'to study history to get at meaning,' to phrase this generally). In other words, despite specific parallels, this is not a project of direct comparison and contrast; it is about imagining a possible dialogue between these thinkers.

As noted in the previous section on Dewey, Professor John Graham will be a key source for simply exploring the possible dialogue between Ortega and pragmatism in general given the sparse research in this area. But again direct connections will not be drawn, just possible, imagined dialogues.\textsuperscript{475}

Furthermore, it must also be emphasized that Graham sees James (and Dewey), as a \textit{principal} influence for Ortega, which is another hard argument to make given not only all that Ortega studied and read in regards to philosophy, but also because in general, regardless of the possible connection being explored, one still cannot say with absolute certainty which ideas came to him originally on his own, and which from others. Graham argues for this connection so strongly in fact that at times it must also be added that he undervalues individual, unique initiative and thought in Ortega, because again we cannot know with absolute certainty what

\textsuperscript{475} To note again —John Graham is Emeritus of European history at the University of Missouri-Kansas City. He has dedicated the work of several books to elaborating on his arguments for the pragmatist nature of José Ortega y Gasset's philosophy. Since Graham is a reference that will be cited frequently, as he is one of the few scholars who has studied specifically the possible pragmatist elements in Ortega's work, it must be noted again that Graham is not meant to be presented as an absolute authority of course, which he says himself in his own comments on his work being comprised of hypotheses.
influenced him and his work, and what did not. In other words, questionably Graham perhaps does not always give credit where due.

But this is what Graham argues. And of all the American pragmatists, Graham ties James most closely to Ortega. As he opens his argument on this, he proposes,

> It may help to predispose readers to accept pragmatism in Ortega if they learn of the main evidence here at the beginning. So many of Ortega's basic concepts (even his notion of "concept" itself) were from James that in 1916 he confided to a class that his "system of vital reason" has been crudely anticipated by "so-called 'pragmatism'" and by German Weltanschauung theory, or Dilthey's historical "worldviews." Not until near the end of his life, however, in what he called an "autobiographical" account by "historical reason," did he again directly confess his early debt to James and to Pragmatism (1907).\(^{476}\)

While explored here will be some specific potential manifestations of what that dialogue could consist of, the focus threading them all together will be, of course, on a philosophical discussion on historicism, as ultimately it will be demonstrated how some of both thinkers' fundamental ideas on life, truth, and reality in general can be applied to specifically a historicist thought, since the attempt here is to create a potential, imaginary dialogue between the two philosophers. The objective in this is to find yet another means to better understanding Ortega's thought on history, and specifically his seemingly polemical maxim 'man has no nature, but rather he has history.' Again, the main argument here will be to converse from specifically a pragmatist perspective an additional way to help better understand Ortega's meditations on

\(^{476}\) Graham, *Pragmatist Philosophy*, pp. 17-18. Graham, *Pragmatist Philosophy*, pp. 17-18. In reviewing the source noted by Graham here, I was unable to find the mention he is referring to in which Ortega admits such debt—as he does not include a specific quote from Ortega saying this—the only mention of James in this referenced article appears to be a quick note simply of chronology of the publication of his *Pragmatism* in 1907.
history. And as with the section on Dewey and Ortega, similarly a dialogue can be created between James and Ortega (and again between Ortega and Schiller in the next section) in which a pragmatist anti-dualistic interpretation may help us better understand how we can argue that when Ortega posits that man has no nature, only history, it is because his nature is his history (they are anti-dualistically interconnected, in a pragmatist sense). As Ortega phrases is: "lo único que el hombre tiene de ser, de <<naturaleza>>, es lo que ha sido."\textsuperscript{477} As will be explored, this can add to the discipline of history in general by bringing in another perspective on how it can be studied and applied.

The following is a brief synopsis of how this first part of this section on the potential dialogue between William James and José Ortega y Gasset will proceed. First discussed will be a brief biography on James, since one has already been included on Ortega in the section on Dewey. Next there will be a discussion on pragmatism in a general sense, and how it was specifically interpreted and defined by William James. Then some key areas will be analyzed in the first section that will lay the foundation for specific conclusions on how a dialogue can be imagined in historicist thought between Ortega and James in the second section, as done with Dewey.\textsuperscript{478}

In the initial section, the first of these key, fundamental areas discussed will be their metaphysics on life. The next section will contain an analysis on nature (given we must continue to ponder their views and definitions of "nature" in order to understand why this is in part

\textsuperscript{477} Ortega y Gasset, \textit{Historia}, p. 46.

\textsuperscript{478} In general, perhaps arguably there are more similarities in analyses in the first two sections of this dissertation since maybe more is shared between Dewey and James philosophically than either with Ferdinand Schiller, the thinker explored in the third and final section (however, if one had to present the argument, of the two Americans Schiller would arguably share more with James, as they were friends).
disregarded—but not fully—in a certain sense in the case of Ortega). Next discussed is how the anti-dualistic property of James's "unitary duality," or his unitary-dual principle of life-reality, can dialogue with Ortega, as what defines us; our lives, our realities, etcetera, is our history. Then there will also be a section on the two philosopher's "perspectives on perspective," given the importance that both place on this; on individual perspective in particular (though neither thinker is entirely individualist in their views, let it be quickly noted). Subsequently there will be a lengthy investigation toward envisioning a possible dialogue between Ortega and James in regards to their theories on "truth" and "reality." This will then proceed to the next general themes of ideas and beliefs, where another potential conversation between Ortega and James can be envisioned.

And then the second section will apply all this to specifically a historicist dialogue. Again there are topics and areas of overlap here with the previous section on Dewey, and as there will be in the third and final section on Schiller, because as the main objective is to imagine a pragmatist dialogue in Ortega's work, we must therefore envision an exchange on the same topics with the three different pragmatists. So again, the principal goal is to explore how these imaginary dialogues can possibly lead us to new interpretations on Ortega's work, and perhaps it will also shed some new light on pragmatism in general.
II. Biographical Backgrounds

As aforementioned, it is important that we consider the biographical backgrounds of both thinkers given that the maxim explored here is that of how "we are our histories," which would include that "we are our biographies." José Lasaga Medina described this importance so succinctly in reference to Ortega in the following part of the introduction to one version of Ortega's *En torno a Galileo*, "La vida humana es biografía y la biografía es historia." Thus, while the goal here is to try to understand what they were arguing, proposing, and a possible dialogue between the two (in other words, in part just reading their work for what it was), it is still important to include academic and scholarly specifics in regards to areas of possible dialogue. As Ortega's background has already been covered in the first section, only that of William James will be explored in what immediately follows.

William James was born almost a half century before Ortega in 1883 and died in 1910 before Ortega had published his first book (*Meditaciones del quijote* in 1914). All of James's principal works, therefore, had been published by the time Ortega was certainly old enough to have potentially read them (all appeared between 1890 and 1912). James was born into quite the intellectual family, as growing up his household was associated with a number of distinguished figures such as Ralph Waldo Emerson and Henry David Thoreau. His brother, Henry James, would also obtain notoriety as an eminent novelist. In fact, perhaps it is hard to say which brother gained more fame (although whomever one argues for depends partly on their area of discipline and personal interest of course—but this is a topic for another paper of course).

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479 Ortega y Gasset, *Galileo*, p. 16.
James's academic formation was quite diverse. Originally intended for medicine, James received his medical degree from Harvard in 1869, but eventually he shifted to Psychology and then Philosophy later as a professor at Harvard. Like Ortega, James quickly became a very popular professor, public lecturer, and scholar of multiple subjects. William James is perhaps best known for his writings on and work in Psychology and in helping establish Pragmatism as the fundamental philosophical movement in the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  

480 As referenced, in the section on Dewey, José Ortega y Gasset was born in Madrid on the 9th of May, 1883. Similarly, Ortega was born into a privileged family. He received his college degree in philosophy in 1902 from the University of Madrid. Subsequently he went abroad to Germany for his graduate work, studying at the University of Marburg until 1908. In 1910 Ortega began teaching metaphysics back at the University of Madrid. As additionally aforementioned, Ortega was quite a prolific writer. The total of his works span ten volumes, comprised of both books and articles. From 1936 to 1945 Ortega was a voluntary exile living abroad in Argentina and Portugal. After his return to Spain, in 1948 he founded the Institute of Humanities in Madrid. From then until the end of his life in 1955, Ortega would continue his writing and lecturing throughout the western world, traveling not only all around Europe, but also holding a conference in the United States as well.
III. Defining Pragmatism per William James

Before delving into the specific philosophical area of historicism, first studied here will be, on a foundational level, William James's idea of what pragmatism is and means, and how that may perhaps "dialogue" with some of the style of Ortega's thought, all in a more general sense.

In the following excerpt William James explains the beginnings of the history of pragmatism as a movement:

The term is derived from the same Greek word [pi rho alpha gamma mu alpha], meaning action, from which our words 'practice' and 'practical' come. It was first introduced into philosophy by Charles Sanders Peirce in 1878. In an article entitled 'How to Make Our Ideas Clear,' in the 'Popular Science Monthly' for January of that year Mr. Peirce, after pointing out that our beliefs are really rules for action, said that to develop a thought's meaning, we need only to determine what conduct it is fitted to produce: that conduct is for us its sole significance. [...] To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object, then, we need only consider what conceivable effects of a practical kind the object may involve—what sensations we are to expect from it, and what reactions we must prepare. Our conception of these effects, whether immediate or remote, is then for us the whole of our conception of the object, so far as that conception has positive significance at all.481

Long considered primarily a very "American" philosophical tradition, it has only relatively recently been more recognized outside of the United States even though it was known and studied by some abroad when it first appeared (this is a topic we will visit in greater detail in

481 Quoted in: James, Pragmatism, p. 21.
the third dialogue explored here with Ferdinand Schiller, the first principal European representative of the movement). As James defines it, in "pragmatism" it is important to first ask the following question: "What difference would it practically make to anyone if this [any] notion rather than that notion were true?" And in regards to the next step in the philosophical method of pragmatism he responds,

If no practical difference whatever can be traced, then the alternatives mean practically the same thing, and all dispute is idle. Whenever a dispute is serious, we ought to be able to show some practical difference that must follow from one side or the other's being right.

Pragmatism emphasizes the concrete, empirical, facts and action. And pragmatism's view is essentially plastic, but without ever being entirely abstract of course. Pragmatism is about the more directly tangible. In a sense, pragmatism attempts to be "practical" and "realistic;" to mold with life and reality, arguably. As Kaila proposes is James's thinking on this,

We can call this way of thinking--operating rigorously in our everyday experience--a logic of action, defining its basic principle thus: one must dare to face (to "risk") the

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482 As we also saw in the introduction, for reference here are some basic summarizing principles of the movement. As its name suggests, pragmatism stresses the "pragmatic," or the "practical," in that, most tersely summarized, what matters most are the "practical results" for understanding something and its' effect, most generally speaking. In fact, the term derives from the Greek "pragma," which refers to "action." In other words, "inquiries," in a general sense, must be tried and tested before we can reach any possible conclusions about them. But given how many "tries" and "tests" are often needed, sometimes there are not enough that can be conducted, and so results and conclusions are tenuous; simply practical, likely possibilities.

483 James, Pragmatism, p. 21.

484 Ibid., p. 21.
chance of failure, if through this daring one can possibly attain a valuable truth (or something concrete). It is easy to see how in our everyday lives we always follow this way of thinking whenever we need to accomplish something valuable but uncertain.

[...] All life, therefore, consists essentially in daring, "risking"--life-threatening experiments, in which we expose a great deal of things to risk, and a great deal of things, perchance, will be won by us. Yet if we do not expose anything to risk, neither will we gain anything; that, for one, is certain.

This primordial wisdom of everyday experience William James has elevated into a philosophical principle, making it one of the corner-stones of his pragmatic philosophy. At the center of each world-view is the question concerning the value of life.485

Pragmatism, as we saw in the introduction and the section on Dewey, therefore, most specifically emphasizes "experience." Very broadly speaking, to reiterate: essentially what we understand and conclude is revealed to us through experience. Something, anything, can only be pondered philosophically if it can be experienced. Experience is an ongoing, continuous process of interaction between an individual and his or her environment (which as we have and shall continually see in great depth arguably resonates with Ortega's central dictum that "I am myself and my circumstance;" "yo soy yo y mi circunstancia"). Subjects and objects are created and revealed in this progression and development. We cannot really begin to understand anything until we have had an experience with it, as we saw with Dewey, and as is the same with James. We should not, nor realistically can we ever jump to any conclusions without direct incident, for

everything needs to be discovered, explored, and learned about through specific and direct experience. It is through our experience with some thing that we begin to possibly understand that some thing.

This, as we shall continue to see in great depth ahead, most certainly dialogues with the interpretation of Blas González that follows on Ortega's definition of "the radical reality that is my life": "Thus to summarize, Ortega argues that only through one’s circumstance can one come to reflect upon oneself. This is the fundamental dialectic of the lived experience, one that demonstrates that it takes different situations, circumstances, and experiences for us to discover our “I” of consciousness."486 Here the term "experience" (which as we know is a very pragmatist term in this sense of it) specifically is being used to describe Ortega's yo soy yo y mi circunstancia, arguing that through this; through our experience of this; through our experience in general, we come to interpret, view, and understand our realities. This is thus a common thread weaved throughout this paper in the three dialogues as it is a key concept in this paper's objectives, and as such must be reiterated.

It is also important to take a moment to look specifically in detail at one of James's key defining concepts in his philosophical work: "radical empiricism." The following excerpt succinctly defines James's radical empiricism in a very general sense, declaring that it,

[...] consists first of a postulate, next of a statement of fact, and finally of a generalized conclusion. The postulate is that the only things that shall be debatable among philosophers shall be things definable in terms drawn from experience.... The statement

of fact is that the relations between things, conjunctive as well as disjunctive, are just as much matters of direct particular experience, neither more so nor less so, than the things themselves. The generalized conclusion is that therefore the parts of experience hold together from next to next by relations that are themselves parts of experience. The directly apprehended universe needs, in short, no extraneous trans-empirical connective support, but possesses in its own right concatenated or continuous structure.  

Most simply stated, our understanding comes strictly from that which we experience. And our experiences flow continuously. Further, the transitions in between experiences are experiences in themselves as well, so no part of this process is without impact; it all plays a role in an interdependent, simultaneous existence of separate but connected processes (i.e., anti-dualism). For James "radical empiricism" is about the continuous process of "pure experience;"

To be radical, an empiricism must neither admit into its constructions any element that is not directly experienced, nor exclude from any element that is directly experienced. For such a philosophy, the relations that connect experiences must themselves be experienced relations, and any kind of relation experience must be accounted as 'real' as anything else in the system. Elements may indeed be redistributed, the original placing of things getting corrected, but a real place must be found for every kind of thing experienced, whether term or relation, in the final philosophic arrangement.

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488 JAMES, William: Essays in Radical Empiricism Kindle Edition, Kindle location p. 490. (Subsequently referred to as Essays.)
His empiricism was "radical" because it was not "dual;" there is an interdependence among classical distinctions such as the known and the knower because experience is constantly flowing. And in that non-stop flow, "Radical empiricism, on the contrary, is fair to both the unity and the disconnection." Again here we have anti-dualism in the existence together of both unity and disarray. The transitions between experiences are also constant per James. And that constant continuity of transitions is a type of experience itself, along with the two connections creating that transition. Moreover, this is "radical" because in the universe and in our experiences, "No one single type of connection runs through all the experiences that compose it." In connecting this to historicism, that this is the same as historical events along a continuum (experiences can be used synonymously here with historical experiences or events), and further we could add here the notion that this is another reason why "history does not repeat itself" because no event, or experience, is replicated exactly.

As experiences increasingly accumulate over time, this continually adds to our general knowledge and perception; "The universe continually grows in quantity by new experiences that graft themselves upon the older mass; but these very new experiences often help the mass to a more consolidated form." So James's radical empiricism clearly also contained a certain degree of reliance on the past, or history, as the collection of past experiences shape our current perception and knowledge— but the instrumentalist aspect should be added here that they continue to do so into the future as well.

\footnote{Ibid., p. 517.}
\footnote{Ibid., p. 508.}
\footnote{Ibid., p. 845.}
It should be noted, however, that James's definitions of "experience" do vary to a certain degree in different books of his, but perhaps that was intentional; in other words, "experience" is supposed to be broad enough (maybe more so than for Dewey) that it simply is 'anything that we think and feel, and experience, is experience' (experience is simply what we experience it to be is perhaps the most simplistic, essential summary of this).

Experience, logically, gathers from the past, it is present in the current day, and it continues proceeding into the future. Again there is no one, overarching experience in life in James's philosophy, rather there is a continuous and constantly flowing stream of experiences, plural. Experience is never "closed." Thus, arguably perhaps his seemingly different definitions were not really different definitions but rather examples, in one sense, to make his point that experience is simply 'everything we experience, and that we experience experience to be,' whether we are talking about religion, the divine, or the subjective, objective, or both—for instance.

A fundamental statement established at the start of this dissertation is that pragmatism arguably inherently places an importance on "history" generally and literally speaking, even if this is not directly declared. We can only begin to study something through analyzing its (past) experiences, or past history. Again this is a specific area where we can certainly create a possible dialogue with José Ortega y Gasset, given his very historicist focus on the other hand. So, again, part of the reason for this new possible reading of pragmatism is how "experience" can sometimes be used synonymously with "history."

Perhaps the following quote best summarizes the idea of "experience" for James, Despite the varying definitions in his work:
Experience means experience of something foreign supposed to impress us, whether spontaneously or in consequence of our own exertions and acts. [...] experience moulds us at every hour, and makes of our minds a mirror of the time- and space-connections between the things in the world. [...] and we continually divine from the present what the future is to be.\textsuperscript{492}

"Experience" is not, like with empiricism, a correspondence with an event, act, fact, etcetera of the past; it does not refer to just the "experimented." Rather, "experience" for James is about the agreement and concordance between our beliefs and ideas, and a "putting into practice" an event, act, etcetera, and in turn its successful realization, execution—so it is more. "Experience" is not about a closed experience in the past, but rather it is about an experience open to the future as well—it is continual; past, present, and future.

As noted, "Radical Empiricism" is essentially at the core of James's thought and work. And it is directly connected to the concept of "experience" because, as we saw, "To be radical, an empiricism must neither admit into its constructions any element that is not directly experienced, nor exclude from them any element that is directly experienced."\textsuperscript{493} James further explained,

I say 'empiricism,' because it is contented to regard its most assured conclusions concerning matters of fact as hypotheses liable to modification in the course of future experience; and I say 'radical,' because it treats the doctrine of monism itself as an hypothesis, and, unlike so much of the half-way empiricism that is current under the

\textsuperscript{492} McDermott, The Writings of William James, p. 76.

\textsuperscript{493} Ibid, p. 195.
name of positivism or agnosticism or scientific naturalism, it does not dogmatically affirm monism as something with which all experiences has got to square. ⁴⁹⁴

"Radical empiricism," therefore, is never closed, which is a general concept that will be explored as part of the dialogue plausible between James and Ortega. As James continues, "But absolute unity, in spite of brilliant dashes in its direction, still remains undiscovered, still remains a Grenzbegriff [limit-concept]. "Ever not quite" must be the rationalistic philosopher's last confession concerning it." ⁴⁹⁵

Another part of this concept that can potentially dialogue with Ortega is the inherent "perspectivism," which as we have seen is central in Ortega's work, and which we saw can arguably dialogue with Dewey as well. James writes,

[...] there are various 'points of view' which the philosopher must distinguish in discussing the world; and what is inwardly clear from one point remains a bare externality and datum to the other. [...] there may be in the whole universe no one point of view extant from which this would not be found to be the case. [...] There is no possible point of view from which the world can appear an absolutely single fact." ⁴⁹⁶

So part of the reason that there is no one experience threading as common through all others, as we saw earlier, is because our different perspectives lead to different perceptions, interpretations, and therefore understandings of our experiences. Again, therefore, there is our experience, then there is what we think is that experience, and we cannot know for sure when

⁴⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 135.
they coincide (i.e., anti-dualism). Further, we can each perceive a different reality; we can each have a different experience and resultant conclusion and interpretation on that experience, its meaning, etcetera. In simplistic terms, as deduced from James's final words in this previous quote, "we create our own worlds," which then implies that we create our own realities, truths, etc.; *everything*, in a sense, including histories. To reiterate: Ortega declared that the only falsity is to say that there is one absolute perspective, as James declared as well in the last sentence from the previous quote (i.e., "There is no possible point of view from which the world can appear an absolutely single fact"). And as Jose Medina explains on this, "[...] according to James's pluralism, there is an irreducibility plurality of different epistemic perspectives, and different epistemic perspectives are likely to yield different truths."497 Our perspectives influence our interpretations of everything around us, such as, as noted in this case, "truths." This idea of there not being absolute truths was one that James and Dewey both shared. As we saw in the previous section, Dewey termed his truth "warranted assertibility." Hence, the same areas we saw then we can argue will continue to dialogue now between James and Ortega. Compare James's aforementioned notion of the existence of different perspectives and how they yield different truths with the following summarizing excerpts of Ortega's perspectivism: "La realidad, pues, se ofrece en perspectivas individuales."498 And further, "El punto de vista individual me parece el único punto de vista desde el cual puede mirarse el mundo en su verdad"499 So again there is no one or absolute truth, as there is no one, absolute perspective; we each create our unique versions and interpretations of all this—and this is emphasized by both James and Ortega.

497 Stuhr, *100 Years of Pragmatism*, p. 134.


499 Ortega, *Obras Completas II*, p. 18
And in Ortega's philosophy, the more perspectives we gather together, arguably the closer we are going to get to any possible truths—we may not actually always necessarily arrive to any truth(s), but again the more perspectives, the closer we can get. This concept is scarcely different from that expressed in the following aforementioned quote of James: "The universe continually grows in quantity by new experiences that graft themselves upon the older mass; but these very new experiences often help the mass to a more consolidated form." 500 Meaning, to speak generally, understanding becomes more consolidated and tangible the more experiences we accumulate—and to tie into the dialogue here, experiences are had via different and unique perspectives.

Moreover, as noted and as shall also be investigated in great depth, there is to a certain extent an inherent historicism in this "radical empiricism," even though James did not directly explore in detail historicism in his work in general (but again Ortega certainly did—hence in part the envisioned dialogue here). As James added in a later essay on the topic, as previously cited, "Radical empiricism consists first of a postulate, next of a statement of fact, and finally of a generalized conclusion." 501 He goes on to add that the postulate part of this formula means that element which can be debated by philosophers, which is that "drawn from experience." Further, "statement of fact" results just as much from direct experience as the things themselves experienced, And finally,

The generalized conclusion is that therefore the parts of experience hold together from next to next by relations that are themselves parts of experience. The directly-

500 James, Essays, p. 845.
apprehended universe needs, in short, no extraneous trans-empirical connective support, but possesses in its own right a concatenated or continuous structure.\footnote{Ibid.}

"Next to next" here, in its "continuous structure" as he explains, arguably has inherent historicism because as it is continuous, there will be some "nexts" that become, or are, the past, (and some that are the present, or will become the present, and some that are the future). History does play a role here. To reiterate this section's purpose: putting James's radical empiricism, therefore, into an imagined dialogue with Ortega's historicism will not only help us better understand Ortega's concept of "man has no nature only history," (because history is our nature), but it will also enrich a possible historicist reading of Jamesian pragmatism.

The following basic tenet of pragmatism applies to James as we saw it did to Dewey: Pragmatism is forward-looking, or more specifically, it is "functionalist" and "instrumental" because although we are using the past to search for understanding, the objective is to learn something that we can apply to the future. "Theories thus become instruments, not answers to enigmas, in which we can rest," wrote James, "We don't lie back upon them, we move forward, and, on occasion, make nature over again by their aid."\footnote{Ibid, p. 380.} Along with this very pragmatist declaration, this last piece here is interesting because as we saw with Dewey, there is an acceptance of a "nature," but since as he insinuates it is basically one that changes, we cannot really, therefore, ever get to it precisely or accurately—another point of possible dialogue between Dewey and James's pragmatism with Ortega that will be further explored.
Thus, this all, as we shall also continually see, dialogues with Ortega's thought even if
James does not rely as much on history as Ortega because as explored in the section on Dewey
we saw how Ortega was still indeed forward-looking as well as these two pragmatists. "With the
"instrumental" side of pragmatism," as Graham proposes, "Ortega obviously agreed" because
despite Ortega's great emphasis on the general importance of history, he too argued as we saw
that part of its value is in how it can help us shape better futures.\textsuperscript{504} In fact, one of Ortega's most
famously cited quotes we saw is the following: "Necesitamos de la historia íntegra para ver si
logramos escapar de ella, no recaer en ella" which implies that there is an important need to
apply historical lessons to the present and future.\textsuperscript{505} James cited often the dictum from
Kierkegaard that "we live forward, but we understand backward," which resonates,
fundamentally, the similar idea that history is important because it gives us the 'understanding'
that we can use to help create better futures. Ortega would certainly agree with this, and this is
both functionalist and instrumentalist in a pragmatist manner. It may be a very broad concept,
but it is nonetheless one dominant in pragmatism, and therefore adds support to being able to
imagine a dialogue with Ortega in these areas.

James wrote that fundamentally, "In the pulse of inner life immediately present now in
each of us is a little past, a little future, a little awareness of our own body, of each other's
persons, of these sublimities we are trying to talk about, of the earth's geography and the
direction of history [...].\textsuperscript{506} Hence, "pragmatism faces forward to the future."\textsuperscript{507} And

\textsuperscript{504}Graham, \textit{Pragmatist Philosophy}, p. 177.

\textsuperscript{505}Ortega, \textit{Rebelión}, p. 159. The following is my translation of this: "We have need of history in its entirety, not to
fall back into it, but to see if we can escape from it."

\textsuperscript{506}McDermott, \textit{The Writings of William James}, p. 295.
interestingly enough, he essentially notes how history is forward-looking at the end, making thus the future also historical, and history forward-looking, thereby being anti-dualistic, interdependent concepts. Furthermore, despite Ortega's emphasis on the importance of history, as we have seen he was indeed forward looking as well, as the following quote illustrates when Ortega similarly affirmed that "la vida es una actividad que se ejecuta hacia adelante, y el presente o el pasado se descubre después, en relación con el futuro." And in another instance he declared (in this quote, it was to one of his classes, but we can assume that this can be meant for all in general), "Ustedes en este instante presente no están [....] están en el futuro inmediato, proyectados hacia él, atentos a él." However, the key here to be declared is that what we most tangibly have is the history to apply to the future, because while we may be forward-looking, the future remains illusive and unpredictable of course. At every moment, therefore, what we really have and are is our history (we are our histories, in prospective view of the future). So to put into dialogue James's radical empiricism and its anti-dualism projected upon experience in the past, present, and future, with Ortega's concept of history, this permits us in one sense to interpret the concept of pragmatist experience in a historicist dimension as the process of construction of experience in temporal fluidity, and this in turn will also add to the study of Ortega's historicism.


509 Ibid., 93.
IV. On Life, Self, And Circumstance

In building a possibly better understanding of how 'man's nature is really his history,' the first piece developed here will be the two respective thinker's thoughts on life. "Life" is of course quite the broad topic that will in fact never stop challenging philosophers in general, but the analysis here will be narrowed to how this ties specifically to ideas on historicism, and to 'life as history' particularly. The potential dialogue we can envision is one with Ortega's metaphysics, and how it is particularly 'conversable' with Jamesian "radical empiricism."

There are basic fundamentals that we can establish about James's definition of experience and its relation to life specifically; for example, it is the base of reality, as there is no other reality than that based on experience, or other than that experienced, in life. That experienced reality, therefore, defines our lives—we are continuously flowing among incessant experiences. Some experiences are related to other experiences, through which we add to the development of our 'understandings' (whether essentially "true" or not).

We can certainly imagine a dialogue here with Ortega, as we saw he, in fact, often explicitly uses the term "experience of life," or "experiencia de la vida." And as the following quote of his shows, this "experience of life" is a continuously building process, as he uses a rolling snowball as a metaphor here to illustrate this idea:

En esta experiencia de la vida que se va lentamente formando y que es como la bola de nieve que conforme camina se va haciendo de su camino, y es como si se enrollase a su
Just as with James's "radical empiricism" defined in the previously cited quote of his, again fundamental in James's philosophy on life is that it is based on experience. This is because "experience moulds us at every hour," as he wrote. So our experiences are constantly building upon one another (as in the previous metaphor used by Ortega of an increasingly growing snowball as it rolls); they make up our past, our present, and from that we "divine from the present what our future is to be," essentially, as James added. Again we see here the very functionalist and instrumentalist element in pragmatism in general, having also seen this idea with Dewey. As Murphy summarizes this so nicely and concisely, citing James as well;

When James speaks of the pragmatic method, he is referring to applications of this principle in philosophy: It is "primarily a method of settling metaphysical disputes that otherwise might be interminable." It can settle these disputes because "the effective meaning of any philosophic proposition can always be brought down to some particular consequence, in our future practical experience." Futurity comes in because James's conception of possibility is Diodorean; that is, what is possible is what either is or will be actual, and what is possible for a particular person is what either is or will be actual in a person's lifetime. Hence, according to James, "the whole function of philosophy ought to

510 Ortega, Interpretación, p. 28.
511 McDermott, The Writings of William James, p. 76.
512 Ibid.
be to find out what definite difference it will make to you and me, at definite instants in
our life, if this world-formula or that world-formula be the one which is true."\textsuperscript{513}

Again this notion of "what difference does this make" is a key pragmatist one. As we
shall continue exploring throughout, and as a general idea that we also saw with Dewey, the past
is part of this continuum, or what is truly history, and this plays a major role in defining our
selves. As Livingston supports (referring here to time, but time in part implies history, too),
"James is, then, claiming that the vicissitudes of time are the necessary condition of the self's
integrity as well as knowledge."\textsuperscript{514} For James it is not just about time bringing changes to
individual lives and selves, but \textit{experiencing those changes} are what are particularly impactful
and influential; "Personal histories are processes of change in time, and the change itself is one
of things immediately experienced."\textsuperscript{515} This was key as we saw in Dewey as well; that generally
speaking, we must, experience, recognize, and acknowledge change for it to really be 'change'
(for example, in history and what we record of history). This is why the change itself; meaning,
the transition space itself in between two experiences, is also an experience per pragmatist
Jamesian thought because we need to experience it for it to be able to exist in the first place.

In this there is the important pragmatist aspect here that life, therefore, is "useful." Life's
past in particular, or our histories (as well as our presents, and potential futures, and that are then
later present, and then past), are pragmatically useful because this is where we search to better
explore and understand our presents and our futures in our lives, meanings, and realities. So there

\textsuperscript{513}MURPHY, John: \textit{Pragmatism: From Pierce to Davidson}, p. 47.

\textsuperscript{514}Stuhr, \textit{100 Years of Pragmatism}, p. 153.

\textsuperscript{515}Ibid.
are arguably two parts to the pragmatist dialogue here that will be envisioned with Ortega again. The first is that life is history, and we are, therefore, our histories. And the second is that our life's past histories are pragmatically "useful"—hence a potential pragmatist instrumentalist exchange with Ortega. "Ortega had extended his search for life-reality beyond metaphysics even into a metahistory that was meant to be pragmatically "useful" for life," argues Graham in a possible interpretation relevant here for this study, "and for the human sciences. Even there James inspired him. "Life is always a place and a date," Ortega wrote, "...life is of itself, historical."" 516 Though we saw this in the first part's dialogue with Dewey, this perhaps would exchange more smoothly with James, which is why it must be revisited here.

"Life" for James is often interpreted to be something very individualistic, given, in part, this emphasis on individual sets of experiences that shape personal histories. However, his philosophy should not be interpreted solely as individualist, as there is not only a very important social factor in all this in regards to present and immediate circumstances, but also in regards to those handed down to one by his or her ancestors (even though this, arguably, is simultaneously something 'individual' as well). In other words, we are influenced in part by other, external experiences around us at any one time, as well as in part from those that we inherit. This was the case for Dewey as well, as was explored in the first section. James writes,

> In its widest possible sense, however, a man's Self is the sum total of all that he CAN call his, not only his body and his psychic powers, but his clothes and his house, his wife and

516 Graham, Pragmatist Philosophy, p. 173.

Arguably, as we shall continue to see in depth, these texts could dialogue with Ortega's view of "circumstance" (\textit{circunstancia}), as some of what James cites here are circumstances that can surround and impact an individual at any given time. Or more succinctly, James wrote that "Not only the people but the places and things I know enlarge my Self in a sort of metaphoric social way."\footnote{In another instance he writes "The words \textit{ME}, then, and \textit{SELF}, SO far as they arouse feeling and connote emotional worth, are \textsc{Objective} designations, meaning \textsc{All the Things} which have the power to produce in a stream of consciousness excitement of a certain peculiar sort" (Ibid. pp. 4980-4982).} So clearly his philosophy is not entirely individualistic, as there are both individual and social elements that define a person's life, as we saw was also true for Dewey. The resultant sum total combination may be 'individualistic' in the sense that it is a unique amalgamation, but that does not mean, as we shall see Ortega argues as well, that there are not overlapping social factors and elements within that incorporation that some individuals may share also, and as we saw was the case with Dewey.

Ortega also wrote that there are both individual and social factors present when defining "human life," as is clear in the following quote:

[...] \textit{la teoría de la vida humana} es, por lo pronto, teoría de la vida personal. Pero dentro de nuestra vida personal encontramos no sólo a otras personas individuales como nosotros y que no dan lugar a una disciplina diferente de aquella, sino que las encontramos juntas en un conjunto, el cual es distinto de cada una de ellas y de todas, tomadas una a una; es el conjunto que llamamos sociedad o colectividad. España no es
ningún español ni es la serie de todos los españoles singularmente tomados, sino que es una realidad distinta de cada uno de ellos y con la que cada uno de ellos se encuentra fuera de sí y hasta dentro de sí. [...] pero sí importa decir que sin una teoría perfectamente clara de los fenómenos sociales y colectivos es imposible nada que de lejos merezca llamarse ciencia histórica.\textsuperscript{519}

In other words, we can certainly be unique and yet similar with others at the same time, because there are so many circumstances surrounding us at any one time, some of which we may share, and others we may not.\textsuperscript{520} This sounds quite anti-dualistic indeed. But as will also continue to be explored in depth, in part what can make us especially distinct are our perspectives that result from our realities as 'self and circumstance.' We can be, in fact for Ortega we need to be, individuals, but within our limited circumstances (some of which we share, socially); "El hombre es afán de ser," he wrote, "—afán en absoluto de ser; de subsistir— y afán de ser tal, de realizar nuestro individualísimo yo."\textsuperscript{521} So there is a limited sense in which we are both individual, and social, for both Ortega and James, as Medina supports in the latter's case, "James's philosophy seems oriented toward the individual and her experiences, but not so much toward interpersonal relations. However, despite his recalcitrant and unqualified individualism, I want to argue that there is a strong social element in James's philosophy."\textsuperscript{522} As just quoted, James wrote that

\textsuperscript{519} Ortega, \textit{Interpretación}, p. 92.

\textsuperscript{520} For example, you (the reader) and I (the writer), we have both studied some of the same topics to be now reading about this one, which has resultantly impacted our academic formations (as one example of a repercussion). However, there are people, even close to myself, such as family, who have not heard of pragmatism, but this is simply a result of differing circumstances.

\textsuperscript{521} Ortega, \textit{Galileo}, p. 78.

\textsuperscript{522} From chapter titled "James on Truth and Solidarity: The Epistemology of Diversity and the Politics of Specificity" from: Stuhr, \textit{100 Years of Pragmatism}, p. 124.
people, places, things expand our "selves," as social beings, so clearly Medina argues well in noting the social element also present in James despite his emphasis on the additionally present role of individualism.523

As has also been discussed in the potential dialogue between Ortega and Dewey, one of the key ways to define "life" for Ortega is as "self and circumstance" (yo y circunstancia; "yo soy yo y mi circunstancia"); life is like anything from which one can 'peel' off various 'circumstances' that encompass a core 'self.' An onion and its layers serves as a good metaphor here.524 As we have seen, most broadly and succinctly stated, therefore, for Ortega life is the self and the world. As we saw, life is composed of two inseparable dimensions; one in which each is the self and circumstance living and working within and among that reality, and the second which is to figure out what that circumstance is; meaning, put into simplistic words, what we should do with our lives.525 So there are two dimensions that are mutually existent; just as we each subsist among circumstances, and those are our circumstances, we live among those circumstances and we become aware of living among those circumstances, as yet further ways to describe how this is both social and individual. Most fundamentally, the notion of "circumstances" implies in part a social element. Some of those circumstances are shared with others, and in sum they make up

523 Concisely stated, James declared: "Not only the people but the places and things I know enlarge my Self in a sort of metaphoric social way" (James, *Principles*, pp. 4813-4814).

524 "Hence, pragmatic historicism assumes that traditions exhibit both continuities and discontinuities within themselves but that these cannot be known abstracly or ahead of time, but can only be traced retrospectively. Moreover, this position assumes, because of the porous nature of all historical configurations and because of the interconnected web of historical reality, that traditions continually engage in transformative encounter and exchange and thus not only modify each other but also may exhibit crucial overlap" (Davaney, *Historicism*, p. 150).

525 This concept is clear in the following previously cited quote: "[…] constituida por dos dimensiones, inseparable la una de la otra y que quiero dejar destacadas ante ustedes con toda claridad. En su dimensión primaria vivir es estar yo, el yo de cada cual, en la circunstancia y no tener más remedio que habérselas con ella. Pero esto impone a la vida una segunda dimensión consistente en que no tiene más remedio que averiguar lo que la circunstancia es" (Ortega, *Galileo*, p. 71).
unique sets of circumstances for each individual, so again there is both the social and individual element.

Ortega's notion of our various such dimensions is scarcely different from James when he argued that,

Thus social evolution is a resultant of the interaction of two wholly distinct factors, —the individual, deriving his peculiar gifts from the play of physiological and infra-social forces, but bearing all the power of initiative and origination in his hands; and, second, the social environment, with its power of adopting or rejecting both him and his gifts. Both factors are essential to change. The community stagnates without the impulse of the individual. The impulse dies away without the sympathy of the community.\textsuperscript{526}

Moreover, here James clearly notes an argument for the interplay between the individual and the social, or in his specific terms, the individual and the community (which could dialogue as such with Ortega's \textit{yo soy yo y mi circunstancia}). And hence Greeve Davaney's supporting argument here that

James, over against these, sought to articulate a mediating position that he came to term radical empiricism, which offers a portrayal of a pluralistic universe of multiple but connected concrete realities. The vision James developed was of a universe composed of a multiplicity of particular realities. Empiricism also emphasized an interpretation of reality composed of discrete perceptions. Where James differed was to insist that these multiple individual realities are always in relation with one another; they are not separate

\textsuperscript{526} JAMES, William: "Great Men, Great Thoughts, and the Environment" from \textit{The Atlantic Monthly}, paragraph 24.
entities existing side by side but without connection. Instead, the universe is the dynamic conglomeration of units of reality and experience that are connected with one another without losing their individuality. The universe is not a container holding static realities. Instead, it is the very flow of experience, the dynamic interaction of concrete realities. James thus used words like flow, flux, and pulses, and he repeatedly referred to the continuous changing character of reality. "What really exists," for James, "is not things made but things in the making."\textsuperscript{527}

To summarize here then, this idea of life as self and world can perhaps dialogue in a pragmatist, anti-dualistic manner between James and Ortega. As we saw, life, argued Ortega, is a "radical unitary duality," to use the term Graham developed. As one example excerpt of this, Ortega wrote, "[...] lo que nuestra vida sea depende tanto de lo que sea nuestra persona como de lo que sea nuestro mundo."\textsuperscript{528} Life, therefore, depends on, is shaped by, both person and world. In this effective example to apply here, Ortega affirms that 'to live' is "esa sorprendente presencia que su vida tiene para cada cual: sin ese saberse, sin ese darse cuenta, el dolor de las muelas no nos dolería. [...] Es el descubrimiento incesante que hacemos de nosotros mismos y del mundo en derredor."\textsuperscript{529} We have to be "individual" or else we would not realize things, such as the pain of molars in this case, but these things take place on the stage that is the world. Arguably James's "unitary duality" is "anti-dualism," because it is representing here the generalized idea that there can be two (or more) and one interdependent simultaneously. "Unitary" for Ortega we can argue is "self and circumstance" (yo y circunstancia). And "duality"

\textsuperscript{527} Davaney, \textit{Historicism}, p. 75.

\textsuperscript{528} Ortega, \textit{Metafísica}, p. 38.

\textsuperscript{529} Ortega, \textit{Metafísica}, pp. 36-37.
for Ortega we can argue is "self and circumstance" (or world as circumstance) as separate elements. In other words, self and world, as two separate entities, are united into one radical reality that is inextricably "self and circumstance;" "yo soy yo y mi circunstancia." A metaphor that Ortega used for this was a "ginkgo tree," arguing how just the same there is one ginkgo tree (I am self and circumstance) with two equal branches (self and world, separately, but the branches are of course tied to just one tree).

The one ginkgo tree with its two equal branches supplemented Ortega's metaphors on life as "unitary duality: two aspects of the same basic philosophical reality. Although the duality to which he directly alluded with these metaphors was the "root" (meaning "radical") unity of life comprehending the duality of self and circumstance, it seems logically necessary and aesthetically symmetrical to carry that initial structure of "unitary duality" over into the development of his philosophy, into its obvious duality of stages, vital and historical.530

A tree really does provide a good metaphor of anti-dualism since it has many individual parts; branches, leaves, roots, all connected together into one tree. "Life provided that unity, but life itself was dual—on several levels at once," argued Graham, as there is a "'coexistence' of self and circumstance."531 Life is the "radical reality" because it is the origin of all others, not because it is the highest and most supreme reality. This is life's radical unitary duality. And this, averred Graham, was in part inspired by James, as a supporting argument for this dissertation's vision of a possible dialogue; "Of course James had already given him a convenient rationale for a


531 Ibid., p. 346.
philosophy from life that represented a "radical unitary duality." So had Goethe. Graham even went as far as to argue that Ortega had a "basic debt to James" for this "view of life as basic (and double) reality" (i.e., "radical unitary duality" and the "self balanced with circumstance"). But the objective here is not to argue, as Graham does, that this came directly from James, it is rather to again imagine a possible dialogue between James and Ortega on these concepts, for which the arguments of Graham lend support to the ability to envision this possible exchange. That said, it should also noted that at no point does this paper argue such a direct inheritance as Graham does; in fact, there is no "inheritance" meant to be argued here, because again the idea is to just imagine ways in which Ortega might converse with three pragmatists, as here with William James, but not which figure had which ideas first, or who influenced whom.

In a general sense, this form of pragmatist anti-dualism of life as 'radical unitary duality' is conversable with the following additional description of "life" according to Ortega:

He aquí cómo hoy nos aparecen bajo nuevo cariz esos dos modos de la vida que son la soledad y la sociedad, el yo real, auténtico, responsable y el yo irresponsable, social, el vulgo, la gente. Y de hecho nuestra vida va y viene entre ambos modos y es en cada instante una ecuación entre lo que somos por nuestra propia cuenta —lo que pensamos, sentimos, hacemos con plena autenticidad— y lo que somos por cuenta de la gente, de la socieded.

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532 Ibid., p. 331.
533 Ibid, p. 332
534 Ortega, Galileo, p. 123.
In other words, *yo soy yo y mi circunstancia* as the "radical reality" that is one's "life" can arguably be directed toward a potential pragmatist dialogue, as in the previous excerpt he is clearly saying that one can be, generally speaking, 'two things which are separate but coexist together inextricably' (as in the individual and the social), which is the general pragmatist anti-dualistic concept explored in the first section as well on Dewey.

Moreover, a further pragmatist dialogue can be established here in the use of the terms by Ortega, as we have seen, of "experience of life" (*experiencia de la vida*). "Experience of life" is both individual (myself) and collective (society, and all the other circumstances surrounding "myself"). The "saga" that is this continuously building experience of life is what makes up our histories, and therefore ourselves—hence what we have is history, most importantly, as the main thesis here; this is our 'nature.' And it must be repeated how "pragmatist" this application and definition of the concept "experience" can be interpreted to sound. As Ortega argued,

Porque esto que he llamado experiencia de la vida personal, por mecanismos que no voy ahora entreternerme en enunciar, se amplía a la experiencia de la vida colectiva del pueblo a que uno pertenece. Y aún más: a través de ese pueblo se amplía a experiencias de todo un proceso histórico humano que la memoria de nuestro pueblo o del conjunto de pueblos a que el nuestro pertenece ha ido conservando.  

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535 Ortega, *Interpretación*, p. 29. He continues, "Y también esa imagen o figura del proceso histórico universal se va formando, no menos que las más humildes experiencias de nuestra vida privada, al cabo de los tiempos, automáticamente y sin que intervenga o apenas intervenga nuestra reflexión" (Ibid). Reflection is needed because recognition is needed for something to exist; it is not automatic. This is what creates what Ortega terms "memory" (i.e., historical memory, or simply history). What is automatic is the passing of time and the accumulation of experiences. This we saw was the same with James; experience exists because we *experience experience*. Even the transitions between experiences are experiences. It all needs to be experienced and then as such recognized to exist. And a further step in the process of incorporating this all into our perceptions and interpretations on realities, truths, etc., is reflection. And reflection comes in personal, unique perspectives.
So again the idea here is that for Ortega, the "experience" of something outside and unrelated to a concrete perspective, and that is free and independent of any perspective, does not exist, regardless of whether or not it is personal or universal. We do not "pick" all our perspectives, nor are we always directly conscious of them, per Ortega. We are always installed in our perspectives; we always see and perceive reality from a concrete, specific perspective (whether general or individual) for Ortega. Reflection or 'reflective reason' is nothing other than one of the many perspectives with which each human being relates to and with reality, but none are the only ones or the only "true" one(s). This is why Ortega says, "Y también esa imagen o figura del proceso histórico universal se va formando, (...) al cabo de los tiempos, automáticamente y sin que intervenga o apenas intervenga nuestra reflexión," because we can perceive reality and create for ourselves an image or notion of the historical process via vital perspectives, as opposed to rational or non-reflective perspectives.536 This, of course, is not to say that we proceed forming an idea of the historical process "automatically," without reflecting on it, or without being conscious of historical process and its effects. Meaning, it is not the same to say that we are "installed" in some beliefs that we receive (and that we do not reflect on them or ponder them, as they are more 'subconscious') as it is to say that we have some "ideas," some of which we are conscious of, reflect on, and ponder rationally (such as in historical reason). Here indeed is an interesting point of dialogue with James's position on "experiencing experience."

For Ortega, life is a happening, it is a becoming; it is something not fixed nor static. Most fundamentally, life is the accumulation of history; that of our own histories, that of those before us from whom we inherit some history, and some of the history surrounding us. We could

536 Graham, Pragmatist Philosophy, p. 346.
arguably re-phrase this here that life is also the history of experiences. Life is in constant flux, and hence the dictum that man has no nature, only history (because history really is here something in constant movement and progression as a continuum, hence it is really not closed partly because it lives on in the present and future). Life is both unique, particular, individual, and yet also general, worldly—life is "anti-dualistic" as the pragmatist term implies. Again Graham offers the suggestion that this comes from James, which is included here not to argue for this direct influence but rather to show that there is some agreement that at the very least a dialogue can be imagined between Ortega and James;

[...] he defined life in a very Jamesian way: this strange, neglected reality was not a thing, neither physical nor psychic, but was a dramatic "happening." Of itself, life has "structure" that consists in "connections," not just individual and concrete but also general and formal—among the more basic and important of which are the "beliefs," even the doubts, in which we live.537

Again, in life there is history, not nature, because it is a 'continuously progressing process;' there is nothing static or fixed in life. This idea of life being essentially a continuum (and therefore of course history as well when incorporating the constant stream of "parts" in this) is therefore indeed a dialogue that can be envisioned between James and Ortega. As the following additional example that Graham cites illustrates:

Consider, for example, James's statement: "The essence of life is continuously changing character; but our concepts are all discontinuous and fixed..." Compare that with Ortega: "Human life is thus not an entity that changes accidentally, rather the reverse; in it the

537 Graham, Pragmatist Philosophy, p. 350.
'substance' is precisely change..." And he had just said that concepts of nature (including 
"human nature") were (for "intellectualism") of things "fixed, static, predetermined."\textsuperscript{538}

Change, flux—this continuum present in life is indeed a topic of possible dialogue between James's pragmatism and Ortega's historicism, as we saw it was between Dewey and Ortega.

Furthermore, James's radical pluralism can potentially dialogue with Ortega's concept of "self and circumstance", as the following additionally supportive analysis by José Medina proposes:

James's radical pluralism is based on a theory of relationality according to which nothing can be understood in and by itself, but rather in relation to other things, in a network of relations. On this relational view, the identity of things is concocted in a network of interdependences; and to have a sense of self is to have a sense of the dependences that compose one's life, for we can understand the identity of something only by grasping the fabric of relations in which that thing appears.\textsuperscript{539}

So again we have further argument for the social element present in James's philosophy. We could say here, along these Jamseian lines, "I am myself and my network of interdependences." Key here is the term "interdependent," as it implies both dependence and independence, but intertwined inextricably as one (i.e., anti-dualism). We cannot be just ourselves, because we are ourselves and all that surrounds us—this, therefore, can arguably

\textsuperscript{538} Graham, \textit{Theory of History}, p. 141.
\textsuperscript{539} In another example it is proposed by Medina that "to understand the identity of something is to understand how that thing is related to many other things, but also how it can become entangled in many other potential relations. For it is not only the factual relations that are already given that matter, but also those other potential relations that can unfold or be created" (Stuhr, \textit{100 Years of Pragmatism}, pp. 124-125).
dialogue with Ortega's dictum "yo soy yo y mi circunstancia," helping us envision how this could be understood more clearly as something anti-dualistic.

In James's radical empiricism, self and world are two individual elements that cannot exist without the each other. Just the same, there are not just wholes and parts, but essentially both. James's radical empiricism emphasized time and space. So again here we have two more possible parts to a dialogue between James and Ortega on life, reality, and how we are our histories. First, James did not separate self and world, but acknowledged that the two exist anti-dualistically, just as "yo soy yo y mi circunstancia." So again this paper's imaginary dialogue enriches studies on Ortega by proposing that this central tenet of his could arguably be labeled "anti-dualistic" because our yoes and our circumstances are separate entities but that are constantly connected interdependently at all times to make up our realities, our lives, and our histories. And second, the best means we have to try to investigate and comprehend all this is through the study of history, as James emphasized "time and space" in this while Ortega explicitly argued that "we are our histories." Again, as Graham suggests,

He [James] refused to separate self and world, which were bound together by a variety of conjunctive relations starting from merely "to be with," and going on to include such terms as time and space, like and unlike, continuity and discontinuity, or disjunction. Possibly it was from this conjunctive relation of "being-with" that Ortega derived his ideas of "self and circumstance" in 1913 and convivencia ("living-with") as a Spanish equivalent. [...] Thus Ortega turned the phenomenon of life implicitly toward history—all consistent with what James implied by his emphasis on "time and space." \(^{540}\)

\(^{540}\) Graham, Pragmatist Philosophy, p. 175.
This aforementioned proposition by Graham argues almost exactly the thesis presented here of a prospective dialogue between the two arguing anti-dualistically that life is history and that history is our nature.

For Ortega, we are not our natures because we are more than our natures; we are ourselves and the circumstances surrounding us because they restrict and define us because of those limitations, and our unique choices of which to address or not, and which to maneuver among. Moreover, again as explored in the section on Dewey and applicable here as well, one's history also implies one's nature, since it can also involve what one literally "inherits." So here we have again the basic pragmatist dialogue; life is anti-dualistic; this is our anti-dualistic human reality because the two, life and circumstances, are interdependent, though they are two elements, as again our lives are defined as “ourselves within our lives’ circumstances.” And we are constantly maneuvering among our lives' circumstances, which is why life, for Ortega, is a continual "quehacer." Ortega often writes that "man is the novelist of himself" because he must choose, within the circumstances he was in many instances uncontrollably placed in, how to direct his life, and, in fact, he must do so. There is a limited freedom, therefore, in life, which is a topic we saw in the first part and is particularly important in the third dialogue with Schiller. As Molinuevo helps propose here,

[...] vida es historia. Efectivamente, afirma Ortega que el hombre no tiene naturaleza, sino historia, y eso significa que su trayectoria vital, teniendo siempre un trayecto, no lo tiene predeterminado, como es el caso de la bala, ejemplo que cita con frecuencia. La

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541 Garcia's explanation here should be cited again: "No tener naturaleza implica que el hombre no es cosa ni cuerpo, alma o conciencia, sino que el hombre es un drama, ser insustancial, nuevo homo viator, <<peregrino del ser>>, cuya esencia consiste en querer ser lo que todavía no es, lo que convierte su vida en un continuo quehacer" (Regalado García, Laberinto, p. 202).
vida no es algo hecho sino por hacer, que da mucho quehacer. Porque lo que nos pasa no está en nuestras manos, pero sí lo está darle un sentido vital nuestro. Lo importante para Ortega no es lo que se vive, sino cómo se vive, ese estilo de vida, sobre el que insistirá mucho luego cuando aborde la vida desde la biografía en la razón histórica. El sentido vital consiste en los proyectos, programas vitales que el hombre elabora con su imaginación y lo que convierten en un novelista de sí mismo, como si fueran diferentes personajes de su vida. Pero no todos son iguales, y entre ellos están los que se acomodan, encajan, con ese proyecto vital que tenemos que ser y al que llama vocación. Cuando encajan entonces se vive auténticamente.  

So again, as has been elaborated, Ortega is not denying, per se, that we do not have a nature, or that we are not also individuals. He is saying that history is our nature because it is a continuum, as again our lives are defined as ourselves within our lives’ circumstances and the maneuvering movement that is constantly defining and re-defining, and constantly creating and re-creating, our histories, or our lives. To repeat: "En suma, que el hombre no tiene naturaleza, sino que tiene... historia. O, lo que es igual: lo que la naturaleza es a las cosas, es la historia—como res gestae—al hombre." Or as succinctly translated in an English version; “[...] the past is man’s nature.” And this is because, as has been explored, it is through history that we can begin to try to comprehend and envision an individual’s life since the past can be more 'tangible' and 'concrete' than the present or future (the present can of course be to a certain extent 'tangible' 

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542 MOLINUEVO, José Luis: Para leer a Ortega, p. 195. (Subsequently referred to as Leer Ortega.)

543 Ortega, Historia, p. 48.

544 ORTEGA Y GASSET, José: History as a System, p. 62. (Subsequently referred to as: History.) (Translated to English in 1941.).
and 'concrete' as well, but not as much as the past, and perhaps in part because the present actually becomes past as we say it, so it is also the 'past' in this sense). As Molinuevo further argues, "[...] no se trata tampoco de analizar la <<historicidad>> del hombre, sino de acudir a su historia como medio para acceder a su vida. "

As articulated in the section on Dewey, for Ortega, the most basic reality of man is simply life and to live; "la situación del hombre es la vida, es vivir." And life is history. As quoted previously, Ortega defines life succinctly in the following excerpt:

¿Qué es, pues, vida? No busquen ustedes lejos, no traten de recordar sabidurías aprendidas. Las verdades fundamentales tienen que estar siempre a la mano, porque sólo así son fundamentales. [...] Vida es lo que somos y lo que hacemos: es, pues, de todas las cosas la más próxima a cada cual. [...] La vida es lo que hacemos y lo que nos pasa.

It must be noted here that when Ortega says "lo que nos pasa" (what happens to us, or our history we build) is part of life, this could, again, arguably be interchangeable with the term "experience." For Ortega we begin our lives essentially 'free to be,' but within the limits of the 'circumstances' surrounding each one of us, which as we have seen, some are unique, and some are shared with others. So we do have a certain amount of freedom, but it is also limited—we are "free" only to maneuver among the circumstances we are surrounded by, some of which we have no control over choosing; it is, in other words, a "limited freedom" (again this is a topic that will be envisioned as conversable with another pragmatist's view in the third section of this

545 Molinuevo, Leer Ortega, p. 115.
547 Ibid., p. 34-35.
dissertation, that of the British Philosopher Ferdinand Schiller, as it is yet another central pragmatist tenet and therefore as such it must be revisited). As Molinuevo concisely explains this, "[..] vida es libertad (elección de posibilidades) en la fatalidad (no hemos elegido la circunstancia), lo que dota a nuestra vida una dimensión dramática y trágica." 548 So really we are simply re-defining freedom as a "limited freedom." As Ortega writes, "Dentro de la fatalidad de vuestra circunstancia sois libres; más aún, sois fatalmente libres porque no tenéis más remedio, queráis o no, que escoger vuestro destino en la holgura y el margen que os ofrece vuestra fatal circunstancia." 549 There is a "margin" as Ortega notes, so freedom is limited by our circumstances. Again, circumstances exist in interaction with our selves or yoes, and at any given time each individual has a unique "circumstance" in regards to a distinct set of circumstances in this relation. 550

Life is a continuous decision-making process in regards to what we are going to be, and what we are going to do, according to Ortega, so it is, therefore, in a constant state of flux; "[..] la situación del hombre, la vida, es desorientación, es estar perdido," as he says on numerous occasions. 551 This is why man has no nature, in the limited traditional sense of the term, because there really is no "present, permanent being," as we are constantly living amidst a decision-making process to shape who we are going to be and what we are going to do in our search for our "authentic selves" and our "authentic individual vocations." "[..] this metaphysical

548 Molinuevo, Leer Ortega, p. 194.
549 Ortega, Interpretación, p. 95.
550 As was quoted in the section on Dewey, "El hombre, en cambio, cuando empieza a existir no trae prefijado o impuesto lo que va a ser, sino que, por el contrario, trae prefijada e impuesta la libertad para elegir lo que va a ser dentro de un amplio horizonte de posibilidades. Le es dado, pues, el poder elegir, pero no le es dado el poder no elegir" (Ibid, p. 12).
character," proposes Rodríguez Huescar, "like any other having its foundation in one and the same basic structure, turns human life into something unique and thus irreducible to any form of "life" belonging merely to the "biological order." And as Blas González further posits, this is what makes man a historical being; "Man is a historic being in the sense that he is faced with the task of forging a history for himself." González further argues how this essentially is anti-dualistic, supporting, therefore, the analysis proposed here in this thesis of a dialogue with pragmatism in Ortega's philosophy:

Authentic life, according to Ortega, is always striving toward individuality and concreteness. Hence, to live is to create and re-create the totality that is the universe. This is why life is in essence a drama or aesthetic creation that should attempt to re-create the ideal that man carries within him as a heroic or tragic being. Thus human life is always in the process of individualization. Yet this individualization can never take place apart from our individual circumstances that frame and shape our being. Therefore, life is coexistence-with-things as well. The unifying structure of life is to be seen in the individual perspective, which organizes reality rather than deforming it.

Dialogue can also be imagined with James in this idea of life being essentially 'thrown at us.' As was quoted in the section on Dewey as well, Gray argues in his biography on Ortega that, "Life, he was wont to say, comes at us "point blank," demanding immediate response. In this,

552 RODRÍGUEZ HUÉSCAR, Antonio and GARCÍA-GÓMEZ, Jorge: José Ortega y Gasset's Metaphysical Innovation: A Critique and Overcoming of Idealism, pp. 116-117. (Subsequently referred to as Metaphysical Innovation.)

553 Gonzalez, Ortega y Gasset's Philosophy of Subjectivity, pp. 2242-2243.

554 Ibid., pp. 449-453.
Ortega was closer to William James and John Dewey than to Plato, Leibniz, or Kant.”⁵⁵⁵ This is precisely how Ortega defines "to live" in the following quote, as "[...] encontrarse de pronto y sin saber cómo, caído, sumergido, proyectado en un mundo incanjeable: en este de ahora. Nuestra vida empieza por ser la perpetua sorpresa de existir, sin nuestra anuencia previa, náufragos en un orbe impremeditado.”⁵⁵⁶ As James explicitly argues, "Reality, life, experience, concreteness, immediacy, use what word you will, exceeds our logic, overflows and surrounds it.”⁵⁵⁷ And he continues, defining life in one instance as follows:

The essence of life is its continuously changing character; but our concepts are all discontinuous and fixed, and the only mode of making them coincide with life is by arbitrarily supposing positions of arrest therein. With such arrests our concepts may be made congruent. But these concepts are not parts of reality, not real positions taken by it, but suppositions rather, notes taken by ourselves, and you can no more dip up the substance of reality with them than you can dip up water with a net, however finely meshed. [...] whereas in the real concrete sensible flux of life experiences compenetrate each other so that it is not easy to know just what is excluded and what not. Past and future, for example, conceptually separated by the cut to which we give the name of present, and defined as being the opposite sides of that cut, are to some extent, however brief, co-present with each other throughout experience. The literally present moment is a purely verbal supposition, not a position; the only present ever realized concretely being

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the 'passing moment' in which the dying rearward of time and its dawning future forever mix their lights. Say 'now' and it was even while you say it.558

This last sentence really highlights how every moment, every reality, therefore, is essentially always past, or always "historical." Yet of course also true to instrumentalism in pragmatism, every moment is focused on the future as well, because logically that is what we live towards—we understand backwards and live forward, to paraphrase again Kierkegaard's useful and applicable referenced notion here. We can most certainly envision a dialogue here, therefore, as Ortega also uses the terms "concrete" to refer to experience, and he also promotes the idea that the "present" is not just the "now" but also the past and the future; "[...] la vida es puntual, es un punto: el presente, que contiene todo nuestro pasado y todo nuestro porvenir."559 Ortega often said that we have to 'decide what we are going to do with our lives and be in our lives in every moment' ("[...] tenemos que decidir lo que vamos a ser [...] A esto llamo <llevarse a sí mismo en vilo, sostener el propio ser>"), so there is also always this sense of the present as "going-to-be;" a very pragmatist concept explored in both James and Dewey. 560 Hence why life is history, not nature, because it is always in a flux between past, present, and future (as the present can also be considered the present-becoming-the-past-focused-on-the-future, what we have of course for study and identity is the past; what we have been and done; what we have experienced).561

558 Ibid., p. 111.
559 Ortega, Metafísica, p. 45.
561 Rodríguez Huescar offers further support here in his analyses on Ortega, even applying the use of the term "pragmatic;" "In other words, the primordial reality of "things" is to be characterized as a being-for, as the
So Ortega's metaphysics can dialogue with James's "radical empiricism." As aforementioned, James's "radical empiricism" is very pragmatist in the sense that in order to ponder and/or understand something, it must be experienced. As we have seen, in James's philosophy, life, and all that we contemplate and comprehend in life, is gained through experience. Experiences are constant. Life is, thus, experience. As needs to be repeated, therefore, to support this imaginary dialogue, Ortega says this as well that life is the experience of life; "[…] resulta que la vida es constitutivamente experiencia de la vida." "Experience" for James, as we saw is also the case for Dewey, is "anti-dualistic," as his metaphysics of radical empiricism was anti-dualistic as a whole. In other words, again experience and life are separate but united; life is defined by our experiences, and life brings us our experiences, so while they are two different parts, one, nonetheless, cannot exist without the other, as one vision

serviceable, pragmatic being they execute as they instance or urge us [to do this or that]" (p. 86). From his book José Ortega y Gasset's Metaphysical Innovation: A Critique and Overcoming of Idealism.

This "being-for" of Ortega means that things 'are not in and of themselves,' rather they 'are' for us; they 'are' in how they form part of our circumstances, and in how they 'serve' us or permit us to move or maneuver within reality. So even if things can have a reality in and of themsevles, they are real or truthful for us when they have this practical, and anti-dualistic relation that has been defended throughout here.

562 "To be radical, an empiricism must neither admit into its constructions any element that is not directly experienced, nor exclude from them any element that is directly experienced. For such a philosophy, the relations that connect experiences must themselves be experienced relations, and any kind of relation experienced must be accounted as 'real' as anything else in the system" (James, Essays, pp. 487-490).

563 Ortega, Historia, p. 43. Could this quote of Ortega's arguably be a sentence out of pragmatist theory (perhaps, since pragmatism was developed prior to Ortega's work)? For this thesis's purpose, this will be left as such as a quandary only.

564 Dewey wrote, "[…] experience is what James called a double-barelled word. Like its congers, life and history, it includes what men do and suffer, what they strive for, love, believe, endure, and also how men act and are acted upon, the ways in which they do and suffer, desire and enjoy, see, believe, imagine—in short, processes of experiencing" (Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 8).

And as Wilshire defines James's anti-dualistic metaphysics of radical empiricism, "Key phenomenal characteristics constitute both the world known and the knower. Any distinction between the two amounts only to different arrangements of phenomena, different interdigitating contexts of the same phenomenal characteristics" (Stuhr, 100 Years of Pragmatism, p. 100).
and example of this anti-dualism. This is indeed the case for pragmatism, but again is this also true for Ortega? Can we apply this pragmatist idea to Ortega? Again what we can imagine is that if he were to converse with James on this, he would likely agree if we were to swap the term "history" for "experience." And in the other direction, James would likely respond in agreement considering that there is history inherent in the basic, fundamental concept of experience, as has been reiterated here.

So as we shall again continue to see in great depth, since experience accumulates in the process of defining our lives, this implies essentially history, so life is most fundamentally history, and, therefore, what we primarily are is our histories. Again experience, or history, and life, are anti-dualistic along pragmatist lines. As Wilshire argues in support of this, "James (and John Dewey as well) knew that we should not use atomic, or "single-barreled," terms such as experience, percept, concept, but rather dynamic "double-barreled" ones, for example, experiencing-experienced, perceiving-perceived, conceiving-conceived."565 We have an experience in the present (i.e., experiencing), which we then use and apply in the future (from that 'present' moment) to reflect on, so therefore it becomes the past (i.e., experienced) as one possible way of looking at this.566 To reiterate: what is generally known, therefore, is 'experienciable.' And experiences add to one another, constantly layering on top of one another, to provide us with our general knowledge, realities, and identities. This emphasis on the addition of experiences to other experiences has of course again, logically, an inherently historical nature to it, as it in part refers to the 'past'.

565 Stuhr, 100 Years of Pragmatism, p. 99. From his chapter titled "William James's Pragmatism: A Distinctly Mixed Bag."

566 "There must be at least two major dimensions of "consciousness": the momentary experiencing and the recur-able experienced-recur-able perhaps only in memory or anticipation" (Stuhr, 100 Years of Pragmatism, pp. 98-99).
In a sense there are two stages in the process of experience per James's thought; first there is "pure experience," which is sheer, raw sensation, and then next there is our conscious awareness of that experience (a bit like how Dewey similarly labeled "primary" and "secondary" experience, respectively). In *Essays in Radical Empiricism* James provides the simple example of a pen to illustrate this, and how there is the physical nature of something ("So far as in that world it is a stable feature, holds ink, marks paper and obeys the guidance of a hand, it is a physical pen") and its personal relation to us ("coming and going with the movements of my eyes, altering with what I call my fancy, continuous with subsequent experiences of its ‘having been’ (in the past tense), it is the perpect of a pen in my mind. Those peculiarities are what we mean by being ‘conscious,’ in a pen"). Meaning, this is how something can be both subjective and objective simultaneously, and in regards to how we gain our conscious awareness and knowledge about this.567 Further, he refers to Kierkegaard's view here again that "We live forward but we understand backward"—and hence once again the emphasis on history in all this.

In fact, in his book *Principles of Psychology, Volume One*, James provides a very illustrative example of the importance of our history of our experiences in shaping who we are and our lives, when he discusses the case of when, for one reason or another, one loses their memory, they become in part a 'new person,' logically.568 The following excerpt helps illustrate his conclusion on why this is so important:

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568 This James says in the following excerpt: "If a man wakes up some fine day unable to recall any of his past experiences, so that he has to learn his biography afresh, or if he only recalls the facts of it in a cold abstract way as things that he is sure once happened; or if, without this loss of memory, his bodily and spiritual habits all change during the night, each organ giving a different tone, and the act of thought becoming aware of itself in a different way; he feels, he says, that he is a changed person. He disowns his former me, gives himself a new name, identifies his present life with nothing from out of the older time" (James, *Principles*, pp. 5237-5238).
This succession of feelings, which I call my memory of the past, is that by which I distinguish my Self. Myself is the person who had that series of feelings, and I know nothing of myself, by direct knowledge, except that I had them. But there is a bond of some sort among all the parts of the series, which makes me say that they were feelings of a person who was the same person throughout [according to us this is their ‘warmth’ and resemblance to the ‘central spiritual self’ now actually felt] and a different person from those who had any of the parallel successions of feelings; and this bond, to me, constitutes my Ego.  

In this excerpt we see a very clear dependence on history determining 'who we are,' as he says that we cannot know anything about ourselves other than that we have had experiences; other than the memories of our pasts. And specifically perhaps what we find in James here is a psychological theory that my Self; myself, "experiences experiences," which in each individual are bonded, perhaps organized together in unique "Egos;" as in a sense our 'personal history books.'

As Jacques Barzun supports, "[...] the radical empiricist logically regards history as the crystallized remains of experience." And he continues that in a "radical-empiricist theory of history," "The spectacle of the past is inevitably a reflection of the quasi chaos of experience itself." So again clearly we can imagine a pragmatist dialogue with Ortega's dictum that what man has is history, as additional scholars here support the argument for some historicism in the pragmatism of James's philosophy.

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569 Ibid, pp. 5576-5581.

570 BARZUN, Jacques: A Stroll with William James, p. 124. (Subsequently referred to as: Stroll.)

571 Ibid., p. 125.
Ortega argued, "Yo no soy más que un ingrediente de mi vida: el otro es la circunstancia o mundo."  This can maybe dialogue in part with the following quote of James that "Every bit of us at every moment is part and parcel of a wider self." And James adds here a functionalist aspect in that the future plays an important role in defining our selves; since this is a continuous process, life is, therefore, also future-oriented; "[...] it quivers along various radii like the wind-rose on a compass, and the actual in it is continuously one with possibles not yet in our present sight." As has been discussed, in James's pragmatism, his fundamental concept of "experience" is open to the future; it is not just in relation to the past or the present, it is about the constant continuum of them all.

In this line we live prospectively as well as retrospectively. It [life] is ‘of’ the past, inasmuch as it comes expressly as the past’s continuation; it is ‘of’ the future in so far as the future, when it comes, will have continued it. These relations of continuous transition experienced are what make our experiences cognitive.

This is what his pragmatism is all about; "I described pragmatism as holding that the meaning of any proposition can always be brought down to some particular consequence in our future practical experience [...]." As was noted to be also applicable to Dewey, Pragmatism is "instrumental" and 'functionalist' in part because we use what we study from the past and present toward the future. Pragmatism is perhaps more a method than an "ism" to study the practical

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572 Ortega, Metafísica, p. 78.
573 Quoted in: Stuhr, 100 Years of Pragmatism, p. 125.
574 Ibid., p. 125.
575 James, Essays, pp. 834-836.
576 William James, Meaning of Truth, p. 1640.
results and applications of things; of the repercussions of our experiences, as in how what happened in the past affects our presents and how it will continue to affect our futures.

Ortega's view on life is future-oriented in this sense as well (despite his great emphasis on the past), as demonstrated in this excerpt from Unas lecciones de metafísica quoted also in the section on Dewey in which he elaborates extensively on his concept of "yo soy yo y mi circunstancia;"

\[\ldots\] si nuestra vida consiste en decidir lo que vamos a ser, quiere decirse, que en la raíz misma de nuestra vida hay un atributo temporal: decidir lo que vamos a ser, por tanto, el futuro. \[\ldots\] que nuestra vida es ante todo toparse con el futuro. No es el presente o el pasado lo primero que vivimos, no: la vida es una actividad que se ejecuta hacia adelante, y el presente o el pasado se descubre después, en relación con el futuro.\[^{577}\]

Life is a future-oriented project, therefore, in part, for Ortega. So again there is most certainly here an overlapping dialogue that can be envisioned between James and Ortega (as was also the case between Dewey and Ortega); both thinkers indeed emphasize the element of future-orientation in life and its' focus. This possible dialogue Graham also explicitly suggests, arguing that for Ortega,

\[\ldots\] that one's reality is "life" as "self and circumstance". That was his basic "pocketbook" metaphysics—his constant vade mecum. In fact, for the most part, that formula had rested first on James's "radical empiricism," which became Ortega's "absolute [later, radical] positivism" after 1916.\[^{578}\]

\[^{577}\text{Ortega, Metafísica, pp. 42-43.}\]

\[^{578}\text{Graham, Pragmatist Philosophy, p. 43.}\]
And he adds the further suggestion that Ortega,

[...] had developed his vitalist, dual metaphysical basis of Jamesian "radical empiricism" into two branches, first an existentialism and then a historicism that he then still closely linked as "vital and historical reason." All together, they constituted his general philosophy of life."579

As Graham continues to argue this connection to Ortega, "James's invitation to a philosophy of life experience based on a radical empiricism as a pluralist unity and using a pragmatic method—as a practical, functional "living reason"—was going to greatly attract and influence young Ortega."580 Further, Graham explicitly presents the possible argument that "The parallels between "radical empiricism" and "radical positivism" [the term Graham uses to describe Ortega's thought] represented the most basic part of their philosophies, and here they were almost identical."581 So Ortega's basic metaphysics on how "life" is "self and world" (vida es yo y circunstancia) can again possibly converse with James's "radical empiricism" because as Graham argues in support of this proposition, Ortega's "metaphysics was mainly a version of James's realist "radical empiricism." Such a pragmatist metaphysics, formulated in phenomenological terms, supported his well-known formula: 'self and circumstance'."582

Again it must be noted, however, that Graham perhaps gives much too much importance and weight to a direct influence of James on Ortega. Nonetheless, Graham's studies must be

579 Ibid., p. 318. Again, it must be noted that Graham's propositions go much further than the intentions of this paper, but they serve to lend support for the argument to imagine a dialogue here at the very least.

580 Ibid., p. 179.

581 Ibid., p. 162.

582 Ibid., p. 144.
noted here as they, at the very least, lend support to the ability to imagine a possible dialogue between James and Ortega, as he is another scholar who has clearly envisioned this. Moreover, his insistence on connecting a relationship between Ortega's *yo y las circunstancias* with radical empiricism helps strengthen the possible anti-dualist interpretation that we are developing here as a possible imaginary dialogue between Ortega and James, which is a central part of the discussion here.

In one instance James describes what he terms "pure experience" of life as follows, dividing this up into two parts in his example of a "room-experience": "One of them is the reader’s personal biography, the other is the history of the house of which the room is part." So the fundamental idea here is that, just as with Ortega, there is always some sort of interaction with our surroundings, even if it is just "*I am sitting in a room,*" or "being in a room" as again a good example here, in fact interestingly enough used by both philosophers. Ortega uses this metaphor frequently. As developed in the dialogue explored between Dewey and Ortega, the "*I*" and the "sitting in a room" are separate but united essentially, antidualistically it was argued, as "*yo*" and "circumstance" respectively. When we are sitting in a room, the "*I*" and the "room" are the two separate elements, but it is not just "*I*" and "room" alone; it is also "*I am in the room.*"

Continuing with this metaphor, in the following excerpt we can clearly find a dialogue with James in how Ortega's notions of a "*yo*" mixing with "circumstances," and specifically in regards to histories, together make up our present and the potential of our future, thereby defining *us*. James wrote, "In the reader’s personal history the room occupies a single date—he saw it only once perhaps, a year ago. Of the house’s history, on the other hand, it forms a

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permanent ingredient." In this example, in reading this literally, the person being in a room once upon a time means that there was one specific point along the continuum (i.e., personal history) of that person's life in which they were in that room; one specific date and time. The room will also always have recorded that moment in its continuum of having had that person in its surroundings. The same can be said for the house, as the room is part of the house. But why does James say that in the case of the house it forms a 'permanent' ingredient? Perhaps because he is referring to how the room is part of the "self" of the house, not the circumstances of the house; the person being momentarily in the room of the house is a circumstance, but the room is part of the structure of the house, and as such it is an integral separate but connected interdependently part of the house (i.e., anti-dualism). Circumstances, on the other hand—continuing to purposely use Ortega's term here—are permanent marks upon our continuums of life, but they may change so they are separate in this sense from our selves (yoes) since a circumstance may come and go. This is of course just one proposal of how to interpret James's thought here with the goal to specifically apply it to a possible dialogue with Ortega. This is likely not exactly how James saw it, but it is possibly an interpretation that he would dialogue on; that he might respond is perhaps another way to envision this, as Ortega would. Thus these points along the continuum are examples of "circumstances" in Ortega's application of the concept. Moreover, the sum of all this is history, and as James would arguably say here, of the house's history, or the person's history. To summarize here: history is also the product of self and circumstance.

584 Ibid, pp. 278-279.
This of course Ortega would likely converse in agreement because for him again we are our selves, and we are our selves in the "room" or any part of the manifestation of "world;" "life is a dialogue with our surroundings," he also says.

La circunstancia—en el caso presente y preciso: esta habitación—, es la otra parte de mi vida. Era un error decir que yo—parte de mi vida—formo parte de la otra parte de mi vida que es la habitación. No; formo parte del todo que es mi vida, la cual es un todo precisamente porque yo soy [una] parte distinta de la otra parte que es la habitación. Así decía yo en la segunda lección: <<Nuestra vida, según esto, no es sólo nuestra persona, sino que de ella forma parte nuestro mundo: ella—nuestra vida—consiste en que la persona se ocupa de las cosas o con ellas, y, evidentemente, lo que nuestra vida sea depende tanto de lo que sea nuestra persona como de lo que sea nuestro mundo.585

In James's description, he references personal biography and history of the 'circumstance' (in this case, the house of which the room is a part), and again this can certainly dialogue with Ortega's dictum that "man has no nature, only history," as both pieces in James's theory on defining life emphasize history (and in this particular case directly, which is not all that common to find in James's work); specifically, the sole history of an individual, combined with the history of their surroundings. To summarize: James's general idea of "life" is as experience, so there is a dialogue that can created between the two in both the idea of us being ourselves and our

585 Ortega, _Metafísica_, p. 78. Furthermore, as quoted previously in the section on Dewey, Ortega posited that, "La vida es, esencialmente, un diálogo con el contorno; lo es en sus funciones fisiológicas más sencillas como en sus funciones psíquicas más sublimes. Vivir es convivir, y el otro que con nosotros convive es el mundo en derredor. No entendemos, pues, un acto vital, cualquiera que él sea, si no lo ponemos en conexión con el contorno hacia el cual se dirige, en función del cual ha nacido" (Ortega, _Obras Completas III_, p. 291.)
circumstances, and this is all most dependent on our histories. Further, together our *selves* and our circumstances form and continually shape our histories, as this all exists along a continuum.

As we shall continue to see at length, the basic formula here is that life is experience, and experience is in part history. And when looking at the 'experiences' of two individuals, for example, James argues, "My experiences and your experiences are 'with' each other in various external ways, but mine pass into mine, and yours pass into yours and a way in which yours and mine never pass into one another." Once again this indeed also sounds like something which could possibly 'converse' with Ortega's "self and circumstance." As used in one example metaphor in the section on Dewey (and for this reason will just be tersely stated here to avoid too much repetition), two individuals may jump into a lake and create ripples in which many, but not all, overlap with each other—such is a person's life or "radical reality," in Ortega's term, as there is our self/the individual jumping (*yo*), and that person's circumstances/the ripples (*circumstancia*). And James writes, "In the same act by which I feel that this passing minute is a new pulse of my life, I feel that the old life continues into it, and the feeling of continuance in no wise jars upon the simultaneous feeling of a novelty. They, too, compenetre harmoniously." In the aforementioned metaphor, the ripples extend over time; they are historical, they "compenetre harmoniously," and they are all connected to the initial ripple (in an effort here to create a dialogue between the two philosophers). Graham goes even farther to argue more than

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just an envisioned dialogue that "Radical reality was life, self and circumstance, mutually "positing," "presenting" themselves "absolutely," an idea originally from James."\(^{588}\)

As has been presented, there are many envisionable points of dialogue that can be established between Ortega's concept of "yo soy yo y mi circunstancia" and James's concept of life and experience in radical empiricism. As the extensive footnote that follows illustrates from James's *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, "life" for him as well is most fundamentally defined as 'ourselves within our circumstances,' and we can maneuver, but only among the circumstances that happen to surround us (i.e., again 'limited freedom'). And therefore what makes us unique is how we choose and which we choose to maneuver among, giving us each a unique perspective—something that most certainly resonates, as has been seen, with Ortega (and as we shall see is also a significant part of the imagined dialogue in the third and final section of this dissertation with the European pragmatist Ferdinand Schiller).

The individualized self, which I believe to be the only thing properly called self, is a part of the content of the world experienced.... The body is the storm centre, the origin of co-ordinates, the constant place of stress in all that experience-train. Everything circles round it, and is felt from its point of view. The word "I," then, is primarily a noun of position, just like "this" and "here." Activities attached to "this" position have prerogative emphasis, and, if activities have feelings, must be felt in a peculiar way. The word "my" designates the kind of emphasis. I see no inconsistency whatever in defending, on the one hand, "my" activities as unique and opposed to those of outer nature, and, on the other hand, in affirming, after introspection, that they consist in movements in the head. The

"my" of them is the emphasis, the feeling of perspective interest in which they are dyed.\(^{589}\)

Here James first states that "the individualized self" is "the only thing properly called self"—this arguably resonates with Ortega's aforementioned idea of each man searching for his authentic self and his genuine vocation, so surely the two would have an interesting conversation on this. Then he proceeds to conjecture that this is "part of the content of the world experienced," which can possibly resound as a point of further discussion with the "circumstances" that Ortega refers to. He ensues to declare essentially "perspectivism" as in that dominant precept of this in Ortega's philosophy, as "everything" "is felt from its point of view."\(^{590}\)

So here again James and Ortega, as Dewey, recognize that while there are ways in which we can be similar, there is also a unique individuality within each of us. Ortega wrote that we each have to live "una cierta vida," or a "certain life," and as he says here, a strictly determined life; "Nótese, una cierta vida. No una vida cualquiera, sino, por el contrario, una vida estrictamente determinada."\(^{591}\) And as we saw, for Ortega life is the constant struggle to realize and make real that unique individual; that strictly determined self within the wider world. He further writes, "La vida es constitutivamente una drama, porque es siempre la lucha frenética por conseguir ser de hecho el que somos en proyecto [...] Pero la vida no es sólo nuestro <<yo>>,

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\(^{589}\) Quoted in: Stuhr, *100 Years of Pragmatism*, p. 101.

\(^{590}\) And as cited earlier that Jose Medina explains in regards to James, this is arguably scarely different from Ortega, "[...] according to James's pluralism, there is an irreducibility plurality of different epistemic perspectives, and different epistemic perspectives are likely to yield different truths" (Ibid, p. 134).

sino que es también el mundo en que ese yo tiene que realizarse.\textsuperscript{592} And this unique individuality is manifested in part in our "point of view," or "perspective," as we saw in the previous excerpt from James, and which as has been discussed at great length is a very central part of Ortega's thought.\textsuperscript{593}

Again we "narrate life from a point of view," for Ortega, all narrations of which are essentially equally valid, and the only falsity is to say that one is absolutely valid, or absolutely invalid. As Gonzalez argued, "Since Ortega’s early thought treats human life as the starting point of philosophy, reality is not seen as absolute, but rather as that which depends on individual perspective given that, as he writes, “every life is a point of view directed upon the universe.”\textsuperscript{594}

But this should still all be understood anti-dualistically; hence the objective to re-read Ortega here from a pragmatist perspective. Per Ortega's philosophy, essentially all is derived from our unique perspectives; "Ortega takes it as a fact" explains Mora, "that individual perspective is the only way of seizing reality and, therefore, of formulating universal truths."\textsuperscript{595} So as Graham proposes, Ortega developed his own type of "instrumentalist perspectivism," that was arguably both pragmatist and phenomenological, in that through a sort of 'trial and error' we use the tangible pieces of reality and assumed truths available to us via our individual perspectives for

\textsuperscript{592} Ibid., pp. 156-157.

\textsuperscript{593} This is demonstrated in the following aforementioned excerpt of his; "El punto de visita individual me parece el único punto de vista desde el cual puede mirarse el mundo en su verdad. Otra cosa es arteficio. [...] cada hombre tiene una misión de verdad. Dónde están mi pupila no está otra: lo que de la realidad ve mi pupila no lo ve otra. Somos insustituibles, somos necesarios. [...] la realidad, pues, se ofrece en perspectivas individuales" (Ortega, \textit{Obras Completas II}, pp. 18-19). To summarize: again, every individual has and is a perspective. A perspective can never be true or false. Life is perspective. Every reality, therefore, has infinite perspectives, each of which is neither true or false, and the only fallacy is to say that one is absolute.

\textsuperscript{594} Gonzalez, \textit{Ortega y Gasset's Philosophy of Subjectivity}, pp. 535-537.

\textsuperscript{595} Mora, \textit{Spanish Philosophers}, p. 149.
our general comprehension of ourselves and all that surrounds us, and life, reality, truth, etcetera.\textsuperscript{596}

Again as we saw was the case for Dewey, James also would likely converse with Ortega on the idea of our lives, our histories, being on a continuum; "Within each of our personal histories, subject, object, interest and purpose are continuous or may be continuous. Perhaps personal histories are processes of change in time, and the change itself is one of the things immediately experienced."\textsuperscript{597} To repeat the basic pragmatist tenet applicable to both Dewey and James: life is made up of experiences, had over time; therefore, again life is very much defined by the history of those experiences. Stated in another instance, James cites the following from Spencer, "[...] the human brain is an organized register of infinitely-numerous experiences received during the evolution of life, or rather during the evolution of that series of organisms through which the human organism has been reached."\textsuperscript{598} So, life is the continuous accumulation of experiences that are both individual and social/group-based. And he adds another excerpt from Spencer, clearly emphasizing the important role of essentially history, though he uses the term "bequeathed" in defining our lives (and which is of course again the main part of the dialogue we are trying to create here); "The effects of the most uniform and frequent of these experiences have been successfully bequeathed."\textsuperscript{599} Logically of course bequeathed refers to inheritance, which of course implies "history." So again here we find an emphasis on history as the

\textsuperscript{596} See Graham, \textit{Pragmatist Philosophy}, p.177.

\textsuperscript{597} McDermott, \textit{The Writings of William James}, pp. 197-198.

\textsuperscript{598} Ibid, p. 80.

\textsuperscript{599} Ibid, p. 80.
Our selves are our pasts (or our histories); "This succession of feelings, which I call my memory of the past, is that by which I distinguish my Self." This is perhaps one of the clearest examples of James expressing something similar to Ortega's dominant notion in his philosophy that we have history (not nature); that we are our histories. The 'self' is important as it is the source of "narration" or "story" of past experiences, as well as restitution and restoration of the continuity of experience—hence again life here, too, being a "drama," as with Ortega. This gives our "existence," as Ortega affirms, "un gesto terriblemente dramático."

Graham proposes directly (again, more than is meant to be done here in this dissertation) that Ortega's philosophy on "self and circumstance," not to mention dictum that man is his history, therefore, was likely influenced by this radical empiricism of James developed prior;

Now this conception of human self and world of things—thus initially compounded in one experiencing and experienced reality as human life—is very like what Ortega began to call "self and circumstance" (yo y circunstancia) in 1913 and later justified as the "radical unitary duality" comprising our "life" reality. He had distinguished those elements since 1910, but he had not brought them intimately together until after James's Essays in Radical Empiricism appeared posthumously in 1912.

With so much overlap of these specific historicist ideas between the two pragmatist thinkers Dewey and James, it is no wonder that there are increasingly more scholars arguing for more historicism in this philosophical movement.

James, Principles, pp. 5576-5577.

Ortega, Metafísica, p. 39.

Graham, Pragmatist Philosophy, p. 182.
As we know Ortega uniformly declares that 'man only has history.' James uses the term "life-history" on several occasions. In one example he defines "life-history" as such: "The world is full of partial stories that run parallel to one another, beginning and ending at odd times. They mutually interlace and interfere at points, but we cannot unify them completely in our minds." Again this sounds very much like Ortega's "self and circumstance." Life, therefore, is a continuous series of experiences that constantly continue defining our histories. Given this constant flux, essentially, this is yet another reason we cannot fully separate always our selves from our circumstances. Life is plastic for both Ortega and James. "El hombre no es natural, no tiene naturaleza, no está adscrito a un ser fijo, es... infinito en posibilidades." and, "To a certain degree, therefore, everything here is plastic," is respectively argued by philosophers Ortega and James. As aforementioned Ortega also declared directly; "El hombre es una entidad infinitamente plástica de la que se puede hacer lo que se quiera" as an example to coincide with James's words just referenced.

This, perhaps, is also part of the reason why life carries with it the various synonyms in Ortega and James's works such as "drama" or "náufrago" because given its constant state of flux and plasticity, we can just momentarily, and perhaps only partially, comprehend certain aspects, but overall this is for the most part out of our reach of complete understanding. As Lasaga Medina proposes,


Ortega usa el término <<drama>> porque además del sentido ya apuntado, le sirve de metáfora para precisar que vivir es actuar en un mundo-escenario que no se elige; eso da a nuestra vida su peculiar carácter de inseguridad y naufragio. La respuesta es el esfuerzo y afán por vivir que se manifiesta en la necesidad de reacionar; interpretando la circunstancia. La vida concreta es posible porque la circunstancia no es pura dificultad, sino un tejido de soluciones y problemas.607

James describes life in one instance as "always off its balance."608 Ortega writes that our "radical substance" of life is "insecurity;" hence our being in a sense 'shipwrecked' in his metaphor because life is about always having to decide what we are going to be, and what we are going to do. Ortega declared to one of his classes,

El ser del hombre es lo que éste suele llamar su vida. Somos nuestra vida. Ahora bien, la vida de cada cual consiste, por lo pronto, en que se encuentra teniendo que existir en una circunstancia, contorno, mundo o como quieran ustedes llamarlo. Esa circunstancia o mundo en que, queramos o no, tenemos que vivir no podemos elegirlo nosotros, sino que, sin nuestra anuencia previa y sin saber cómo nos encontramos disparados sobre él, arrojados a ál, náufragos en él y para sostenernos en él y vivir no tenemos más remedio que hacer siempre also, que salir nadando.609

As Graham suggests directly,

607 Ibid., p. 21.
608 McDermott, The Writings of William James, p. 294.
609 Ortega, Metafísica, p. 91. As quoted again for reference, Gray argued that Dewey and James were influences in this, "Life, he was wont to say, comes at us "point blank," demanding immediate response. In this, Ortega was closer to William James and John Dewey than to Plato, Leibniz, or Kant" (Gray, Imperative of Modernity, p.144).
he defined life in a very Jamesian way: this strange, neglected reality was not a thing, neither physical nor psychic, but was a dramatic "happening." Of itself, life has "structure" that consists in "connections," not just individual and concrete but also general and formal [...].

Ortega argued that man has no nature, only history, but that history is also of a "becoming," so it is the past, present, and future together in what makes up one's own "history." Again Graham argues that this was inspired from James, "In Ortega's conception, historical reason is subordinate to life, and the intermediate form of "living reason," in which he expressed it as most clearly subject to life, from 1933 to 1937, was directly out of James's Pragmatism." Here with both philosophers, as was also the case with Dewey, therefore, there is in a sense a double meaning of history in that it is both individual and social.

So again, most fundamentally, life is history. William James wrote, "A living being must always contain within itself the history, not merely of its own existence, but of all its ancestors." For James, a partial reason for why we can affirm that we are our histories is because it is our memories which define our selves, as previously cited; "This succession of feelings, which I call my memory of the past, is that by which I distinguish my Self. Myself is the person who had that series of feelings, and I know nothing of myself, by direct knowledge, except that I had them." Perhaps his emphasis on memories results from the focus on

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610 Graham, Pragmatist Philosophy, p. 350.
611 Ibid., p. 350.
612 MYERS, Gerald E.: William James: His Life and Thought, p. 36. (Subsequently referred to as: William James.) Gerald Myers is Professor of Philosophy at Queens College and the Graduate Center, City University of New York.
613 James, Principles, pp. 5576-5578.
experience being central in our realities, knowledge, "truths," because they are some of the results of our experiences. So as we can see in this excerpt, and as Myers argues, James,

[...] linked personal identity with preservation of memory. [...] The self is this a momentary phase in the stream of consciousness, the same as earlier ones not because they are numerically identical —they are not— but because essentially the same set of memories attaches to both.\textsuperscript{614}

In other words, we remember our past selves, and we anticipate our future selves, as Myers adds, which at any given time is what defines our selves and our personal identities, as a specific part of our streams of consciousness. Here again of course we also find a very functionalist, pragmatist nature in James's philosophy, and which was also applicable in this specific sense to Dewey. But given also this great reliance on the future and practical aspect of the nature of the self, this was also the "ultimate mystery" for James; the 'who am I' and the 'what am I.'\textsuperscript{615} And this for Ortega would perhaps dialogue more smoothly with James than with Dewey because as we saw the former emphasized more so this illusive, mystifying, mysterious characteristic of life.

Hence the imaginable dialogue between Ortega and James, as with Dewey, that what we can at least in part study and perhaps know is our history, but we cannot be certain of our nature—but we can say that our nature is our history, relatively safely.\textsuperscript{616} Again the means to

\textsuperscript{614} Myers, \textit{William James}, p. 363.

\textsuperscript{615} Myers, \textit{William James}, p. 369.

\textsuperscript{616} And as quoted on numerous occasions here, this we know is central to Ortega's thought; "El hombre, señores, no tiene naturaleza sino que tiene historia. La historia es el modo de ser un ente radicalmente variable y sin identidad" (Ortega, \textit{Obras Completas IX}, p. 557).
understanding life is through understanding history, as Graham argues, "Understanding of life contributes to history, just as historical understanding adds to philosophy of life," because life is history."\(^{617}\) Again, man's nature, therefore, really is his history.

In summary, how does James's radical empiricism and notion of life dialogue with Ortega and thereby provide some new ways of looking at his philosophy on life? When using James's philosophy to place a pragmatist lens over Ortega's meditations on life, the result we find in what we can imagine is how the two would dialogue is that life is anti-dualistic in that life is history, not nature—just as Ortega argued, then adding—because history is our nature. The two exist interdependently. Moreover, while our life is shaped by the past, we live toward the future, in the pragmatist instrumentalist sense. And to further summarize the key points of this section, life is the experience of life. Life exists along a continuum—this is key in James's radical empiricism; this continuous process of "pure experience." And a time continuum implies that there is role of history. Again as we have seen life is what we experience it to be in James's radical empiricism. Moreover it is "radical" because this continuum has to be understood anti-dualistically; that at every moment there are points along that continuum moving from future to present to past continually, but while they are separate they all exist together in one continuum linked interdependently. This is defining life in every moment uniquely in its combination for each individual. Further, there are individual and social elements present at each moment in that continuum that define our lives; life is our selves and our circumstances. This concept by itself really is best understood anti-dualistically; the self and the circumstances that at all moments define an individual's life exist separately but they cannot exist alone; it is an anti-dualistic, interdependent relation. This combination in sum is individual for each person, even though

some components may overlap with others. And this is all filtered through individual perspectives, bringing in further uniqueness to our lives. Although we cannot choose all our circumstances, we can choose how we react to them, so life has limited freedom. This limited freedom adds to making life "dramatic."

This has been only a concise summary of some of the key points of this sub-section in which Ortega and James would likely converse. And as we shall continue to see in the section that follows, these are also some of the reasons that we cannot say that there is one strict, absolute sense of "nature" for each of us, in any sense, definition, or application of the term—or if there were to be, we cannot get to it—because there are many elements interacting at any given time resulting in unique combinations and resultant perspectives.
V. Nature

For Ortega, as we know, man has no nature, he only has history. Tersely summarized as a basic conclusion for the following section on the topic of "nature," as elaborated in the essay on Dewey as well, while Ortega directly states at times that a human being does not have nature (rather what he or she has, and is, is his or her history), what is being developed here is that again—all philosophers, in fact, explored here—are not really denying, per se, that there is a nature, in any sense of the term. Rather, what Ortega especially is arguing is that 'history' is much more important, influential, etcetera, and in fact also contains our nature, which is why again we can instead posit that fundamental in this is that our nature is our history. So again the dialogue here is to dictate this anti-dualistically; we are our histories because our histories contain our natures, which is also precisely another area where we can create a pragmatist dialogue, in this part's case here with William James.

As we know a fundamental characteristic of Ortega's philosophy is that reality, life, etcetera, are not static concepts, they are ever changing. This is part, in a sense, of what is "radical" in Ortega's view on life, reality; everything is a "becoming." Man is essentially a becoming because he is making himself. "No digamos, pues, que el hombre es, sino que

618 As Lasaga Medina was quoted previously as arguing, "Que el hombre no tenga naturaleza, no significa que no tenga una identidad suficiente como para poder ser pensada de acuerdo a las capacidades lógicas de la razón humana (no hay otras), sino que esa identidad es histórica, lo que significa que tiene que ser comprendida <<al paso>> o mientras pasa, viniendo de algo y yendo hacia algo: como genesis y proyecto” (Lasaga Medina, Ortega: Vida y Filosofía, p. 151). As aforementioned, Ortega directly said, "lo único que el hombre tiene de ser, de <<naturaleza>>, es lo que ha sido” (Ortega, Historia, p. 46).

619 See: Graham, Pragmatist Philosophy, p. 274.

620 Ibid., p. 278.
Hence, again life is comprised of this series of events, experiences, etcetera, along the path of our constant "becoming;" "life is experience of life." In arguably a pragmatist fashion, for Ortega man makes himself in his experiences, which we can also posit is part of Ortega's reason for not studying and applying any kind of "nature" in all this since experience is a continuous, incessant process that changes in both type and interpretation. The specific notion that "life is experience of life" is quite fundamental in pragmatist philosophy, and also directly stated by Ortega. Of course, this is a very general concept not unique to only pragmatism, but for the sake of this essay's argument, it is just another piece of the basic dialogue being envisioned here between the pragmatist William James, and José Ortega y Gasset, as was also the case with Dewey and Ortega. Graham argues that,

Since Dilthey, observed Ortega, we know that "man has no nature," but a history of "variations" instead, for his "being" is becoming. "Man, who is not, goes on making himself in the dialectical series of his experiences." Therefore, because of his historicity, "the only thing we can know of man is what he has been." "The past constrains the future." "For that reason, the science of the past, properly understood, is the only science of the future in the very precise sense in which a science of the future is possible. [...] This new reason was "historical reason," which was also a "living reason" that was subject to life. In Ortega's conception, historical reason is subordinate to life, and the

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621 Ortega, Historia, p. 46.

622 As cited on various occasions, Ortega writes, "[...] <<experiencia de la vida>> Es ésta un conocimiento de lo que hemos sido que la memoria nos conserva y que encontramos siempre acumulado en nuestro hoy, en nuestra actualidad o realidad. [...] resulta que la vida es constitutivamente experiencia de la vida" (Ibid., p. 43).
intermediate form of "living reason," in which he expressed as most clearly subject to life, from 1933 to 1937, was directly out of James's *Pragmatism*.\(^{623}\)

As we shall continue to see, one reason for Graham's argument for the influence of James in Ortega's view that an individual's nature is essentially in a constant state of becoming is because of how James saw nature as essentially plastic as well. This is applied to any reading of nature, whether it be a genetic one, or a philosophical one of characteristics and identities, or just generally one referring to any notion of innate characteristics, features, or essences. This James also wrote (1907) prior to Ortega's first publication (1914). This is exemplified well in the following excerpt:

> The general 'uniformity of nature' is presupposed by every lesser law. But nature may be only approximately uniform; and persons in whom knowledge of the world's past has bred pessimism (or doubts as to the world's good character, which become certainties if that character be supposed eternally fixed) may naturally welcome free-will as a MELIORISTIC doctrine.\(^{624}\)

Arguably James was not entirely on the "nature" side of the argument in reference to the genetic interpretation of the term, given that he saw nature and nurture as functioning antidualistically, as the latter reinforces the former—as summarized was the case with Dewey, we could say in this specific sense that both essentially argue that "nurture nurtures nature." James wrote,


\(^{624}\) James, *Pragmatism*, p. 65.
If we look at an animal or a human being, distinguished from the rest of his kind by the possession of some extraordinary peculiarity, good or bad, we shall be able to discriminate between the causes which originally produced the peculiarity in him and the causes that maintained it after it is produced; and we shall see, if the peculiarity be one that he was born with, that these two sets of causes belong to two such irrelevant cycles. It was the triumphant originality of Darwin to see this, and to act accordingly.625

By essentially calling the "nurture" and "environing conditions" "irrelevant cycles" in shaping a person and their behavior, this makes James sound quite like he is leaning on the side of "nature," at least in the case of genetics and biology. But again he is not strictly on this side of the argument, as he adds later in the article, as quoted earlier, that the individual and social elements are both important.626 Further, he continues, "To conclude: The evolutionary view of history, when it denies the vital importance of individual initiative, is, then, an utterly vague and unscientific conception."627

In the next excerpt, James appears to be arguing that, again, we cannot really know any kind of nature: "[...] nature is but a name for excess; every point in her opens out and runs into the more; and the only question, with reference to any point we may be considering, is how far into the rest of nature we may have to go in order to get entirely beyond its overflow."628 In other

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625 James, "Great Men, Great Thoughts, and the Environment."

626 As quoted, "Thus social evolution is a resultant of the interaction of two wholly distinct factors, —the individual, deriving his peculiar gifts from the play of physiological and infra-social forces, but bearing all the power of initiative and origination in his hands; and, second, the social environment, with its power of adopting or rejecting both him and his gifts. Both factors are essential to change. The community stagnates without the impulse of the individual. The impulse dies away without the sympathy of the community" (Ibid).

627 Ibid.

628 McDermott, The Writings of William James, p. 295.
words, it is as if we are constantly trying to 'chase down' a meaning of nature, but that journey seems and appears endless.

As González explains in reference to Ortega, supporting this fundamental concept here as well that "nurture nurtures nature;" "[...] a distinction is made between the two forms of life: biological and biographical, where man partakes in the former by way of the latter." So we can at best contemplate any notion of nature through our experience with it, or via our 'biographies,' but not directly, for the experience is a necessary part. Again the concept of anti-dualism is present here because the idea is that experience and nature, in any sense of the term, are separate concepts, but one cannot exist without the other as experiences are constantly shaping our natures. We may not be able to actually fully get to our natures in terms of our genetics, biology, characteristics, essences, identities, etcetera, but we can at least propose here that our nature is defined by our experiences; that our experiences are our natures since our experiences are what are constantly defining who we are, and our lives as we saw in the previous sub-section - so experiences and natures coexist anti-dualistically. And it must be reminded here that the proposal is to consider "experiences" and "history" as synonymous.

By bringing back in the argument again that "nurture nurtures nature," when pondering the genetic and biological application of the term, we are not only emphasizing the greater importance and role of "nurture" in a human being's behavior, actions, and human events in general, but we are also fundamentally reiterating what Ortega argued that "man has no nature, only history," while adding the key point that "because nature is his history." Or, we could also say that "man has no nature, only nurture, because nurture interacts anti-dualistically with

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629 González, Ortega y Gasset's Philosophy of Subjectivity, pp. 461-462.
nature." Nature and nurture in the traditional argument referencing genetics, therefore, coexist interdependently as anti-dualistic phenomena dialoguing here with William James's pragmatism, as it did with John Dewey. This coexistence can be applied to any interpretation of the concept of "nature." "Nurture" implies interaction with the environment, or "experience," and indeed over the course of life we accumulate experiences, thereby forming our own individual "histories," of "experiences." But to clarify, it is our "natures," whether it be genetic, biological, essences, characteristics, identities—in all application of the term—that interact with our environments and form, shape, and define our experiences. Hence why we must say 'nurture nurtures nature' (in any type of nature). And hence the following example that James gives in the same article,

The same parents, living in the same environing conditions, may at one birth produce a genius, at the next an idiot or a monster. The visible external conditions are therefore not direct determinants of this cycle; and the more we consider the matter, the more we are forced to believe that two children of the same parents are made to differ from each other by causes as disproportionate to their ultimate effects.630

Here we see how he is not denying the existence of a nature, especially in the scientific sense of the term, but clearly the idea is to emphasize the concept that one's environment (or circumstance to use Ortega's term) reinforces one's nature. Perhaps the idea of James is that there are simply so many variables involved in shaping a person, their actions, and human events in general that there is no one overarching, determining factor—because two children of the same parents, for instance, can be very different (which can be a result of the environment, a distinct mix of genes, age and therefore time period, etcetera, just to cite a few possible factors—

630 James, "Great Men, Great Thoughts, and the Environment." This excerpt is also found in James's The Will to Believe, p. 196.
humanity, human behavior and characteristics, is all simply quite complex). Moreover, as we saw, he denied the evolutionary view, at least as a sole method, in history, humanity, and human development, characteristics, and behavior.631

Hence also Ortega's view of radical reality and life as "myself and my circumstance," because the experiences that come with anti-dualistic parts in that formula are both individual and collective. Meaning, "history" implies something unique and social. As he explains, "Pero la experiencia de la vida no se compone sólo de las experiencias que yo personalmente he hecho, de mi pasado. Va integrada también por el pasado de los antepasados que la sociedad en que vivo me transmite."

Again these excerpts of Ortega's that contain the term "experience" are important and therefore at times need to be repeated for this essay's purposes of imagining a pragmatist dialogue since "experience" is so key in its methodology. Moreover, the implication is also that there are many factors involved in shaping and influencing one's 'experience of life' that are individual, social, etcetera, but again all of which can fall under the broader notion of "history." We just saw that James declared "A living being must always contain within itself the history, not merely of its own existence, but of all its ancestors," so not only are there elements that we inherit of course, but there is also an overlay of inheritance within our experiences and how we experience our experiences—again in this there is a dialogue to be imagined between Ortega and James here in this historicist emphasis as well.633

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631 "To conclude: The evolutionary view of history, when it denies the vital importance of individual initiative, is, then, an utterly vague and unscientific conception [...]" (James, "Great Men, Great Thoughts, and the Environment," paragraph 41).

632 Ortega, Historia, p. 44.

633 Again the reference is from A Will to Believe.
part by those who came before us. This can be manifested in culture, for example. Arguably there is at least some influence in this. So as has been examined, perspective is historical for Ortega, and experience is historical as well, at least in part.634

After grasping that 'what man has is his history rather than his nature, because history contains our nature,' we can then continue in Ortega's philosophical steps toward his razón histórica as the means to better studying and comprehending our radical reality which is our life, our existence. He writes, also here not denying the existence of a nature, "[...] la naturaleza es sólo una dimensión de la vida humana, y el glorioso éxito con respecto a ella no excluye su fracaso con respecto a la totalidad de nuestra existencia."635 To repeat: despite his maxim that "man has no nature, only history," he really is not completely denying that man or woman has a nature, instead he is emphasizing in part how less important it is than has traditionally been believed. And again this is in part because we are in, we live in, a state of becoming; man isn't, man lives. As has been discussed at length, we are free to choose within the many, but limited, circumstances that surround us; "Ser libre quiere decir carecer de identidad constitutiva."636

634 And this can further relate to Ortega's notions of beliefs that we saw in the first section on Dewey and how they are handed down and ingrained in us (until brought to the surface and questioned of course). In other words, the previous beliefs that were shaped by past experiences continue to live forward into the next generations (but again only until moments of crisis and question), further influencing how experiences are experienced. So this is an example of what Ortega might have been referring to in the aforementioned quote when he says that experience of life is not just our own experience of experience, but also that of those in our societies who came before us and handed down their experiences and how they experienced their experiences; their and our perspectives. In other words, our experiences are interwoven with those of the people in our societies and cultures who came before us. A "belief" is just an one example of what is handed down. While James may not explicitly reference 'beliefs' in the quote previously cited, we can hypothesize that he would dialogue with Ortega on this.

635 Ortega, Historia, p. 23.

636 Ibid., p. 39.
Again, "man is an infinitely plastic entity that is constantly always faced with limited possibilities."\(^{637}\)

In *Historia como sistema*, Ortega elaborates on the history of the study and development of the term "nature," citing, for example, how its connection to science has been strengthened over the previous centuries, and then more recent to Ortega's day in particular by the revolutionary discoveries of Albert Einstein. Ortega discusses how science, physics, etcetera, really cannot add anything to a study, analysis, and understanding of humanity; "Resulta que sobre los grandes cambios humanos, la ciencia propiamente tal no tiene nada preciso que decir" because, simply stated, there is not much "scientific" in the study of humanity and our complexities in regards to emotions, behaviors, etcetera.\(^{638}\) Again we can connect the theme here of perspective, and the notion that science is yet another "perspective," but not one that yields much in the study of humanity and human emotions, conduct, etcetera. This most certainly dialogues with James's comment that (and which is a topic we will look at in the second section of this part two), "It is folly, then, to speak of the "laws of history" as of something inevitable, which science has only to discover, and whose consequences any one can then foretell but do nothing to alter or avert. Why, the very laws of physics are conditional, and deal with *ifs*."\(^{639}\) This is because, arguably, history is humanity and the study of humanity.

Since the Enlightenment, and especially through the 19th century, it had been a dominant belief that most objective truths and reality were mathematically demonstrated. Ortega argued

\(^{637}\) As has been quoted, "El hombre es una entidad infinitamente plástica de la que se puede hacer lo que se quiera. [...] En cada instante se abren ante él posibilidades limitadas" (Ibid., pp. 39-40).

\(^{638}\) Ibid., p. 22.

\(^{639}\) James, "Great Men, Great Thoughts, and the Environment", paragraph 40.
that this cannot be so; that human character, human emotions, behavior, to cite a few examples, cannot be mathematically expressed. As Ortega continues, "Lo humano se escapa a la razón físico-matemática como el agua por una canastilla. [...] que el hombre no es una cosa, que es falso hablar de la naturaleza humana, que el hombre no tiene naturaleza."640 This is another reason why Ortega argues that man has no nature, because this in part implies science, biology, and physics in the genetic connotation of the term, or in the more open philosophical and traditional sense of the term something with an analyzable structure that can be studied—none of which is true for humankind, as we are far more complex. But again this does not mean he denies explicitly and completely its existence, as the thesis here is that he is more so re-defining it to be within history. So in other words, any kind of "nature" can really only be studied via historical reason (razón histórica for Ortega), not the natural sciences, because per Ortega what man has is history, not nature—but as argued here, the addition is because history contains our nature. None of this is to say that there is no science or no human nature, just that the former cannot really be fully used to explain the latter. And for the same reason, we should not speak solely of an "evolutionary" type of historical study (or a genetic, biological notion of nature, we can deduce), as James argues in the following excerpt as another point of potential dialogue with Ortega;

To conclude: The evolutionary view of history, when it denies the vital importance of individual initiative, is, then, an utterly vague and unscientific conception, a lapse from modern scientific determinism into the most ancient oriental fatalism. The lesson of the analysis that we have made (even on the completely deterministic hypothesis with which we started) forms an appeal of the most stimulating sort to the energy of the individual.

Even the dogged resistance of the reactionary conservative to changes which he cannot

640 Ortega, Historia, p. 27.
hope entirely to defeat is justified and shown to be effective. He retards the movement; deflects it a little by the concessions he extracts; gives it a resultant momentum, compounded of his inertia and his adversaries' speed; and keeps up, in short, a constant lateral pressure, which, to be sure, never heads it round about, but brings it up at last at a goal far to the right or left of that to which it would have drifted had he allowed it to drift alone.\textsuperscript{641}

So arguably James, as Ortega, does not deny that there is a "nature" for humans of sorts. Rather this, like with the "truth" and other metaphysical concepts, is also something that is revealed to us (though not completely) over the course of experiences. For instance, in the case above James emphasizes the need for "individual initiative" or motivation. We need the past, or history, to lead us to our (partial) understandings of nature. But as with the truth, the continued process of experiences can reveal to us different natures, and perhaps at times falsify previous interpretations and ideas of nature, so we generally cannot refer to any concepts of nature as absolute and objective. However, we can study what we have thought it is, and therefore gain insight as to our views on nature, how they have changed, how they have remained the same, and what that means for us. As James defines it,

Nature exhibits only changes, which habitually coincide with one another so that their habits are describable in simple 'laws.' There is no original spirituality of materiality of being, intuitively discerned, then; but only a translocation of experiences from one world

\textsuperscript{641} James, "Great Men, Great Thoughts, and the Environment", paragraph 41.
to another; a grouping of them with one set or another of associates for definitely practical or intellectual ends.\(^{642}\)

So again here we have the position that what we can know about nature is *what we think it is, but not necessarily what it is*. And we can use this for "practical" and "intellectual" ends. What we think nature is, is in part dependent on history; it is in part dependent on the varying understandings and definitions that we have of it over time. "Nature" has history as well, therefore (the idea of "nature" has changed over time, just as science has brought new definitions and discoveries, for example)—this is why really what we have, for Ortega, is history not nature. As James might add in this imaginary dialogue, we experience these changes; we experience these changing interpretations of nature as they proceed along a temporal continuum. This again is further instance of how nature is really historical, which then Ortega might continue the conversation to propose yet again that this is why we have history, not nature. None of this denies, per se, that a nature of some sort exists in humans and is something real, but rather the idea is that we may not be able to know for sure what it is—*but again what we can know, nevertheless, is what we think it is*.

As has been quoted, Ortega defines nature in one instance as a "transitory interpretation," and although Ortega may be speaking of nature more generally, we can assume that this applies to human nature as well, given this, too, is in a sense 'transitory' (because they are temporal) as it is a narration that we build and construct with the details and specifics of our experiences that we

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have been exposed to in the past or that we are exposed to in the present. And as Skrupskelis succinctly explains, this same dialogue occurs in reference to James,

[...] in the nature of things there are no essential properties. Every reality has an infinity of properties, James argues, and any one of them can be seen as essential in the light of some interest. [...] He writes: "There is no property ABSOLUTELY essential to any one thing." The same property which figures as the essence of the thing on one occasion becomes a very inessential feature upon another." Thus common sense—and much of philosophy—is wrong in thinking that every thing has an essence which makes it just the thing it is. As a matter of fact, the "essence of a thing is that one of its properties which is so important for my interests that in comparison with it I may neglect the rest ... The properties which are important vary from man to man and from hour to hour."  

Part of what we can gain in understanding about what we have thought or think nature is depends on 'interest.' (The topic of "interest" is key in pragmatism, as we saw was the case with Dewey as well.) So nature is our understanding of nature (based in part on our interests) and thus they change, vary over time (at times from hour to hour even, as cited above). Not only, therefore, are our interests different, but even for each individual their own interests can change and shift over time. "Interest" is key here for more than just nature, but rather really all that we direct our focus and perspective to in general. And there is a key sense of individuality here playing an important role as well. This is also important in the process of creating our beliefs in

643 "La naturaleza es una interpretación transitoria que el hombre ha dado a lo que encuentra frente a sí en su vida" (Ortega, Historia, p. 36).

644 SKRUPSKELIS, Ignas K.: "Evolution and Pragmatism: An Unpublished Letter of William James" in Transactions of the Charles S. Pierce Society, Vol. 43, No. 4., pp. 748-749. (Subsequently referred to as: Evolution and Pragmatism.) Skrupskelis is Professor of Philosophy from the University of South Carolina.
Ortega's thought, which in turn helps shape our realities and definitions of nature. As Malishev and González support,

[...] no es difícil ver cierta semejanza entre la posición filosófica de Ortega y el pragmatismo. Tanto para el pensador español como para los pragmatistas el ser independiente de la realidad objetiva, las cosas en sí mismas presentan interés sólo porque el sujeto cognoscente y práctico las capta, y las comprende, pues el sentido primordial del conocimiento del mundo es saber qué puede y qué debe hacer el sujeto con ellos.645

And as an example of this directly from Ortega, he affirmed, that in regards to the world and all that surrounds us, key indeed are our interests; "Lo importante no es que las cosas sean o no cuerpos sino que nos afectan, nos interesan [...]."646

Once more we have the idea that perhaps part of what we should study, therefore, are the changes in our "interests" (as well as in interpretations and ideas on nature) toward nature, rather than the definitions and concepts of nature in and of themselves. As the general trend that has been elaborated at great length here in various specific examples, perhaps our changing views and perspectives tell us more; they provide us more knowledge in general than the specific details themselves. Hence Ortega's emphasis on perspectivism. As we have seen, James talked about how the changes themselves are experienced/experiences, as well, so surely the two would converse on this. The dialogue here between the two American pragmatist thinkers and Ortega

645 MALISHEV, Mijail Malishev and HERRERA GONZÁLEZ, Julián: "José Ortega y Gasset: La Metafísica Existencial de la Vida" in Eidos, No. 12, p. 225 These two authors are from the Universidad Autónoma del Estado de México.

646 Ortega, Metafísica, p. 38.
(as this was also explored in the section on Dewey), therefore, is that what we can say is that nature is the history of changing ideas and definitions of nature that we have had (but not those ideas and definitions in and of themselves necessarily, with absolute certainty). Although as we have seen Ortega does not always appear to be instrumentalist, the pragmatist explanation on interests permits us to read and interpret in a new, profound way Ortega's position and his subjectivism-perspectivism in relation to the polemic here of the concept of nature. Therefore, we cannot really say for sure what nature is, we can just say what we think it is, or have thought it was (as with the other metaphysical topics we have visited, not to mention of course also history and its meaning), and this is certainly very pragmatist at its' core, which is why we saw this to also be true for Dewey and therefore needed to be revisited here in the imaginary dialogue with James.

As Cerezo Galán elaborated in reference to Ortega's thought on this;

Si el hombre tuviese una naturaleza, un ser fijo como lo tienen el mineral, el vegetal, y el animal, podríamos saber de una vez para siempre lo que significaban sus comportamientos; pero como no hay tal, el hombre en cada época pone su vida a finalidades diferentes más o menos nuevas, finalidades que él mismo ha inventado y que son la convención o supuesto tácito de sus actuaciones y ocupaciones.647

Perhaps if we insert "interests" for "finalidades" we then resultantly further insert the pragmatist perspective into this interpretation of Ortega. The pragmatist reliance on interests really is logical, considering that this is part of our subjectivism (which this Ortega would likely converse on) because individual interests add to guiding our lives, behaviors, decisions, events,

647Galán, La voluntad de aventura, p. 306.
studies, etcetera. In other words, again, we cannot deny completely that there is a "human nature," but again we certainly cannot speak of it in an absolute or definitive sense. This specific potential dialogue with pragmatism is also directly proposed by Graham as a possible interpretation;

How like Ortega's later famous "denial" of human "nature" is the following observation by James about such static "absolutes": "There is no other nature, no other whatness than this absence of break and this sense of continuity in that most intimate of all conjunctive relations, the passing of one experience into another when they belong to the same self." "Practically to experience one's personal continuum in this living way" is so similar to what Ortega later meant by claiming that history is man's only "nature," or that he has no nature but only a history.\footnote{648 Graham, \textit{Pragmatist Philosophy}, p. 182.}

This quote is clearly key in defending this thesis's main objective to create a dialogue between three pragmatist thinkers and Ortega in an effort to better understand his maxim that man has no nature, only history.

As also discussed in the section on Dewey, it is important to remember how there were times Ortega recognized, in a specific way, nonetheless, that there are aspects of human nature that are fixed, and that he had some degree of predilection for the "biological and genetic" in this application of the term "nature," which at first glance seems contradictory (and here the goal of this study is to clarify this and how it was not).\footnote{649 To quote again Ferrater Mora's suggestion, hence,"Ortega has often shown a predilection for biological science [...] He has thus even seemed prone to consider 'life' from the point of view of biological impulse [...] It is beyond doubt, however, that he would not accept a biological interpretation of knowledge, however difficult it proves to lay
provides the example of the same parents giving birth to two very different children in the same environing conditions also demonstrates a belief in the existence of a "human nature," even if we cannot necessarily understand or pinpoint the concept. So this quote of James also is seemingly contradictory at first, but essentially expresses the same idea that, again, man does have some sort of nature, though any notions of nature are really contained within his history, which more appropriately phrased means that again history is our nature, because history contains our nature. Again we fix this "apparent" contradiction and polemic by declaring "what man has is history because history contains his nature," thereby not denying nature's existence, just re-defining it. As Graham suggests in connecting this dialogue between Ortega and James,

In 1951 he again asserted publicly that "man has no nature" but history and "variation" instead: no "fixed being" but "pure mobility" -- "always under way." His unusual position was not as radical, pure, or absolute as it sounded, however, for he recognized some fixed traits in human behavior.650

In the following excerpt from James's *Principles of Psychology* he writes overtly that we can only guess at the nature of one's self, and that this must remain an open question;

At present, then, the only conclusion I come to is the following: That (in some persons at least) the part of the innermost Self which is most vividly felt turns out to consist for the most part of a collection of cephalic movements of ‘adjustments’ which, for want of attention and reflection, usually fail to be perceived and classed as what they are; that

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over and above these there is an obscurer feeling of something more; but whether it be of
fainter physiological processes, or of nothing objective at all, but rather of subjectivity as
such, of thought become ‘its own object,’ must at present remain an open question,—like
the question whether it be an indivisible active soul-substance, or the question whether it
be a personification of the pronoun I, or any other of the guesses as to what its nature
may be.651

Part of the reason why James denies being able to know our "natures" is because in his
philosophy, everything "knowable" is "experienceable." We need to consciously perceive to have
experiences and therefore to exist, essentially. But again, our perceptions vary, in part because
our experiences vary. As he posits, "When my perceptions are removed for any time, as by sound
sleep, so long am I insensible of myself, and may truly be said not to exist."652 And not
everything in "nature" is tangible, experiencable, and knowable. Furthermore, again not
everything in "nature" can be mathematically measured and understood, such as human emotions
and behavior. For the psychologist side of James, it was important to be flexible to a certain
extent of course with the study of humanity, such as with human emotion and behavior. But as a
psychologist it was also important to try to at least find some trends or try to find something
somewhat 'scientific' in humanity.

In this respect we can imagine that Ortega might respond with the following: "El hombre,
señores, no tiene naturaleza sino que tiene historia. La historia es el modo de ser un ente
radicalmente variable y sin identidad. [...] Al hombre no se le puede identificar. Es un Arsenio

651 James, Principles, pp. 4760-4762.
652 Ibid., pp. 5485-5486.
Furthermore, the aforementioned quote from James (which has been placed in the footnote below for quick reference) that we saw resonates with the metaphor of the ripples in water from two (or more) stones being tossed in, each ripple being an experience, arguably dialogues with Ortega's notion of "I am myself and my circumstances." This is because both ideas insinuate that there is a nature of sorts (the "myself," or the experiencer/rock, and/or the experience/ripple in and of itself), though we may not be able to truly get to it or understand it, or the ways in which we are each unique. And yet there are still also the ways in which we are similar from overlapping circumstances (or "ripples," such as in family, the historical time period we are born into, etc.). This again is further evidence as to how we can imagine a pragmatist dialogue in Ortega's work, having seen this prior in the additional example of Dewey. As Graham supports here as well,

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653 Ortega, Obras Completas IX, p. 557. So again the argument here is that Ortega did not really deny that there was a nature for human beings, but rather he emphasized that it depends more so on history, so this is not closed or fixed; "El hombre no es natural, no tiene naturaleza, no está adscrito a un ser fijo, es... infinito en posibilidades" (Ortega, Interpretación, p. 257). After all, Ortega did emphasize that we are each "yo y mi circunstancia," as has been discussed at length. Further, as discussed, Graham supports this plausible dialogue here on nature in history, as clear in the following excerpt in which he addresses this directly, suggesting, "How like Ortega's later famous "denial" of human "nature" is the following observation by James about such static "absolutes": "There is no other nature, no other whatness than this absence of break and this sense of continuity in that most intimate of all conjunctive relations, the passing of one experience into another when they belong to the same self." "Practically to experience one's personal continuum in this living way" is so similar to what Ortega later meant by claiming that history is man's only "nature," or that he has no nature but only a history" (Graham, Pragmatist Philosophy, p. 182). Some of the writing before and after the aforementioned excerpt cited by Graham about nature being man's history needs to be included here to further illustrate this dialogue that can be created between the two on how what we can understand is our history, but not at its core our nature; we can just understand what we think it is.

654 The quote from James is as follows: "My experiences and your experiences are 'with' each other in various external ways, but mine pass into mine, and yours pass into yours in a way in which yours and mine never pass into one another" (McDermott, The Writings of William James, p. 197).
In discussing the "thing" and its relations, James described the world of living experience as "fluent," flowing, a "flux" or stream, until it is broken into discrete parts by the analytical, reflective intellect. "The great [original] continua of time, space, and the self envelop everything, betwixt them, and flow together without interfering." They "compenstrate." Now this conception of human self and world of things—thus initially compounded in one experiencing and experienced reality as human life—is very like what Ortega began to call "self and circumstance" (yo y circunstancia) in 1913 and later justified as the "radical unitary duality" comprising our "life" reality. He had distinguished those elements since 1910, but he had not brought them intimately together until after James's Essays in Radical Empiricism appeared posthumously in 1912. 655

And as James continues with the previously cited excerpt, which is what Graham refers to in regards to the flow of experience,

Within each of our personal histories, subject, object, interest and purpose are continuous or may be continuous. Personal histories are processes of change in time, and the change itself is one of the things immediately experienced. 'Change' in this case means continuous as opposed to discontinuous transition. [...] Continuity here is a definite sort of experience; just as definite as is the discontinuity-experience which I find it impossible to avoid when I see to make the transition from an experience of my own to one of yours. 656

Here we find an emphasis on "personal history" for James, as well as on change, as that is

655 Graham, Pragmatist Philosophy, p. 182.

656 McDermott, The Writings of William James, pp. 197-198.
what we can perceive and try to understand. In other words, a dialogue can be envisioned here in that for both James and Ortega, what should be emphasized is our personal history—hence, personal, meaning unique rather than generally applied to all—as that is what we can each potentially analyze, study, and begin to understand, becoming therefore really what our "nature" is (since again that, in and of itself, we cannot fully reach, we can only study what we think it is and has been). This is *perspectivism*, again, because our understandings, as in this case of nature, are funneled through our perspectives and therefore have individuality. And finally James posited that, as noted in an earlier quote from Graham,

> There is no other *nature*, no other whatness than this absence of break and this sense of continuity in that most intimate of all conjunctive relations, the passing of one experience into another when they belong to the same self. And this whatness is real empirical 'content,' just as the whatness of separation and discontinuity is real content in the contrasted cases.  

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The passing of one experience into another, or history, as James says, has "empirical content," so this is what can be at least studied. Because as he writes in what follows, he denies that we can be certain of either environmental conditions (nurture) or genetics (nature, in the traditional, standard sense of the term), because, we can add here, it is really both accumulated in the general term of "history." Perhaps in a sense this is overcomplicating the matter in that he is denying both nature (genetics, birth) and nurture (environing conditions)—especially denying that we would be able to get any notion of either, more so than their actual existence—to *really* say that *they are both possible* (just not directly tangible). In other words, since "experience is what we experience it to be," it can be experienced and interpreted based on genetic factors, or

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657 Ibid., p. 198.
by circumstances in the environment, so it is neither because we cannot say for sure that it is
definitely one or the other. By being neither it can also, arguably, really be both here. For James
then, arguably there is no other nature other than the passing of experiences over time for an
individual; there essentially is no other nature than history. Hence again the further dialogue here
that can be imagined between James and Ortega.

This conception of "nature" for both thinkers helps explain why they can both deny a
purely genetic explanation for behavior (in looking at the term specifically from this biological
and scientific point of view), for example, but while still recognizing that this is a factor, to a
certain degree, albeit not an entirely deterministic or directly causational one, as was also argued
in the dialogue between Ortega and Dewey. James writes that

[...] 1) That taking the word experience as it is universally understood, the experience of
the race can no more account for our necessary or a priori judgments than the experience
of the individual can; 2) That there is no good evidence for the belief that our instinctive
reactions are fruits of our ancestors' education in the midst of the same environment,
transmitted to us at birth.\textsuperscript{658}

So as he continues, fundamentally what we can know is what we think we know, albeit
talking about nature, the environment, circumstances, reality, truth, or history;

For in the first place, if a feeling do not mirror the reality which wakens it and to which
we say it corresponds, if it mirror no reality whatever outside of the mind, it of course is a
purely mental product. By its very definition it can be nothing else. But in the second

\textsuperscript{658} Ibid., p. 75.
place, even if it *do* mirror the reality exactly, still it *is* not that reality itself, it is a duplication of it, the result of a mental reaction.\(^{659}\)

In other words, here James appears to be arguing that mental reaction is what we can know, for example in this case in comparison to reality (or any other metaphysical topic essentially). Again we cannot know for sure what reality is, but we can know what our mental reaction to and of reality is. We must add here again the point of possible dialogue that there is a history of our mental reactions accumulated upon a continuum that we are constantly experiencing, so our mental reactions as James refers to them are historical.

So once more "history," therefore, becomes a convenient term to use here to clarify this "denying to accept" in James since it can imply all these terms of experience, circumstances, nature, etcetera. And it is also the better, more all-encompassing term for Ortega, as supported by Lasaga Medina,"[...] el pasado es siempre el límite absoluto de lo que el hombre puede llegar a ser en el futuro. Ahora bien, su naturaleza humana (biológica y psicológica) pertenece a ese pasado: la Naturaleza es el pasado absoluto de la Historia, algo que el hombre no puede cambiar."\(^{660}\) So again, we can see how we can argue that man has no nature, only history, because history is our nature, as it is such a broad term that it includes all that characterizes all definitions and conceptions of nature; ancestry, local history, genes, to name just a few.

\(^{659}\) Ibid., p. 75.
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VI. Unitary Duality

As we have seen, one succinct way to summarize Ortega's meditations on life is to consider it a "unitary duality" in that there are two, dual parts; "self" and "circumstance," which are united as "one" in each individual. In other words, the self cannot be separated from the circumstances that surround the self, as they dynamically interact and are inextricably interdependent though there are two separate entities. Again one's "circumstances" are the specific set of circumstances for that "yo" (self). This can potentially dialogue with pragmatism in that an individual's specific set of circumstances arguably in part define one's interests, which was aforementioned to be key in James's pragmatism. This is what defines "my life" per Ortega's thought, and this, which is "self and circumstance," is what constitutes "reality." Graham proposes the possible argument that,

"The unity of Ortega's philosophy would be lost, if it were simply a developing "one-two" sequence of "stages" that are not finally a "unitary duality" of self and circumstance as basic life-reality and also of vital reason and historical reason as a "philosophy of life."

The textual context is both consistent with and pregnant with this meaning: "two in one.""

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Graham, Pragmatist Philosophy, p. 351. While this may at first seem to not place much emphasis on individuality, given that some circumstances of one individual can overlap with another, nevertheless, because not all can, and because the self, itself, is unique, there is still an individualism urged in this. This we saw was also applicable in the dialogue with Dewey as it is here in this imaginable conversation with James. Every life is the result of this dynamic interaction and interdependence of what is for each a unique set of self plus circumstances. Again this is Ortega's "perspectivism" in that this results in every self having a unique perspective. And again Ortega's perspectivism can arguably dialogue with James's emphasis on personal interests—these can add to shaping one's perspective of course. And as we shall see further ahead in more depth, this is what provides for each of us our unique truths as well, because truth is "perspectival" per Ortega, as it is formulated from the unique perspective of each individual—again, all of which are "true" in the sense that the only falsity is to say that any one perspective is exclusive or absolute. There is here too that idea seen in James to "deny to accept," as perspectives are not
This "self and circumstance" is anti-dualistic and is an individual "reality" resulting in unique perspectives. This dialogues with the same concept at the core of James's radical empiricism. As Graham proposes, quoting James at the end of this excerpt,

This plurality of "given" fact and individual viewpoints was at the heart of James's radical empiricism, as was later Husserl's *Ideen* (1913) and of Ortega's "absolute positivism" in 1916. James had expressed this insight rhapsodically. "There is no possible point of view from which the world can appear an absolutely single fact."^662

Again, however, it must be noted here that "radical positivism" is a term that only Graham created to describe and define Ortega's philosophy in this. But there not being one sole point of view is precisely what Ortega argues in his perspectivism, and therefore individuality pervades in his thought as well.^663 James was also known for his declaration of the power of the "promethean self," arguing that we are 'self-making,' another case in point for this imaginary dialogue here with Ortega. For both Ortega and James, ultimately we make our own worlds. As Graham further supports, as a possible argument here,

As the basis for knowing reality, James's metaphysics of "radical empiricism" was grounded in "fact" and "thing" and "experience of life" and "viewpoint" or "perspective" thereon, with basic relations and "connections" included. All of that was scarcely necessarily true nor false in a whole absolute sense, though they can be "true" for that individual, solely, or among more than one person.

^662 Ibid., p. 169. It is important to note here another arguable possible dialogue in the case of Husserl, as Graham argues, "Undoubtedly Ortega's "absolute positivism" reflected not only (primarily) James's concept of "radical empiricism" but also Husserl's methods" (Ibid., p. 205).

^663 Ortega said that the only falsity is to say that there is one absolute perspective; as quoted, "[...] la realidad, como un paisaje, tiene infinitas perspectivas, todas ellas igualmente verídicas y auténticas. La sola perspectiva falsa es esa que pretende ser la única" (Ortega, *Nuestro Tiempo*, p. 149).
different from Ortega's "radical positivism" in any significant respect. [...] Continuity with James is also true of Ortega's "dualism" (or "pluralism") balanced by "unity" [...].

There are some differences, however, in Ortega's emphasis on "circumstances" and James's emphasis on "experiences" in how they shape the ways in which we are simultaneously both personally unique and socially similar. But ultimately the key potential dialogue that can be created here is how both share an emphasis on the importance of perspective at the most fundamental level.

Experience we know is key for James, as it is constant and continually shapes our understanding of so much, including life, reality, and truth. Experience is the basic foundation of life; reality, truth, etcetera. As we know 'experience' in pragmatism is fundamental in all this, which again we can tersely summarize as the following: "experience is what we experience it to be." It is continuous, constantly revealing to us our realities, truth, and selves. Pronouncing that experience is the experience of the self with our circumstances can arguably dialogue with Ortega as this can be broadly understood to encompass again truth, reality, etcetera. In the article "What is Meant by Experience?" James provides further detail on what this term "experience" means for him, as quoted earlier, "Experience means experience of something foreign supposed to impress us, whether spontaneously or in consequence of our own exertions and acts. [...] experience moulds us at every hour, and makes of our minds a mirror of the time- and space-connections between the things in the world." In other words, again the main difference here in this imagined dialogue is that often James is using a broader term here, "experience," but we can posit nonetheless that the conversation would still flow smoothly if we were to insist that we

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665 McDermott, The Writings of William James, p. 76.
could interchange Ortega's use of his term "history" for James's "experience." This is because James's notion of 'experience' can arguably be exchanged with much of Ortega's philosophy, such as here with *yo soy yo y mi circunstancia* in that this is what we experience it to be (and this exchange we saw also arguably applied in the section on Dewey since it is a fundamental pragmatist concept). For Ortega, key is the *interaction* between the self and the circumstances; our *yo/self* is not just the circumstances that surround us, it is also the interaction specifically; that sort of 'in between,' which is a concept similar to James's emphasis on the importance of the transitions/changes between experiences being experiences in and of themselves as well.

For Ortega, "circumstance," while an integral part of our life, is not the only one, as there is also "myself" (*yo soy yo y mi circunstancia*). The formula here of Ortega's requires both in its definition of life and its radical reality. Circumstance is directly a part of our experience of life and reality, but not a literal direct part of our life and reality. In other words, there is "ourselves," and then there are the circumstances surrounding us that, while they impact and influence the experiences we have of our lives, realities, truths, etcetera, they are not direct, integral parts of our core selves. This is another area where "experience" again comes in for Ortega, because there are our "yoes" (our "selves") and our circumstances as separate phenomena, and then there is also the interaction between the two (again similar to James's more broad insistence on how the transitions between experiences are experiences as well in and of themselves; i.e., also here again anti-dualism). Hence, there is a difference here again between the experience and understanding of something, and that something in and of its core self; once more we must apply an anti-dualistic conception of this. "Yo vivo, y al vivir estoy en la circunstancia, la cual no soy yo. La realidad de mi yo es, pues, secundaria a la realidad integral que es mi vida; encuentro aquélla — la de mi yo— en ésta, en la realidad vital. Yo y la circunstancia formamos parte de mi vida,"
posited Ortega.\textsuperscript{666} This we could envision in a concise pragmatist dialogue as "life is what I experience it to be."

Ultimately the final conclusion reached by the two is that the world and our realities are malleable, and we are led to our own truths. Our "worlds" consist of a "unitary duality" in that, interpreted from a pragmatist, anti-dualist vision, this permits us to perhaps see more clearly how for Ortega we are ourselves and ourselves maneuvering through that which surrounds ourselves—this is the basic concluding dialogue that we can potentially envision here between James and Ortega. This "unitary duality" of our lives and their realities are individual and understood via our unique perspectives.

\textsuperscript{666} Ortega, \textit{Metafísica}, p.78.
VII. On Perspective

Ortega wrote at length on perspectivism, as was explored in the section on Dewey, since this was central to his philosophy. He declared that "Es la teoría general de mi filosofía: el perspectivismo. Pero no es el "punto de vista" en el sentido idealista, sino al revés: es que lo visto, la realidad, es también punto de vista." Most fundamentally, to reiterate, Ortega's perspectivism declares that reality is revealed in individual perspectives, and so each person has their own unique perspective, and therefore reality. Perspectives are diverse; they can be vital, social, to note just a couple examples, but ultimately, at any given moment our perspective in sum is unique and singular to each of us. Perspective, in part, is a distinct orientation and reaction to our situation; our "radical reality" of "yo y mi circunstancia" of any given time, so because circumstances can change, then our radical realities can change, and our perspectives therefore can change. But whatever that perspective be, it is inimitable to each one of us, as least as long as it is in orientation and use. Thus, we each can have multiple unique perspectives. Our perspectives are a component of our realities. None of these individual perspectives, and therefore realities, are correct or incorrect, they just are; each person is a point of view of a specific reality. This can arguably sound like James's pragmatist idea, exaggerated here to make a point, that 'we experience experience to be what we experience it to be.' Hence, for Ortega, again every 'reality' essentially can have an infinite number of perspectives because each individual has their own realities. So what we can know about reality is what we perceive it to be, what we experience it to be, but we cannot be certain about what it may be aside from this relationship/connection. To reiterate, there is what our perspective leads us to see reality as, and

667 Quoted in: Molinuevo, Leer Ortega, p. 120.
then there is what reality might really be, so what we can know is what our perspective leads us to see and believe (rather than reality in and of its self). And this, therefore, is also the way to understand reality; 'experience is what we experience it to be.' As Molinuevo explains,

La teoría de la perspectiva va unida ahora a estas tres palabras: espectador, vida, individuo. Dos afirmaciones complementarias articulan la perspectiva: la realidad se ofrece en perspectivas individuales y cada hombre es un punto de vista de la realidad. Por tanto, la perspectiva es el modo de ser de lo real y también el modo de conocerlo.668

Graham proposes the theory that this perspectivismo comes directly from James (though this of course is, for the moment, just an argument that has not been proven, but we can, nevertheless, propose this possible dialogue here for the purposes of this essay); "Despite his unfavorable comments on pragmatism from 1908 to 1916, Ortega had derived basic inspiration and some key ideas from James during those very years. Not the least of these was his "perspectivism," or epistemology of 'point of view'."669 Further, as Graham adds, "Most basically, his [Ortega's] phenomenology was "seeing" as "perspectivism" —an addition to the epistemological side of his Jamsian metaphysics, but also rooted in James."670

Indeed, there is a pragmatist dialogue that can be imagined here in regards to Ortega's perspectivism because pragmatism is inherently 'perspetivistic' as well (as in the case here of James), but without of course arguing for a direct causal relationship of influence. As Barzun explains in reference to James,

668 Ibid., p. 120.
669 Ibid., p. 151.
670 Graham, Pragmatist Philosophy, p. 207.
Purpose and point of view—perspectivism—inevitably shape our human truths. Familiar phrases record this necessity: "from this angle," "considering this aspect," "relatively to the norms of that time," "all other things being equal," and the like, show how difficult it is to tell the truth without specifying the perspective. The very change in the meaning of "point of view" to its present sense of "opinion" reminds us that true statements vary with the point of sight. When therefore the pragmatist says that his truth fits his purpose and may not fit others he is not claiming the privilege of being "subjective" or eccentric, he is only pointing to a condition of human thought. [...] The permanent real things for you are your individual persons.671

It is interesting here how Barzun describes James's philosophy specifically as "perspectivism." James's philosophy here is that "perspectivism" is not just "spacial" in terms of "point of view," it is also vital and gnoseological, as it is with Ortega as well. In other words, here we live directly in our perspectives because we live them in our experiences, which are simply, again, what we experience them to be. And as we shall see further ahead, this is arguably the same idea behind Ortega's historicism as well; that a historian provides a written account of a history from an individual perspective, and hence some of the frequently cited issues in historical accounts that they are subjective and therefore not able to bring in and apply all the possible perspectives at any one date and time, as we will see again in more detail ahead.672

671 Barzun, Stroll, p. 93.

672 This is a key concept to keep in mind throughout this dialogue; this anti-dualistic sense of individual perspective inextricably linked to the reality of there being an infinite set of possible perspectives, no one being absolute, which is why it must be repeated.
As has been discussed, in most writings James appears quite individualist. To a certain extent he is, but without denying *entirely* an important social aspect of life, as we have seen. James, however, did emphasize the important role of perspectives being unique in how they are our lens to life and understanding our lives and experiences in life. For James, not only do any two (or more) people not necessarily see the same object, but each individual might not see the same object the same way all the time. A good definition of this idea comes from the following excerpt from *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, in which James explains how there would be nothing to contemplate if all perspectives essentially were the same, and the same all the time;

In general terms, then, whatever differing contents our minds may eventually fill a place with, the place itself is a numerically identical content of the two minds, a piece of common property in which, through which, and over which they join. The receptacle of certain of our experiences being thus common, the experiences themselves might some day become common also. If that day ever did come, our thoughts would terminate in a complete empirical identity, there would be an end, so far as those experiences went, to our discussions about truth. No points of difference appearing, they would have to count as the same.\footnote{James, *Essays*, pp. 819-823.}

Perhaps James mentions, "if that day ever did come" not because he thinks it might, but rather to make a point about perspectives, and how they are ultimately different for each individual and funnel different views on realities and truths. So even if there were absolutes in these concepts, and that day were thus to come, it does not matter because they will always be sifted through different points of view that result in different interpretations (perhaps some may
overlap, but not all), so again we have here anti-dualism; there is what we think are such things as reality, truth, etcetera, and then there is what they really are, but we cannot know for sure when they coincide though they exist interdependently.

And this can certainly dialogue with Ortega's aforementioned view that "the will is real, but the willed cannot necessarily be proven real," because what we do know is what we see, but we cannot say for sure that whatever this vision may be is shared in the exact same way by all or even exactly the same always by the same person because again, “[…] la querencia es real, pero lo querido es irreal.”

Moreover, it is not even just about having experiences; this is not enough, we must also process them, remember them, and organize them, which 'how' also adds to our "unique perspectives" at any one time. Hence again why man is his history. And as was similarly applicable in the section on Dewey, to re-quote, Ortega proclaimed that man "[…] va acumulando ser —el pasado—: se va haciendo un ser en la dialéctica de sus experiencias. Esta dialéctica no es de la razón lógica, sino precisamente de la histórica […]" And hence again the use of the very pragmatist term of "experience" as very credible evidence of the ability to create a potential dialogue here. Our experiences are dialectical; 'dialectic' being in one sense 'the investigation and discussion of our thoughts on the truth, concepts, and metaphysics in general.'

So again the idea is that everything is offered to us in different and unique perspectives, such as reality, and this also applies to history, and our histories. This can help us understand

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674 Ortega, Meditaciones del Quijote, p. 226.

675 This connection to man being his history must be repeated throughout this paper since it is the central thesis being explored. (Ortega, Historia, p. 48).
further Ortega's maxim that we have history, and not nature, because we do not have something fixed; "No hay una persona única, como tampoco hay un paisaje único." Hence the importance of *perspectivismo* in understanding Ortega's historicist maxim, and why we have explored this here, envisioning a possible dialogue with James as one potential way (of many) to perhaps better understand Ortega's philosophy on historicism.

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\(^{676}\) 126.
VIII. Truth and Reality

In this imagined dialogue between Ortega and James, the concept of perspectivism also applies here as to how to possibly better understand the following concepts that will be explored here of truth and reality. Perhaps the most succinct statement one can make in regards to the pragmatist view on truth is to say that there are no "truths" in the strictest and most absolute sense, but rather there are only "approximations to" or "assertions of" the truth, as we saw with Dewey, who argued that there are only "warranted assertibilities." William James wrote,

Truth, as any dictionary will tell you, is a property of certain of our ideas. It means their 'agreement,' as falsity means their disagreement, with reality. Pragmatists and intellectuals both accept this definition as a matter of course. They begin to quarrel only after the question is raised as to what may precisely be meant by the term 'agreement,' and what by the term 'reality,' when reality is taken as something for our ideas to agree with.677

For the pragmatist such as James, again "experience" is key here. "Experience" corresponds with "consequences" in that they are somewhat interchangeable—experiences, and the consequences, speaking broadly, that they bring, construct in a sense our realities, which in turn bring into practice our beliefs—a topic that will be further explored ahead, but for the moment needs to be referenced here in this section on the concepts of truth and reality.

But as James notes, where philosophers might not coincide is in how "agreement" between experiences, or our histories, and reality, truth, is achieved and defined—but this can

677 McDermott, The Writings of William James, p. 429.
simply be possibly resolved by concluding that this is because our experiences, perspectives, and resulting consequences that we experience are different, individual, so of course there will not always necessarily be agreement. Hence again the element of individualism prevalent in these philosophical ideas as we have seen at length. For Ortega, as we shall explore further just a bit ahead, we also start different, rather than only having different end results. Moreover, there are differing ideas on when that "agreement" occurs, as for pragmatism it is with future experiences, whereas for empiricism and positivism, for example, this happens with past experiences. So perhaps this is a key point of disagreement; whether "agreement" comes more from the future or the past experience.

This idea of truth agreeing with an individual's reality, as opposed to the reality, dialogues with Ortega, as well as the idea that this also leads to individual truths, but not necessarily the truth(s). As supported by Abad Pascual,"Por lo tanto, el filósofo no puede permanecer en el acierto o verdad pretérita, ya que ésta, justamente por ser pretérita, es incompleta. Se le impone la obligación de reflexionar sobre ella a fin de intentar encontrar su propia verdad, a fin de encontrar su propio conocimiento." For Ortega, all reality is human and is therefore historical, because these individual perspectives, beliefs, truths, and realities are from a specific time, as one of the key historical factors in this. But as can be insinuated from this quote, if perspective, truths, etcetera, are temporal, again then why can this not be so in reference to the future as well as the past? As noted in this aforementioned quote, sometimes the study of the past can only bring us incomplete truths, for example, as they must be further corroborated in the future, for instance (which is quite pragmatist of course). Moreover, this still does not mean

678 ABAD PASCUAL, Juan J.: El método de la razón vital y su teoría en Ortega y Gasset, p. 126. José Juan Abad Pascual is a specialist on Ortega y Gasset and head of the Philosophy Department at CAP Madrid Centro.
that perspectives, truths, and realities are not historical, because in the future, that time will at some point become history, so we can also argue that the future is historical, or it is going to be historical at least (as well). But again the past is key because it is more tangible, and therefore easier to study, logically, and therefore in certain ways can yield more knowledge as a result. And ultimately for Ortega key in all this is how it stems from individual perspective, first and foremost, as a defining feature on notions of the truth, realities, etcetera. It must be reminded here that the past is not just a collection of dates and registered events, for example, as here the concept of "history" or "historical" is meant to convey many additional notions such as how it is really part of a continuum of past, present and future, or how it has and will have a characteristic of being a narrative. Moreover, by being "temporal," history and historical reason acquire new meanings as we incorporate new perspectives. So more safely summarized, razón histórica is razón narrativa. Thus as Abad Pascual continues later,

Nuestro autor, por el contrario, afirmará que las variaciones humanas son constantes. El hombre siempre es distinto. No se trata, solamente, de que sea distinto porque viva desde distintas realidades, sino al revés, porque el hombre es distinto, porque son distintas e innumerables las maneras de ser hombre, son distintas sus realidades; Ortega, contra toda posición fisista y mecanista afirmará que vivir es creación, aumento, expansión, dominio [...] capacidad de crearla.679

As discussed as well in the section on Dewey, a pragmatist account of the "truth" requires direct, tangible observation and experience. The analysis is "functional" and "instrumental" in that it requires a look to the past and especially application for the possible future. And as

679 Ibid., p. 165.
demonstrated in the quote that follows, James emphasizes the individual element in all this (as did Ortega), given different "interests" leading these directions here toward "consequences" "experienced through experience."

Rejecting the absolutist conception of truth, James argues that truths are desired for their consequences, for the impact they can have on our life-experiences and practices. So his view of truth can be understood as an alethic consequentialism and instrumentalism. He himself describes his position as an "instrumental" conception of truth that follows the footsteps of the instrumentalist views put forth by Schiller and Dewey.680

Linking these notions with the other two pragmatists explored here, Schiller and Dewey, lends further support to this dissertation's objectives. Compare this with González's proposition that for Ortega, "truth speaks to us through the dialectic that is our lived experience."681

For James, truth matters because it helps us better understand our experiences and it helps better prepare us for future experiences, in the same way as we saw with Dewey;

What he wanted to accomplish is fairly clear. Truth matters. Truth is not merely a stunningly pretty word that people reify and then claim to revere. Truth is a matter of being led effectively through the shoals, pitfalls, very real dangers of the world: it is not to be misled. Truth is a species of goodness.682

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680 Stuhr, *100 Years of Pragmatism*, p. 126. Also see page 34.


682 Stuhr, *100 Years of Pragmatism*, p. 101-102.
But again as was the case with Dewey truth is anti-dualistic in that there is the truth, and then there is what we think is the truth, and we cannot necessarily know when the two coincide. But indeed we can know what we think is the truth, and this can vary by experiences, or which is essentially history—and here again we can imagine a potential dialogue between Ortega and James, as was proposed between Ortega and Dewey. This is why James, in the same sense as Dewey, does not see truth as "absolute" per se, but rather focuses on their being multiple truths, just as with perspectives;

James argues that we should always talk about truths in the plural. He defends the diversification of truth according to plural contexts, plural practices, and plural interests. On this view, truths are relative to the always changeable reality we cope with in our experiences and practices.  

No matter which way we look at it, key in James's philosophy is that truth comes to us, whether by searching or it is simply revealed to us, via our experiences. And again the specific connection that can be made in a possible dialogue between the two is to converse that inherently experience is history, because it is in a great part the accumulation of experiences in the past, which is the same as one's history in sum. So truth is historical as well for James, as Greeve Davaney supports,

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Ibid., p. 135.

As another strong interpretation of this, "Looked at one way, truth is created. Looked at another, truth is found or discovered. That is, the concept of truth is ambiguous—though essentially and beneficently so. James should have emphasized more—I believe—that the two ways of looking must always both be employed. In any case, what is discovered—if it's true discovery of something that really happened and had or has a career—is discovery of what is the case. This just IS the case" (Ibid., p. 104).
True ideas or theories are not eternal unchanging templates that we somehow discover. Rather, they are the products of human history that work in relation to other dimensions of experience, including other ideas. James used all sorts of dynamic terms to indicate what he meant by truth; true ideas "lead" humans to experience, they are "instruments of action," they "fit" experience. A number of important claims accompany this approach. Truth, for James, is not a "stagnant property" inherent in ideas. Instead, truth is something that happens to ideas as they work for humans, as they allow humans to enhance and enlarge their experience. Ideas become true through a process of contributing to more satisfactory experience. Truth is not discovered but invented. It is not an unchanging attribute of an eternal idea but an event and a process by which historical human ideas are verified in experience and action.685

To add further support then, Daveney also interprets that the truth is historical. In one sense, a partial part of the dialogue we can create here with Ortega, as in the first section, is to look at truth as our beliefs, and apply the same meaning of "belief" that Ortega has. Briefly revisited, for Ortega we are our beliefs, essentially, as they are latently part of us; "la creencia es quien nos tiene y sostiene a nosotros."686 "Belief" is like "faith," such as in regards to religion or science; "[...] se trata de una fe, que la ciencia es una fe, una creencia en que se está, como se puede estar en la creencia religiosa."687 And these latent beliefs are arguably forms of 'assumed' truths for Ortega, as explained in greater depth in the section on Dewey (which can be found as reference below in the footnote).

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685 Daveney. Historicism, p. 73.
686 Ortega, Ideas y creencias, p. 25.
687 Ortega, Galileo, p. 130.
And in regards to James, as Stuhr explains,

James set forth his pragmatism as a theory of truth. In his view, truth is an instrument for getting us into satisfactory relations with experiences, an expedient in our way of thinking, a marrying function between old beliefs and new experiences, and something made rather than found. 688

As proposed by Graham, "Obviously, "beliefs" as a concept came to Ortega first from James, as did 'instrument.'”689 It must be repeated here that Graham's very direct affirmations that Ortega basically copied quite a lot from James are only theories that have not been proven, as few scholars have explored so direct of a hypothetical connection. What is important for this thesis, nonetheless, is that the existence of this argument supports our being able to at least imagine a dialogue here. Moreover, again as noted Ortega and James lived contemporaneously, so there is that historical connection between the two, which as we have seen both would agree plays a role in adding to shaping and influencing their views (we are our history).

688 Stuhr, 100 Years of Pragmatism, p. 2. As discussed, in Ortega's philosophy there is an important distinction between "ideas" (ideas) and "beliefs" (creencias). Most tersely stated, we have ideas, and we are our beliefs. "Las creencias son lo que verdaderamente constituye el estado del hombre," summarized Ortega (Historia como sistema, p. 14). Some ideas, in other words, become so important and ingrained in our circumstances and perspectives that they convert into beliefs. And the topic of creencias is important here because this is an example of a type of "circumstance" that would factor into his definition of the "radical reality that is my life," which is "yo soy yo y mi circunstancia." And since beliefs (creencias) are dependent on the historical time period, this also adds to Ortega's reasoning for why man is a historical being. In his own words:

El hombre no tiene más remedio que contar con las creencias de su tiempo, y esta dimensión de su circunstancia es lo que hace del hombre un ente esencialmente histórico, o, dicho en otra forma, el hombre no es nunca un primer hombre, sino siempre un sucesor; un heredero, un hijo del pasado humano. Le toca siempre vivir en un instante determinado de un procesor anterior a él, se ve obligado a entrar en escena en un preciso momento del amplísimo drama humano que llamamos <<historia>> (Ortega, Galileo, p. 172).

This, of course, is just a brief discussion of Ortega's philosophy on ideas and beliefs, as it is quite profound and will be limited here to the partial dialogue that can be possibly envisioned with James.

689 Graham, Theory of History, p. 141.
Ortega argued, "Las creencias constituyen el estrato básico, el más profundo de la arquitectura de nuestra vida. Vivimos de ellas y, por lo mismo, no sollemos pensar en ellas. [...] Por eso decimos que tenemos estas o las otras ideas; pero nuestras creencias, más que tenerlas, las somos." 690 Again, as some ideas become so ingrained in us that they become beliefs, in turn, some of these beliefs become our "truths." As quoted in the section on Dewey, humanity

[...] tiene que inventar el mundo. La mayor porción de él la ha heredado de sus mayores y actúa en su vida como sistema de creencias firmes. Pero cada cual tiene que habérselas por su cuenta con todo lo dudoso, con todo lo que es cuestión. A este fin ensaya figuras imaginarias de mundos y de su posible conducta en ellos. Entre ellas, una le parece idealmente más firme, y a eso llama verdad. Pero conste: lo verdadero, y aun lo científicamente verdadero, no es sino un caso particular de lo fantástico. 691

Here again we see the important role of history because some beliefs are essentially inherited, as Ortega declares here, and thus are in part dependent on history. This previous assertion of Ortega most certainly dialogues with the following excerpt from James, in which he also emphasizes the way new beliefs and/or truths can come to us via experiences (which we experience experiences over the course of our histories);

This is the process "by which any individual settles into new opinions": "The individual has a stock of old opinions already, but he meets a new experience that puts them to a strain" (P, 34). The strain, he adds, may also come from the experience of others who contradict our opinions or add new facts that have to be reconciled with them.

690 Ortega, Historia, p. 19.

691 Ortega, Ideas y Creencias, pp. 37-38.
In these negotiations we try to preserve "the older stock of truths with a minimum of modification, stretching them just enough to make them admit the novelty" (P, 35). According to James, the role of "older truths" in our epistemic life should not be underestimated. 692

Hence the following supporting conclusion by Davaney as well that there is, thus, a historicism present in James's thought;

First, he had a deep sense of the importance of tradition and the past. For James, human ideas do not spring de novo into existence. Instead, they develop over time and change and are transformed as experience stresses them, demanding revision. Humans, according to this perspective, build up stores of ideas, beliefs, and theories through which we interpret our world. As historical beings we are always inheriting the ideas that came before us. But in a dynamic, historical world of ongoing change, experience is always straining, contradicting, stressing our ideas. New ideas, new versions of the truth, emerge as humans amend and revise their inherited traditions in light of new experiences. 693

Truth is historical, we are historical. Therefore, James also accepts this idea that while the past, or history, has such an influential role, this does not disregard the responsibility of novelty either, as in the excerpt in which he states that "New truth is always a go-between, a smoother-over of transitions. It marries old opinion to new fact so as ever to show a minimum of jolt, a

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692 Stuhr, 100 Years of Pragmatism, p. 128.

693 Davaney, Historicism, p. 71.
maximum of continuity." Generally speaking, it is of course possible to see how continuity and novelty, especially in the case of the course of history, are not contradictory terms.

And this is all because of the instrumentalist, functional aspect of pragmatism in which something that is "useful" gains special value for us, most tersely summarized, but as we shall see is something that Ortega argues in this specific sense that beliefs, for him, must be "useful." "As James described it, "ideas (which themselves are but parts of our experience) become true just insofar as they help us to get into satisfactory relation with other parts of our experience."695

As also noted in the section on Dewey, there is an important contrast here that must be reiterated between pragmatist thought and Ortega; namely, that some beliefs, and hence some truths, are so ingrained and latent in our selves according to Ortega that we are not even always aware of them, which this last point is likely not something that a pragmatist would generally agree with. As we saw Ortega critiqued directly,

El error del pragmatismo no radica en que considere las ideas como instrumentos, sino en que quiera reducir las cosas con que el hombre tiene que habérselas a lo perceptible y experimentable, lo que está a la mano y presente, el mineral, la planta, el animal y la estrella. […] Si así fuese, la vida resultaría faena fácil, tal vez resuelta con cierta plenitud hace milenios.696

In comparison to this critique, James's theory is that

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694 James, *Pragmatism*, p. 40.

695 Stuhr, *100 Years of Pragmatism*, p. 127. See page 34; "emphasis dropped."

Pragmatism, on the other hand, asks its usual question, "Grant an idea or belief to be true," it says, "what concrete difference will its being true make in any one's actual life? How will the truth be realized? What experiences will be different from those which would obtain if the belief were false? What, in short, is the truth's cash value in experiential terms?" The moment the pragmatist asks this question, it sees the answer: True ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify. False ideas are those that we can not. That is the practical difference it makes to us to have true ideas; that, therefore, is the meaning of truth, for it is all that truth is known-as.\(^{697}\)

This implies, therefore, that the truth is something that we have to search for and discover through 'study,' in a sense, via our experiences. What is key is how we experience something, rather than that something in and of itself in terms of its 'truthfulness.' "The truth of an idea is not a stagnant property inherent in it. Truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, is made true by events. Its verity is in fact an event, a process: the process namely of its verifying itself, its verification. Its validity is the process of valid-ation," wrote James.\(^ {698}\) A good example proposed to understand this in simple terms is to think of prerequisite college courses for a degree; they are termed "prerequisites" because they are required for understanding through the advancement of classes and for obtaining the degree. A college student who does not take these course will not receive his or her degree, but taking them is not an absolute guarantee for understanding and obtaining the degree; one still has to pass and understand the material. This is one simple, helpful way to understand the pragmatist notion of the "truth;" we know something will not be truthful if

\(^{697}\) McDermott, The Writings of William James, p. 430.

\(^{698}\) Ibid., p. 430
it does not meet "prerequisites," but just meeting "prerequisites" does not guarantee for something to be truthful (hence a somewhat abstract notion of the truth), but it is a requirement nonetheless. In other words, again the truth is fundamentally anti-dualistic; there is the "truth," which we might not ever reach, and there is what we think is the truth, and one cannot exist without the other though they are separate concepts. Moreover, again key is how we experience that truth to be truthful. James writes,

Any idea upon which we can ride, so to speak; any idea that will carry us prosperously from any one part of our experience to any other part, linking things satisfactorily, working securely, simplifying, saving labor; is true for just so much, true in so far forth, true instrumentally. This is the 'instrumental' view of truth.700

"Truth" needs to be incorporated and assimilated into our lives via experience to be able to ponder and conceptualize it. And it is "instrumental" because "truthfulness" depends on consequences, and the "usefulness" of those consequences, as well as 'whether or not any difference resulted;' how experiences can differ depending on whether or not one believes something to be "true." (The pragmatist emphasis on "usefulness" was explored in Dewey as well.) Again, our experiences construct a continuous flow that is the narration of our lives, our histories—and key is how we experience our experiences. Our lives, our histories, are defined by the constant, continual accumulation of experiences, and of course on awareness, consciousness, and response to those experiences and their consequences. As another example raised to conceptualize this better, James writes,

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699 This idea is from: Talisse, Guide for the Perplexed, p. 55.
700 McDermott, The Writings of William James, p. 382.
Truth makes no other kind of claim and imposes no other kind of ought than health and wealth do. All these claims are conditional; the concrete benefits we gain are what we mean by calling the pursuit a duty. In the case of truth, untrue beliefs work as perniciously in the long run as true beliefs work beneficially.  

So if truth is based on concrete consequences via experience, we can use the example raised here of "health" as if it were a "truth" and think of all the consequences that validate "health," such as sleeping well, eating well, being fit, having good circulation, etc. And it does not make a difference the order we consider these in terms of validity (logic is another matter); "one is healthy because they are fit," is as valid as to say "one is fit because he or she is healthy." Or a treatment for an illness, for example, would be considered "true" if it cures, and false if it does not. But there are contradictorily theories out there (regardless of whether or not they are proven, they are out there) that eating less can help one live longer and which to most sounds ridiculous. So again in these everyday examples here we have this notion that what we know is true is what we think is true, but we cannot necessarily know for certain that something in and of itself is really true (again to reiterate we can just know that we think it is true). This, as has been emphasized, is a fundamental general concept in pragmatism. The following propositions from Livingston help support this:

They [James and Dewey] were not interested in authenticity of any kind because they knew there was neither a true world apart from "what we say about it"—every truth was a bet on the future that had paid off—nor a genuine self prior to the scene of acting and

701 Ibid., p. 441.

Hence again the anti-dualism in this. In simplified terms,

There is a variety of uses and benefits true beliefs and theories yield, and there is no singular truth, but many plural truths. As a consequence, James reasons, theories of truth that take truth to be a property abstractable from those successes are bound to failure. This is why truth is not the sort of thing or property we can have a theory about.  

"Functionality," therefore, is key here; "truth" has to "function well" in life for James. Truths have to "make a difference" (in consequences) to be "worth" anything. But just being "useful" does not suffice; there has to be a sufficient amount of usefulness/useful applications. One of the challenges here is defining how much is required to be considered "sufficient." When something 'makes a difference in one's life' then it becomes 'useful' in one way or another, 'enough,' and then in turn it becomes valuable; something that we appreciate and remember. Hence the idea that what we can say is that the truth is what we think it is (but we cannot say exactly, for sure, what it is in and of itself), because it simply depends on what 'makes enough of a difference for each individual, and therefore becomes valuable and remembered.' Again it is 'useful' and 'connotes, marks a difference' because it allows one to, in a sense, 'construct myself,' and it allows one to give and define meaning to one's experiences, which in turn permits an interpretation of truth and reality in a specific unique, individual sense. James writes, "Once we know what "difference ... [a claim's] being true will make in some possible person's history, we shall know, not only just what you are really claiming, but also how important an issue it is, and

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703 Stuhr, *100 Years of Pragmatism*, p. 168.

how to go to work to verify the claim.\textsuperscript{705} Note how James uses the specific term here of "a person's history," and not "a person's nature" in the construction of this possible dialogue here with Ortega—nor does he focus on the future here, as he usually would as a pragmatist.

A very "pragmatist" excerpt in Ortega's meditations on the topics of what is real and what is reality is when he directly defines it as being something "useful," as he writes that man or woman "Lo que tiene de real—de no mera idea—es sólo lo que tiene de útil.\textsuperscript{706} And this is despite the aforementioned critique of his direct negation of the need for something to be "useful"—here he declares that what is real is what is useful.

This "threshold of usefulness" also depends on the future, as it is not something that we can know instantaneously, since it depends on "experiments" of sorts in experiences; hence the application of "functionalism" (practical application). "Meanwhile," writes James, "we have to live to-day by what truth we can get to-day, and be ready to-morrow to call it falsehood. [...] We live forwards, a Danish thinker has said, but we understand backwards."\textsuperscript{707} So here again is the important historicist connection in all this; our ideas of the "truth" depend very much on the past, and our projection and foresight about the future, restoring in turn the continual flow of experience. As Davaney summarizes in support, in reference to this same quote;

James thus developed a picture of historical existence in which human ideas, beliefs, and theories are always in the process of making and remaking. Truths become true and sometimes die. They enhance experience and then no longer function satisfactorily in

\textsuperscript{705} Stuhr, \textit{100 Years of Pragmatism}, p. 113.

\textsuperscript{706} Ortega, \textit{Historia}, p. 57.

\textsuperscript{707} McDermott, \textit{The Writings of William James}, p. 438.
relation to new experiences. In practice humans are always testing their beliefs against other beliefs and in terms of the experiences they permit or inhibit. Such ideas are not passive duplications of reality standing outside of the world. Rather, they are part of experience, additions to the ongoing sum of reality. They not only describe the world; they add to it, becoming part of the world's experience as humans and the rest of finite reality move ever into an open future.  

There is here also a dialogue with Ortega's theories on ideas and beliefs as this reading of Greeve Davaney's is scarcely different from the explored themes of Ortega's notion that ideas over time become beliefs, installed within us basically subconsciously, until new ideas come along and challenge them, creating times of "crisis" and the need for new beliefs—in this interpretation from Greeve Davaney she uses interchangeably fundamentally the same concept of ideas and beliefs with pragmatist "experience."

And there is also an important "individualistic" factor in all this, because truth is relative, as it depends on experiences, which can vary by person. Therefore, two people may of course disagree on the "truth" of something. But that is why we must resolve this by once again stating that we cannot, therefore, truly know the truth, we can only know what we think it is. Truth is plural; there can be multiple truths. Again, truth is what we experience it to be. And again this can certainly dialogue with Ortega's "perspectivism," because essentially here James is focusing on perspective as a determining factor in concepts and ideas of "truth." Succinctly explained, "The value of every view is something determined individually by each believer's temperament. The matter is not the truth of any of the views, but how they reflect our given inclinations—like

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finding shoes that fit."\(^7\)\(^{09}\) This dialogues with the following affirmation of Ortega quoted in the first section that: "cada hombre tiene una misión de verdad. Donde está mi pupila no está otra: lo que de la realidad ve mi pupila no lo ve otra. Somos insustituibles, somos necesarios. [...] la realidad, pues, se ofrece en perspectivas individuales."\(^7\)\(^{10}\) Therefore, again "reality" and "truth" for Ortega is essentially based on our individual perspectives on ideas corresponding to our realities, and these are, as he says, 'infinite in possibilities.'\(^7\)\(^{11}\) Truth, therefore, is revealed to us over the course of history in unique perspectives for individuals and time periods (time periods both generally speaking, and for the individual him or herself), as arguably a key point of possible discourse with pragmatism for Ortega. Truths can change. Truth is also true for its historical time period, not necessarily inherently in and of itself (or at least we cannot necessarily confirm that). Stuhr supports this same historical notion of the truth in James's philosophy, as explained in the following quote:

>'Day follows day,' says James, `and its contents are simply added. The new contents themselves are not true, they simply come and are. Truth is what we say about them.'

Again, all we have are those semiotic artifacts, those provisional, second-order truths that emerge in the narrative time of historical consciousness and explanation. The one true world—"truth absolute and objective"—would appear only at the end of days.\(^7\)\(^{12}\)

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\(^{7}\)\(^{10}\) Ortega, *Obras Completas II*, p. 19.

\(^{7}\)\(^{11}\) As we saw in the first section Lasaga Medina explains, "<<Verdadero>> significa entonces dos cosas: primero, significará <<de acuerdo con las cosas>>, que acierta o desvela lo que hay, que la idea capta realidad; y en segundo lugar, significará <<verdadero en y para mí>>, es decir, auténtico. El sentido final de la verdad en Ortega es verdad como autenticidad. Ambos significados no se pueden separar: el primero depende absolutamente del segundo" (Lasaga Medina, *Ortega: Vida y Filosofía*, p. 176).

\(^{7}\)\(^{12}\) Stuhr, *100 Years of Pragmatism*, p. 160.
These so-called "second order truths," therefore, are the only ones we can really contemplate, as they are historical. As Livingston explains,

James identifies three orders of truth or reality. There is the "practical truth" residing in the "instant field of the present." There are the truths we learn backward by adding, retrospectively, to the practical truth of immediate experience. And then there is "truth absolute and objective." This third order of truth is final in every sense because its condition is the end of time. So the only truths of which we can speak and be aware are those semiotic artifacts, those provisional, second-order truths, that emerge in the narrative time of historical consciousness and explanation.\(^{713}\)

So again what is tangible is that which comes from the past. Moreover, the use of the term "narrative" to describe one sense of history dialogues with Ortega's definition of history, of razón histórica, as being razón narrativa, as we shall continue to analyze here.

Hence the notion of life as narrative that Ortega employs is not just a colorful metaphor. Life as narrative expresses the essential dynamic character of man to whom “things” constantly happen. Thus life-as-lived friction between individual consciousness and the world becomes the foundation of human reality.\(^ {714}\)

As a terse summary of all this, we can say that in Jamesian pragmatism "our ideas agree with reality."\(^ {715}\) And in another example, he writes "I conclude, then, that real effectual causation as an ultimate nature, as a 'category,' if you like, of reality, is just what we feel it to be, just that

\(^{713}\) Stuhr, *100 Years of Pragmatism*, pp. 150-151.

\(^{714}\) Gonzalez, *Ortega y Gasset's Philosophy of Subjectivity*, pp. 467-469.

kind of conjunction which our own activity-series reveal." Ortega also wrote that our ideas are "truthful" when they correspond to the idea that we have of reality; "Una idea es verdadera cuando corresponde a la idea que tenemos de la realidad." These two excerpts are scarcely different.

As we saw, for Ortega, "reality" is what we call "world," and "world" is interpretations of circumstances. We simply experience something to be real, which is not to say that there is necessarily any "proof," per se, that it is real. This emphasis again here on "experience" can most certainly dialogue with pragmatism in general. So for Ortega, a person's "radical reality" is that unique perspective of reality of each individual; each is distinct, and no one is correct or incorrect. And this must all be reiterated here because not only was this arguably a point of possible discourse between Ortega and Dewey, but Graham suggests this is even more imaginable between Ortega and James, arguing that "Radical reality was life, self, circumstance, mutually "positing," "presenting" themselves "absolutely," an idea originally from James." Of course the argument here is not that it was 'an idea originally from James,' but perhaps there is a dialogue to be imagined here.

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716 Ibid., p. 290.
717 Ortega, Ideas y creencias, p. 29.
718 Hence as aforementioned Ortega's view that "the will is real, but the willed is not." "[...] la querencia es real, pero lo querido es irreal" (Ortega, Meditaciones del Quijote, p. 226). The center of the world for each individual is that very individual, as Ortega argues for in his "perspectivismo," as the basic perspective of life.
719 As quoted in the first section, Ortega posits that "la realidad o el ser consiste en las cosas y su conjunto que llamamos mundo. [...] mundo, como interpretación de la circunstancia, como sistema de nuestras convicciones. [...] lo que verdaderamente hay, la realidad, lo que es: es el Mundo" (From: Ortega, Metafísica, p. 130).
720 Again, "[...] la realidad, como un paisaje, tiene infinitas perspectivas, todas ellas igualmente verídicas y auténticas. La sola perspectiva falsa es esa que pretende ser la única" (From: Ortega, Nuestro Tiempo, p. 149).
721 Graham, Pragmatist Philosophy, p. 205.
The concept of "truth" for James relies on a "perspectivism," as aforementioned, that is not very different from that of Ortega.\textsuperscript{722} It should be further noted that the concept of "truth" for James can also dialogue, albeit just a bit indirectly, with Ortega's concept of our lives and how we are each defined as being "self and circumstance." As Medina further supports, "When James defines truth as "whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief" he is referring not only to what we believe individually but also to what we believe together, socially.\textsuperscript{723}

In pragmatism, the "truth" is connected to reality in that our so-called "truths" agree with reality; literally, as argued by James, "our ideas agree with reality."\textsuperscript{724} But again this is not to say, however, that they are absolute; this is just to say that over the course of time and experiences, something proves to \textit{generally} correspond with reality, thereby making it "true," but essentially only in a tentative sense, as it is possible for something to come along and disprove our "truth" (though this also may conversely \textit{not} happen; this can go in both directions). Truth is indeed historical then. Science is a good example to consider here as a case in point, as "scientific truths" have changed over the course of history. As James writes, "Truth lives, in fact, for the most part on a credit system. Our thoughts and beliefs 'pass,' so long as nothing challenges them."\textsuperscript{725} Interestingly enough, there is a shared metaphor used here of "credit," as Ortega uses this same idea in reference to his explanation of the meaning of "beliefs," some of which, as has been explained, can become our "truths" (hence a dialogue here with James that

\textsuperscript{722} As quoted previously, Jose Medina argues, "[...] according to James's pluralism, there is an irreducibility plurality of different epistemic perspectives, and different epistemic perspectives are likely to yield different truths" (Stuhr, \textit{100 Years of Pragmatism}, p. 134).

\textsuperscript{723} Ibid., p. 125.

\textsuperscript{724} McDermott, \textit{The Writings of William James}, p. 430.

\textsuperscript{725} Ibid., p. 433.
can be possibly imagined. Ortega explained, referring to how we are our beliefs, and that they are the basic foundation of our lives;

Cabe simbolizar la vida de cada hombre como un Banco. Este vive a crédito de un encaje oro que no suele verse, que yace en profundo de cajas metálicas oculatas en los sótanos de un edificio. La más elemental cautela invita a revisar de cuando en cuando el estado efectivo de esas garantías—diríamos creencias, base del crédito.  

Returning to James, "Truth" is something that is observed, studied, built, and developed over time. "Truth is made, just as health, wealth, and strength are made, in the course of experience." And we could add here to this dialogue that this course of experiences thus leads us through our histories. The experiences are our histories. This dialogue therefore adds to studies on Ortega by proposing a possible pragmatist element and vision in his philosophy, which has been explored only very little in general scholarship. And more specifically again it is a way to possibly resolve what had at first glance seemed polemical of Ortega's notion that man has no nature, only history, because instead man's nature is his history, because our experiences, which are everything, comprise a continuum that forms our lives and the drama that is our lives. This must be repeated throughout, as demonstrating this is the main purpose of this dissertation.

Therefore, again, in James's thought the "truth" contains a certain degree of historicism. So given this dependence on the past essentially we also find again this very historicist leaning here, further enabling the creation of a dialogue with Ortega who we know leaned quite heavily on historicism. As aforementioned, James, referring to Kierkegaard, argues that it is through the

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726 Ortega, Historia, p. 19.

727 McDermott, The Writings of William James, p. 436.
past that we reflect on the experiences that led us to the "truths" we hold, or once held; again, "We live forwards, a Danish thinker has said, but we understand backwards. The present sheds a backward light on the world's previous processes. They may have been truth-processes for the actors in them. They are not so for one who knows the later revelations of the story." Thus, as we can see, truth essentially depends at least in part on history per James. He further writes,

> [...] truth is made largely out of previous truths. Men's beliefs at any time are so much experience funded. But the beliefs are themselves parts of the sum total of the world's experience, and become matter, therefore, for the next day's funding operations. So far as experience means experiencable reality, both it and the truths men gain about it are everlastingly in process of mutation—mutation towards a definite goal, it may be—but still mutation.

Our notions of "reality" as well depend on history per James, in a very anti-dualistic sense, as Wilshire explains;

> In his dynamical and organismic view, reality is a matter of interweaving histories. They must be distinguished but not disconnected. There is the history of the knower's believing—and of course what's believed—and the history of the thing or things about which one is believing something.

Thus, so much for both James and Ortega is dependent on history. Again we return to the idea that there is history, and there is what we think is history/what we think that history is, and

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728 Ibid., p. 438.

729 Ibid., p. 439.

730 Stuhr, 100 Years of Pragmatism, p. 103.
both are connected anti-dualistically. In this explanation here we can also find a potential anti-dualist dialogue again with Ortega's concept of "yo soy yo y mi circunstancia;" there is the history of the individual (the history of the knower's believing and what he or she believes; "the history of the knower's believing—and of course what's believed"), and the history of the things surrounding that individual ("the history of the thing or things about which one is believing something").731 As was also the argument in the section on Dewey, we cannot really know what history is, therefore, as we will continue to see ahead in the second section as well. Part of this is because of the perspectivism previously discussed at length, and another reason for this is because over the very course of history itself our ideas, views, etcetera, change as well. For example, the same person can interpret and write a history book in one year, then subsequently conduct new research that sheds life on new findings or theories, and write a second edition that could be very different. This we know happens quite frequently. As James explains, "In every series of real terms, not only do the terms themselves and their associates and environments change, but we change, and their meaning for us changes, so that new kinds of sameness and types of causation continually come into view and appeal to our interest."732 Also here again we find this emphasis on "interest" leading to our interpretations and understandings of things in general. Bringing Ortega into the conversation here, we could insert that our interests are in part influenced by the surrounding circumstances of the time, and consequently as circumstances change, interests change, and so do our yoes/selves. Hence, again, we are our experiences, which

731 Again, true to pragmatist fashion, James argues that fundamentally, most tersely stated, for something to be "real" it needs to be "experienced as real." As he writes specifically, "Nothing shall be admitted as fact, it says [methodological postulate of pure experience], except what can be experienced at some definite time by some experient; and for every feature of fact ever so experienced, a definite place must be found somewhere in the final system of reality. In other words: Everything real must be experienceable somewhere, and every kind of thing experienced somewhere must be real" (McDermott, The Writings of William James, p. 279).

732 McDermott, The Writings of William James, p. 301.
together comprise our histories, so more appropriately and properly we are our histories. And hence a pragmatist exchange that can be envisioned with Ortega, bringing new thoughts and ideas to additional possible readings of his work.

Truths come to us in time; they reveal themselves over the course of history. Every new era brings with it new perspectives that lead to new truths and new realities—hence why truth, reality, etcetera depends on history. And hence again why we are our history, therefore. "Like James," proposed Graham as a possible theory here, "he [Ortega] could see human truth and error as something that "becomes," "is made," "happens" in the course of time or history, as "event" and as "process" of verification or validation."733 This idea of the importance of "perspectival lens" in history (as it was for the other metaphysical topics explored) shall be further looked at ahead, but for now suffice to say that there is an emphasis on this being fundamental in both thinkers. Again, essentially all comes to us via our experiences, or our histories of the continuous accumulation of the flow of these experiences. This concept of "continuum," therefore, is again key. Together our experiences form our histories along this continuum, making James thus again perhaps more historicist than generally assumed. As Davaney supports here as well,

For James, ideas, concepts, and beliefs, including both scientific and religious ones, are thoroughly human and, as such, finite, contingent, and fallible, just like the world of which they are part. In particular, James saw these as human constructions that emerge in history and in turn contribute to ongoing developing reality. In relation to our exploration

733 Graham, Pragmatist Philosophy, p. 178.
of historicism James can be seen to have developed a number of important insights in relation to this process.\textsuperscript{734}

So, "Although Ortega spoke primarily of a "radical positivism" instead of a "radical empiricism," suggests Graham, "that was not an \textit{essential} difference."\textsuperscript{735} In other words, as Graham further argues, while applying himself the definition of "radical positivism" in regards to Ortega, we must cite again the following excerpt here:

As the basis for knowing reality, James's metaphysics of "radical empiricism" was grounded in "fact" and "thing" and in "experience of life" and "viewpoint" or "perspective" thereon, with basic relations and "connections" included. All that is scarcely different from Ortega's "radical positivism" in any significant respect."\textsuperscript{736}

Again here we have a possible dialogue between James and Ortega that overlaps in several regards. For example, in the case of the emphasis on perspective, here we also need to read and conceptualize this anti-dualistically; there is at any given time a perspective per person, but given the multifaceted circumstances surrounding that one person, there are an infinite number of combinations to possibly focus on and apply. And if perspective in part shapes our reality and our truths, then again there are an infinite number of possible realities and truths, though in the end there is one unique one that results per person at any given time, as we have seen at length. As Skrupskelis argues in support of this applying similarly to James,

\textsuperscript{734} Davaney, \textit{Historicism}, p. 71.

\textsuperscript{735} Graham, \textit{Pragmatist Philosophy}, p. 168.

\textsuperscript{736} Ibid., p. 161.
Every reality has an infinity of properties, James argues, and any one of them can be seen as essential in the light of some interest. He writes: "There is no property ABSOLUTELY essential to any one thing." [...] This common sense—and much of philosophy—is wrong in thinking that every thing has an essence which makes it just the thing it is.737

Compare this with Pedro Blas González's explanation of reality for Ortega:

“I am I and my circumstances” is possible because, according to Ortega, the true idealist immerses himself in the material world and thus makes it his concern to make sense of its being. The reality of the world as an independent entity can never be fully grasped because the coming to consciousness of the universe as a totality of relations is an infinite procedure. What is known, in effect, is the world as a limited idea of consciousness. He states: The outside world is within us, it exists in our power of formulating ideas. The world is my production, and my image—as the rough Schopenhauer will say roughly. The ideal is the real. Strictly speaking, and in pure truth, only the idea-producing, the thinking, the conscious exists; I, I myself, me Ipsum.738

But to reiterate for this thesis's main purpose, most fundamental in all this is how reality is historical, or based on history—or to put it in specific pragmatist terms, it is based on experience. Ortega repeats directly that human reality is historical, which is, again, because what we have is history; "[...] toda realidad humana, por su historicidad, consiste en venir de algo


738 Gonzalez, Ortega y Gasset's Philosophy of Subjectivity, pp. 438-444.
pasado e ir hacia algo futuro. Por tanto, que es una realidad sustativamente móvil."739 Hence Ortega's frequent use of specifically the term "realidad histórica." And it also must be emphasized again the evidence here for a possible dialogue in his stress on the "reality of man, for its historicity," is based on the past, and the future as well.

Now that we have established part of a vision of a possible dialogue between James and Ortega on basic philosophical concepts, this concept will next be narrowed specifically to philosophy on history and historicism.

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Section II: On the Philosophical Historicism in James and Ortega

IX. Introduction

For Ortega, as we know, basically everything is historical. There are few excerpts from Ortega defining history as concise as the following: "La historia es ciencia sistemática de la realidad radical que es mi vida."\(^{740}\) Also tersely stated, the "historical" is the "way of being of a thing;" the "modo de ser de una cosa."\(^{741}\) As aforementioned, for Ortega, it is through the study of history specifically that we can attempt to better understand, and not just explain, humanity. "Para comprender algo humano," declared Ortega, "personal o colectivo, es preciso contar una historia. [...] La vida sólo se vuelve un poco transparente ante la razón histórica."\(^{742}\) History is more than just one event or happening after another, it is another thing after another in part because of that other, to phrase this simply. And this shall be a first step in exploring the meaning, application, and method of the study and definition of the discipline of history in this part's imagined dialogue with James. Hence, Ortega implored that,

[...] la historia deja de ser la simple averiguación de lo que ha pasado y se convierte en otra cosa un poco más complicada —en la investigación de cómo han sido las vidas humanas en cuanto tales. Conste, pues, no lo que ha pasado a los hombres—, ya que,

\(^{740}\) Ortega, *Historia*, p. 52. Ortega repeats this throughout his writings, as in this additional excerpt from *En torno a Galileo*: "[...] la historia, que es la ciencia de las vidas humanas" (p. 68).

\(^{741}\) Ortega, *Interpretación*, p. 98.

\(^{742}\) Ortega, *Historia*, p. 47.
As explored in the general introduction, Koopman's arguments for the inherent historicism in pragmatism is especially true of Jamesian pragmatism as he insinuated that pragmatism was indeed "transitionalism," a term that implies temporality, and therefore at least some history. As Koopman argues at length, and as James stated clearly in the following passage from *Essays in Radical Empiricism*,

> Life is in the transitions as much as in the terms connected [...] In this line we live prospectively as well as retrospectively. It is ‘of’ the past, inasmuch as it comes expressly as the past’s continuation; it is ‘of’ the future in so far as the future, when it comes, will have continued it. These relations of continuous transition experienced are what make our experiences cognitive.

Continuous transition of course implies that at some point everything is past, just as everything is a present, and the future continues those pasts and presents. As Daveney proposes in summary,

James had a profound sense of the historicity of experience and of ideas that led him to emphasize contingency, fallibility, and the need for ongoing revisions in all arenas of human life. Such a sense would also lead him to propose pragmatism as both the best method for adjudicating disputes and for interpreting the meaning of truth. This linking of

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743 Ortega, *Galileo*, p. 66.

historicism and pragmatism is an important development that will be seen to continue especially in contemporary theological reflection.\textsuperscript{745}

For James, as we have elaborated on, experience must be past, present, and future oriented, as a continuously flowing narrative. This is necessary for us to even be aware of it in the first place, as he says here; hence, it has to be more than just history in terms of solely being comprised of the past. This is why Koopman uses the term "temporal" and "transitionalism" in his aforementioned book on the historicism of pragmatism. "Transitionalism" is arguably found in every central topic expounded upon here; reality, life, nature, truth, radical empiricism, experience—everything is a continuum, everything is temporal, and therefore part of everything has an inherent historicity. Hence the central dialogue here being elaborated between Ortega and James that what we have his history, and especially history since this is what we can study more tangibly (the present being transient and the future not having arrived yet and existing as a potentiality). And this is especially "conversable" between the two when we conceptualize history as continual; as past, present, and future.

But again, William James, however, is not usually considered a "historicist philosopher," but as arguably a fundamental part of pragmatism, and as a pragmatist, the potential dialogue can be created, nonetheless, with Ortega. In particular, James's book, \textit{A Pluralistic Universe}, arguably has some historicist discussion, such as his concept of "pluralism" that will be analyzed in further depth ahead. James's \textit{Essays in Radical Empiricism} is a collection that also has some historicist dialogue, such as, succinctly defined, his emphasis on essentially everything being

\textsuperscript{745} Davaney, \textit{Historicism}, p. 69.
based on experience along a continuum characterized by time and date. Perhaps Davaney offers here some insight into why James is not considered more often also a historicist:

James can thus be seen to occupy an ambiguous position in any tale about historicism. Few thinkers evidence a greater willingness to acknowledge the contingent and fallible character of human thought, the funded nature of human experience, and the open but risk-filled character of a finite universe that is our only home. But James also refused to keep human experience within the prison house of language and insisted that, on all levels, experience always outruns our conceptual understanding of it; we traffic with reality in ways not mediated by language, including trafficking with that More James chose to call God. For James, such claims did not entail a repudiation of historicist insights but a more holistic understanding of human historical existence, including bodily experience. To those who have followed James he stands both as a beacon of historicist thought and a challenge to its limits, offering a heritage that has been debated ever since.746

And of course as we have seen at length, James being a pragmatist instrumentalist, there is also a central emphasis on the future and the importance of its potentiality in our perspectives on life, reality, and simply in our lives in general. But as Graham suggests, as a possible argument to support the thesis here,

No one has ever attributed "historicism" to William James, but Ortega was able to draw from his books and doctrines some of the basic components of his own historicism, which appeared when he was preparing to emphasize his historicist position in the 1930s.

746 Ibid., p. 80.
A Pluralistic Universe was the most relatable to history of all of James's works. There he emphasized the "pluralism" that Ortega formally took over into his historical worldview by the 1920s. [...] At the same time, in Essays in Radical Empiricism, he adverted to the "change," "event," "happening," and "doing" that take place in the real, historical world, and he saw this world as only "more or less" rational, and as having to be loosely connection by "hypotheses" following daily experience. Broadly speaking, that is all very much like what Ortega saw and practiced in his historiology.\textsuperscript{747}

Despite all of the possible dialogue being elaborated here on a type of "philosophy of history," in truth "philosophy" here is not the correct term (Ortega was referenced to prefer the term "meditations"), as we know there is no very well organized systematic structure of historical study in particular included in either Ortega or James's work though both thinkers have historicist elements, nonetheless, in their philosophies. They also share the view that what they have developed in their work specifically should not be classified as a "philosophy of history" in the strictest and most structured sense of the classification. The discipline of history is not like that of science. As Barzun explains in regards to James, "What James and I subscribe to is of course the opposite of what is called a "philosophy of history." That name is reserved for the schemes, the systems, the "laws of history" such as are found in the works of Toynbee or Spengler, Buckle or Karl Marx.\textsuperscript{748} And this is because in James's work, the objective is not some overarching structure with just one teleological meaning, as Barzun continues, "The philosophers of history want the confusion to have meaning, and only one. Every chance event

\textsuperscript{747} Graham, Pragmatist Philosophy, p. 280.

\textsuperscript{748} Barzun, Stroll, p. 125. Interestingly, Barzun here cites Toynbee, who Ortega wrote at length on in regards to primarily Toynbee's errors as a historian, and as an example in certain ways of how historical study should not be conducted in Ortega's Una interpretación de la historial univeral.
and every active being must conspire and converge toward a single end as in the plot of a well made play."749 Arguably we could posit that Ortega would agree on this, based on his theory of perspectivism that we have seen. In general James did not agree with seeing the world teleologically, as he explicitly declares in the following excerpt: "Whoever claims ABSOLUTE teleological unity, saying that there is one purpose and that every detail of the universe subserves, dogmatizes at his own risk."750 As we saw Ortega believed, a “philosophy of history” in general is a “misnomer,” writing, ""Llamar algo <<filosofía de la historia>> partía del hecho de que se tenía la idea más confusa de la filosofía y se pensaba que de todo puede hacerse filosofía. [...] Mas no hay tal filosofía de la historia."751 So in this fundamental view on how to define the existence of historical thought we have a potential dialogue between James and Ortega.

One of the main reasons for this lack of structure and absolute, or singular teleology in history for both Ortega and James is that fundamentally different "philosophers of history" and different "historians" have different ideas, ends, and conclusions, of course, logically. For example, Hegel's teleology saw history as the process and progress toward freedom and the 'ideal state.' Marx envisioned history as specifically the evolution of class struggles terminating in an ideal society without class structure. But the problem in this for both James and Ortega is that here we have two very different views, although both are teleological, but the ends are different, so how can we know for sure which is correct? Is history even teleological? And even more broadly speaking, different historians interpret and explain the "same past" differently. This is no

749 Ibid., p. 126.

750 James, Pragmatism and the Meaning of Truth, p. 53. Of course he references absolute teleology, which we can assume is meant as opposed to Schiller's conception of it, for example, as we will see in the third part.

different than life essentially and the experience of life as we saw; we each experience our own lives in unique, personal, and individual ways. Hence the common thread here from Ortega that also runs through James that "life is history." In other words, what we do have is our own histories, and we can reflect on our own histories, which are both individual and social, as we have seen for both and will continue to see.\textsuperscript{752} \textit{It is all simply what we experience it to be.}\textsuperscript{753} Again the argument here is focused on demonstrating how certain aspects of Ortega's "meditations" (again, to use the term specifically chosen by Ortega rather than "philosophy") on history were in part perhaps uniquely able to converse with pragmatism, and through this resultant dialogue we can understand better some specific parts of his work. But it must be reiterated that this is of course never to deny the influence of various other philosophical movements in Ortega's historicism, and at not point is there any kind of declaration of direct influence of pragmatism.

\begin{quote}
Why is history and its study so important? William James answered that "The passing moment is the only thing that ever concretely was or is or shall be."\textsuperscript{754} In other words, again the past is one thing we can contemplate, because it has already passed. The present is fleeting, and the future has not arrived yet, logically. Ortega also declared that one thing, logically, that we do
\end{quote}

\footnote{\textsuperscript{752} In an earlier section on the topic of life, the following quote of James was included, which shows how life is history, and both individual as well as social: "\textit{In its widest possible sense, however, a man's Self is the sum total of all that he CAN call this}, not only his body and his psychic powers, but his clothes and his house, his wife and children, his ancestors and friends, his reputation and works, his lands and horses, and yacht and bank-account" (James, \textit{Principles}, pp. 4551-4553). And for Ortega, as we have seen in detail in the same section, we know this is the case based on his "\textit{yo soy yo y mi circunstancia}," circumstances of course having a social element.}

\footnote{\textsuperscript{753} Nonetheless, it must also be noted here yet again because of its importance that Ortega cannot be interpreted as solely and absolutely pragmatist, including his historicism, of course. Perhaps it is just a momentary development? Ortega explored and emphasized historicism much more than any pragmatist, including William James of course, as despite these historicist aspects inherent in pragmatism, again it is not traditionally considered a historical philosophy. And James neither has traditionally been considered a historicist philosopher.}

\footnote{\textsuperscript{754} McDermott, \textit{The Writings of William James}, p. 158.}
have, is our past; our history, as quoted in the beginning; "el hombre hace historia porque ante el futuro, que no está en su mano, se encuentra con lo único que tiene, que posee, es su pasado." Ortega further answered, as we saw, that "Necesitamos de la historia íntegra para ver si logramos escapar de ella, no recaer en ella." For Ortega, therefore, history is a learning tool to create a better future; hence again more reason for the discipline's importance.

As we have seen, life is somewhat chaotic, undetermined, uncertain, ambiguous, to cite just a few adjectives to describe the general view that we can imagine to dialogue between both James and Ortega. James wrote that "We realize this life as something always off its balance. [...]," and Ortega emphasized our status as "náufragos." James added, "The general nature of it [being-known-together, essentially] we can probably never account for," which resonates with Ortega's argument that we have no nature, and James continues, "But the particular conditions whereby we know particular things together might conceivably be traced." And by "conditions" we can certainly apply, at least as one option, history, because the past can sometimes be traced. Clearly this can dialogue with Ortega's dictum, "man has no nature, only history." Stated another way, 'we cannot really ever come to know what our nature is, because our nature is based on the conditions surrounding us (and which could also converse with the idea of Ortega's circumstances in radical reality), which are historical; which is our history. And it is specifically this concept that will be explored in detail in the section that follows. Again: "En


756 Ortega, *Rebelión*, p. 159.

757 McDermott, *The Writings of William James*, p. 158. See for example the aforementioned quote from Ortega, *Lecciones*, pages 91 or 39 for good examples that in life we are, “náufragos en un orbe impregnadito.”

And again each of our histories is offered to us in unique perspectives:

Todos tienen su puesto determinado en la serie histórica; ninguno puede aspirar a salirse de ella, porque esto equivaldría a convertirse en un ente abstracto, con íntegra renuncia a la existencia. Desde distintos puntos de vista, dos hombres miran al mismo paisaje. Sin embargo, no ven lo mismo.  

This idea of us being our unique perspectival histories can certainly dialogue with the following declaration of James:

We shall see that we have a constant feeling sui generis of pastness, to which every one of our experiences in turn falls a prey. To think a thing as past is to think it amongst the objects or in the direction of the objects which at the present moment appear affected by this quality. This is the original of our notion of past time, which memory and history build their systems.

We have "our own kind;" our sui generis, or perspective or pastness—pastness is history. Hence, as history is individual perspective, history is also life—and thus in part why what we have is history (not nature), and in its amalgamation our own kind of history that makes us individual (even if again some elements overlap with others, in total our combinations are distinct).

759 Ortega, Historia, p. 48.
760 Ortega, Nuestro tiempo, p. 147.
761 James, Principles, p. 9465.
X. History as Past, Present, and Future

As noted, fundamental in understanding history from a pragmatist perspective is to contemplate it as a continuum; history is the past, as well as the present and the future. This of course was not an entirely new idea when pragmatism was developed. Nonetheless, it is possible that arguably this may have come into Ortega's meditations by way of William James (the other direction is a possibility in certain respects, but this is stated just going in chronological order of biographical appearance), among others; "[...] his interest in a historical concept of time—from James, Bergson, and Heraclitus—as a continuous "flow" from the relived past, through a conscious present, into an anticipated future was long evident in his thinking," suggested Graham.\footnote{Graham, Theory of History, p. 25.} While the past is what we can concretely reflect on and ponder, in regards to specific details (generally speaking), it is what enables us to better understand our current situation, date, and time, as well as prepare for, and at times maybe foresee or predict the future direction(s) of our next situations, dates, and times. Hence Ortega's argument that, as quoted in English to keep the flow here, "All historical knowledge is, in truth, the never-ending story."\footnote{Ibid., p. 127.} History is a continuum for Ortega as well, therefore, as clear in his considering it here a "never-ending story" (as we saw in the section on Dewey).

While in the following passage James does not use the term "history" specifically, we can posit that this is inherent in what he referred to here in his description of such a continuum:

The knowledge of some other part of the stream, past or future, near or remote, is always mixed in with our knowledge of the present thing. A simple sensation, as we shall
hereafter see, is an abstraction, and all our concrete states of mind are representations of
objects with some amount of complexity. Part of the complexity is the echo of the objects
just past, and, in a less degree, perhaps, the foretaste of those just to arrive. Objects fade
out of consciousness slowly. If the present thought is of ABCDEFG, the next one will be
of B C D E F G H, and the one after that of C D E F G H I— the lingerings of the past
dropping successively away, and the incomings of the future making up the loss. These
lingerings of old objects, these incomings of new, are the germs of memory and
expectation, the retrospective and the prospective sense of time. They give that continuity
to consciousness without which it could not be called a stream. 764

This is a good example to really clearly see how this continuum is a constantly flowing
interconnected event, concept, between past, present, and future, because as James wrote, it is
not ABCDEFG, then HIJLMNOP -- it is ABCDEFG, then BCDEFGH; or one piece only of
the past drops off (but not into non-existence of course) and is replaced with one piece of the
future, as they are separate chapters in this progression that flow continually together in an
interconnected chain, anti-dualistically. One changes because of the other that came before since
they are still connected. In this part of his writings he seems to provide this example primarily to
make the one basic argument that the past is connected in a continuum without specific
separating breaks in between any parts, as they are all connected (even if our memory is
selective, for example, and just remembers part of that chain, such as just the EFGHI out of the
ABCDEFGHI, not to mention that we cannot remember all the past, which all of us would agree
on is true in our lives and despite our ages). As he summarizes right before; "The knowledge of

764 James, Principles, pp. 9478-9485.
some other part of the stream, past or future, near or remote, is always mixed in with our knowledge of the present thing.”765 In another example he explains,

What I do feel simply when a later moment of my experience succeeds an earlier one is that they are two moments, the transition from the one to the other is \textit{continuous}. Continuity here is a definite sort of experience; just as definite as is the \textit{discontinuity-experience} which I find it impossible to avoid when I seek to make the transition from an experience of my own to one of yours.766

While again James does not use the term "history" here, he does use "time," "past" and "memory," all of which can essentially refer to history. And similarly in the following additional example from James he is arguably referring to history since he also here uses the terms "event" and "years of time": "[...] events separated by years of time in a man's life hang together unbrokenly by the intermediary events. Their \textit{names}, to be sure, cut them into separate conceptual entities, but no cuts existed in the continuum in which they originally came."767

Part of the reason why we cannot really know these "cuts," though they have "names," which are essentially just superficial, is because just as we cannot know reality absolutely or singularly, we cannot know events or experiences as such. Again, \textit{we can just contemplate what we think they are}. The following excerpt demonstrates this, and it can be argued that here in particular the use of "experiences" can be somewhat interchangeable with "historical events";

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765 Ibid., pp. 9478-9479.
767 Ibid., p. 295.
Experiences come on an enormous scale, and if we take them all together, they come in a chaos of incommensurable relations that we cannot straighten out. We have to abstract different groups of them, and handle these separately if we are to talk of them at all. But how the experiences ever get themselves made, or why their characters and relations are just such as appear, we can not begin to understand.\textsuperscript{768}

However, in this next quote he does use the term "history" and appears to be discussing this very same concept just described of "cuts" only being reference to their names, but not their existence, existentially; "We must not forget, namely, in talking of the ultimate character of our activity-experiences, that each of them is but a portion of a wider world, one link in the vast chain of processes of experience out of which history is made."\textsuperscript{769}

We have seen how Ortega uses the metaphor of a movie or a book to understand life, and how it can only be fully understood when we watch all the movie or read all the book. We can also apply this same concept, of a continuum basically, when we compare watching a movie or reading a book versus if we were to look at still photographs of that movie divided up into separate photos or to just read specific, random pages of a book. If we were to just look through the stills, or only read specific, random pages without order, not only would it be difficult to piece them together into an overall flow and meaning, without going through enough of them we would not be able to deduce any meaning at all really (the "enough" is variable really depending on what we are trying to comprehend). In other words, while a movie and a book can be theoretically divided up into still photographs and distinct, separate pages, a "movie" or a "book"

\textsuperscript{768} Ibid., p. 231.

\textsuperscript{769} Ibid., p. 285.
loses its significance and meaning as such (as a "whole product") if we consider these parts separately, though we can consider that a movie is a collection of still photographs or a book a collection of pages strung together creating a continuous flow. In looking at stills or pages we are labeling and naming "moments" but not the movie or book as a whole. Meaning, here again we have anti-dualism; a movie is made up of its stills, and a book is made up of its pages, but they can only be strung together in a continuous flow to result in a movie or a book, so they are interdependent in this way; stills and pages are separate pieces but necessarily all together in a continuous flow as one movie or one book, similar to the example of the alphabet provided by James.

Ortega most certainly sees history as a continuum because it is constantly being shaped; "[...] la vida histórica tiene la condición de cambiar constantemente. La historia es permanente inquietud y mutación."\(^{770}\) In other words, "doing history" is a way to summarize this view of an individual's life as history; as continuously "doing history," a term which is also very pragmatist.

As we have also seen, experience is central to not just James's philosophy, but the pragmatist tradition in general, given its emphasis on practicality, in all that is 'tangible,' and individual perspective. Whether we are referring to truth, reality, etcetera, this comes to us through experience, a term that has been emphasized several times here is intrinsically historical. As Livingston lends further support for this potential interpretation, positing this being the case as well for James,

He keeps stopping to summarize, to emphasize that historical time is the key to his argument. For example, "According to my view, experience as a whole is a process in

time, whereby innumerable particular terms lapse and are superseded by others that
follow upon them by transitions which, whether disjunctive or conjunctive in content, are
themselves experiences, and must in general be accounted at least as real as the terms
which they relate." Indeed James insists that timeless knowledge is impossible if not
inconceivable because "every later moment continues and corroborates an earlier one":
"In this continuing and corroborating, taken in no transcendental sense, but denoting
definitely felt transitions, lies all that the knowing of a percept by an idea can possibly
contain or signify.... Knowledge of sensible realities thus comes to life inside the tissue of
experience. It is made; and made by relations that unroll themselves in time."771

This aforementioned quote by Livingston certainly dialogues with Velázquez Delgado's
proposed summary of Ortega's historicism in the following excerpt, arguing that his history is

[...] proceso acumulado del ser del hombre. Lo que acumula el hombre es, en efecto,
experiencia histórica; la inmensa serie de referentes cognitivas y culturales pero sobre
todo vitales, que heredemos del tiempo muerto o pasado. Experiencias que, como ya se
ha indicado, se hacen presentes a otros hombres como constructores y responsables de
sus propias circunstancias. Tales experiencias son el basamento sobre el cual se establece
la tradición o se genera la innovación. [...] tales experiencias son invariablemente campos
selectivos y como tales son a su vez campos de indentidad.772

771 Stuhr, *100 Years of Pragmatism*, p. 152.

772 VELÁZQUEZ DELGADO, Jorge: *Fragmentos de la modernidad. Filosofía de la historia e imperativo de la
modernidad en José Ortega y Gasset y María Zambrano*, pp. 62-63. (Subsequently referred to as: *Fragmentos.*)
Per James, the continuous flow of experiences clarify our knowledge in a general sense. In other words, "knowledge" and "understanding" is a result of "temporal reasoning," which come to us via experiences. These experiences then accumulate into personal and social biographies, and thus they are historical; they are our histories. And in this aforementioned quote, Velázquez Delgado uses the very pragmatist term "experience" several times, because reading this pragmatically, history is "experiencia histórica" ("historical experience"). All of this is scarcely different than the explanation just provided about James's theory on the continuous flow of experience clarifying our general knowledge via "temporal reasoning" accumulating into the personal and social biographies that are our histories—thus making us historical beings, and this is logical because we have historical experience.

As we saw in the dialogue between Ortega and Dewey, similarly there is a specific way we must understand what is meant by "system" in the historical theory here of James and Ortega. As discussed previously, by "system" what is meant is "human system," which, being as complex as it is, is in a sense in part systematic by not being systematic. In other words, there are some abstract constants in the 'non-systematic system' that is Ortega's view on history, and its study, meaning, and application. And one of these abstract characteristics is this idea that our perspective and interpretation of history is really a continuum, as it is the past, present, and future. This last point must be clarified, however, that when we affirm here that history is a continuum, what is meant (in a very pragmatist sense essentially), is our perception, interpretation, and "believed understanding" of history, but not history itself. Meaning, we cannot know history absolutely or completely, not just because it exists along a never-ending continuum, but also because what we can know is what we think we know of history. So we build ourselves this interpreted continuum of historical pasts, and presents, and in view of and
projected upon the possible futures, which we define, in summation, as simply "history." Further, the continuum of history is not necessarily in and of itself, but rather the way in which we construct a meaning for history of the connected past experiences with the present and in view of the future—this is what we call "history" The continuum of history is simply what we think it is; we perceive the continuum. There is no denying the pragmatist nature of viewing what we understand as history as a continuum, as well as that this continuum is simply what we think it is—and this is very much a feature of Ortega's historicism as well, as clear in the following excerpt from Historia como sistema, not to mention additionally his use of the fundamental term in pragmatism of "experience":

La historia es un sistema—el sistema de las experiencias humanas, que forman una cadena inexorable y única. De aquí que nada pueda estar verdaderamente claro en historia mientras no está toda ella clara. [...] Cualquier término histórico, para ser preciso, necesita ser fijado en función de toda la historia.773

This connects with pragmatist notions of the truth that we saw in how it depends on a present truth being integrated and assimilated into the future; history and historical truths form part of a chain, or a continuum, as Ortega says here, and so historical truths have to be continually integrated and assimilated along that continuum to persist in application and existence. Again nothing can be entirely "clear" in history except what we think it is. While defining "history as a system" could imply that an event has a sense and meaning in the overall structure, again we must clarify a characteristic of "system" to be that sometimes history reveals to us "trends of trends" in what we think history is and means, as raised as well in the section on

773 Ibid., p. 51.
Dewey. Meaning, history does not exactly repeat itself, per se, as the common *refrán* goes, rather there are times when the study of history reveals to us certain "humanistic trends," which can, therefore, be the root of similar situations and reactions (speaking generally). Perhaps we should say, instead, "history as experience" because what we can also say, abstractly, is that history and historical structure and systems are simply what we think they are (without being absolutely demonstrated or proven). For example, Ortega spoke of an "espíritu del tiempo," "ideas de la época," and "creencias de un repertorio colectivo," so to a certain extent there are also specifics to particular periods, making history in this sense, and in part, an *abstract* structured systematic study. Ortega wrote, "[...] la mayor porción de mi mundo, de mis creencias proviene de ese repertorio colectivo, coincide con ellas. El espíritu del tiempo, las ideas de la época en su inmensa porción y mayoría están en mí, son las mías."\(^\text{774}\) And these terms are evidence as to how Ortega does not *fully* deny there is a human nature, which is why we must instead re-phrase his dictum to say man has no nature, only history, because his nature is his history; his history contains his nature. *Exact* repetition does not occur in history, per Ortega, as concisely summarized by Velázquez Delgado (and as many would agree), "Pero en el fondo del asunto lo característico y propio a toda experiencia histórica es su naturaleza única e irrepetible."\(^\text{775}\) And note also here the use of declaring that history is nature in support of this dissertation's thesis.\(^\text{776}\)

\(^\text{774}\) Ortega, *Galileo*, p. 82.

\(^\text{775}\) Velázquez, *Fragmentos*, p. 63.

\(^\text{776}\) Again, history is nature because it is the most fundamental element we have that not only encompasses so much when understood in the most general sense, but it is also the one we can more directly study and contemplate, at least specifically past history, past events. "Our history" implies that of our family and country, or that which is inherited, as one piece of the definition of "history." That which is inherited can also even imply the biological or genetic, which is a fundamental part of the traditional, standard meaning of the term "nature." So history is our nature because history contains our nature, thus history is the most appropriate term to use to define "what we are" since it is broader to include that which surrounds us, that which we experience, contain—so we can use the term "nature," but to say specifically that "*history is our nature.*"
But there are 'trends of trends,' which as has been proposed as a central argument here, is something somewhat systematic.

As Graham further suggests, Ortega

[...] proposed the systematic use of "instrumental concepts" for interpretation, as ultimately the meaning of "history as a system": "the need to think systematically in history" with such carefully elaborated and verifiable concepts. That was historiology in fact, and it was a form of historical instrumentalism. For this technique he owed much more to James than to Dewey, it seems.777

It must be noted here the "instrumentalism" cited in Ortega's work, which as we know is a pragmatist term and concept. In other words, some events, reactions, behaviors, etcetera, may appear to be repetitious, but it is because the motive and cause, or "instrumental elements" (in regards to trends in human behavior and actions) behind it might be similar. Hence part of the reason why Ortega does not think that there can be an explicit "philosophy of history," rather essentially there can just be "historical meditations." He argued,

[...] no hay tal filosofía de la historia. [...] se trata simplemente de ver si en ese caos que es la serie confusa de los hechos históricos pueden descubrirse líneas, facciones, rasgos, en suma, fisonomía; no ha habido época para la que el destino histórico no haya presentado algo así como una cara o sistema de facciones reconocibles.778


James agreed that in the world "Lines of INFLUENCE can be traced [...]"\(^{779}\) And as we shall see this is part of how we can define the study of the discipline of history; i.e., one historical "line of influence" we can search for are 'instrumental trends of trends.'

Above Ortega discusses how historical study leads to the discovery of "líneas, facciones, rasgos," which are elements we can collect in the present, from and of the past, in turn "restoring" and "reestablishing" continuity; the continuum of our perception and interpretation of history. Note here how James and Ortega both use the term "lines," which additionally helps illustrate the concept of a continuum. Here again we must reference the concept of perspectivism shared by both to a certain extent in that the interpretations we make of a continuum of history comes to us via individual perspectives. Thus, there are multiple "continuums of history," no one being true or false—in Ortega's language, the only falsity is to say that one is absolute—it is simply again what we think it is, as we shall continue to see in the following section.

\(^{779}\) James, *Pragmatism and the Meaning of Truth*, p. 50.
XI. Historical Perspectives

History, therefore, just like life, radical reality, and truth, is perspective. As aforementioned, James defined "I" as a "noun of position," and Ortega essentially argued that all comes to us in "perspectivas individuales." History, therefore, is no different. These ideas we saw in the section on Dewey as well, which we will revisit here in the case of James and how he might dialogue with Ortega on these topics. This is an additional part of a "method" of sorts, albeit a general one, that we can apply to the study and understanding of history. Hence, as we shall continue to see, why history does not repeat itself in exact ways, or why all of history can never be fully recorded. This is because every moment recorded is done so through specific perspective(s), and each perspective will have a selective memory, which may or may not be willingly or consciously remembered. Stuhr posited that in regards to James,

It is not difficult to see that our beliefs about the past are perspectival and that they are formed and articulated through selective emphasis. Given the selective nature of our memory, we have to subject to constant critical scrutiny what we remember and forget, as well as how we remember and forget. And the critical examination of how our beliefs about the past are formed and maintained in our memory should be open to a plurality of diverse perspectives in order to avoid limitations and distortions as much as possible and improve their objectivity. [...] Our beliefs about the past maintain their vital force, if they do, thanks to day-to-day epistemic negotiations embedded in a complex network of interpretative practices that always involve a multiplicity of perspectives.780

780 Stuhr, 100 Years of Pragmatism, p. 132.
The first key argument that James is referenced to arguably make here is that what we should first analyze in all this is how we remember and forget, in a general sense, and in turn why we remember and forget what we do. This is the first step in understanding why history cannot be objective, since we are individually selective in our memory, and this therefore differs between individuals in what is remembered, forgotten, and therefore again history, historical memory, is perspective; it comes to us via individual perspectives. And as he continues, the next step is to study and incorporate as many of these individual memories, perspectives, as possible, to get as close as possible to objectivity (but never completely). A better historical theory, therefore, is that which applies, as James arguably insinuates, a "multiplicity of perspectives." This is because again we see things differently, and we have unique sets of experiences, some of which overlap and others which do not; "You see how differently people take things. The world we live in exists diffused and distributed, in the form of an indefinitely numerous lot of eaches, coherent in all sorts of ways and degrees; and the tough-minded are perfectly willing to keep them at that valuation."781

History is perspective and therefore history is subjective. Again what a historian records can never incorporate all the possible perspectives of the time in which he or she is recording and reflecting on because there simply are too many, since each one of us has our own. This is especially true of a history written after the fact (meaning, as opposed to an event, for example, being recorded as it is happening). This James clearly affirms in the following quote: "There have been numerous events in the history of our planet of which nobody ever has been or ever

781 James Pragmatism and the Meaning of Truth, p. 94.
will be able to give an account [...]." Moreover, any one perspective is going to be shaped by a number of factors, most importantly and broadly of which is simply that person's history of course. In other words, we need to speak of "historical perspectives" when we speak of recorded history. But none of this is to say that we cannot, resultantly, study history, again it is just to provide some important criteria and limitations to keep in mind as we develop further the discipline of history, what it means, and how it is studied. As Greeve Davaney support in this,

James stressed as well what might be termed the perspectival character of historical experience and knowledge. Humans do not know everything equally or passively reflect what is before us. Instead, we attend to some things while ignoring others, highlight certain realities while downplaying others that might as well have demanded our attention.

Ortega wrote at great length on his theories of generation and the importance of seeing life, reality, and history in regards to "generations," as one influence on "perspective." His theory of generations is also important to briefly discuss here because it involved his theory of crisis, which was also key for his historical theory; namely, that different generations may have different beliefs, and a generation can enter a period of "crisis" when beliefs are lacking, or proven incorrect, and this is part of what creates a sort of historical division. A "generation" is also a type of "circumstance," which has a specific date and time, so it is thus historical. Just as man must 'decide who he is going to be at any given moment,' so must a generation. Although in the following quote James does not use the term "generation," he does create a "group" together as a "society of men," emphasizing as well this idea of 'living in potential,' just as Ortega

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consistently argues that at every moment we must choose who we are going to be; "Societies of men are just like individuals, in that both at any given moment offer ambiguous potentialities of development." And as he continues,

Each bifurcation cuts off certain sides of the field altogether, and limits the future possible angles of deflection. A community is a living thing, and in words which I can do no better than quote from Professor Clifford, "it is the peculiarity of living things not merely that they change under the influence of surrounding circumstances, but that any change which takes place in them is not lost but retained, and as it were built into the organism to serve as the foundation for future actions. If you cause any distortion in the growth of a tree and make it crooked, whatever you may do afterwards to make the tree straight the mark of your distortion is there; it is absolutely indelible; it has become part of the tree's nature. ... Suppose, however, that you take a lump of gold, melt it, and let it cool. ... No one can tell by examining a piece of gold how often it has melted and cooled in geologic ages, or even in the last year by the hand of man. Any one who cuts down an oak can tell by the rings of its trunk how many times winter has frozen it into widowhood, and how many times summer has warmed it into life. A living being must always contain within itself the history, not merely of its own existence, but of all its ancestors.

As this illustrates, the argument is that for James we indeed have history. And our ancestors (which can be understood as encompassing both nature, as in genes passed on, and nurture, as in the social influence such as the culture and traditions passed on, for instance) and

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784 James, "Great Men, Great Thoughts, and the Environment," paragraph 18.

785 Ibid., paragraph 22.
the generation we are born into are also logically a part of that history. Hence, again, our nature is our history, because history contains our nature, as in the example he cites above of the tree's nature which is its past, which serves as a great metaphor here as each is unique but we can still see the influence of the past in a root's rings. Yet much of the time we will not be able to know all of a past, or history, as in the example he provided of melting gold, which without the fanciest of scientific tools we would not be able to know who melted it and when. Moreover, perhaps in the example of the gold melting and our not being able to determine how many times that had happened over the course of its history, this metaphor can serve as a reminder as to how history can never be fully recorded. And this also dialogues again with *yo soy yo y mi circunstancia* as well, as also noted is the role of circumstance in influencing all this.

Moreover, again we see here how this is the same idea in regards to truth; there is the history (such as historical happenings, events, figures, etcetera), or the truth, and then there is what we think is the history (in other words, our experience of what history is and our resulting interpretations of that experience of history), or the truth, and we cannot know for sure when they coincide. Moreover, what we think is history is of course dependent on history. Perspective and history are anti-dualistically interrelated and interdependent as well. Just as there are multiple realities, no one reality ever being absolute, there are multiple histories, no one history ever being absolute either. All these concepts have this basic foundation in common, which is most tersely summarized again as "anti-dualism," something which has been repeated here as fundamental in pragmatism. Graham proposed as a possible argument here that, in regards to Ortega, "[...] historical "perspective" now changes with every historian and with every
generation, but what is seen, reexperienced, or understood is (in a pragmatist sense) necessarily "true" for us in our epoch and society—in James's sense of "truths" but not 'Truth.' 786

In other words, for Ortega, what the historicist should and tries to recreate, along these lines, is the "reality" of a certain time period or event, which is manifested in the "perspective(s) of the time"—this is how we may attempt to discover the sense, emotion, feeling, or viewpoint, for a particular moment in time, a particular event, person, period or generation, for example. Unique perspective(s) and historical circumstance(s), albeit two different concepts, are connected anti-dualistically. The following explanation by Rodríguez Huescar helps corroborate this idea further:

[...] we continue to "live" in others after we are dead, for this is one of the essential dimensions of history, of what I could call "historical life," as opposed to [my] personal life, however inseparable these two dimensions may be de facto (although they are never inseparable de jure or formaliter), for life is always one and the other, both overlapping and existing for each other's sake. 787

This dialogues again with James's arguments on how to get as close as possible to the "truth," whether it be "historical truth" or some other kind of truth, we need to gather and relate as many perspectives as possible. In other words, in applying this specifically to historicism, while we may not be able to gather all recordings of history, nor can we ever record everything, the more we do collect, the more accurate our historical record will be, without ever being fully complete or truthful of course. So again this adds to studies on Ortega by offering some other

787 Rodríguez Húescar, Metaphysical Innovation, pp. 109-110.
areas of possible conversation, in this case with pragmatism and William James, to add new levels of potential interpretations of his historicism.  

And of course specifically we are focused on better reading his maxim that man has no nature, only history. Again part of the reason for this is because history is our nature, as history contains our nature; because history includes all that we inherit. So again since history is an even broader term than nature, it is therefore the better one to describe how and what we are and come to be, and continuously come to be and have been; to describe how we become who we are—and what we are is our histories.
XII. History as the Evolution of Self and Circumstance

Given the dialogue that can be created between Ortega and James that we have seen in regards to life as self and circumstance, this being so fundamental, it is no different to then apply this to history and the study of history as well, given that self and circumstance lead one in part to his or her unique perspective. History is the essential foundation of "life" that is comprised of "self and circumstance." This Graham posits in the following excerpt, citing Ortega, "To study the past is, then, to study the radical reality that is my life. The past is not a past reality, [...] but is the actual dimension of the past that integrates present reality." As history is a continuum of the past, present, and future, we can also say, therefore, that history is the constant evolution and potential realization of self and circumstance, in the past, present and future. And this inclusion of the focus on the future again is another specific area in which we can create a pragmatist dialogue, as we have seen, as this is intrinsically instrumentalist and functionalist. A pragmatist aspect in this is the searching for something useful and practical in the past to be applied to the future, for example. Ortega wrote,

La historia nace del rebote de nuestra curiosidad, afanosa por el futuro y porvenir, que nos lanza y nos hace descubrir el pretérito. El recordar, el volver la cara atrás, el mirar el pasado no es algo espontáneo que por si acontece sino porque, sin miedo seguro ante la enorme indecisión del porvenir.

789 “Unlike most other philosophers of history, Ortega did not come belatedly to history but instead began with it, for it was an ever essential ingredient of "life," of his "self and circumstance," argued Graham (Graham, Theory of History, p. 26).

790 Ibid., p. 28.

791 Ortega, Interpretación, p. 49.
History always has some aspect that is current; there is always "una dimensión de actualidad," Ortega wrote.\textsuperscript{792}

James also avowed that the past always has a part that is connected to the present as well (logically); "But whether our feeling of the time which immediately-past\* events have filled be of something long or of something short, it is not what it is because those events are past, because they have left behind them processes which are present."\textsuperscript{793} Again history is the study of our (ever-changing) perspectives and interpretations of the past-continued into the present-while looking ahead to the future; "[...] por historia entiendo el estudio de la realidad humana desde el más remoto pasado hasta los hombres presentes inclusive."\textsuperscript{794}

History is the study of human lives and man has history because there is constant variation in how that history progresses and proceeds, as it is not something stable as in the traditional, classic understanding of the term "human nature;" "He aquí, señores," wrote Ortega, "por qué hay historia, por qué hay variación continua de las vidas humanas. Si seccionamos por cualquier fecha el pasado humano, hallamos siempre al hombre instalado en un mundo."\textsuperscript{795}

In what follows, James similarly references that what we have are times, dates, spaces, from which we can study history, and therefore humanity, in and during a particular place and time.

\textsuperscript{792} Ibid., p. 90.

\textsuperscript{793} James, \textit{Principles}, pp. 9891-9892.

\textsuperscript{794} Ortega, \textit{Interpretación}, p. 90.

\textsuperscript{795} Ortega, \textit{Galileo}, p. 80.
No one has anything like a perception of the greater length of the time between now and
the first century than of that between now and the tenth. To an historian, it is true, the
longer interval will suggest a host of additional dates and events, and so appear a more
multitudinous thing. And for the same reason most people will think they directly
perceive the length of the past fortnight to exceed that of the past week. But there is
properly no comparative time intuition in these cases at all. It is but dates and events,
representing time; their abundance symbolizing its length. I am sure that this is so [...]"796

And he continues,

When we come to study the perception of Space, we shall find it quite analogous to time
in this regard. Date in time corresponds to position in space; and although we now
mentally construct large spaces by mentally imagining remoter and remoter positions,
just as we now construct great durations by mentally prolonging a series of successive
dates, yet the original experience of both space and time is always of something already
given as a unit, inside of which attention afterward discriminates parts in relation to each
other.797

Here James seems to highlight the anti-dualistic nature of history in that as a continuum
there are still separate divisions; those "series of successive dates" as he says, so it cannot exist
as such without its part as again they exist interdependently; separate dates (parts) and history as
a continuum (incomplete "whole" because history is not complete as it continues into the future).

796 James, *Principles*, pp. 9673-9678.

797 Ibid., pp. 9511-9515.
In an extension of an aforementioned quote by Ortega he continues writing that history is essentially a continuum, being therefore another point of possible dialogue in this with James,

[...] la cosa, cuando es una realidad parcial, no termina en sí misma, sino que continúa en otra [...] quien quiera ver un ladrillo necesita ver sus poros y, por tanto, acercarlo a los ojos, pero quien quiera ver una catedral no la puede ver a la distancia de un ladrillo. Nos lo exige el respeto de la distancia. Cada cosa nos impone una determinada distancia si queremos obtener de ella una visión óptima. [...] el historiador miope que no sabe desprenderse de los detalles es incapaz de ver un auténtico hecho histórico, y nos da gana de gritarle que la historia es aquella manera de contemplar las cosas humanas desde la distancia suficiente para que no sea necesario ver la nariz de Cleopatra.

To reiterate as a key part of Ortega's historicism: the critique here is essentially that a historical analysis should be done from all distances (i.e., perspectives), not just one. Ortega criticized how in his day historical study often committed this error by examining history from too close a perspective. It is important, therefore, to study and preserve all layers and perspectives in history—or at least as many as possible, to revisit this point of dialogue with James that we have seen.

This, therefore is one way to somewhat "structuralize" history and its study, but it remains, nevertheless, as such, perspectival, subjective, and still lacking in a more formalized logic and system. Therefore, as we shall continue to see in what follows, these are important limiting factors to keep in mind as we explore the discipline of history, what it means, and how it should be studied.

798 Ortega, Interpretación, p. 66.
XIII. The Study of History

Now that we have established some key features of what history essentially means to James and Ortega, some of which overlap of course with those we saw in the first section of James's fellow pragmatist John Dewey, we can put this together into a potential dialogue between the two in regards to how the discipline should and could further be studied. In order to study history, per Ortega, we need to see it as fundamental to understanding humanity, and therefore in the same way as man or woman; that history has no nature, only its history, essentially, as he wrote,

La razón histórica, en cambio, no acepta nada como mero hecho, sino que fluidifica todo hecho en el fieri de que proviene: ve cómo se hace el hecho. No cree aclarar los fenómenos humanos reduciéndolos a un repertorio de instintos y <<facultades>>—que serían, en efecto, hechos brutos, como el choque y la atracción—, sino que muestra lo que el hombre hace con esos instintos y facultades, e inclusive nos declara cómo han venido a ser esos <<hechos>>—los instintos y las facultades—, que no son, claro está, más que ideas—interpretaciones—que el hombre ha fabricado en una cierta coyuntura de su vivir.799

Again Ortega gives history "fluidity," as it is a continuum, in how we see and interpret history. And Ortega also reiterates here the argument that history cannot reveal itself in its absolute true nature; we cannot know it entirely, but rather it reveals, simply stated, what we think it reveals, so just ideas, interpretations, which are, therefore, 'human-made.'

799 Ortega, Historia, pp. 59-60.
History is the radical reality that is life; "[...] Ortega was a pragmatist and neo-positivist (committed to an "absolute positivism") in his search for system, structure, schematic models, and regularities with variables, for he understood "history" as "the systematic science of that radical reality," or "the basic reality" of human life," proposed Graham.800

As also discussed in length in the section on Dewey, while there are a number of reasons for the following, we must conclude, in line with both Ortega and James, that history can never really be fully studied. In other words, even if one were to live in the moment to be recorded, one can never take in and be, include, every perspective of that soon-to-be historical moment. As noted, this is the same as one's unique perspective on reality or truth, and therefore reality or truth itself; there is no one absolute, just a multitude, none of which are true or false (it is simply false to say one is absolute). History is always recorded and written from a specific perspective, or sometimes a group of perspectives, but never all of them. Therefore, what we can say is that history can be recorded in parts, but never completely. And furthermore, history really does not stop since it is not just past, it is also present and future (again history is a continuum). This general idea is arguably essentially what James called the "specious present";

When a long-past event is reproduced in memory and conceived with its date, the reproduction and conceiving traverse the specious present. The immediate content of the latter is thus all my direct experiences, whether subjective or objective. Some of these meanwhile may be representative of other experiences indefinitely remote.801

800 Graham, *Theory of History*, p. 50. Again it must be noted that "neo-positivist" is a term that Graham has applied here to Ortega in his arguments, but this is not again something that Ortega used himself.

801 James, *Principles*, pp. 9846-9849. History is perspective; as aforementioned, we are, whether willingly or consciously or not, selective in our memory. And historians, no matter how hard they may try, cannot escape this
So again the recording and subsequent study of history, therefore, should incorporate as many different perspectives as possible. This only "improves" objectivity but does not provide full objectivity. But given that we would never be able to incorporate all of them, what we should be doing, therefore, essentially, is "negotiating" between them and figuring out which are most imperative, useful, etcetera, for example, as James says,

The idea that retrospection can proceed through the meshing of diverse perspectives suggests a negotiating model of memory. According to this pluralistic negotiating model, memory is not something that can be fully monopolized, and, therefore, it always remains beyond the exclusive control of any singular perspective, be it the perspective of a particular individual or that of a particular group or institution. Our memory, both individual and collective, is forged and maintained through negotiating processes (often unconscious) in which different experiential standpoints intersect and different agential perspectives are coordinated. The past of individuals and peoples is not something fixed and inert; our epistemic relation with the past is always in the making through our agency and negotiations.802

In an article that appeared in the Atlantic Monthly by William James, published in 1880, titled "Great Men, Great Thoughts, and the Environment" (and which was originally a lecture he gave at the Harvard Natural History Society), he discussed quite a bit about his thoughts on either. To illustrate this shared point, we must quote again here the following explanation from James: "It is not difficult to see that our beliefs about the past are perspectival and that they are formed and articulated through selective emphasis. Given the selective nature of our memory, we have to subject to constant critical scrutiny what we remember and forget, as well as how we remember and forget. And the critical examination of how our beliefs about the past are formed and maintained in our memory should be open to a plurality of diverse perspectives in order to avoid limitations and distortions as much as possible and improve their objectivity" (Stuhr, 100 Years of Pragmatism, p. 132).

802 Ibid..
history, which is a rare find. The following excerpt from this piece explains more generally why it is that history will always be viewed and recorded selectively, subjectively:

The human mind is essentially partial. It can be efficient at all only by picking out what to attend to, and ignoring everything else, —by narrowing its point of view. Otherwise, what little strength it has is dispersed, and it loses its way altogether. Man always wants his curiosity gratified for a particular purpose. 803

This, as we saw, was the same concern fundamentally expressed by Ortega in the aforementioned quote in which he criticizes historians of his days of having "myopia" (near-sightedness).

What we have in the way of history books, therefore, can never encompass everything and should, therefore, be read that way—as not absolute. In fact, there are events, individuals, acts, to cite just a few elements, that may never even make it into the books, which to some may be considered of utmost importance. This we can conclude from the following quote from James, even though he does not reference history exactly and specifically, but he references experiences (which we at times here use interchangeably with history), as well as time and predecessors; "Some experiences simply abolish their predecessors without continuing them in any way. Others are felt to increase or to enlarge their meaning, to carry out their purpose, or to bring us nearer to their goal." 804

There is a selective memory in history, based in part on interest per James. History is what we think it is, and our selective interests shape and define that in part in the first place.

803 James, "Great Men, Great Thoughts, and the Environment," paragraph 6.

804 McDermott, The Writings of William James, p. 203.
Again, in order to understand the past, history, we have to remember to always see it as perspective and as a continuum. And this does not include just the specific study of history, but anything that incorporates, whether subtly or very directly, the past, as James proceeds,

The past is constantly being recreated in our everyday practices through a plurality of heterogeneous interpretative activities, formal and informal, conscious and unconscious. These diverse interpretative activities that recreate the past and maintain our memories alive include heavily regulated practices designed for this purpose: for example, writing and reading historical narratives (memoirs, biographies, history books, etc.), celebrating commemorations, and creating and consuming historical artworks (movies, paintings, novels, songs, etc.); but also more informal activities that have a historical or retrospective component: for example, habits and customs that reproduce how things had been done previously; ways of talking (naming, describing, praising, etc.) that echo in particular ways past subjects, events, and cultures; and ways of using and interpreting symbols from the past (e.g., the confederate flag, the cross, the pink triangle, etc.). There are many institutions (museums, historical societies, universities, governments, etc.), many artifacts (archives, libraries, public commemorative objects such as statues, plaques, etc.), and many disciplines (history, anthropology, museology, cultural criticism, etc.) that actively participate in the epistemic practices that shape our beliefs about the past; but even more importantly, there is always an irreducible plurality of experiential and agential perspectives involved in these practices. For the agents who participate in the interpretative practices that recreate the past have (or at least can have) differently
organized and differently situated selves with different temperaments, and they go about
differently in the assessment of their memories and in the reconstruction of their past. 805

The first and last parts of this long excerpt are the most important here. First, James
argues that the past is essentially constantly being re-interpreted, whether we are aware of it or
not, so we can conclude from this that any historical recording is not final, and is constantly
being re-defined. So in that sense historical record can tell us more about our selective interests,
and of that time, and the specific time itself in which it was recorded, than the historical details
themselves. Second, at the end James affirms that each historical reading is based on selective
perspective, so at any one time there are multiple ways, means, views, to see, interpret, and
define history and what we resultantly record. Thus, we cannot say absolutely that one historical
recording is ever more true over another.

This certainly dialogues with Ortega per his view that man is not a fixed entity, so neither
is his history. Most tersely stated, he argued, "El tema de la historia queda así formalmente
precisado como el estudio de las formas o estructuras que ha tenido la vida humana desde que
hay noticia." 806 And more specifically, Ortega outlined two criteria: first, that man is not a fixed
being, and second, for this reason, he only has history (and no nature, although this is because
history is his nature). He added,

Esto nos permite formular dos principios fundamentales para la construcción de la
historia:

805 Suhr, 100 Years of Pragmatism, p. 132.
806 Ortega, Galileo, p. 81.
1. El hombre constantemente hace mundo, forja horizonte.

2. Todo cambio del mundo, del horizonte, trae consigo un cambio en la estructura del drama vital. El sujeto psico-fisiológico que vive, el alma y el cuerpo del hombre pueden no cambiar; no obstante, cambia su vida porque ha cambiado el mundo. Y el hombre no es su alma y su cuerpo, sino su vida, la figura de su problema vital.807

As also just seen with James, Ortega as well argues that man is constantly making, and re-making, his world, and therefore his history. Although there is emphasis here on individual life, this is not the only or main objective focus in historical study, as Ortega continued: "La historia no se ocupa sólo de tal vida individual [...] cada vida esta sumergida en una determinada circunstancia de una vida colectiva."808 There is of course an important sociological aspect to the study of history for Ortega, given as we have seen his emphasis on the anti-dualistic relationship in life with generations and circumstances as well. History, like life, is self/selves and circumstance(s).

As explored in the dialogue with Dewey, Ortega does argue that there are "trends of trends," as something at least partially 'systematic,' essentially, as we saw he used phrases like "espíritu del tiempo," ideas de la época," and "creencias del repertorio colectivo." And as a summary of this, part of what we can consider somewhat "systematic" in Ortega's historicism is his theory of generations in that there is a historical division of generations that manifest these 'trends of trends' cited (and he even cited this being divided by approximately fifteen years). This is a specific method that Ortega wants historians to adopt;

807 Ibid., p. 81.

808 Ibid., p. 82.
La idea de las generaciones, convertida en método de investigación histórica, no consiste más que en proyectar esa estructura sobre todo el pasado. Todo lo que no sea esto es renunciar a descubrir la auténtica realidad de la vida humana en cada tiempo —que es la misión de la historia.  

The aforementioned idea that in order to record history as accurately as possible (but it cannot ever be fully accurate), we need to incorporate as many perspectives as possible, is one that James concludes in the following excerpt:

Our beliefs about the past maintain their vital force, if they do, thanks to day-to-day epistemic negotiations embedded in a complex network of interpretative practices that always involve a multiplicity of perspectives. It is within these plural and diverse interpretative practices that our epistemic negotiations about individual and collective memories take place, and the objectivity and truth of our beliefs about the past is established.  

Though James in the previous quote specifically does reference "objectivity" and "truth," what we can safely conclude is that again this is in terms of what we think history is; we can study what we think, and have thought, history is and was—or will be. And this is because he still also uses the terms "interpretative" and "multiplicity of perspectives" in, as he says, "our beliefs about the past"—"beliefs," not absolutes or truths. And of course again we know that Ortega would converse with James on this because of Ortega's central dictum that there is not one absolute perspective, such as on history or on a specific historical moment. And again this

809 Ibid., p. 87.
810 Stuhr, 100 Years of Pragmatism, p. 132.
applies to how we study history: we should gather as many perspectives as possible, while keeping in mind the limitation that we can never gather them all. Thus, history can never be recorded completely, and as such it can never be studied in its entirety or in complete accuracy. It is important to be aware of these limitations, but not, of course, to say that we cannot study history, rather we should just keep in mind what the results represent, exactly, when we do ponder the discipline.

So as we have seen, not only is it impossible to record all feasible perspectives, but we also cannot be certain of the accuracy of each perspective in and of itself. History cannot be fully objective, as history is perspective. Again as James notes there is always some degree of subjectivity integrated. As aforementioned James cites the need to "negotiate" among the different interpretations of the past (as many as possible, because acquiring and reading all is not possible). This therefore is key in pondering a methodology for historical study.

When we assess the objectivity of our beliefs about the past and of the interpretative practices in which they were formed, we have to consider whether there has been an unbiased process of negotiation among differing perspectives, that is, whether our beliefs and interpretations have been compared with others in a negotiating process in which each perspective has been given an equal voice and treated with equal respect.  

And this can certainly dialogue with the following argument from Ortega:

Porque historia es entender bien las realidades humanas a que estos documentos aluden y que esos documentos son, y esta intelección supone poseer todo un surtido de difíciles

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811 Ibid., p. 132.
teorías, fundamentales unas e instrumentales otras, que esos beneméritos hombres no conocen e ignoran concienzudamente, tanto que ni siquiera las echan de menos. Pero sin ellas no hay historia. Por eso es la historia todavía una ciencia adolosecente que con frecuencia balbucea.  

And hence Ortega's desire to transform the study of history into "una ciencia adulta." At first glance this can seem a bit contradictory in that Ortega denies the role of science, math, or physics for the study of humanity—which this last is the purpose of history in regards to its changes—yet this is also, in some specific senses, what he wants to convert it into. Ortega wants to advance the discipline of history to a systematic and essentially therefore somewhat "scientific" level, in the sense of being practical, rational, organized, somewhat exact and precise—but all in specific ways that do not in any way interfere with the complexities of humans, human emotions, or human behaviors, which cannot be studied in such a tangible and systematized way. Ortega clarified,

La historia necesita de una peculiar exactitud, precisamente la exactitud histórica que no es la matemática, y cuando se quiere suplantar aquélla con ésta se cae en errores como el de esta objeción que podía muy bien haber extremado más las cosas reclamando el nombre de coetáneos exclusivamente para los nacidos en una misma hora o en un mismo minuto.

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813 Ibid., p. 91.
814 Ortega, *Galileo*, pp. 87-88.
As quoted, a specific method that Ortega wanted historians to adopt was "La idea de las generaciones, convertida en método de investigación histórica, no consiste más que en proyectar esa estructura sobre todo el pasado," which was because for Ortega, "[... ] la edad es,[...] un cierto modo de vivir. [...] La edad, pues, no es una fecha, sino una <<zona de fechas>> y tienen la misma edad, vital e históricamente."815 And this is important because within that "zona de fechas" we can find that "el hombre vive en un mundo de convicciones, la mayor parte de las cuales son convicciones en su época: es el espíritu del tiempo."816 Again, Ortega uses terms to describe that there are at least "trends of trends" that we can search for and study in history, as he says that generations have "convictions (or beliefs) for their era" (convicciones en su época) and a "spirit of the time" (espíritu del tiempo). Moreover, since there is a specific division of fifteen years in Ortega's generations, this gives his historicism an element of structure, system, and what he called for, "an adult science." And finally, as Ortega then summarized,

Y como el tema de la historia no es la vida humana, que es asunto de la filosofía—sino los cambios, las variaciones de ella—, tendremos que el mundo vigente en cada fecha es el factor primordial de la historia. Pero ese mundo cambia con cada generación porque la anterior ha hecho algo en el mundo, lo ha dejado más o menos distinto de como lo encontró.817

So, as Ortega posits, there are some specifics in historical generations, which is something we can study. And he argues that history is not about "human life just itself," but

815 Ibid., pp. 87-88.
816 Ibid., p. 91.
817 Ibid., p. 91.
rather the changes in human lives. This is because the former would imply "human nature," and more importantly what we can study are these "variations and changes" as he says, in human lives, or history, in history. This emphasis on variations and changes arguably would converse smoothly with the aforementioned notion of James that experience is also the transition between experiences. For reference, this was one example of a quote on this from James: "Personal histories are processes of change in time, and the change itself is one of things immediately experienced."\textsuperscript{818} Clearly, therefore, this dialogues with Ortega's position above that the study of history includes the changes and variations in and of human lives.

As history is a continuum; the past, present, and future, each of these generational divisions contains all the history prior up to that present as well, as he continued,

\[\text{[\ldots] cada generación humana lleva en sí todas las anteriores y es como un escorzo de la historia universal. Y en el mismo sentido es preciso reconocer que el pasado es presente, somos su resumen, que nuestro presente está hecho con la materia de ese pasado, el cual pasado, por tanto, es actual.}\textsuperscript{819}

Thus, as James also affirmed, summarizing this possibly shared dialogue concisely, "Space and time are thus vehicles of continuity."\textsuperscript{820}

\textsuperscript{818} Stuhr, 100 Years of Pragmatism, p. 153. As another example noted earlier, for reference here, James proclaimed in reference to defining radical his empiricism that, "the relations that connect experiences must themselves be experienced relations, and any kind of relation experience must be accounted as 'real' as anything else in the system" (James, Essays, p. 490).

\textsuperscript{819} Ortega, Galileo, p. 94.

\textsuperscript{820} James, Pragmatism and the Meaning of Truth, p. 50.
And this is why Ortega's theory of generations is "el método fundamental para la investigación histórica," because it is within this that we can search for and study any 'trends of trends,' not to mention that, frankly speaking, history, as a formal discipline of study must have *some* organization and discipline.\(^{821}\) Through the division of generations we find the variations of human life, which is what Ortega believed the discipline of history should be; through the comparison and contrast of generations, we can study and better understand how humanity has changed and these are some of the "variations" he was referring to (rather than more metaphysical topics such as the study of life in and of itself, which is for the philosophers, per Ortega, rather than historians, reasonably).

Again, this is also another motive for why Ortega argued that man has no nature (as here we are studying the variations, changes in humanity, rather than any fixed or stable characteristics within an individual), but rather history (we are those changes, variations, because we are all the generations that have come before us as well as our own, and more; we are our history, not our nature, though history encompasses our nature, and more).\(^{822}\) As Ortega continued, "El hombre es primariamente su vida —una cierta trayectoria con tiempo máximo prefijado. Y la edad, [...], es ante todo una etapa de esa trayectoria y no un estado de su cuerpo no de su alma."\(^{823}\) It is, therefore, again through the study of generations that we find what are *possibly some* of the 'trends of trends' of each one because, although he is speaking in general terms here (and for a specialized "new" type of discipline of history, as a so-called "adult science," it would be helpful to provide perhaps a bit more in the way of more concrete

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\(^{821}\) Ortega, *Galileo*, p. 94.

\(^{822}\) As another example, Ortega reiterates, "la generación implica ineludiblemente la serie de toda de las generaciones" (Ibid., p. 99).

\(^{823}\) Ibid., p. 95.
specifics), nonetheless, "[...] cada generación tenía por fuerza que ver sus problemas desde una altura distinta. [...] el principio general de que cada quince años cambia el cariz de la vida." Ortega does, therefore, provide some structure by dividing generations specifically in fifteen-year increments. Again generally speaking, he continues, "Un mismo hecho acontecido a dos generaciones diferentes es una realidad vital, y por tanto, histórica, completamente distinta."  

Per Ortega, as we know one factor that we always find in history is man among his circumstances; the circumstances are 'spacial' and temporal, within which we are born, live, and pass on. So this is one characteristic that we can study, at least in part; the unique, concrete set of circumstances in any one moment or period of history, or in our generation(s), or our generation(s) itself. So perhaps here again we can continue to search for something systematic. And more specifically, one type of circumstance, as noted, is a man's generation. Generations shape and move history; they are "agentes o sujetos históricos que participan en forma diversa en las variaciones vitales de la historia," as they are "referentes espacio-temporales" in a "determinado momento colectivo de la historia." Again each generation is also representative of a historical set of perspectives.

As previously mentioned, Ortega further divides the concept of generational divisions into a focus on historical crisis periods within generations. Life is a drama, life is insecurity for Ortega. Life is about 'being shipwrecked,' to use one of his most frequently cited metaphors, so crises are key in moving history. He wrote, "Porque nuestra idea es reacción a un problema [...]  

824 Ibid., p. 102.
825 Ibid., p. 104.
Y esta observación me importaba mucho hacerla porque es la clave para entender las crisis históricas. But Ortega defines "crisis" quite generally (which is a bit of a weak point here because as an "adult science" it would be useful to have a more detailed structure to apply, but this is in part precisely what he is asking that we explore and develop). Essentially Ortega considers a "period of historical crisis" when there is a shift in "convictions," which we can also understand here as "beliefs" (creencias) between two successive generations; "[...] hay crisis histórica cuando el cambio de mundo se produce consiste en que al mundo o sistema de convicciones de la generación anterior sucede a un estado vital en que el hombre se queda sin aquellas convicciones, por tanto, sin mundo." And having convicciones, or "beliefs" (creencias), is essential in life, as we saw, in Ortega's philosophy; "Vivir es siempre, quiérase o no, estar en alguna convicción, creer algo cerca del mundo y de sí mismo"—hence why not having them would result in "crisis." Perhaps we can also interpret this via a dialogue with pragmatism in how for both Ortega and pragmatists such as James the idea is to recuperate the fluidity of the continuum of experiences, to use the pragmatist term, or of the continuum of "history" to use Ortega's emphasis.

Having "convictions" is important because as concisely explained by González, "History, then, is the outer manifestations of an internal dialectic of beliefs and convictions." And this is Ortega's "historical reason" (razón histórica), González continues,

827 Ortega, Galileo, p. 112.
828 Ibid., p. 118.
829 Ibid., p. 119.
830 Gonzalez, Ortega y Gasset's Philosophy of Subjectivity, p. 2147.
Convictions then, as the core of the dialectic of the lived experience attempt to question the opinions prevalent both in the past as well as the present in order to give them form and thus make concrete our immediacy. This task, Ortega gives the designation “historical reason.” He [man] goes on accumulating being—the past; he goes on making for himself a being through his dialectical series of experiments. This is a dialectic not of logical but precisely of historical reason.\textsuperscript{831}

Since history is a continuum ('man goes on accumulating being,' but this is not a logical reason, but a historical reason—hence this being an abstract sort of system), we need to study it as such, which means that we need to study it as the past, present, and future. This is also how we would apply James's empiricism to historical study, or his "content empiricism" specifically, as explained by Richard Gale,

\[\ldots\] and there seemingly is no way to explain why it is not without tracing the past history of this cap against that of my original cap in order to show that it is not spatio-temporally continuous with the original cap. Thus, unless it is possible to refer to a past object qua past object, it is not possible to determine that a present object is the referent of a past act of reference. In order to show how a past object can be referred to he must again supplement his pragmatic account of meaning with that of content empiricism. In the case of my cap that is now in the next room, my causal recipe for getting my hands on it must be supplemented by a content empiricism description of the cap's past history, its continuous history since I purchased it seven years ago, that is, a description of the

\textsuperscript{831} Ibid., p. 2154-2158.
experiences that would have been had were an observer to have continuously observed it over this seven-year interval. And this is content empiricism.\textsuperscript{832}

Again the basic conclusion in all this, therefore, is that again we must remember that we cannot ever completely record and therefore study and subsequently understand history given the impossibility to integrate and apply all the different perspectives along that vast continuum that add to shaping and creating that history. Moreover, if history is a continuum that proceeds from the past and also exists in the present and projects into the future, since 'the future has not arrived yet,' this is another reason we generally cannot be conclusive in historical study, as this would involve 'predicting the future,' which of course we cannot always do. The discipline of history is, therefore, an open-ended one in which study is continuous, just as history itself. The study of history should, therefore, also be seen as a continuum. This is why Ortega argues that history can only be narrated; "razón histórica" can not be deduced, for example, it can only be recited; "La razón histórica, que no consiste en inducir ni deducir, sino lisamente en narrar, es la única capaz de entender las realidades humanas, porque la contextura de estas es ser históricas, es historicidad."\textsuperscript{833}

James also posited that history, and therefore logically its study, is ceaseless of course,

It is important to note that the critical reconstruction of one's past is a never-ending task.

No matter how much critical reflection goes into the establishment and evaluation of our

\textsuperscript{832} Stuhr, \textit{100 Years of Pragmatism}, p. 116.

\textsuperscript{833} Ortega, \textit{Interpretación}, p. 108.
memories, the critical reconstruction of our beliefs about the past cannot reach an end-point and be declared final.834

By "critical reconstruction" we can logically understand here "historical study"—which is a never-ending task. Again, history itself, and thus historical study, is ceaseless.

This most certainly dialogues with Ortega's shared view that a historian's work is never finished. He averred, "[...] la pupila del historiador para ver una cosa determinada [...] tiene que moverse sin cesar, oscilando constantemente del pasado al futuro, del futuro al pasado."835

Of course Ortega uses the literal 'metaphor' of pupil since history and historical study comes to us via different, unique, and specific perspectives. History is always unfinished (despite the term traditionally implying the exact opposite) not only because it is open to the future but also because we are constantly incorporating new perspectives (never all of them of course), and so as James added, history and historical study is constantly changing. So again the historian's task continues to be endless and limitless.

History must be read like a novel, as we must read it in order (this is arguably similar to James's aforementioned example of ABCDEFG leading to BCDEFGH). And this is another piece of what is "systematic" to a certain extent in Ortega's historicism, which most appropriately perhaps we should call a "requisite" in his "system," or form of historical study.

Por eso la canción de la historia sólo se puede cantar entera —después de todo, como la vida de un hombre sólo se entiende cuando se cuenta de su principio a su fin. La historia

834 Stuhr, 100 Years of Pragmatism, p. 133.
es sistema —un sistema lineal tendido en el tiempo. La serie de las formas de vida humana que ha habido, en efecto, no son infinitas, son unas cuantas, tantas como generaciones, unas cuantas precisas y determinadas que se suceden unas a otras [...] Porque en la vida humana va inclusa toda otra realidad, es ella la realidad radical, y cuando una realidad es la realidad, la única que propiamente hay, es, claro está, transcendente. He aquí por qué la historia —aunque no lo hayan creído las últimas generaciones— es la ciencia superior, la ciencia de la realidad fundamental —ella y no la física. 836

Although Ortega does refer here to history needing to be studied from start to finish, arguably what he means here is 'ideally,' and more specifically and appropriately just along as much of that continuum as possible, since in reality along all of it is not possible. Here also we find an anti-dualistic dialogue along pragmatist lines in this idea of continuum and therefore reading and studying history ideally just like a novel, in order—the idea that each "chapter," or each "page" in history is singular yet part of a larger "book" or "story," one not existing without the other, as they are separate elements but bound all together in one book. The following additional excerpt of Ortega's illustrates this very clearly, where here he uses the metaphor of a movie instead of a book in this case, but these fundamental ideas just outlined are the same (just as with "pages in a book" there are "screenshots/still images in a movie"), as quoted earlier;

La historia, en efecto, es, en una de sus dimensiones, cinematografía. Cada hombre vive en una actualidad, en un paisaje vital, en un mundo, en un sistema de creencias —todas expresiones son sinónimos— que de ordinario está quieto por lo menos en sus grandes

836 Ortega, Galileo, pp. 144-45.
líneas topográficas. Pero ese paisaje o estructura de la vida cambia en cada generación y aunque cada uno de ellos sea quieto, como lo es cada fotografía de la película, su sucesión da un movimiento.837

Compare this with the following excerpt of James also cited earlier:

The world is full of partial stories that run parallel to one another, beginning and ending at odd times. They mutually interlace and interfere at points, but we cannot unify them completely in our minds. In following your life-history, I must temporarily turn my attention away from my own. [...] It is easy to see the world's history pluralistically, as a rope of which every fibre tells a separate tale; but to conceive of each cross-section of the rope as an absolutely single fact, and to sum the whole longitudinal series into one being living an undivided life, is harder. [...] the world is unified by its many systems, kinds, purposes, and dramas. [...] That there MAY be one sovereign purpose, system, kind, and story, is a legitimate hypothesis. All I say here is that it is rash to affirm this dogmatically without better evidence than we possess at present.838

The notion that the world's "partial stories that run parallel to one another, beginning and ending at odd times. They mutually interlace and interfere at points, but we cannot unify them completely in our minds" is one which resonates with and helps us understand more profoundly Ortega's conviction that 'we are ourselves and our circumstances.' And a rope with its separate unique fibers all interconnected is another excellent and clear way to understand the ceaseless, anti-dualistic progression of history and the multiple tales, or perspectives, present at any one


838 James, *Pragmatism*, p. 54.
time along its continuum. And just the same, whether we are speaking of pages in a book, screenshots in a movie, or a rope in James's account — whatever the metaphor be to illustrate this anti-dualism in the continuum that is life, which is history — through this succession we can search for and find some trends of trends that might even have a certain degree of logic. Hence why Ortega can call his historicism to a certain extent "systematic," as illustrated in the continuation from the excerpt on applying the metaphor of cinematography to history, because at the very least, that is the objective; to create something hopefully more systematic, even if at times abstract:

Pero claro es que si al reconstruir nosotros el pasado mediante la historia, hallamos que cada nueva época o estadio emerge del anterior con una cierta lógica o, dicho de otro modo, que a cada forma de vida sucede otra que no es cualquiera, sino precisamente una que la anterior predetermina, quiere decirse que también será posible en alguna medida lo contrario, a saber; viviendo en un época vaticinar como será en sus líneas generales la inmediata futura, en suma, que es en serio posible la profecía.\(^\text{839}\)

Per Ortega, historical "pieces" are of course not random, rather previous ones are connected to present ones which will eventually be connected to future ones as, regardless of strength or degree, some extent of connection is there in the continuum that is history. Or, as more concisely stated by Blas González "history is indeed the system of my experiences, which are “linked in a single, inexorable chain”\(^\text{840}\) While Ortega is not cited here as explicitly using the example of a rope, as James did, Blas González describes historical progression as a chain

\(^{839}\) Ortega, *Galileo*, pp. 183-84.

\(^{840}\) Gonzalez, *Ortega y Gasset's Philosophy of Subjectivity*, pp. 2167-2168.
when explaining his argument on Ortega's theory here, which fundamentally is no different. Moreover, he uses the specific, very pragmatist application of the term "experience." Hence why this quote is included here, as further evidence for leanings toward there being a possible pragmatist dialogue to imagine with Ortega. So in connecting this possible dialogue further with James, we could add here that experiences which have proven successful in the past and have 'made some sort of difference,' we can then take what we have learned and gained to verify them as such in practice, confirm their utility, and then apply them to creating better future(s).

Personal history is indeed the system of my experiences, which are “linked in a single, inexorable chain.” Thus, what we take to be life as biographical, emotional, and experiential reality, Ortega simply views as an inevitable and ongoing dialectic that will take place regardless of our being conscious of it or not. This existential dialectic that makes up personal life is directly responsible for the movement of history that manifests itself as quantitative and universal.841

But again as Ortega pleaded the study of history does not just imply reading and reviewing that "novel" from any one, strict view. For example, it should not be read from a strictly individual or just a social perspective, per se. It is not about just psychology or sociology. The study of history is not just about "the lives and events of the past," for example, it is about, as Ortega argued,

La historia se ocupa en averiguar cómo han sido las vidas humanas, pero suele malentenderse la expresión como si se tratase de inquirir cuál ha sido el carácter de los

841 Ibid., pp. 2167-2171. Furthermore, "The vital project that is autonomous and individual human lived experience makes up the indeterminate body of universal history. This is why Ortega contends that to understand history, it is first essential to comprehend individual life as autobiography and personal narrative and therefore as task" (Ibid., pp. 2174-2177).
sujetos humanos. La vida no es sin más ni más el hombre, es decir, el sujeto que vive. Sino que es el drama de ese sujeto al encontrarse teniendo que brasear; que nadar náufrago en el mundo. La historia no es, pues, primordialmente psicología de los hombres, sino reconstrucción de la estructura de ese drama que se dispara entre el hombre y el mundo.

[...] Es preciso que la historia abandone el psicologismo o subjetivismo en que sus más finas producciones actuales andan perdidas y reconozca que su misión es reconstruir las condiciones objetivas en que los individuos, los sujetos humanos han estado sumergidos. De aquí su pregunta radical tiene que ser, no cómo han variado los seres humanos, sino como ha variado la estructura objetiva de la vida.

[...] La pregunta radical de la historia se precisa, pues, así: ¿qué cambios de la estructura vital ha habido? ¿Cómo, cuándo, y por qué cambia la vida?842

This last part certainly dialogues with James's basic question that he posits pragmatism should ask about the general aim to discover 'what difference something would make.' This last sentence of Ortega's, therefore, would arguably dialogue very smoothly with pragmatism.

842 Ortega, Galileo, pp. 74-75.
XIV. Conclusions

While this all may sound pessimistic and negative to mostly conclude that we cannot ever completely record and therefore study and know history, the idea, nonetheless, is that in order to understand it as much and as best as possible, and improve the discipline (as it is a very important one), these are some of the "prerequisites," or standards, that we need to have in mind always. None of this should read as an impossibility to create a more logical, systematic, and scientific-like discipline of history, but rather it should be read as a critique of the important limitations to the study that we must always keep at the forefront, and that we need to consider before we outline how we can improve historical reading, revision, and interpretation. We will get closer, therefore, to the "truth" on history, but not right on target. It will remain, however, the truth that we think it is on history, and we will not reach the actual truth(s) in and of it(Them)self(ves). But we will improve the discipline of history, nonetheless.

This is what James appeared to believe, as witnessed in the following quote:

The reconstruction of our past—both individual and collective—has to contend with a plurality of perspectives and must, in that sense, be polyphonic. The memory of an individual or of a people cannot be monopolized, that is, it cannot be completely unified and fully controlled by a single perspective.843

This again certainly resounds with Ortega's affirmation of perspectivism and the argument that the only erroneous perspective is the one which claims to be the only and absolute

843 Stuhr, 100 Years of Pragmatism, p. 136.
—for example, how "positivist rationalism" denies any reality that cannot be explained rationally.

And as James also posited,

Our memory (both individual and collective) always remains open to reinterpretation and renegotiation. The articulation and interpretation of memories (as well as their critical reconstruction) require the weaving of past and present experiences and their projection into the future, that is, the delineating of trajectories: our beliefs about the past get articulated and interpreted in relation to the present and future; and this means through the mediation of our understanding of the present and our vision of the future (or of possible futures in the plural). This task of articulating and interpreting by delineating trajectories can always be carried out in multiple and varied ways since subjects and groups are differently situated with respect to their past, given the different circumstances of their lives.\(^{844}\)

It must be reiterated here James's emphasis on the idea of circumstances in this excerpt to further corroborate the possibility for a dialogue with Ortega. Additionally, again history weaves together like the threads on a continuous, never-ending rope as James also references here.

Moreover, recognizing further the subjectivity in the recording and study of history will help us better see each historical revision for what it is, and the accuracy it may or may not have for itself and its own perspective. In other words, we will incorporate into our study how the piece we are reviewing is uniquely subjective and therefore study its accuracy for its own perspective (but not necessarily for history in general, just a part), because history, as James

\(^{844}\) Ibid., p. 136.
argues, needs to be "open to reinterpretation and renegotiation." If we focus on history as a perspective (not as history in a potential completeness), then perhaps we can analyze in a comparison and contrast the different views, potentially even correct the errors in the process, and compile as many perspectives as possible to get as close as we can to accuracy (but never completely). Once more, history is the study of what we think it is, what we think it has been, and what we think it will be. Studying history will provide detail, in part, on the history of what we have thought and think history was and is.

As José Medina explains, providing support for this argument for an imagined dialogue here between James and Ortega,

The reinterpretability and renegotiability of our beliefs about the past have been viewed by many as an obstacle to historical objectivity and historical truth, the thinking being that (at least in principle) we should be able to determine and fix the veridicality of our memories once and for all, so that we reach a point where we can no longer change our minds through reinterpretation and renegotiation. However, James's radical fallibilism and pluralism suggest that, far from being at odds with objectivity and truth, the openness to reinterpretation and renegotiation of our beliefs is in fact what makes it possible to improve their objectivity, to correct their biases and mistakes, and to maintain their truth alive, that is, dynamic, adaptable, and integrated in our lives. The openness to negotiation that James's pluralism recommends calls attention to the kind of accountability and responsiveness to others required by our epistemic agency. As more perspectives are taken into account in our epistemic negotiations, we can improve the articulation and justification of our beliefs, and our epistemic appraisals thus become more objective. The
reinterpretation and renegotiation of our beliefs should be thought of as opportunities for learning from each other and correcting each other.845

So we can study history, of course, and we should always remember to take into account as many perspectives as possible. Hence Medina's support of "perspectivism" in all this, a cornerstone of Ortega's philosophy, is something that can certainly dialogue with James. Thus again there is a conversation to be imagined between Ortega and pragmatism, and pragmatism with an Ortegian historicism (as the goal here is simply envisioning a dialogue, not establishing lines of comparison, contrast, or influence). James further concludes that

Time and space, cause and effect, nature and history, and one's own biography remain untouched. New truth is always a go-between, a smoother-over of transitions. It marries old opinion to new fact so as ever to show a minimum of jolt, a maximum of continuity. We hold a theory true just in proportion to its success in solving this 'problem of maxima and minima.' But success in solving this problem is eminently a matter of approximation. We say this theory solves it on the whole more satisfactorily than that theory; but that means more satisfactorily to ourselves, and individuals will emphasize their points of satisfaction differently. To a certain degree, therefore, everything here is plastic.846

But, again, everything here is "plastic," including this imaginary dialogue between William James and José Ortega y Gasset. This discussion is just meant to add to the study here of Ortega's polemic maxim, "man has not nature, only history" in further envisioning a possible pragmatist conversation in this. At no time is it meant to be definitive, finished, or a study of

845 Ibid., p. 134.

846 James, Pragmatism, p. 40.
comparison and contrast. Rather, again it must be reiterated that here the objective has just been to simply elaborate more on philosophy of history. As has been repeated: history itself really exists along a continuum, which is therefore never closed, and neither should its study. The purpose of this dissertation is just to essentially continue expanding that continuum, and that continuum of study.
Part Three

European Pragmatism's Principal Representative:

Ferdinand Schiller

"On the Topic of the Historicity of Life"

in an Imagined Dialogue with José Ortega y Gasset
Section I: European Pragmatism and its Principal Representative:

Ferdinand Schiller

I. Introduction

To begin this section it must be restated that the main objective of this full dissertation in general has been mainly bipartite. First, the goal has been to understand that when José Ortega y Gasset declared "man has no nature, only history," it was because what was meant by this was that man's nature is his history. Second, the objective has also specifically been to demonstrate how one way to possibly better understand this famous maxim of Ortega's is through a potential pragmatist dialogue. Of all the pragmatists and 'pragmatist leaning' philosophers, three have been chosen in particular to be used in this envisioned, feasible pragmatist dialogue with Ortega. As has been demonstrated in the first two parts of this dissertation, the two Americans chosen, John Dewey and William James, are perhaps those with whom we can imagine the strongest possible dialogue. And the third figure chosen was the most 'pragmatist' philosopher from Ortega's shared European continent of the time (and therefore an envoy of sorts of the movement's at least reach into Europe). British philosopher Ferdinand Canning Scott Schiller has thus been chosen as the representative for this third and final section because he was the preeminent representative of pragmatism in Europe in the first half of the twentieth century, as further evidence and proof of pragmatism's reach abroad, and which also coincides with Ortega's lifetime, as did Dewey and James' lives. This is part of what, therefore, makes it possible to envision this dialogue between Schiller and Ortega, the specific details of which will be elaborated in the pages ahead.
In this third section there is not quite as much overlap as in the first two, because there were some ways in which Schiller deviated from American pragmatism quite significantly. Schiller and James, however, were friends who corresponded relatively frequently, so there is still, nonetheless, quite a bit shared between the two (more than Schiller and Dewey).

This third section will be divided into two parts similarly to how the first two sections were divided. The first part will focus on some basic metaphysical topics in an effort to outline some basic principles in an envisioned dialogue between Schiller and Ortega that can be used subsequently as a foundation for the application to contemplating a possible discussion between the two on the topic of history; its meaning, purpose, use, and how it should be studied.

In this we will begin with a background discussion on the historical development and context of pragmatism in Europe, with a brief overview of the key European figures who had incorporated, at least to a certain extent and for a certain period of time, some pragmatist influence and elements in their thought and work. This helps serve as proof and evidence of its reach into Europe.

The next part of this first section will outline the basic biographical background of Ferdinand Canning Scott Schiller, the principle representative of pragmatism in Europe. Subsequently there will then be a basic general explanation of Schiller's philosophy, which though he termed it "Humanism" rather than Pragmatism, and it was a bit distinct, it was still predominantly pragmatist at its core.

After this, again some basic metaphysical discussion on the topics of truth, reality, and life (and especially here in this third part, on life as limited freedom) will be discussed in an imaginary shared dialogue between Schiller and Ortega. This will all then be applied in a second
section to the concrete topics of history, historicism, and the historicity of life. Thus the second section will apply all these fundamentals toward establishing possible definitions on the historicity of life, it will also provide some additional quandaries for the philosophy of history, and finally it will create some standards in a possible methodology of ideas for the study of history.

Very importantly, however, in all this it must remain abundantly clear, as declared on numerous occasions throughout this dissertation, that at no point is any of this meant to serve as a comparison and contrast of Ortega with these three pragmatist figures. Nor is any declaration of direct influence being made at any point. The objective here in this dissertation as a whole is at no time to determine influences or concrete similarities. Rather the aim is, at all times, to imagine a possible dialogue that could be discussed between them all as a way to not only possibly better understand the conclusion established here on Ortega's maxim that man has no nature only history because nature is his history (at least as part of a way to contemplate this as a pragmatist dialogue), but also with the hope that this will all add to the improvement of the academic discipline and study of history in general. Moreover, and more concretely, as a result of imagining this dialogue we are also looking to clarify and elaborate a vision of history and the importance of the concept of history in the "European pragmatism" of Schiller. Plus we simply have the contemporaneity of these four individuals to consider as further evidence for the ability to imagine a possible conversation (as Ortega, our philosopher of principal focus here, would certainly agree given his theories on generations as we have seen). Again, this is not a study of influence or similarity, but rather a study of a way to perhaps better contemplate a specific and significant piece of Ortega's philosophy by simply imagining a possible dialogue with some specific areas of pragmatism and pragmatist thinkers. Here the intention is mainly to take the
philosophies as they are, and analyze profoundly the concepts in and of themselves philosophically.
II. Historical Development and Context of European Pragmatism

American Pragmatism has only relatively recently gained a particular popularity on the European continent, specifically starting in the latter decades of the twentieth century when figures such as Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam appeared with a new reborn and reinvigorated generation of pragmatism. Part of the reason as to why pragmatism did not become more widespread in Europe during the first part of the twentieth century was a question of essentially 'bad timing.' Amidst a strong air of racism and pessimism, to cite just a bit of the negative energy circulating at the time, pragmatism was simply a "hard sell," as Porrovecchio, one of the few experts on Ferdinand Schiller, explains, as it was seen as "too optimistic and popular" (popular in terms of "vulgar," and optimistic in terms of basically "naive"). There was also the eventual leaning toward fascism in some European countries that also inhibited further its potential reach in Europe, as its "popular" ideology did not exactly fit with the demagogical and elitist beliefs of fascism. And this is not to mention that Ferdinand Schiller was a bit of a racist who developed a leaning toward eugenics and resultantly attached this association to pragmatism in Europe, to a certain extent. And despite the times of existent discrimination, this was not something everyone agreed with of course.

Nonetheless, during the movement of the first American pragmatists in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there is still plenty of evidence that it reached the European continent, at least to a certain extent, and found expression in a number of important figures across various academic disciplines (albeit not as much as the late twentieth century). There are scholars that support this, as witnessed by the following comment from Professor Julio

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847 Comparison from: Porrovecchio, *Dawn of Pragmatism.*
Seoane Pinilla from the University of Alcalá; "Y dégase que aun siendo un fenómeno estadounidense, el pragmatismo fue mucho y bien discutido—y asimilado—en Europa." And in another instance he also defends this further, arguing that

Pragmatismo siendo, como indudablemente es, un movimiento de marcado carácter estadounidense, no es realmente algo propio solo de los Estados Unidos; existe también un movimiento europeo con el mismo tono pragmatista. No se trata en este punto de atender al modo como en Europa se recogió y recibió el Pragmatismo, sino que la apuesta es algo más profundo: en la tradición europea existen modos de pensar con un tremendo parecido de familia con el Pragmatismo (que incluso se pueden datar con anterior fecha a las exposiciones de Peirce o James).

And he adds that arguably we can imagine a dialogue with Ortega specifically;

En Europa no sólo se leyó el pragmatismo estadounidense, sino que se supo discutir con él y hacerlo compatible o integrarlo en tradiciones que despuntaban por la época en diferentes países y que llevaban caminos y reclamaciones similares. [...] o con el mismo Ortega y Gasset que en no pocos momentos se descuelga con ideas pragmatistas.

Jaime Nubiola also supports this position, arguing that

848 PINILLA SEOANE, Julio: "Una invitación a la lectura de Ferdinand Canning Scott Schiller" in ISEGORÍA. Revista de Filosofía moral y Política N.º 41, julio-diciembre, p. 254.

849 PINILLA SEOANE, Julio & VEGAS, Serafín (eds.). Al hilo del pragmatismo Kindle Edition, Kindle Locations pp. 99-103. And as he adds in another instance, "Europa sí que entendió al Pragmatismo pues ella misma era pragmatista en muchos lugares y porque el Pragmatismo si bien tiene un aroma inconfundiblemente estadounidense, era también una respuesta «propia de una época» (entendiendo por tal que en diferentes lugares aparecieron semejantes ideas, metáforas y conceptos)" (Ibid., pp. 643-645).

850 Ibid., p. 260. This he also supports in Al hilo de pragmatismo, arguing that part of Schiller's view on how the world is constructed and interpreted is in fact similar; "[...] se me hace a veces similar en algunos aspectos a Ortega, tremendamente parecido al mundo que Papini presentó y seguramente que es un mundo nada lejano a Bergson" (Ibid., pp. 641-642).
James's thought and books were received early on in Spain by prominent scholars such as Miguel de Unamuno (1864-1936), José Ortega y Gasset (1883-1955), and Eugenio d'Ors (1881-1954). In fact, it is possible to assert that, contrary to a superficial impression, there is a deep affinity between the central questions of James's thought and the topics and problems addressed by the most relevant Hispanic thinkers of the twentieth century.⁸⁵¹

So clearly there is a circle of scholars addressing pragmatism's further reach into Europe during this time, not just generally but also in reference to Ortega, and it only continues growing.

In particular, from about 1900 to the 1920s we find evidence that William James and Ferdinand Schiller were broadly read. Moreover, these prominent European figures of the early twentieth century who took on varying degrees of pragmatism in their thought and work extend around the continent to several different countries. However, the key representative of American pragmatism in Europe, and who incorporated the most pragmatism into his work and thought was undoubtedly the British thinker Ferdinand Canning Scott Schiller. Furthermore, it was Schiller who was read around Europe and considered to be the foremost "European Pragmatist."

Although Oxford philosopher F.C.S. Schiller remains the only European to design a comprehensive version of pragmatism that ranks with the systems of Charles Pierce, William James, John Dewey, and George Herbert Mead, many thinkers in England,

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France, Germany, Italy, and other countries incorporated pragmatic themes into their philosophies.\(^{852}\)

In moving around the continent to France we find the pragmatist message inspired figures such as Henri Bergson, Maurice Blondel, Henri Poincaré, Pierre Duhem, Éduard Le Roy, André Laland, Émile Durkheim, Georges Sorel, and Gérard Deladalle. This last individual, Deladalle, was arguably the primary exponent of American pragmatism in France, who through his lectures inspired bits of pragmatic views to additional important French philosophers later such as Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, and Jacques Lacan around the middle of the twentieth century. But pragmatism in France in the early twentieth century, as in much of the rest of Europe, was short lived. Consideration of the American movement in France began with William James at the end of the nineteenth century but quickly disappeared with the First World War. Arguably this all perhaps coincided with similar veins of thought prevalent in France at the time of modernism, and of a disapproval of conservatism and rationalism.

Moving on to Italy, both James and Schiller had a brief period of influence, inspiring the key thinkers self-defined as pragmatists and humanists Giovanni Papini and Giuseppe Prezzolini. Also moved by pragmatism were Giovanni Vailati, Mario Calderoni, Giovanni Amendola and Antonio Aliotta. But as in France, pragmatism virtually disappeared by the start of the First

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\(^{852}\) Shook and Margolis, *A Companion to Pragmatism*, p. 44. "In a trip to Rome in 1905 for the Fifth International Congress of Psychology, the American Pragmatist William James discovered that there was a circle, albeit small, of European pragmatists. He wrote, "I have been having this afternoon a very good and rather intimate talk with the little band of "pragmatists," Papini, Vailati, Calderoni, Amendola, etc., most of whom inhabit Florence, publish the monthly journal *Leonardo*, at their own expense, and carry on a very serious philosophic movement, apparently really inspired by Schiller and myself (I never could have believed it before, although Ferrari had assured me), to show an enthusiasm, and also a literary swing and activity that I know nothing of in our own land....It has given me a certain new idea of the way in which truth ought to find its way into the world. The most interesting, and in fact genuinely edifying, part of my trip has been meeting this little cénacle, who have taken my own writings, entre autres, au grand sérieux" (Ibid., p. 313).
American Pragmatism was first seen by Papini as a source for renovation of Italy toward further modernization. But Papini would later move into the Italian Futurist movement, as well as come to strongly support Italian Fascism, moving therefore away from American Pragmatism. And prior to him, Vailati and Calderoni had developed an even more "moderate" version of pragmatism significantly different from its American counterpart. Nonetheless, the reach of American pragmatism in Italy even extended to Mussolini, who himself declared that

The pragmatism of William James as of great use to me in my political career. James taught me that an action should be judged rather by its results than by its doctrinary basis. I learnt of James that faith in action, that ardent will to live and fight, to which Fascism owes a great part of its success.  

It must be noted, though a bit off topic however, that Mussolini declared a long list of influences, and that he goes on to say here that George Sorel was the individual to whom he owes "the greatest debt"—so James's "influence" is debatable. Nonetheless, the point of this is just to show that American pragmatism did clearly extend to much of Europe, even if in unintended and at times secondary consequential ways (given that James would never have supported Fascism).

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854 Perhaps in this we find a similar situation in the ways in which the Nazis manipulated the words and meanings of German Philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche's work, and specifically that of his book Beyond Good and Evil, which was compiled and edited by his sister who was a Nazi loyalist. The general pragmatist idea that beliefs, ideas, etcetera that do not have some sort of practical and useful application in experience and the tangible, 'experimentable' and 'experiencable' world are essentially meaningless and valueless is a concept that can be appealing to a very broad spectrum of thinkers and, for example, political campaigns and movements (as it really is quite a general, wide-ranging idea). Arguably, therefore, one can perhaps develop a case of sorts for pragmatism's influence in Fascist trends in Europe in the first half of the twentieth century, but this shall not be the case in this dissertation, as not only is this a weak argument given, but this was certainly not the political intention of American pragmatism nor of any individual American pragmatist. Moreover, it strays from the focus here on historicism, which is why its mention has been kept brief, but is nonetheless important to note as simply another arguable example of American
Germany also provides an interesting historical case for the spread of American pragmatism, as the history of philosophy there in the early twentieth century resulted in an environment already hostile and certainly not open to its reception. The common thread running through the nation's philosophical fabric was one of denial and inferiority of American pragmatism. Professor of philosophy at the University of Darmstadt, Julius Goldstein, was one of the early defenders of American pragmatism in Germany. James, in fact, kept frequent correspondence with Goldstein, hoping to inspire more pragmatist thought in Germany, writing in one letter to him,

Schiller had already written to me about you as the only pragmatist now living in Germany. I hope that this will not long be true, but that you may succeed in inoculating your fellow-countrymen with a taste for more empirical philosophy, or rather with a distaste for the elements of absolutism which so many Germans still leave to flourish in the midst of an otherwise very empirical way of thinking.

I am getting numerous acknowledgments of my book, but only one so far as been as enthusiastically sympathetic as yours. It is evident that your mind and mine are cut on the same pattern....The Germans, as you say, are given over to monism--monism in the depths, however empiricist they appear on the surface. My empiricism and pluralism are in the depths also.\textsuperscript{855}

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pragmatism's reach into Europe during its first 'phase' to show it was there—and specifically during the time of the Spanish Philosopher José Ortega y Gasset's life, who is the focus of this dissertation, and who could, therefore, have arguably been plenty exposed to American pragmatism.

\footnotesubscript{855} Shook and Margolis, \textit{A Companion to Pragmatism}, p. 321.
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The case of Germany is a particularly important one here for this dissertation's purpose, as Ortega spent a significant portion of his academic formation there. Though his time there only spanned a few years, they were quite focused on academic study and were arguably quite influential nevertheless. Briefly noted, first he studied classical philology and philosophy at the University of Leipzig in 1905. Then in 1906 he studied at the University of Berlin. Six months after that he headed over to the University of Marburg where he obtained another degree in philosophy. This aforementioned aversion yet existence of American pragmatism in Germany, albeit to a small degree, could perhaps help explain part of the same sort of 'recognition' we have seen that Ortega made of American pragmatism. As has been quoted in the other sections of this thesis, in his second chapter from *What is Philosophy*, Ortega dedicates a small section at the very end to pragmatism, of which his thoughts on the American philosophy can be summarized in the following excerpt, part of which has been quoted but should be revisited here:

[...] la verdad es el precipitado intelectual de la utilidad práctica. Poco tiempo después, en los albores pueriles de nuestro siglo, se hizo de este pensamiento una filosofía: el pragmatismo. Con el simpático cinismo propio de los "<yankees>", propio de todo pueblo nuevo—un pueblo nuevo, a poco bien que le vaya, es un *enfant terrible*—, el pragmatismo norteamericano se ha atrevido a declarar este tesis: "<no hay más verdad que el buen éxito en el trato de las cosas.>> Y con esta tesis, tan audaz como ingenua, tan ingenuamente audaz, ha hecho su ingreso en la historia milenaria de la filosofía el lóbulo norte del continente americano.\(^{856}\)

\(^{856}\) ORTEGA Y GASSET, José: *¿Qué es Filosofía?*, pp. 35-36. (Subsequently referred to as: *Filosofía*.). As Nubiola writes, in his interpretation "If I understand this passage correctly, what Ortega is trying to say is that pragmatism is a valuable philosophical tradition, but it is alien, foreign ("centrifugal") to the mainstream of European philosophy. Moreover, as Graham noted (Graham 1994: 146), there is an autobiographical text of Ortega in which he seems to
Still, as noted there were a few inspired by American pragmatism in Germany, particularly after World War Two. Prior there was Hans Vaihinger, professor of philosophy at the University of Halle. And post-World War Two we find the self-declared pragmatists of Karl-Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas. In fact, in general, pragmatism appeared to have more reception in Europe beginning toward the middle of the twentieth century after the Second World War.

Further across Europe we also find F.P. Ramsey in England, as well as Tomas Garrigue Masaryk and Karl Capek in the Czech Republic.

But most importantly for this dissertation's purposes, in Spain we find José Ortega y Gasset, who is of course not directly linked in any form to American pragmatism, but a possible dialogue with three pragmatist figures in particular; John Dewey, William James, and in what follows, with Ferdinand Schiller, is envisioned as being possible nonetheless. As noted, there was another key Spanish philosopher who read pragmatism; Miguel de Unamuno, who serves as further evidence for its reach into Spain. Unamuno read and cited European pragmatists as well in his work, including Schiller and Papini. But this is of course a topic for another dissertation, as again here the focus is on his fellow Spaniard and Philosopher, José Ortega y Gasset. Despite the lack of study in this imagined pragmatist dialogue with Ortega, as this is certainly a unique topic, there are a few initial steps in this direction, nonetheless, as we have seen and will continue to see in this final part. As proposed by John Shook, an author referenced on several occasions in this dissertation given his profound study of pragmatism,

assert that pragmatism, which began outside the boundaries of the European stage, did not reach its full maturity until it was integrated in the framework of German philosophy, that is, in the mainstream of his own philosophical position (Ortega 1980: 14). This is for me one of the main avenues for further exploration concerning the overlapping of pragmatism and Hispanic philosophy: if one understands Ortega's thought as a German flourishing of pragmatist roots, it is possible to bring the most distinctive traits of Hispanic philosophy and James's philosophy closer” (From: NUBIOLA, Jaime: "The Reception of William James in Continental Europe," 81).
One of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century, José Ortega y Gasset, developed several recognizably pragmatist themes at the core of his humanist philosophy. Some scholars have claimed that American pragmatism, and above all James's radical empiricism, were a major influence, alongside the acknowledged impact of phenomenology, on Ortega y Gasset. Regardless of direct influence his philosophy should be taken seriously as a major development of the pragmatic worldview on the primacy of lived creative experience, the ineliminable nature of perspective, and the historical nature of reason.\textsuperscript{857}

\textsuperscript{857} Shook and Margolis, \textit{A Companion to Pragmatism}, p. 53.
III. Ferdinand Canning Scott Schiller

As aforementioned, Schiller is considered the first "representative" of pragmatism in Europe. As Thayer summarizes in one of the few in-depth studies on Schiller, he was "the most famous pragmatist outside of the United States" who, as he continues to explain, with William James was given more attention than any other pragmatist in Europe, perhaps considered by some even as equals.\textsuperscript{858} Schiller, in fact, was developing "pragmatist" ideas prior to his meeting James—this is of course up for debate and also a topic for another dissertation, but it should be noted that this argument has been proposed. However, he always considered himself a "humanist" and championed this separate term to define his philosophy as something a bit different, nonetheless, from American pragmatism.

Sadly, however, his role in promoting pragmatism not just in Europe but in general has not been studied and appreciated enough. Yet still some consider Schiller to be "pragmatism's most forgotten figure."\textsuperscript{859} As Porrovecchio argues, even though he was a bit younger than his American pragmatist contemporaries, a further look into whether or not some of his ideas appeared prior is warranted;

There is ample evidence to suggest the tripartite origins via Peirce, James, and Dewey should more rightly be viewed as \textit{quadr}ipartite. And, chronologically speaking, Schiller should be placed prior to Dewey in explicating the basic components of pragmatism. As Winetrout notes: "[...] On certain levels he antedated both James and Dewey as an

\textsuperscript{858} From: Thayer, \textit{Meaning and Action: A Critical History of Pragmatism}.

\textsuperscript{859} PORROVECCHIO, Mark J.: \textit{F.C.S. Schiller and the Dawn of Pragmatism: The Rhetoric of a Philosophical Rebel}, P. xvi. (Subsequently referred to as: \textit{F.C.S. Schiller}.)
explicator of this new philosophy. Much of the source material for this conclusion was published before key philosophical works of Dewey appeared.\textsuperscript{860}

This can be debated, however, and so the objective here is not to determine who came first with which ideas, but rather simply to continue to explore a possible dialogue between Ortega and pragmatism, with the three figures in particular of Dewey, James, and Schiller. Whether or not Schiller had some ideas before or after James or Dewey is a topic for another dissertation, but it is noted here since it is nonetheless important background information.

As further background history, Bertrand Russell, in his \textit{History of Western Philosophy} in fact considers James, Dewey and Schiller to be the three founders of pragmatism (he did not include Peirce based on his retiring himself from pragmatism early in the twentieth century). Porrovecchio in his work cites another academic, British Alban Gregory Widgery, who agreed that Schiller has been underestimated and underappreciated, arguing in 1927 that "Schiller's thought was not a product of the discussion of Pragmatism in the first decade of the century; his work was a predisposing cause of and a leading part in that discussion."\textsuperscript{861}

This leads one to question, why, therefore, Schiller has not been more studied and recognized, and why he has been so undervalued. Perhaps part of Schiller's lack of appearance in the historical annals of philosophy can be attributed to his rebellious and polemical character. He did not take to criticism very well and quite stubbornly stood his ground on his beliefs, so much in fact that, as aforementioned, he decided to forgo the final examination for his doctorate simply because he disagreed with the methods and standards set where he studied at Cornell University.

\textsuperscript{860} Ibid, p. xix.

\textsuperscript{861} Ibid, p. xix.
Moreover, he is by no means considered a "great" or "clear" writer, as his sometimes humorous and convoluted style can be quite challenging to interpret. And this is also not to mention that he was quite repetitive in his work. But is this sufficient for being so little studied? Probably not.

Despite Schiller's great respect for the American pragmatists, and their lives being contemporaneous, he nevertheless, as aforementioned, still developed a version that was a bit dissimilar, and hence the use of his different term to define it of "humanism." Maybe this is also part of the reason for his lack of further recognition to-date? Perhaps it could also be labeled a "pragmatic humanism," but key is his centering humanity in his philosophy much more so than pragmatism; "all acts and all thoughts are irreducibly the products of individual human beings, and are therefore inescapably associated with the needs, desires, and purposes of men."\(^{862}\) Hence the term "*humanism.*" Schiller's "humanism" will be analyzed in detail further ahead, but suffice to say for the moment that while he was certainly a pragmatist in many respects, he also wanted to develop something a little different and his own; hence, "Humanism." And thus this is part of the reason why he is also a bit distinct from Dewey or James. Nonetheless, he did not reach the level of notoriety for either pragmatism or his humanism that Dewey or James did.

In regards to the specific dialogue being envisioned here in this dissertation, as argued to be the case inherently in pragmatism as in the case of Dewey and James, there is an historicist element in Schiller's "pragmatist humanism" as well, as will be elaborated throughout. As succinctly proposed by Porrovecchio, one of the key ways in which to understand his "pragmatic humanism" is as follows: "knowledge (or truth) is subject to the conditions of the time in which

\(^{862}\) Quoted in: Ibid., p. xx.
it occurs."\textsuperscript{863} "Knowledge" is what we gather in experience; it is what we experience over time, as we have seen as a basic pragmatist concept. Hence, we can deduce that knowledge is historical, being based on time, and knowledge forms our ideas of truth, reality, and history as well. And at any given time we can have different experiences, traditions, and therefore truths, realities—so much, therefore, is contingent on time, or history, and hence the historicist element arguably present in Schiller's philosophy that we will use here as a basis to envision a possible dialogue with Ortega, who as we know centrally emphasized history and how 'man has history' as being of the most fundamental concepts defining Ortega's view on the world, life, truth, reality, and metaphysics in general. This inherent nature of "time," or history, in "experience" we saw was key in the other two pragmatist philosophers explored here. This, therefore, is key to imagining a dialogue with Ortega because, tersely summarized, it fundamentally argues for the historicism present in pragmatism, which along with any pragmatism in the work of Ortega, these are both topics that have been explored very little and are therefore both quite the innovative subjects, as has been noted.

As American pragmatism was not widely popular in Europe during its 'first wave,' arguably Schiller's "humanism" was more intended for a "European" audience. We can more specifically consider him the "English representative of American pragmatism in Europe." Though Schiller was English and lived much of his life in England, he was born in the Danish side of Schleswig-Holstein in 1864 and then died in Los Angeles, California in 1937. His studies included "classical moderations," "the Greats," German, and an M.A., all of which were completed in England. He received two firsts; one in 1883 in Classic Moderations, and another in 1886 in Literae Humanitores. He was awarded his B.A. in 1886. Then a year later in 1887 he

\textsuperscript{863} Porrovecchio, \textit{F.C.S. Schiller}, p. xx.
earned the title of Taylorian Scholar in German. In 1891 he earned his M.A. and published *Riddles of the Sphinx* anonymously as A. Troglodyte. He never did officially complete his doctorate at Cornell University, however, because he decided not to do the final examination, as he believed it was poorly and improperly structured. Instead, he took up a prestigious job back in England at Oxford University.

Later, in 1893 he returned to Cornell University as an instructor of logic and metaphysics. It was during this time that we know he was exposed to William James and quickly engrossed himself in his pragmatism (or at least this specific dating we can be certain of given the concrete evidence for this, but this is not to say that it was not possible he had been exposed to his work prior). In 1897 he was called home again and began a long and fruitful career at Corpus Christi College in Oxford. At home he gained the titles of Treasurer of the Mind Association, President of the Aristotelian Society, President of the British Society for Psychical Research, and Fellow of the British Academy. Then in 1926 he headed back to the United States to teach at the University of Southern California until 1935, just two years before he passed away there.

Perhaps one of the most summarizing lines of Schiller's work is the following: "man is the measure of his experience, and so an ineradicable factor in any world he experiences."\(^{864}\) Just as the Greek Philosopher Protagoras claimed in the fifth century, "man is the measure of all things," this is the core of Schiller's humanist doctrine. Individual consciousness is indeed powerful and influential in shaping how we live our lives, but we each live, nonetheless, in a world of 'limited freedom.' This notion is one we saw was also present in James's philosophy. So

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\(^{864}\) SCHILLER, Ferdinand Canning Scott: *Studies in Humanism*, 13. (Subsequently referred to as *Studies in Humanism.*)
Schiller supported trends in personal idealism, as well as evolutionism and voluntarism, which were becoming increasingly prevalent in the United States. But he did believe, nevertheless, that individualism plays a strong and prevalent role in general in the progress of our lives.

For Schiller, although our freedom is limited, we can still each be strongly influential in our own lives, a notion explored previously here within the philosophies of Dewey, James, and Ortega as well. As Shook concisely explains in regards to Schiller, James, Sidgwick, and Papini; they all shared the philosophy that a "common view was a belief in the reality of human power and growth in an accommodating universe." Fundamental in directing this strong but limited freedom was specifically individual human interest, and especially that which was "valuable" and ensured survival.

In James's *Principles of Psychology* (1890) Schiller then discovered a biological theory of consciousness as an interactive process of growth within a selectively perceived environment. Both James and Schiller followed the primary philosophical implication: all thought must service the organism's survival efforts in a plastic and malleable world. Schiller promptly expanded upon James's will-to-believe doctrine, declaring truth to be what proves to be valuable to the individual, and formulated a subjectivist version of James's stream of consciousness theory, declaring that reality must only be as it is knowable by an individual mind. Schiller asserted the ontological ultimacy of the creative personal mind because it is the most real thing knowable, and he argued that personal values must always be the final judge of all knowledge. 

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866 Ibid., p. 45.
In this passage we find some of the fundamental elements in Schiller's philosophy, and that are of American pragmatism in general as well, that arguably might specifically dialogue with the philosophy of the Spaniard José Ortega y Gasset. In regards to American pragmatism, one way in which he is linked is by highlighting individual "experience" at the center of knowledge, as we have seen with all the pragmatists here. This is what leads us to what we think of reality, truth, history, to cite a few examples. So we find here in Schiller (again as noted in the first two sections of this dissertation), the idea that reality, truth, or history, is what we think it is; experience leads us to think what we think we think, to put it plainly. Hence the pragmatist "plastic and malleable world." The emphasis on the "individual mind" within a "selectively perceived environment" is a general concept that arguably resonates with Ortega's theories on "I am myself and my circumstances" and "perspectivism" (as we have seen throughout this dissertation these latter two notions of Ortega seem to converse quite smoothly with pragmatism). Meaning, we are each our individual minds, our yoes, but our freedom is limited by the circumstances that surround us, and together this all adds to creating our individual, selective perspectives. Further, we should look at this anti-dualistically; we are free in our choice but limited by what those choices are, so they are separate but interconnected concepts that define our state of limited freedom. This is a summary of the dialogue we can imagine here between Ortega and Schiller.

Here Shook provides a concise, summarizing explanation on Schiller's idea that we live in a world of "limited freedom" that we can imagine to potentially converse smoothly with Ortega:
Schiller (like James) exulted in the "open universe" of genuine possibilities for personal evolution toward greater harmony within both the social world and the natural world. Reality remained a cooperative yet quasi-independent partner to human efforts. While natural processes cannot be identified apart from the results of human transformations of the world, since nature cannot be known before such transformations, reality surely imposes many constraints on our partially free enterprises.867

This text introduces another key American pragmatist concept that is also fundamental in Schiller's thought: anti-dualism (again the idea of connected but separate parts; separate but one cannot exist without the other). This notion is important, because as Schiller reminds us, "It is a well-known fact that things are not only known by their affinities but also by their opposites."868

As in the previous two sections on Dewey and James, reality, nature, the truth, history—we cannot really know what these things are, we can only know what we think we know that they are, via our experiences. "Meaning cannot be either an inherent property of objects or a static relation between objects, but is an activity or attitude taken up toward objects by a subject. To attribute meaning and to attribute value are practically the same thing."869 And as we will also continue to see at length, Schiller emphasizes an essentially optimistic view on personal growth,

867 Ibid., p. 46.

868 SCHILLER, Ferdinand Canning Scott: Humanism: Philosphic Essays, p. xxi. (Subsequently referred to as: Humanism.) And he continues, "And the fitness of the term Humanism for our philosophic purpose could hardly better be displayed than by the ready transfer of its old associations to a novel context."

869 Quoted in: Shook, A Companion to Pragmatism, p. 47.
development, and advancement, something that is also very prevalent in Ortega's work and his stress on the need for us to each find our fitting personal vocations, for example.  

A further key conclusion to remember here is the following: we cannot really know reality, truth, or history, for example, they are never 'complete,' as they are 'always in the process of being experienced, made, and defined.' We are 'constantly becoming ourselves within our constantly re-discovered realities,' to describe this succinctly and simply.

Again, this constantly progressing evolution gives our truths, realities, or history the key characteristic of being in part dependent, therefore, on time; i.e., history (again). And Schiller's interest in evolutionism is an area that specifically relates to this dissertation's focus on the role of history and historicist thought in all this. Human thought, interest, placement of value, conceptual definitions of reality, truth, etcetera, are also socially determined (not just individually); meaning, they have "evolutionary roots," but more so arguably in the idea of "historical roots" rather than biological or genetic (considering also that "history" can contain biology and genetics, along with much more). And this will be explored in great depth in the second section of this third and final part.

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870 As an example, Ortega wrote, "La vida de cada cual es lo único que para cada cual hay, es la realidad radical, y, por lo mismo, inexorablemente sería. Cada cual tiene, quiera o no, que justificar ante sí mismo su empleo" (Ortega, Galileo, p. 132). And he continues, "En efecto, yo necesito saber a qué atenerme con respecto a las cosas de mi circunstancia. "Éste es el sentido verdadero, originario del saber: saber yo a qué atenerme" (Ibid., p. 134). In another instance he writes, "[...] cada hombre, entre sus varios seres posibles, encuentra siempre uno que es su auténtico ser: Y la voz que le llama a ese auténtico ser es lo que llamamos "vocación"" (Ibid., p. 186).
IV. Pragmatism, or "Humanism," per Schiller

As aforementioned, while Schiller was a zealous reader of American Pragmatism, he did develop his own brand that was a bit different, which he termed "Humanism." However, "Humanism" starts with the basic foundations common to the American pragmatist thinkers and, as he says, it simply goes a little bit further. In what follows Porrovecchio offers a clear interpretive explanation for this, quoting Schiller as well:

Thus pragmatism, while not forming a logical system to organize human action, nonetheless provides "an epistemological method which really describes the facts of actual knowing." It articulates the means by which options are decided upon, tested, and then accepted in everyday life. But pragmatism is connected to the larger framework of Schiller's humanism. Simply put, humanism is a philosophical approach to ameliorating human problems. [...] As a result, pragmatic humanism can be understood in two ways. Pragmatism is the method by which to apply humanism; or framed differently, humanism is the pragmatic approach writ large. Together, then, they provide the basis for arguing against any complete or systematic metaphysics since: (1) knowing is subject to human idiosyncrasies, and (2) knowledge (or truth) is subject to the conditions of the time in which it occurs.871

Schiller's development and use of the concept of "humanism," rather than labeling his philosophy "pragmatism," therefore is a key initial reason to set him a bit apart from Dewey and

871 Porrovecchio, F.C.S. Schiller, p. XX.
James. As Schiller himself begins to explain in the book in which he really develops his philosophy of Humanism, *Studies in Humanism*,

Pragmatism, on the other hand, essays to trace out the actual making of truth, the actual ways in which discriminations between the true and the false are effected, and derives from these its generalisations about the method of determining the nature of truth. It is from such empirical observations that it derives its doctrine that when an assertion claims truth, its consequences are always used to test its claim. In other words, what follows from its truth for any human interest, and more particularly and in the first place, for the interest with which it is directly concerned, is what established its real truth and validity. This is the famous Principle of Peirce, which ought to be regarded as the greatest truism.872

And as Schiller continues to explain about this fundamental pragmatist concept, human interest plays a key role, as the consequences that are studied in this method must be related to interest and have some sort of 'purpose'. This we saw was present in Dewey and James as well, but it is perhaps even more emphasized by Schiller, given his greater placement of humanity at the center in his philosophy in general. This focus on the importance of "interest" Schiller argues, is perhaps "the most essential feature of Pragmatism"; that "all mental life is purposive."873 And again this was also quite present, as we saw, in James's philosophy, as well as in specifically the historicism imagined to dialogue with Dewey.

873 Ibid., p. 11.
This principle, however, focuses on the concept of the "truth," which is where there is differentiation with Schiller's "humanism," because as he says, "But humanism seems to me to go further still, and not to be restricted to the one question of truth." Still, however, key in all applications is the idea of epistemological method in the use of experiments and testing, and especially via experiences. "Hence there is implicit in Pragmatism," Schiller writes, "a demand for an inquiry to ascertain the actual facts." And in Schiller's "Humanism," he simply wants to expand this to cover as much as possible; "Humanism will seem more universal." Schiller declared,

I propose accordingly, to convert to the use of philosophic terminology a word which has long been famed in history and literature, and to denominate HUMANISM the attitude of thought which I know to be habitual in William James and in myself, which seems to be sporadic and inchoate in many others, and which is destined, I believe, to win the widest popularity.

An important distinction, therefore in Schiller's "Humanism" as compared to "American Pragmatism" is that it is a bit broader; it is perhaps less methodological and less empirical. This is fundamentally what Schiller means by "universal;" simply broad enough to essentially encompass all. This is because as man is the center, and man creates methods, man is greater than those very methods since he is the creator. Humanism is therefore "greater" as well in terms of "more extensive" than Pragmatism. "Man" and his malleable character and ability for varying

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874 Ibid., p. 8.

875 SCHILLER, Ferdinand Canning Scott: Humanism: Philosophical Essays, p. xiv. (Subsequently referred to as: Humanism: Philosophical Essays.)

876 Schiller, Studies in Humanism, p. 15.

877 Schiller, Humanism: Philosophical Essays, p. xiv.
interpretation makes this "individualism" particularly strong in Schiller's philosophy, which is not exactly what American pragmatism in general specifies and elaborates. He wrote, "Great therefore, as will be the value we must claim for Pragmatism as a method, we must yet concede that man is greater than any method he has made, and that our Humanism must interpret it."878 Again Schiller's humanism thus has the objective to extend a bit further. By placing so much emphasis on man at the center, and on his individual interpretations, perspectives, or views, his philosophy becomes more plastic and abstract, and therefore broader and more "universal," because of how much each of us vary from one another—and this specifically is an area of potential dialogue with Ortega, as we shall continue to explore ahead.

To pause for a moment, it must be reminded that the three pragmatists explored here are unique and distinct from each other, despite strong areas of parallel. The objective is not to compare and contrast the three pragmatists chosen for analysis here, but rather to use three different figures' philosophies on similar topics to see how there might be a dialogue with Ortega's philosophy, so for that reason, again some areas of overlap among the three philosophers need to be revisited to be able to envision this possible dialogue with Ortega.

All of these key philosophical topics of truth, reality, life, and of course history, will be expanded in great depth in separate sections in what follows.

Continuing with laying out Schiller's definition of his philosophy of humanism, he writes,

The method we have observed; it is empirical, teleological, and concrete. Its spirit is a bigger thing, which may fitly be denominated Humanism.

878 Ibid., p. xxi
Humanism is really in itself the simplest of philosophical standpoints: it is merely the perception that the philosophic problem concerns human beings striving to comprehend a world of human experience by the resources of human minds. Not even Pragmatism could be simpler or nearer to an obvious truism of cognitive method.  

And as noted, at the center of all this is man (or woman), as he writes, "man is the measure of his experience, and so an ineradicable factor in any world he experiences." So to a certain extent this is 'individualist,' but not completely, as there is a social element that he recognizes as important, hence again why he chose the term "humanism" (as opposed to something such as "individualism").

While one of Ortega's famous maxims is "man and his circumstance," arguably 'man' is still part of the center in Ortega's philosophy as well, as has been explored, in regards to life, reality, and history (circumstance comes into play in that a life is 'submerged in a specific, determinate circumstance of a collective, social life' as well)—but without it being a philosophy of pure individualism, as is also the case with Schiller. This was an important concept explored in the previous two sections as well; the idea that no thinker investigated here soley and purely emphasized the individualistic nor social position. "La vida no es sin más ni más el hombre, es decir, el sujeto que vive," wrote Ortega, and "man" the subject, lives within a drama of being lost in the 'not ready made' world, forced to find a way to navigate through it, adding that history and its study, therefore, is "[...] reconstrucción de la estructura de ese drama que dispara entre el

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880 Ibid., p. 13.
hombre y el mundo" (to connect to the historicism prevalent in all this). Thus Ortega and Schiller would likely still converse on this basic conclusion on how we live both individually and socially, as we saw in the previous two parts of this dissertation.

In Schiller's philosophy, everything starts with the "immediate facts of our experience," as he states. This is a point that was inspired of course by pragmatism, as this is shared with the other two pragmatists explored here. Humanism is thus as he defines it like "Common Sense," using as a "natural starting-point" experience, and specifically in terms of man and "the world of man's experience as it has come to seem to him." And as we have seen in the previous two sections, when we interchange the terms "experience" and "history" we find a possible dialogue between Ortega and these three pragmatist thinkers. In other words, everything starts with our experiences, as Schiller reminds us, or our histories, which is why what we are is our histories, to further connect the two thinkers in a possible dialogue. Moreover, in this last quote of Schiller's he appears to insinuate that there is a subjectivity in how we view and interpret our 'worlds of experiences,' or our histories, thus there are unique perspectives that they are offered to us in and from which we see this all. "The world of man's experience" is part of our own specific continuum (i.e., a history that also lives in the present and its potential future as well) that over time has been created and understood in a specific way(s); i.e., our unique perspective(s), and via these, because our perspectives are historical as well, "as it has come to

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881 Ortega, Galileo, p. 74. Moreover, in another instance Ortega emphasizes individualism, writing "El hombre es afán de ser —afán en absoluto de ser, de subsistir—y afán de ser tal, de realizar nuestro individualismo yo" (Ibid., p. 78).


883 See: Ibid., p. xvii.
seem to him." These selective and subjective perspectives thus shape everything, including what we think the truth is, as the first metaphysical topic we will explore in this third and final part.
V. Truth

The topic of the "truth" is one that must be explored at length in any paper that involves a pragmatist discussion, as its fundamental interpretation is essential to understanding most of the basic principles of pragmatism. This is why a separate section on this has been developed in each of the three parts of this dissertation. Summarized in the most simplistic of ways, we can say, as has been elaborated throughout this dissertation as common to all the pragmatist thinkers explored here, that truth is what we think it is. There is, therefore, certainly no absolute truth, there is just what we think there is. "[...] absolute truth is futile," writes Schiller in further agreement with the other pragmatist thinkers here, as he continues, "Even if it existed, it could not help us, because we could not attain it. Even if we could attain it, we could not know that we had done so. Even, therefore, if it could remove doubt, it would not do so to our blinded eyes." This so very clearly demonstrates a basic principle repeated here throughout this dissertation of anti-dualism, and the general concept that 'there is what we think there is, then there is what that 'thing'/object of our thought,' but we can never know if they ever coincide, though we do know that they exist both interconnected and separate, simultaneously.' This is in fact precisely what Schiller was just quoted as arguing in line with the other pragmatists explored here.

Thus there are some basic and stable-like features we can use in defining the key characteristics of the "truth," but in the end it is not something that we can know or identify with complete authenticity, certainty, or accuracy. Schiller writes,

884 Schiller, Studies in Humanism, p. 129.
[...] no truth can ever be so certain that it need not be verified, and may not mislead us, when applied. But this only means that no truth should be taken as unimprovable. [...] We shall, therefore, conceive ourselves to have attained, not complete truths without a stain upon their character, which there is no reason to doubt, but only approximations to truth and working hypotheses, which are, at most, good enough for practical purposes. [...] the discovery of truth is such a personal affair. [...] truth is made, by human operations on the data of human experience.885

As we know this is central in pragmatism; this basic inability to reach any real truth. And here Schiller adds quite an even more personalized aspect to it by positing that what we think is any truth is a "personal affair." This has important implications for history, and historical study, as we shall revisit further ahead, in that the same must be applied to what we come to believe are "historical truths"; they are made by humans, so we cannot confirm their complete 'truthfulness'—a conclusion that we have already reached in the previous two parts of this dissertation as well. We can only really say that historical truths are just what we think they are. And as Schiller notes in the above quote, truths, or historical truths are instrumental in that usually their existence in part stems from and depends on their having "practical purposes," and this must be continually verified and re-verified in the future. This last point is of course a very pragmatist one as well.

Ortega's concept of the "truth," however, does not potentially dialogue quite as smoothly as some other topics with pragmatism, as we have seen, but again there are some specific areas that we can possibly envision to be conversable. As noted, the conclusion, for example, that the

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885 Ibid., p. 120.
truth cannot really be assured or absolutely known is something that Ortega might relate to with the pragmatists. Ortega differentiates two kinds of "truth."

The first is one is essentially personal, as it is "evident to me," which he labels "reason" ("razón"). This first type would perhaps converse most with James, but this next type would certainly dialogue with all three, as witnessed in the case of Schiller in this last point in which he declares that the truth is made based on the amassing of experience, which is essentially the history of our experience. And in the aforementioned quote of Schiller's, we see how he considers the 'discovery of the truth to be a personal affair.' Ortega's second type of truth thus is one which is agreed upon socially by the people in a given time period (a historical truth, essentially), which he calls "tradition" ("tradición").886 Schiller broadly uses the terms "human experience" and "human operations," which we can consider as referencing something more social in this instance, and Ortega considers the plural, "socially" in this as well. And a dialogue could be imagined with this idea that it is simply what we think it is (and thus not "absolute") but specifically dependent on the individual and the social traditions --of the time, to add very importantly again here his historicist leaning, as we have also seen throughout. The "truth" is historical, as it is in a large part dependent on time/history, as declared in the aforementioned quote that "[...] todas las épocas y todos los pueblos han gozado su congrua porción de verdad."887 The objective is to show both the individualist and social elements present in all this.

But as we have seen, it is the general pragmatist conception of the "truth" that Ortega specifically criticizes in his one referenced direct mention of pragmatism, without specifying any single pragmatist philosopher, however, as we saw; "[...] el pragmatismo norteamericano se ha

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886 See: Ortega, Metafísica, p. 111.

887 Ortega, Nuestro tiempo, p. 146.
atrevido proclamar esta tesis: "no hay más verdad que el buen éxito en el trato de las cosas."

Part of the reason for this disagreement is perhaps because Ortega sees some more specifics in the truth, as mentioned above in the example of distinguishing between individual and social truths, rather than it being just only about something "tried and true" (without knowing for sure of course if it is really truly true).

Again the main conclusion, therefore, that can maybe dialogue here is the idea that we cannot really say for sure what is the truth. While perhaps there are several other features of conceptions of the truth that are quite dissimilar between Ortega and the pragmatists, still at least in this we can arguably find a potential conversation. For the pragmatists, such as Schiller, most simply stated truth is more so something that we demonstrate enough, sufficiently to accept, essentially, whereas for Ortega the truth is something more so true for a historical period, fundamentally, but neither of which can be shown to be truly true. Influence or conceptions of the truth may vary, but in the end, regardless, we cannot even truly know or be certain of the truth—this last point is arguably a point of possible dialogue between Ortega and all these pragmatists explored here.

Again we can explore methods in how truth is developed, defined, maintained or disregarded, but not necessarily the truth in and of itself; "The difficulty about objective truth lies not in observing the fact, but in devising a philosophic theory of its possibility" Schiller argued. Again, this is still powerful and important because studying what we think the truth is and why we think that will still reveal quite a lot; this will still tell us a lot about humanity, and it must be added, about that time period in which it was formulated (i.e., the truth is also

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historical). The "Principle of Peirce" is cited as the key definition of the truth by all of the pragmatists explored here, as in this instance from Schiller,

Pragmatism, on the other hand, essays to trace out the actual making of truth, the actual ways in which discriminations between the true and the false are effected, and derives from these its generalisations about the method of determining the nature of truth. It is from such empirical observations that it derives its doctrine that when an assertion claims truth, its consequences are always used to test its claim. In other words, what follows from its truth for any human interest, and more particularly and in the first place, for the interest with which it is directly concerned, is what established its real truth and validity.  

Here we can revisit two basic pragmatist concepts about the truth. First is the idea that what can be explored is a method for understanding how it develops (but not the truth in and of itself). Second is that key in directing this method is human interest, as we saw was especially true for James's thought. Studying the "truth" is empirical for the pragmatist, and therefore dependent on consequences. And those consequences are searched for, emphasized, and selected, mainly as a result of human interest, and what purpose and value they serve; "Human interest, then, is vital to the existence of truth [...] its consequences must be consequences to some one for some purpose." And this reliance on human interest in the formulation of truth makes it again logically a very "human" concept (and hence again Schiller's use of the term "Humanism" for his

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889 Ibid., p. 7

890 Ibid., p. 8.
philosophy rather than "Pragmatism"); "truth has to be felt before it is understood." Schiller therefore relies a bit more than the other pragmatists on the specific individual human interest in formulating our beliefs on the truth; meaning, while they all reference the role of human interest in influencing our beliefs on the truth, Schiller simply gives even more weight to this (given that as he declares his philosophy is "humanism"), which we can also extend to envision as a type of perspectivism that would resultantly dialogue with Ortega even more smoothly here. In the following discussion on the truth that Ortega elaborates on in Unas lecciones de metafísica, he develops the idea that truth arises out of need, and specifically he also emphasizes, as does Schiller, a human need; "Decimos que hemos encontrado una verdad cuando hemos hallado un cierto pensamiento que satisface una necesidad intelectual previamente sentida por nosotros." While "interest" and "need" are of course different, the fundamental idea is that this, whichever it be, is directed by humans; hence again Schiller's "humanism." Moreover, while an interest may not always be a need, a need is always an interest, too, logically, so there is still overlap in imagining a dialogue between Ortega and Schiller here since in this specific quote Ortega references an 'intellectual need.'

So again, given this emphasis on human interest arguably we can also bring in the concept of "perspectivism" to further envision a dialogue between Ortega and Schiller, which has been discussed at length throughout this dissertation as a key concept of Ortega's that can dialogue in numerous ways with various pragmatists. To reiterate: in one sense, everything we see, focus on, and interpret, is funneled through an individual lens that we either actively or

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891 Schiller, Humanism: Philosophical Essays, p. 51. Again, in general there is understandably more shared between Schiller and James, as noted, than Schiller and Dewey, given the close relationship between the two.

892 Ortega, Metafísica, p. 15.
sometimes subconsciously channel specific, selective information. And this is because we have specific, sometimes differing, interests and place diverse degrees of value on different objects, events, behaviors, etcetera. In this dialogue, therefore, we can envisage the commonality that truth is at least in part individual because it can be influenced and shaped from and within perspective. Additionally, perspective is unique and it can be funneled through individual interest.

Schiller raises a key point as to why the individuality in all this is so important; because "individuals are infinitely different," so our perspectives, interests, and considerations of values can also be infinitely combined, as must be revisited here.\(^893\) So again in extending this to our possible dialogue with Ortega, our individuality is part of what leads to differing truths. This is what Ortega implies as well directly in the following declaration: "Cada vida es un punto de vista sobre el universo. En rigor, lo que ella ve no lo puede ver otra. Cada individuo —persona, pueblo, época— es un órgano insustituible para la conquista de la verdad."\(^894\)

A key claim in pragmatism that was explored at the start is that we must emphasize consequences and practical study, because it is arguably one of the more "rational" methods of verification, as it is specific, and it is empirical. Pragmatism is an "epistemological" method. Schiller argues with this need for the empirical and concrete defining features of pragmatism as he in fact considers the philosophy teleological.\(^895\) In other words, specific tests are carried out, making this mode of thought something more tangible, cogent, perhaps more "scientific" and not...


just only or always "pondered" in a more loose, abstract, and ungrounded philosophical way. Pragmatism, therefore, lays its claims to being a more "practical" and "rational" philosophy by establishing some specific criteria and methods, but it does not cease to be a philosophy, nonetheless, left with many open ends and unanswered quandaries. In other words, it remains a philosophy and not a science. And one of the "practical" aspects that Schiller is referring to here is specifically as follows: "[...] truth is 'proved' by its practical working, by the way in which it stands the test of experience [...] the question of the 'practical working of a truth will always ultimately be found to resolve itself into the question whether we can live by it."\(^{896}\) Here also is a bit more of Schiller's social element in defining the truth, as living is a social experience as well of course, and as is arguably true for all the philosophers examined here. It must be noted as well that for both thinkers, especially Ortega, there is also a social element, such as tradition, and specifically historical tradition, in any conceptions of the truth. This point will be revisited ahead.

So the truth is "tested," as Schiller explains it, "All testing of truth, therefore, is fundamentally alike. It is always an appeal to something beyond the original claim. It always implies an experiment. It always involves a risk of failure as well as a prospect of success. And it always ends in a valuation.\(^{897}\)

In fact, this is so important because a "truth," being such a grandiose concept, must be verified, logically, per pragmatist (and logical, rational) claims.

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[...] all truths must be verified to be properly true. A truth which will not (or cannot) submit to verification is not yet a truth at all. Its truth is at best potential, its meaning is null or unintelligible, or at most conjectural and dependent on an unfulfilled condition. To become really true it has to be tested, and it is tested by being applied. Only when this is done, only that is when it is used, can it be determined what it really means, and what conditions it must fulfill to be really true. Hence all real truths must have shown themselves to be useful; they must have been applied to some problem of actual knowing, by usefulness in which they were tested and verified.898

So we may not be able to verify truths as absolutely true, but we can nonetheless categorize them as being useful after testing and verification, thereby funneling out here what we could call 'more real' truths (as opposed to "more true" because the logic in that is essentially faulty since something ideally is simply true, and that's that, but for our purposes here; for how truths can be historically confirmed and continue corroborated as such into the future, we can sometimes insinuate, therefore, "more true" or "truer"). Perhaps Schiller calls this here "real truths," or "really true" truths as another means to demonstrate how it depends on human interest and value, which reveals itself to us from "application to experience" —as experience, we have seen at length, is key in pragmatism. A "truth" that is not tested, applied, and verified as 'useful' is not as "real." For us to at least think that it is really a truth in our lives and/or in society it needs to pass this pragmatist process. Meaning, per Schiller we need to differentiate from something that we cannot 'corroborate' practically and tangibly as useful versus something that we can, regardless of how 'true' we individually or collectively believe something to be. Even if

898 Ibid., p. 10.
we are convinced of something being true, the less we test and verify per the pragmatist process, the less 'true' something really is—and vice versa, the more it is tested, the more 'true' it is (or, if we are speaking of reality, the more real it is, as this same idea applies to other concepts such as the 'real' and 'reality').

But this pragmatist process does not prove any *absolute* truths (or any one absolute reality), hence why what we should refer to is primarily 'more real truths' because again while there may be some truths that some individuals are convinced are 'very true truths' (to purposefully exaggerate) to be a properly pragmatist theory we must add that in order to consider a truth "true" it needs to go through this pragmatist process of test, application, and verification. But again this process will only yield *more warranted* truths, to use the key word from fellow pragmatist Dewey's philosophy, as there is no one supreme, complete process and assessment for determining any *absolute* truths (or any absolute realities). Our truth, just like our reality, is just that; *ours*. Again the anti-dualistic concept that there is what we think is the truth, and what we think is reality, and then there is what either really, truly is reality or a truth, but we cannot confirm if our perspectives ever coincide with these absolutes. And it does not matter essentially because it is what it is; there is just what we think it is, to phrase this colloquially. And this we can ponder and study what it says about us perhaps more so than the actual manifested truth or reality (in other words, phrased generally, what we think about something sometimes tells us more about ourselves and out time periods rather than that something). And also hence the connection to "perspectivism" lending further support to possibly imagine a dialogue here with Ortega given that as "ours," reality and truth exist via our perspectives. Moreover, our truth is part of our reality, and our reality is part of our truth, and some specific, concrete examples within are more "warranted," "affirmed," and perhaps we could say here "justified," when they
can get further through this pragmatist testing process, but it does not prove their absoluteness. To conclusively summarize: none of the thinkers explored in this dissertation confirm the possibility to prove an absolute truth or reality. Ortega also essentially considers these two terms of "reality" and "truth" as being simply what we think they are and that they cannot be absolutely proven one way or the other; "La realidad es la coexistencia mía con la cosa. [...] La verdad es la pura coexistencia de un yo con las cosas, de unas cosas ante el yo."899 Again, there are simply, therefore, more potentially real truths, but no absolutely real truths. And as we shall see, within these notions we can substitute just the same history and the study of history, which is part of the main goal in this dissertation.

In this referenced pragmatist process "experience" is of course key. Perhaps the following is one of the clearest and most concise summaries of the importance of experience in Schiller's words, not to mention an additional very clear connection to pragmatism in general: "everything known to exist must be connected with our experience."900 The tests we conduct for determining what we think is a truth are carried out via experience. And as shall be continued to be explored throughout, key in Schiller's philosophy on this is immediate experience as the most tangible and useful of all. Our human interest and value that we develop over the course of our experiences makes life purposive, which he considers the most essential feature of pragmatism.901

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899 Ortega, Metafísica, pp. 148-149.

900 Schiller, Studies in Humanism, p. 50.

901 See: Schiller, Studies in Humanism, p. 11. "Hence the most essential feature of Pragmatism may well seem its insistence on the fact that (5) all mental life is purposive."
Hence, "truth, then, being a valuation, has reference to a purpose."\(^{902}\) And this is because "truth depends on its consequences, that the true must be good and useful and practical."\(^{903}\) This ultimately, therefore, makes the "truth" something "human." This is key in Schiller's philosophy, as has been repeated, since humanity is central in his humanism. "It must be frankly admitted," writes Schiller, "that truth is human truth, and incapable of coming into being without human effort and agency; that human action is psychologically conditioned."\(^{904}\)

Truth, therefore, must always be "regarded with suspicion," similarly to how Dewey called it a "warranted assertion," because a truth cannot be proven entirely accurate or valid. A truth is ambiguous; it is simply a "claim which may or may not turn out to be valid."\(^{905}\) Even after it has been tested and endorsed, we shall still be obligated to continue to examine it, return to its testing, and remain skeptical, per Schiller, and the other pragmatists explored here. After all, one has only to do a quick review of history to ponder some examples of what was once considered "true" that over time was "tested" and proven not to be true, as in the example cited in the earlier section on Dewey of being certain once upon a time that the world was flat.\(^{906}\)

And in moving toward this dissertation's main focus on historicism in all this, given the changing nature of truth over the course of time, or history, we can posit that truth is not just human, but also historical (as it is also individual and social). For example, in one instance

\(^{902}\) Ibid., p. 96.

\(^{903}\) Ibid., p. 98.

\(^{904}\) Ibid., p. 113.

\(^{905}\) Ibid., p. 92.

\(^{906}\) This is an example, in fact, that Schiller also cites.
Schiller argues how "established truths" are "made in historical times." So this is another dialogue link, therefore, that will be explored here; the possible connection here to historicist thought between Schiller and Ortega, as it was with Dewey and James as well. As examined in the introduction, arguments have been presented on how pragmatism has some fundamental historicist aspects to it (of course something again which was key in Ortega's philosophy), and the work of Schiller is no exception to this.

And as with other topics explored here, like we just saw with truth and reality, history is what we think it is. Since it can never be fully recorded, nor completely objectively, we can only find ways to get closer to what it really is, but never completely. We can study what we think history is, which at times reveals to us more about ourselves within that historical time period in which it was recorded and/or studied, rather than the actual historical details themselves. As there are "more real and more true truths" and "more real, more true realities" there are "more real and more true histories" but we can never get to any of this absolutely. These are all what we think they are, making this all quite "human" and therefore adding to smoothing a possible dialogue between the "humanist" Schiller and the "perspectivist" Ortega.

Here we can argue a possible association in that consequences, which we use to study the development of our ideas of the "truth," because they are based on human interest and value, they are practical. Arguing that a truth needs to be practical is quite pragmatist of course. And consequences can be practical, interesting, and valuable, because of the effects and repercussions that they produce. In other words, consequences can direct, or at least partially influence, a course of events; or, in a word, history. An important part of what we study in general, therefore,

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907 Ibid., p. 121.
is simply history. Schiller writes, "all consequences are practical, sooner or later, in the sense of affecting our action. Even where they do not immediately alter the course of events, they alter our own nature, and cause its actions to be different, and thus lead to different operations on the world." ⁹⁰⁸

This arguable link to history will be explored in great depth in the second section of this part on Schiller and Ortega, but suffice to say here for the moment that there is most certainly a historicist element to Schiller's concept of the "truth" as well. Just as with other pragmatist notions, there is the important feature of being continuous; truth and its changing characters, natures, and definitions, is on a continuum that proceeds through the past into the present and onwards into the future. So there is always, also, a past element that is considered, examined, and applied in study since this concept of a "continuum" is key here. Schiller writes, "We avowed that our truths were made out of previous truths, and built upon pre-existing knowledge; also that our procedure involved an initial recognition of fact." ⁹⁰⁹ Logically previous truths implies previous time, or history. So here he essentially states that truth is, at least in part, historical. And this is also because truth is dependent on experience, and experiences are, logically, accumulated over the past, or history. This has been repeated here throughout because it is key in understanding how "experience" can be historical since this is not often directly declared by pragmatists. And this last point is one of the key objectives that this dissertation's imagined dialogue offers: not just a new layer of reading of Ortega, but also of pragmatism as well in particular in the cases of James, Dewey, and Schiller. As Schiller argues, this is why "In its

⁹⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 9.
⁹⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 123.
fullest sense our truth must harmonise, not only with its own ways of thinking but with our whole experience.”

A further demonstration of how truth is also historical is because it also has an important social element. While truth is pondered and developed often by an individual in distinct ways, man is also a social being, and so in order to continue to apply and exist a truth needs extensive social acceptance. A truth, therefore, needs to be individually as well as socially useful to be accepted, applied, and remain in existence (at least in a defined moment in time, or history). To be accepted, socially, time is required for the truth to disperse, to be tested, to become believed, and to be ‘validated.’ So again truth is also dependent in part on time, or history. Schiller writes, noting also the social element here,

For man is a social being, and truth indubitably is to a large extent a social product. For even though every truth may start in a minority of one, its hold upon existence is exceedingly precarious, unless it can contrive to get itself more extensively appreciated. [...] Truth, then, to be really safe, has to be more than an individual valuation; it has to win social recognition, to transform itself into common property.

This excerpt succinctly demonstrates how Schiller can view the truth as something both individual and social. This dependence on "social usefulness" is another defining characteristic we can add to our list of features for Schiller's notion of the truth, as it is clearly of course not something that is entirely indeterminable or not understandable; "social usefulness is an ultimate

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911 Ibid., p. 58.
determinant of 'truth'" he writes.\textsuperscript{912} Moreover, this shows how despite Schiller being often presented as quite the individualist, there is clearly an important social element in his philosophy as well.

But being the pragmatist that he is, it must be noted of course that Schiller is most interested in the future application of all this in the following, pragmatist, instrumentalist and functionalist declaration that proceeds:

The past is dead and done with, practically speaking; its deeds have hardened into facts, which are accepted, with or without enthusiasm; what it really concerns us to know is how to act with a view to the future. And so like life, and as befits a theory of human life, Pragmatism faces towards the future.\textsuperscript{913}

While it might seem at a first glance a bit pessimistic, ambiguous, and incomplete to say that we can never really know with complete certainty any "truth," "reality," or "history," the argument throughout this dissertation is that what we can do is improve our understanding of them, as this is in part what happens over the course of history. \textit{Improvement is something}, if not better than nothing. As Schiller adds on a more optimistic note, there is still value in these conceptions of the truth outlined here, as they can improve, and they can tell us quite a bit about the historical time in which they were formulated and the people of those times, as a common, threading conclusion weaved throughout this dissertation;

\textsuperscript{912} Ibid., p. 59.

\textsuperscript{913} Schiller, \textit{Studies in Humanism}, p. 123.
[...] our errors were truths in their day. For they were the most adequate ways we then had of dealing with our experience. They were not, therefore, valueless. Nor were they gratuitous errors. More commonly they were natural, or even indispensable, stages in the attainment of better truths.  

There is certainly a historicist element in this quote. Human interest and value is important here in this pragmatist understanding of the "truth" because, tersely defined, at times we assign value to something "good," and then claim it to be true. Schiller writes,

If an assertion is to be valuable, and therefore true, its consequences must be good. [...] If, therefore, the consequences of an assertion turn out to be in this way good, it is valuable for our purposes, and, provisionally at least, establishes itself as true; if they are bad, we reject it as useless and account it false, and search for something that satisfies our purpose better, or in extreme cases accept it as a provisional truth concerning a reality we are determined to unmake.

There is an important argument made here by Schiller in his use of the term "provisional truth" in which as such he is reminding us that there are no absolute truths, which means there are no absolute historical truths either. A truth or historical truth is provisional while its consequences remain "good" per Schiller. And until bad consequences arise, if they do (we cannot of course predict what will happen with all), at that point then the truth is falsified as he argues above. Consequently the search for new adapted truth(s) begins.

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914 Ibid., p. 130.
915 Ibid., p. 9.
Perhaps this also dialogues with Ortega's notion of ideas and beliefs that has been visited here in this view that the ideas which become beliefs through their usefulness are also just provisional because sometimes crises arise and bring their falsity to the surface, starting anew the process of contemplating and pondering new ideas that will later become installed as new beliefs. This is part of what defines a "generation" for Ortega; a generation's set of beliefs, making beliefs in this sense also historical. For Ortega, because beliefs are a form of "truths"/"human truths," or to use Dewey's term which applies quite appropriately here of "warranted assertions," they are provisional of course as they must be maintained as "truth"/"truthful" because the potential remains that they might be overturned in the future. And it is through history in which they remain as such. These warranted assertions, or beliefs, or provisional truths, however we call them, thus define their corresponding historical periods and contexts since they must be continually verified and validated along their continuum of existence, making them historical, and again never absolute. But as part of a continuum there is also an element of the present and future within.

Moreover, here we also have the connection in the pragmatist views that the truth and reality are, to a certain extent, interchangeable concepts, as we shall see in the section that follows on reality. "Truth and Reality," Schiller writes, "grow for us together, in a single process, which is never one of bringing the mind into relation with a fundamentally alien reality, but always one of improving and extending an already existing system which we know."916

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916 Ibid., p. 115.
VI. Reality

Two of the main reasons why Schiller's interpretations of "Truth" and "Reality" are somewhat similarly interchangeable are because first, they are analogous in that we cannot really know either, we can just know what we think we know they are (and, therefore, there is no such thing as an "absolute truth" or an "absolute reality," as they are both not just unreachable, essentially, but also basically ever-changing) as we have seen in the previous two parts of this dissertation. And second, they are both, therefore, also human-made through the same processes in a large part based on the accumulation of experiences (i.e., history, so as we shall see, reality is also historical as well, which is of course revisited here since this dissertation's general purpose is exploring the historicity in everything here). Hence, as Thayer supports this somewhat interchangeable idea as well, "Schiller is led to couple the making of truth with the making of reality."917 Schiller claims

That the pragmatic theory of knowledge [...] conceives reality as something which, for our knowledge at least, grows up in the making of truth, and consequently recognizes nothing but continuous and fluid transitions from hypothesis to fact and from truth to truth [...] the making of the truth is also in a very real sense a making of reality. In validating our claims to truth we really discover realities.918

And he continues, even more succinctly, "Reality is reality for us, and known by us, just as truth is truth for us. [...] The making of truth was necessarily also a making of reality."919 Just

918 Schiller, Studies in Humanism, p. 253.
919 Ibid., p. 253.
As with the truth, at the core of this is the pragmatist concept of "anti-dualism" that we have seen throughout this dissertation. Meaning, there is reality, and then there is what we think is reality; the two are connected anti-dualistically because they are separate (we cannot know for sure if and when they ever coincide) yet interdependent (there is something called "reality" and something that we think we can call "reality"). They are not just separate concepts, because what they are, and what we think they are, are also connected necessarily—again, pragmatist anti-dualism.

As we have seen, this proposal of how truth and reality can be interchangeable terms might dialogue with Ortega to a certain extent, and in a specific way. As included in an aforementioned excerpt, Ortega defines reality and truth as somewhat interchangeable; that the "truth" is the pure, co-existence of "yo" with things, and things in front of "yo."920 We are never fully alone in Ortega's metaphysics on reality. We are always in existence with other things (places, people, things, etcetera) around us at all times, and that are also not directly part of us but they are necessarily still part of our realities and lives. He writes, "[...] siempre que encuentro mi yo le encuentro coexistiendo con algo frente, ante y contra él: el mundo o circunstancia. [...] mi existir es coexistir con lo que no soy yo. La realidad es, pues, esta interdependencia y coexistencia."921 Reality, therefore, is 'me and what surrounds me;' reality is yo y mi circunstancia. "Yo" and "circunstancia" are separate but interconnected concepts in Ortega's philosophy, which is again the arguably inherent anti-dualism examined throughout here as an

920 “La realidad es la coexistencia mía con la cosa. [...] La verdad es la pura coexistencia de un yo con las cosas, de unas cosas ante el yo” (Ortega, Metafísica. p. 148.)

921 Ortega, Metafísica, p. 158.
innovative way to contemplate this notion of his, and hence again evidence for the possibility to imagine a dialogue with pragmatism.

This anti-dualistic nature of reality (and the truth, as we saw) makes this, again, a very "human" concept based on human, and individual, experiences. And there is an important "individualistic" element in this because of differing "perspective"; as Ortega argues as well, we see reality and the world through individual eyes and lens that filter selectively, whether consciously or not. This is, again, Ortega's "perspectivism." As he directly declares, "La perspectiva es uno de los componentes de la realidad."\(^{922}\) Moreover, as reality is presented to us via perspective, there is no one absolute and objective reality, as has been analyzed here in Ortega's philosophy, rather there is a great diversity of perspectives that manifest, present, and give us our realities. An appropriate metaphor here is imaging looking through a kaleidoscope; there is a multiplicity of perspectives through which we see and experience our reality, and through which our realities come to us. As Professor Seoane argues to be the case for Schiller, there are going to be different "truths" because it can depend on what we each value as important, and what we each think is important can vary of course. "La realidad es aquello que evaluamos como importante."\(^{923}\)

Thus, given the multiplicity of perspectives, we cannot say, most certainly not with any conviction, that there is any "absolute reality," just as we saw we could not say there were any "absolute truths," for not only Ortega, Dewey, and James, but Schiller as well would agree with this. And as Schiller argues, "the conception of Absolute Reality will naturally run parallel to

\(^{922}\) Ortega, *Nuestro tiempo*, p. 147.

\(^{923}\) Seoane, "Una invitación a la lectura de Ferdinand Canning Scott Schiller," p. 259.
that of Absolute Truth." The same applies to historicism and historical "truths," as we shall see in the case of Schiller and that we saw applied to Dewey and James. Therefore, what we have is potential reality (or truths), and this is quite the pragmatist concept in that it is future-oriented as something quite instrumentalist and functionalist. What we have are truths and realities via perspectives filtered by individuals within a social milieu, as one way to summarize this. And per Schiller, because what we have is the potential, what we have is thus something plastic, constantly in the making, and never ending:

"[...] there may be as many more potential realities, unreal at present, but capable of being brought into existence by our efforts. [...] reality is still in the making. Nothing is absolutely settled. Human operations are real experiments with a reality that really responds, and may respond differently to different manipulations. [...] Thus our actual experience contains literally infinite possibilities of alternate universes, which struggle for existence in the minds of every agent who is capable, in however limited a degree, of choosing between alternatives."

Here Schiller makes the same claim as Ortega that there is no one absolute perspective or reality because there are "more potential realities," "infinite possibilities of alternate universes," and 'agents can choose between alternatives'. For Ortega as we know, perspective is indeed also part of the defining features of what reality is. But for him the perspective in the first part is to a

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924 Schiller, Studies in Humanism, p. 131.

925 Ortega summarizes the main conclusion on his perspectivism and its relation to reality in the following excerpt, which must be quoted again because it so clearly elucidates this; "[...] la realidad, como paisaje, tiene infinitas perspectivas, todas ellas igualmente verídicas y auténticas. La sola perspectiva falsa es esa que pretende ser la única. Dicho de otra manera: lo falso es la utopía, la verdad no localizada, vista desde <<lugar ninguno>>" (Ortega, Nuestro tiempo, pp. 148-149).

926 Schiller, Studies in Humanism, p. 134.
great extent shaped by its background history; perspective, like so much else is, again, historical for Ortega.  

This always incomplete reality, in fact, is a basic principle of Schiller's "Humanism," as he declares that Humanism involves "the assertion of a really evolving, and therefore as yet incomplete, reality." The following quote from Ortega perhaps dialogues quite well with this previous one just cited from Schiller: "Progresar es acumular ser, tesaurizar realidad." Hence the potential for a dialogue in this idea again of a "continuum" weaving as a common thread throughout this thesis. The world is plastic because reality is always a becoming, also because it is always dependent, in part, on the future. Our reality, our selves, therefore, in part live for the future—something undeniably quite pragmatist. Ortega writes, "Por tanto, el yo posee la extraña consistencia de ser futurición. Yo soy el que tiene que ser y ser de un cierto modo determinado, del mío en el porvenir, inmediato y remoto." So in this specific concept of us being also our futures we also find a possible dialogue between Schiller and Ortega. Even though Ortega most strongly emphasizes that what man has is history, here he clearly also recognizes that what man also has is his future (again because his future is part of every "present" and therefore also every past because at some point the future will become the past, and since we are at times forward thinking and focused—not to mention that a main objective in historical study is to learn from the past how to be create better futures). Thus being history is not just being the past, it is also

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927 As quoted earlier, "Todos tienen su puesto determinado en la serie histórica; ninguno puede aspirar a salirse de ella, porque esto equivaldría a convertirse en un ente abstracto, con íntegra renuncia a la existencia" (Ortega, Nuestro tiempo, p. 147).

928 Schiller, Studies in Humanism, p. 234.

929 Ortega, Historia, p. 50.

930 Ortega, Obras Completas IX, p. 535.
'being the past seen from the present while oriented toward the future'—this is a point of dialogue woven throughout this dissertation between Ortega and all three pragmatists. Again, in this way of seeing our existence as a continuum we can smooth this imaginary conversation by bringing in a historical element to pragmatism, and a pragmatist commentary to Ortega, which are two of the principal innovations argued for here.

Here we can also further continue a dialogue between Schiller with Ortega's idea of 'man adrift, shipwrecked and in search of his need and obligation to find his true self and true vocation' in our 'limited freedom' to choose among the different possibilities or circumstances that we find ourselves among and within. Schiller writes, "Thus it is our duty and our privilege to co-operate in the shaping of the world; among infinite possibilities to select and realize the best." Again reality here is arguably "perspective," essentially (because we "select and realize"), which is another area we can certainly create a dialogue with Ortega. This is why there are 'as many different circumstances as there are individuals'; "[...] tantas circunstancias diferentes cuantos son ustedes." Schiller posits that it needs to be modified that

 [...] individuality is an ultimate and definitely determined characteristic of reality, but the general flux of reality itself. The individual also is in process, and so individuality becomes a characteristic of which reality may be seen to have less or more. [...] Individuality thereby becomes a hypothesis and an ideal, as well as a characteristic of reality. [...] we must learn to think of the individuality of the real as we have learned to think of its reality, not as a completed being, but as a becoming, i.e., as being in process.

931 Schiller, Studies in Humanism, p. 134.

932 Ortega, Obras Completas IX, p. 536.
That which we designate by the term individuality is a varying and growing quantity, never wholly absent, but not always fully developed.\(^{933}\)

This notion of our really always existing in a state of "becoming" has been discussed at length here and clearly applies in this third section as well, as this Schiller has stated exactly in the excerpt above.\(^{934}\) Again it must be reiterated: history is man's story of his 'becoming' because history is really a continuum; in the present we are our history, and the future will also be incorporated later as our history. This, as we saw, Graham argued for precisely to be the case with Ortega;

[...] we know that 'man has no nature,' but a history of 'variations' instead, for his 'being' is becoming. 'Man who is not, goes on making himself in the dialectical series of his experiences.' Therefore, because of his historicity, 'the only thing we can know of man is what he has been.' 'The past constrains the future.'\(^{935}\)

This is perhaps deduced in part from Ortega's claims that man is plastic, as in this excerpt we have see; "El hombre es una entidad infinitamente plástica de la que se puede hacer lo que se


\(^{934}\) As we saw in the first section of this dissertation, Regalado Garcia supports this interpretation as well for Ortega, as noted he posited; "No tener naturaleza implica que el hombre no es cosa ni cuerpo, alma o conciencia, sino que el hombre es un drama, ser insustancial, nuevo *homo viator*, <<peregrino del ser>>, cuya esencia consiste en querer ser lo que todavía no es, lo que convierte su vida en un continuo quehacer" (Regalado García, *Laberinto*, p. 202).

\(^{935}\) Graham, *Pragmatist Philosophy*, p. 350. As another aforementioned source of argued support for this from Graham; "Since Dilthey, observed Ortega, we know that 'man has no nature,' but a history of "variations" instead, for his "being" is becoming. "Man, who is not, goes on making himself in the dialectical series of his experiences."
Therefore, because of his historicity, "the only thing we can know of man is what he has been." "The past constrains the future." "For that reason, the science of the past, properly understood, is the only science of the future in the very precise sense in which a science of the future is possible. [...] This new reason was "historical reason," which was also a "living reason" that was subject to life. In Ortega's conception, historical reason is subordinate to life, and the intermediate form of "living reason," in which he expressed as most clearly subject to life, from 1933 to 1937, was directly out of James's *Pragmatism*" (Ibid., p. 350).
Being 'plastic' and living 'plastically' means, at the very least, that we are not only static, fixed beings with invariable, set characteristics, or circumstances, which leads to and supports the argument that we are not only "being" we are more so "becoming."

We can only "grow" over "time," hence again a historicist element here. And as with the truth, Schiller notes two key factors in what we can establish as part of a "method" of sorts. He posits, "It is fallacious, therefore, to claim ultimate reality for anything that is not (i) known or know-able, and (2) useful in operating on apparent realities." This is clearly quite pragmatist in how reality needs to be something more tangible; that can be experimented with and on, and that is empirical.

In returning to the connection for Schiller between truth and reality, he explains his position further that in our study toward truth, we can only do this and conduct ourselves as such via the ever-changing reality; "In the ascent to Truth we can never lose touch with a continuous reality." And the way in which we are specifically in touch with our reality is through most specifically and poignantly our immediate experiences. Immediate experience is, therefore, our general starting and ending point for Schiller; "We must begin therefore with reality as well as end with it, and cling to it all the way as closely as we can." The following excerpt summarizes quite clearly Schiller's connection here between immediate experience and reality;

937 Schiller, Studies in Humanism, p. 147.
938 Schiller, Humanism: Philosophical Essays, p. 192.
939 Ibid., p. 192.
Now the only reality we can start with is our own personal, immediate experience. We may lay it down therefore that *all immediate experience is as such real, and that no ultimate reality can be reached except from this basis and upon the stimulation of such immediate experience*. [...] In other words, the distinction of 'appearance and reality' is *not* one which transcends our experience, but one which arises in it.\(^{940}\)

In other words, most simplistically and tersely stated, what is *more* real is what we *immediately* experience is real—this is not to say that we can say for certain it truly and absolutely is real, but *at least it is what we think is real*. Schiller's emphasis on "*immediate*" experience is key because this is what is most tangible, essentially, as he explains, "it must never be forgotten that the immediate experience is after all in a way *more real*; *i.e.*, *more directly real*, than the 'higher realities' which are said to 'explain' it."\(^{941}\) While at first glance it seems a bit illogical to say "*more real*" (because a common first thought is that something is simply real, period), here we just find again the need to exaggerate this notion to make a point. It is through immediate experience that we can test, value, and influence (in a limited freedom) our realities. "*Immediate experience forms the touchstone whereby we can test the value of our inferred realities.*"\(^{942}\) This division of a 'more recent' type of experience we saw was also emphasized in Dewey and James, albeit somewhat differently.

To *a certain extent* we can imagine a dialogue here in how these immediate experiences, as they are labeled by Schiller, can be *of* the circumstances that surround us in Ortega's

\(^{940}\) Ibid., p. 192.

\(^{941}\) Ibid., p. 195.

\(^{942}\) Ibid., p. 199.
Experience, albeit fundamental to life, is not the only factor defining and shaping our realities for Schiller. Experience is unique and fundamental, as Porrouvecchio explains, in Schiller's philosophy, "each person's experience of the world is personalized by his or her experience of it." But we also need to contemplate, consider, ponder, and form conclusions, on those experiences. And he continues, quoting Schiller,

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[...] the whole world in which we live is experience and built up out of nothing else than experience. [...] experience, nevertheless, does not, alone and by itself, constitute reality, but, to construct a world, needs certain assumptions, connecting principles, or fundamental truths, in order that it may organize its crude materials and transmute itself into palatable, manageable, and liveable forms.  

And as shall be elaborated in great detail further ahead in the second section, this is connected with historicist thought in that, suffice to say for the moment, these processes of interpretations and inferences form a continuous, never-ending chain in which the past impacts the present and future, ceaselessly; "The results of our past thought enter into and transform our immediate perceptions and render them more adequate as guides to action."  

Again we have this important thread weaved throughout here of the notion of continuum. And to bring this all full circle to this dissertation's objectives, this certainly can dialogue with the following declaration from Ortega on his definition of history that "[...] por historia entiendo el estudio de la realidad humana desde el más remoto pasado hasta los hombres presentes inclusive [...] porque historia es entender bien las realidades humanas [...]."  

For Ortega, therefore, really what we should call reality is 'historical reality' with man at its center—this latter idea being another that can potentially dialogue with Schiller and his humanism; "Por eso el hombre y todo lo humano en él es realidad histórica [...]"

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944 Ibid., p. 61.  
945 Schiller, Humanism: Philosophical Essays, p. 199.  
946 Ortega, Interpretación, pp. 90-91.  
947 Ibid., p. 103.
So "reality is made by the shaping of our experiences," proposes Porrovecchio, because for Schiller "what I experience is what I experience." Thayer supports this as well, also quoting in his book on pragmatism how Schiller, to paraphrase, said the world was not 'ready-made and that the 'world is a construction.' And in this we can find further possible dialogue with Ortega on the notion of how nothing is "ready-made," which is something Ortega repeats on numerous occasions as we have seen (also in the dialogue with James), as in the following example:

De ahí mi fórmula conocida: la vida no es dada, puesto que nos encontramos en ella, sin saber cómo ni por qué; pero eso que nos es dado, la vida, no nos es dado hecho, sino que tenemos que hacérnosla nosotros, cada cual la suya. La vida es qué hacer y da mucho quehacer.

As Porrovecchio suggests in reference to Schiller, "For in science, as in history, what is of consequence is not some ready-made, pre-existing form that we yearn to discover. What is crucial is the extent to which one or another experience succeeds in moving forward our understanding of reality." Again, a key pragmatist element here is how this understanding is based in part on the experiences we have, and they allow us to progress and move forward because their consequences (now and in the future) are (and persist to be) beneficial, useful, and they continue adding to the continuum of our experiences. In other words, again to reiterate:

948 See: Porrovecchio, F.C.S. Schiller, p. 61.
950 Ortega, Obras Completas IX, p. 539.
951 Porrovecchio, F.C.S. Schiller, p. 61.
understanding comes not from an exact correspondence between an interpretation of some thing and that thing, but rather "understanding" is just our experience of that some thing. This concept of a not ready-made world referenced above, which dialogues arguably quite smoothly with Ortega, is key in Schiller's philosophy, as it also is in understanding his humanism and his 'personalism'—as Thayer posits, Schiller's "[...] purely plastic world shaped and constructed by our trying, that is, our "experiments" in a quest of harmonizing and satisfying experience." Being quite the pragmatist of course, experiment, as Thayer continues to explain, is central to Schiller's philosophy;

[…] experiment is any trial or attempt to affect the materials of experience […] all conscious human action is experimental, and it follows that for Schiller, a theory of experiment or analysis of experimentation constitutes the fundamental philosophic conceptual scheme for discussing and understanding human nature and conduct.953

As with the truth, and loyal to pragmatism, part of what we consider "real" and "reality" is that which is useful to us, argues Schiller; "[...] we experiment with notions which are suggested to our intelligence by our immediate experience, until we hit upon one which engrosses us. And then we declare real the conception which serves our purpose."954 In other words, reality converts into the truth when it becomes valuable, useful, tested, and therefore when it brings "harmony" to our life; "An assumed reality, then, approves itself to be true in

952 Thayer, Meaning and Action: A Critical History of Pragmatism, p. 290
953 Ibid.
954 Schiller, Humanism: Philosophical Essays, p. 193.
proportion as it shows itself capable of rendering our life more harmonious." Again this involves time, being a "continuum," and therefore they are 'historical' concepts, at least in part. This is a common fiber strung throughout this dissertation, as we have seen.

But of course there is nothing "absolute" in any of this for Schiller, as it is anti-dualistic; there is just what we think is 'satisfactory or harmonious,' but there is nothing absolutely and completely so, or at least we cannot confirm this with complete certainty. Moreover, there is no threshold explored of what becomes "satisfactory" or "harmonious," nor when. There is no 'Absolute Truth' or 'Absolute Reality,' or at least we cannot know for sure if we have discovered them—a key concept threaded throughout this dissertation again.956 Truth, reality, "nothing is ever quite all that it is capable of being; nothing can ever wholly realise itself in any single moment. [...] nothing is ever all it might be."957 Hence here we find again the emphasis on "potentiality," and the lack of at least knowing anything absolute, and therefore our nature as living within limited freedom. This future orientation is very pragmatist of course. So this is about "becoming," not "being," as we have been reviewing throughout all three sections of this dissertation. Man/woman is plastic—this is something that all four thinkers discussed in this paper would dialogue on. But since the future is intangible, since it has of course logically not arrived yet, instead the past, specifically our histories, is what is tangible; again, this is what we can indeed ponder and study.958 And everything along that continuum in our processes of

955 Ibid., p. 200.
958 For reference here, as quoted already: "el hombre hace historia porque ante el futuro, que no está en su mano, se encuentra con lo único que tiene, que posee, es su pasado" (Ortega, Galileo, p. 143).
becoming later becomes, at some point, part of our history as we progress forward, and it thus becomes past, so the changes and transitions in between become historical as well.

We could certainly envision a dialogue with Ortega here, not only in the historical element of all this of course, but also because he would not deny that we live within a *limited freedom*, as clearly evident in the following excerpt as one of many examples that has been cited here: "Dentro de la enorme circunstancia que es el mundo, podemos movernos con cierta libertad [...] pero no podemos escapar a su círculo total inexorable."⁹⁵⁹ We live among a "margin of possibilities" as he continues, within the world, and among which we can choose from in regards to how we react, behave, act, and move in the world. This makes for a somewhat tragic existence per Ortega in that we are to a certain extent lost among these circumstances, often applying the metaphor of being a person shipwrecked at sea, as we have seen. In fact, to show clearly that essentially Ortega is referring to a *limited* freedom, he also employs the metaphor of being a "prisoner within a prison," as we are "confined to our world."⁹⁶⁰

Schiller's concept of reality debatably dialogues with this idea, as it specifically ties into his notion of limited freedom because again these ideas are somewhat interchangeable. Though this notion of "limited freedom" will be dealt with in great detail in the sub-section that follows, it must be visited briefly here to tie into how reality is plastic and ever-changing, and this thus provides us with a certain degree of freedom to choose among that plasticity—but we do not have complete control over reality itself, therefore we do not have complete freedom. "To sum up," theorizes Schiller, "our Freedom is really such as it appears; it consists in the determinable

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⁹⁶⁰ See: Ibid., pp. 63-64.
indetermination of a nature which is plastic, incomplete, and still evolving.⁹⁶¹ This dialogues with Ortega's argument *yo soy yo y mi circunstancia* in which we are free to move among our circumstances, but we do not have *complete* control over which circumstances those are. As Ortega declares, "La realidad es, pues, esta interdependencia y coexistencia."⁹⁶² So while Schiller indeed emphasizes the "individual," and that reality is essentially reducible to the "self," there is still *also* an important social element for Schiller as well because he recognizes, as does Ortega clearly (there is the self and there are the circumstances), that the *self is not isolated*. As Porrovecchio proposes as an explanation on this, "Even if the "individual" is not always the isolated self, it is a 'hypothesis and an ideal, as well as a characteristic of reality.'"⁹⁶³

And as we shall see further ahead in the second section, this is one 'trend of trends' that has been elaborated in the previous two parts and that we can find in Schiller's philosophy as well on what moves history (and thereby adding philosophy to consider to history as a discipline and methodology). Meaning, reality, the world, is indeterminate because we have a limited freedom to see, interpret, conceptualize and believe we understand that reality and world. We each have the power to choose between an, albeit limited, set of alternatives at any given time. And this power we have can change a course of events; it can change and therefore shape history, while being within history at the same time. In other words, we do not have complete

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⁹⁶² Ortega, *Metafísica*, p. 158.

control of course over the shape and form of history, but we have the power to influence it to a certain degree, and at certain times.⁹⁶⁴

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VII. The Limited Freedom of Life

As we just saw, life, per Schiller, is succinctly defined as being one of "limited freedom." Tersely stated, what makes us "free" is our option to choose, but what is limited are the options to choose from. Nonetheless, there are so many combinations that we can create among those choices that they seem almost limitless, and hence why we can still use the term "freedom" to a certain, of course limited, extent. This means that for Schiller, our life, or our realities, are plastic. As explained in this extension of an aforementioned quoted,

[...] reality is still in the making. Nothing is absolutely settled. Human operations are real experiments with a reality that really responds, and may respond differently to different manipulations. [...] Thus our actual experience contains literally infinite possibilities of alternative universes, which struggle for existing in the minds of every agent who is capable, in however limited a degree, of choosing between alternatives. [...] Thus it is our duty and our privilege to co-operate in the shaping of the world; among infinite possibilities to select and realise the best.965

As we have seen for Ortega, the world is not brought to us 'ready made;' it is not deterministic, and so neither are our lives. Clearly Schiller would converse with him on this as noted he proposes above, "reality is still in the making" (i.e., it is not deterministic). We have the power to navigate through the potentials that lie in the future, as well as the current circumstances that surround us. Hence we have the power to influence and mold at least to a certain degree our realities and therefore our lives. But we do not have complete control, nor can

965 Ibid., p. 134
we choose which are all of those future potentials or current circumstances to steer through. Here thus is further conversation we can imagine between Ortega and Schiller.

It is important to emphasize freedom in Schiller's philosophy, because not only does he accentuate the great individuality among each one of us (therefore making us "free" in our ability to be "individual" and unique, but without denying of course that we live among others still as 'social beings'), but as he describes it here, we directly take part in shaping our realities, the realities, the world.

The last sentence of the aforementioned quote certainly resonates with Ortega's emphasis on our individual duties to find our calling(s), our vocation(s), in life; "La vida da mucho quehacer. [...] antes de hacer algo tengo que decidir yo mismo lo que voy a hacer; por tanto, lo que voy a ser."\(^{966}\) This is similar, albeit more specific, to what Schiller says here about our duty to 'co-operate in the shaping of the world.' We each share duties in shaping the world, as he says we "co-operate," or "we operate separately but together" (as opposed to "cooperate," as in specifically "work together"). In other words, one possible interpretation here is that Schiller is again still, nonetheless, emphasizing the important individuality within and among each one of us, but without denying of course that we still exist and live among others as social beings since we co-operate (because the "co" represents there being more than one individual, element, reality, etcetera—whatever we are referencing, the key points is that there is more than one—and regardless of it being as 'co-operate' or 'cooperate'). In Schiller's aforementioned quote he seems to reference more specifically that we co-operate with the circumstances that surround us ("co-operate in the shaping of the world; among infinite possibilities to select and realise the best"), so

\(^{966}\) Ortega, *Metafísica*, p. 92.
this arguably dialogues smoothly with the same concept behind Ortega's \textit{yo soy yo y mí circunstancia}, which also recognizes individuality and sociality.

"Individuality," per Schiller, as we saw, is

the general flux of reality [...] individuality thereby becomes a hypothesis and an ideal, as well as a characteristic of reality. [...] as a \textit{becoming}, i.e. \textit{as being in process}. That which we designate by the term individuality is a varying and growing quantity, never wholly absent, but not always fully developed.\textsuperscript{967}

Hence it is not just about individuality, since this is always in a state of becoming.

In an effort to return consistently to this dissertation's main purpose, the historical nature of this must be noted; a becoming, growing, or being in process all suggest a temporal, therefore, historical element. Further, as noted, we can certainly envision a dialogue with Ortega on Schiller's concept of life being one of a "limited freedom" in the added sense that even though some lives may seem similar at times, or overlap, and even though we are social beings, we are still unique within our limited freedoms, for instance in the combinations we at least mostly individually choose to make in our reactions and movements. This again is the concept of a rock (el "yo") thrown into a pond that creates ripples (the "circunstancia") that was explored and applied in the previous two parts as well (more than one rock will create more than one ripple, some of which will overlap, and others which will not, just like individual lives and their circumstances). The following aforementioned but extended excerpt exhibits this concept clearly (which is why it is reinserted here):

\textsuperscript{967} Schiller, \textit{Humanism: Philosophical Essays}, p. 124.
Dentro de la fatalidad de vuestra circunstancia sois libres; más aún, sois fatalmente libres porque no tenéis más remedio, queráis o no, que escoger vuestra destino en la holgura y el margen que os ofrece vuestra fatal circunstancia. Cada hombre—y claro está, cada mujer—tiene su mundo o circunstancia que se parece más o menos a la del prójimo, pero que siempre tiene algunos elementos distintos.968

Again, some circumstances overlap, but no two sets of circumstances are necessarily exactly the same (as no two human lives are exactly the same). Ortega's key dictum that 'we are ourselves and our circumstances,' as we have seen, implies we live and operate among a specific, and limited, set of circumstances. We can choose freely which circumstances to react to, address, etcetera, but again those circumstances are limited. Hence, for Ortega we can also argue that we live in a "limited freedom." Within life "yo puedo hacer muchas cosas diversas, por lo menos varias."969 Here "margin" can arguably imply "limited."970

True to pragmatist fashion, in the case of Schiller life (and as we shall see further ahead, history), is experienced and understood upon a "continuum." He writes, "Man is but a transitory term in an infinite series of necessitated events which recedes into the past, and portends its extension into the future, without end; so that at no point can any independence or initiative be ascribed to him."971 Again, as central to the pragmatist interpretations throughout this paper,


969 Ibid., p. 56.

970 As quoted, "La vida, en efecto, deja un margen de posibilidades dentro del mundo, pero no somos libres para estar o no en este mundo que es el de ahora. [...] Esto da a nuestra existencia un gesto terriblemente dramático. Vivir [...] es encontrarse de pronto y sin saber cómo, caído, sumergido, proyectado en un mundo incanjeable: en este de ahora. [...] la vida, es un problema que necesitamos resolver nosotros" (Ibid., p. 39).

because life is experienced and understood upon a continuum, this means that our history (understood as the repertoire of past events along a continuum) is not our only defining characteristic; it is but one element of three, as there is also the present and the future that we must always take into account. All three are necessary elements in our "nature," as he writes, "[...] the essential elements of our nature can never be composed by beings subjected to the material world of Time and Space. It is impossible to compromise the claims of the future with the desires of the present, impossible also to cast off the fetters of the past."  

Being a pragmatist, Schiller is quite "forward-looking" in his emphasis on what life is all about. And while Ortega often emphasizes history most directly as being the key element in defining our lives and our natures, as we have seen he does also conceptualize this all as part of a continuum, and also specifically how man also has an important future-focused element in his realities. This, therefore, potentially adds to an envisioned dialogue with pragmatism in general, and in the specific case here in this section with Schiller. Ortega is at times quite forward-looking, as has been discussed throughout this dissertation; for example, defining life as such; "La vida es una operación que se hace hacia adelante." Ortega, Metafísica, p. 92. There are many exemplifying quotes of this from Ortegs's works, as we have seen.

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972 SCHILLER, Ferdinand Canning Scott: *Riddles of the Sphinx: A Study in the Philosophy of Evolution* [1891], pp. 103-104. (Subsequently referred to as *Riddles of the Sphinx*.)


974 In the following excerpt, in fact, he directly references the important aspect of the future in our lives and who we are;[...] si nuestra vida consiste en decidir lo que vamos a ser, quiere decirse, que el la raíz misma de nuestra vida hay un atributo temporal: decidir lo que vamos a ser, por tanto, el futuro. [...] nuestra vida es ante todo toparse con el futuro. No es el presente o el pasado lo primero que vivimos, no: la vida es una actividad que se ejecuta hacia adelante, y el presente o el pasado de descubre después, en relación con el futuro" (Ibid., pp. 42-43).
As noted, this can be confusing at first glance given his great emphasis on history, but this must not be confused with this being the only element, as ultimately Ortega values history as the element that, at least we could say we can study the most, the best, and the most fully, within our lives and our realities since it is more 'tangible' than the future as it has not arrived yet, and than the present as it is ephemeral. Moreover, even though we begin our analysis by looking forward, ultimately we live in our "presents" because the past and the potential future converge in the present. Life is the present, and in the present we have history and we look forward, logically. "La vida es puntual," writes Ortega, and he continues, "es un punto: el presente, que contiene todo nuestro pasado y todo nuestro porvenir." Further, as quoted earlier because it is such a clear description of this, Ortega explains that

Pero la vida es siempre un <<ahora>> y consiste en lo que ahora se es. El pasado de su vida y el futuro de la misma sólo tiene realidad en el ahora, merced a que ustedes recuerden ahora su pasado o anticipen ahora su porvenir. En este sentido la vida es pura actualidad, es puntual, es un punto —el presente—, que contiene todo nuestro pasado y todo nuestro porvenir. Por eso he podido afirmar que nuestra vida es lo que estamos haciendo ahora.

In other words, the distinctions are as follows. What we have and are, in regards to what is most tangible, or what we are most able to study, is the past; our history. We live our lives, however, at times looking forward to the future, during the present. The two; past and future, therefore, converge in the present. Again what we have and are, however, at any given time is

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975 Ibid., p. 45.
976 Ibid., p. 35.
(at least) mostly our past; our history, since the present is fleeting, and the future has not arrived yet and exists in us as a potential, as we continue living on our continuums. Logically we can assume that since history is the one of the three elements that we can most directly study and know, it is one of the more influential and important, therefore, for Ortega clearly, and perhaps arguably for Schiller as well when we look at it this way as being a big part of a continuum, and the part which is most tangible.

Schiller emphasizes the importance of the past, or our histories, in the following excerpt: "[...] his (man's) nature is a disordered jumble of misinherited tendencies. [...] for each man's soul contains the representatives of ancestral savages and beasts, and has out of such discordant elements to form a government to guide his course."977 And of course this most certainly resonates with Ortega's notion that "man is his history." As he writes, and part of which we saw but is again important to re-cite here,

La vida, decía yo, es una operación que se hace hacia adelante. Vivimos originariamente hacia el futuro, disparados hacia él. Pero el futuro es lo esencialmente problemático: no podemos hacer en él pie, no tiene figura fija, perfil decidido. [...] El futuro es siempre plural: consiste en lo que puede acaecer. Y pueden acaecer muchas cosas diversas, incluso contradictorias. De aquí la condición paradójica, esencial a nuestra vida, de que el hombre no tenga otro medio de orientarse en el futuro que hacerse cargo de lo que ha sido el pasado, cuya figura es inquívoca, fija e inmutable. [...] Recordamos el pasado porque esperamos el futuro en vista de el. [...] Aquí tienen ustedes el origen de la historia.

El hombre hace historia porque ante el futuro, que no está en su mano, se encuentra con

977 Schiller, *Riddles of the Sphinx*, p. 104
lo único que tiene, que posee, es su pasado. Sólo de él puede echar mano: es la navecilla en que se embaraca hacia el inquieto porvenir.  

And so, of course as has been discussed throughout this dissertation, man has and is history for Ortega, as life is historical, because 'the only thing we really possess at any given time is our past' as he said above. Moreover, he avers, "La vida es siempre un lugar y una fecha [...] o lo que es igual, la vida es, por sí misma, histórica." But as has been discussed, this is not to negate that there is also present an important forward-looking orientation in man in Ortega's thought. What we have and are, again, is our history because what we are, in whatever is the 'current present', is our history of forward-looking orientations, as one way to phrase it. And this is because what we have, and therefore (at least mostly, to argue this more safely) are, at any given time are our histories.

We can safely posit that here, too, within Schiller's philosophy, "man is history" (at least for a significant part), which he clearly declared in the aforementioned quote that "his nature is a disordered jumble of misinherited tendencies." Moreover, just as each human is uniquely individual, so are the events in history. Hence he is subscribing here as well to this idea of there being individuality in history as well as in human life, which is important as we shall see in greater depth ahead because it elucidates an important piece of historicist methodology to declare false the banal colloquialism that "history repeats itself," as another key strand interwoven throughout this paper. Briefly, however, as evidence of this, Schiller argues, "[...] the great

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978 Ortega, *Galileo*, pp. 142-143.

979 Ortega, *Metafísica*, p. 95.

980 Schiller, *Riddles of the Sphinx*, p. 104.
events in history are utterly unique, and turn the course of things so thoroughly that they need never be repeated."\textsuperscript{981} As we saw, Ortega expressly declared that history does not repeat itself; "Señores, ninguna situación real, y esto quiere decir concreta, se repite en la historia."\textsuperscript{982} 

And as we shall see further in the section that follows, this idea of the "limited freedom" of life connects with history in many additional ways, one of which is the idea that since, as we saw, for Schiller we choose among alternatives in life, and thereby shape realities, the world, then we have the power to have an influence in developing and shaping history as well (history encompassing realities or worlds of the past). As he clearly explains it: "If human freedom is real, the world is really indeterminate. [...] For if we really have the power to choose between alternatives, the course of things will necessarily differ according as we do one thing or an other. [...] therefore, there will be alternative courses of history."\textsuperscript{983} In other words, the history part of the continuum (the points and what they represent on that continuum) can be defined differently depending on the choices we make, giving us some freedom to shape what will become our histories, and therefore our lives, our selves—but again, what we can choose among is limited, so that freedom in general is a limited one. This is a key quote because it is one of the few where Schiller talks directly about history. Thus, we can deduce again that we are most certainly our histories, and we will most certainly be and continue to be our histories. But again, by "free" Schiller means in a \textit{limited} sense because we are free in our ability to choose, but what we can choose among is limited.

\textsuperscript{981} Schiller, \textit{Humanism: Philosophical Essays}, p. 153.

\textsuperscript{982} Ortega, \textit{Obras Completas IX}, p. 677.

\textsuperscript{983} Schiller, \textit{Studies in Humanism}, pp. 245-246.
Ortega, as we know, of course clearly declared that "man has history," because man is his history, but we could also envision a possible dialogue here with Schiller in a possible agreement with the aforementioned conclusion of Schiller's that, therefore, the world is indeterminate. While Ortega might not always describe the world, life, and its processes, as "indeterminate" specifically, he does refer to life often as a "radical disorientation;" "una radical desorientación;" "[...] la situación del hombre, la vida, es desorientación, es estar perdido." Being disoriented and lost, one key characteristic of life for Ortega, when combined with the idea that we must at all times decide what we are going to do, implies an indetermination in how life is going to proceed and progress. The future has not been written yet of course; it has not been determined, though the past can condition at least some of the present, and as such, the future which comes next as well (since the present was once the future in the past—it is all part of a continuum). And this is yet again the concept of "limited freedom" in how we have some (not complete) influence over the course of history, which then influences the present and future as well, as this is all part of a continuum. What follows is some evidence of Ortega's related thought process:

[...] nuestra existencia es en todo instante un problema, grande o pequeña, que hemos de resolver [...] en todo instante nos sentimos forzados a elegir entre varias posibilidades. [...] nuestra vida es nuestro ser. Somos lo que ella sea y nada más; pero ese ser no está predeterminado, resuelto de antemano sino que necesitamos decidirlo nosotros, tenemos que decidir lo que vamos a ser [...].\(^\text{984}\)

The world is indeterminate because the future, logically, cannot necessarily always be predicted. And as we live in the present, which will become our history in the future, we have a

\(^{984}\) Ortega, \textit{Metafísica}, p. 40.
limited freedom in the directions that continuum moves in and therefore some influence and control (but again not complete) over our historicity, and therefore the continuum to a certain degree at least. Again what is tangible and what we can study is history; hence further the importance of recognizing the historicity of life—and this will be delved into specifically in what follows.
Section II: On the Topic of the Historicity of Life

VIII. Introduction

As we have begun to see, understanding Schiller's view on history and historicism is complicated at times because not only does he not elaborate much directly on this academic discipline (as neither did Dewey nor James), but it is difficult at times to understand just how important he deems its study and concept within his philosophy when it is discussed. He clearly appreciates how history can be more directly and tangibly studied, since it is something of the past (as opposed to the un-arrived future and fleeting present). Yet as we have seen he would probably not at least directly declare that we are our histories as Ortega did, though we can argue by deduction that perhaps at times he would dialogue with Ortega on this if it were proposed.

A good example of this somewhat confusing position can be found in a discussion of his on the classic quandary of the chicken and the egg from his book *Riddles of the Sphinx*. This helps clarify a bit just where he perhaps stands. Schiller's answer to this debate is essentially both. In order to understand how it can be both, we need to keep in mind pragmatism's general emphasis on anti-dualism. And this also helps elucidate why history must be conceptualized on a continuum (as always a separate element, the past, but inextricably connected to the present and the future, anti-dualistically in each relation). The chicken and the egg both came first because one simply cannot be understood without the other. He argues;

[...] take the old puzzle which really involves the whole question of philosophic method, though historically the egg comes before the chicken, it is yet an egg only in virtue of its potentiality to become a chicken; the egg exists in order to the development of the
chicken out of it. Or, to put it into modern phraseology, the lower is prior to the higher historically, but the higher is prior metaphysically, because the lower can be understood only by reference to the higher, which gives it a meaning and of which it is the potentiality. 985

One cannot be understood without the other, but they are separate elements (hence anti-dualistic). To understand any one thing, we need to analyze its causes (history), its significance and its purpose (present and future, respectively). As has been repeated: some thing is its history, present, and future (i.e., continuum). Schiller writes;

In ordinary life and science, where we think backwards, and are more concerned with the past than with the future of things, the explanation by their causes, germs, and potentialities is more in point. [...] things must be explained by their significance and purpose instead of by their "causes," by their ideals instead of by their germs, by their actualities instead of by their potentialities. And these two ways of looking upon things are reconciled by the fact that they regard the same connexion of things in reverse order; the process is one and the same, but we find it convenient to look at it now from the one end and now from the other. 986

Here Schiller clearly does not consider history the only element we should study, but we can add in again the aforementioned argument that history is the more tangible and direct element that we can study as being part of the interpretation to better understand these general metaphysical concepts, because as he later adds, "[...] history had a meaning, and was capable of

985 Schiller, Riddles of the Sphinx, p. 197.
986 Ibid., p. 198.
rational formulation. But we may now go a step further and assert that the conception of the world as an evolution is the conception of the world as a process."987 Understanding why Schiller considers the term "Evolution" to be more fitting for understanding "world" will be part of the key in understanding his view on the meaning, purpose, and use of the study of history. History does have a role in his philosophy, such as in understanding the "world" or how "things" are explained, but in that it falls along a continuum, as was the case with the other pragmatists, since it is a process with other vital factors as well.

Thus Schiller certainly does not place the same emphasis on history as Ortega does, which we saw was also the case for Dewey and James in comparison, but he still does recognize its great importance, nonetheless, as was additionally the case for the other two pragmatists explored here. There are some areas in the discussion of historiography and historicism, therefore, that can certainly dialogue between the two thinkers, as they relate back to the key fundamental and metaphysical concepts that have already been explored as being part of a possible dialogue between Schiller and Ortega. And there are also some key limitations on the academic discipline of history within this dialogue between them that will be analyzed ahead that will help us elaborate a more accurate (never completely accurate) methodology for its study. In other words, although the limitations will be part of the focus again, it must be reiterated that they are meant to help us contemplate and formulate a more efficient, accurate, valuable, and effective discipline of history.

While Ortega says directly that 'man has history;' or man is his history, for Schiller it is perhaps more accurate to say that part of the fundamental nature of man (or woman) is his (or

987 Ibid., p. 200.
her) history; there is to a certain extent a historicity of life. Understanding the similarities and differences between these two ideas in envisioning a dialogue between Ortega and Schiller is what will be explored in the first sub-section of this second part. Then in the second sub-section this will all be applied to the attempt to perhaps better understand the meaning and definition of history, in regards to both specifically Ortega as well as in a general sense. Then this will all be applied to some discussion on the limitations within the academic field and therefore some ideas on how it can be better studied and used in a general sense, as well as within this third part's possibly imagined dialogue between Schiller and Ortega. Subsequently this will then all be wrapped up with some general conclusions.
IX. Defining the Historicity of Life

History has a role in understanding life, reality, ourselves—this would not be denied by any of the thinkers in this dissertation. But since we live along a continuum of experiences, we are also within a process; history, the world, our lives—each is a process, per the pragmatists explored here, including Schiller. We, the world and our realities, are ever evolving; we are within a process of evolution in Schiller's philosophy. This "evolution" is his continuum comprised of the past, present, and future. As we saw in the section on reality, the world is plastic, because reality is always a becoming, also being in part dependent on the future; thus, each "reality," and each "present" is plastic, and so in turn we can conclude again that history; historical constructions and interpretations, are plastic as well, also because they are in themselves historical (i.e., dependent on time, circumstance, tradition, etcetera). History is historical, we should say here to reiterate a key strand intertwined in this paper.988

Albeit in a slightly different way, Ortega also recognizes how there is a process in the historicity of life, as well as how, as has been explored in depth, to use the pragmatist term, "experiences" accumulate to form and shape that process, or continuum. As we have seen, he writes, "[...] la vida es constitutivamente experiencia de la vida," and he continues that as we age, "[...] se ha acumulado más pasado viviente, se ha sido más cosas y se << tiene más experiencias>>. [...] el tiempo no vuelve porque el hombre no puede volver a ser lo que ha

988 As Daveney explains in a chapter in which she defines her concept of pragmatist historicism, "Not only is there a plurality of identifying elements in any historical tradition, but how they are arranged in relation to other elements, both within and outside the tradition, what factors are emphasized or marginalized, what values or norms or past experiences rise to prominence in any given moment while others fade or are forgotten—all shape and determine at any particular time and place the distinctive identity of a tradition" (Daveney, Historicism, p. 152).
sido." This is a great quote for this envisioned dialogue because "experience" is such a key term in pragmatism (and therefore which is why it has been re-quoted on several occasions), and as it is used here in the case of Ortega, the argument in this dissertation in general is that within pragmatism this term can be sometimes used somewhat interchangeably with "history" in just the way it is used here; experiences, or history, accumulate in the past, in our lives.

In Schiller's plastic "process" of "evolution" there are two summarizing characteristics of this that must be explored here briefly to help us better understand what he means when he uses terms such as "determinate" and "fixed." First, the points in the past are finite (and when the future ones become past, they are then finite as well). Second the continuum is teleological in specific future points, but not in terms of the entire future and its direction. So by finite and teleological, what is referred to with the former are the points in the past, and with the latter, parts of the ideal future that we envision. The latter is not a future pre-programmed and determined for us completely beyond our control by external, outside forces. Nor is it meant to include all of the future, again. We have some influence, as we have seen, over our continuums (i.e., we have limited freedom). Meaning, in order to get to any idealized fixed points in the future, we learn over time actions and beliefs that in the past work well toward taking us in this direction. So in this sense we influence at least a bit of our continuums, but they are never completely deterministic, neither by ourselves nor by external, outside forces. In this second characteristic of we could say some teleology we find an important slight deviation from the other pragmatists examined here. And again in regards to the first point we must understand something, such as historical events, as a clear example of this; as existing within "fixed limits,"

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989 Ortega, Historia, p. 43.
so in the previous example explored the egg and the chicken are also both "fixed points" within a process. Hence, now we can better comprehend the following position of Schiller:

In saying, therefore, that the world is evolving, we say that it is in process, i.e., it is becoming something determinate out of something determinate. [...] Hence, if the conception of a process involves two ideal fixed points, then if we assert the process to be a real one, its fixed points must also be real fixed points in the history of the world. [...] the world-process is a determinate Becoming, proceeding from one fixed point or beginning to another fixed point or end, and that all the events which take place within it are susceptible of having their places in that process assigned to them as members of a series, and with reference to those fixed points. In other words, all things are susceptible of explanation from the point of view of the end of that process, as tending towards, or aiming at that end.\textsuperscript{990}

In other words, while the direction of the process of evolution can be malleable, the "points" along the continuum in the past are fixed; they are past and finite in and of themselves (again it is the end, or future, that is plastic).

As noted Ortega often describes history metaphorically as a song that must be sung in its entirety for us to even begin to understand any events in the past, or as a novel that must be read to completion, thus also establishing "fixed points," along a continuum in a similar sense. For Ortega, the historian's task, therefore, is to compile, establish, analyze, and study those points and give it all some comprehensive meaning, most succinctly explained. As he argues, "El historiador tiene en su mano todos los datos, es decir; los detalles del proceso íntegro que va a

\textsuperscript{990} Schiller, Riddles of the Sphinx, p. 202.
historiar, desde su principio hasta su fin. Sólo le falta descubrir el sentido orgánico de esos datos." He continues to explain how we cannot, of course, again completely predict the future, but we can be better at foreseeing some details perhaps. And specifically, as aforementioned, one factor that helps in this endeavor is studying 'closer epochs'; the further back the history, logically, the less we can be certain of and therefore study. The general conclusion here that we must reiterate is that history should be approached in its "entirety" ("entirety" being gathering as much along the continuum as possible); "la historia no se puede contar más que entera," this would imply fixed points, in the past of course, with also a start and an end—at least ideally, which is something that we can also envision here Ortega and Schiller having a dialogue about. But again as we have seen, pragmatists emphasize more the future end of the continuum, whereas Ortega stresses the past, being thus a point of deviation in accentuation. But again they would of course converse on the concept of this all being part of a continuum and the importance of conceptualizing history as such.

The emphasis here on teleology relates to pragmatist fashion in its functionalist and instrumentalist elements in there being a forward-focused orientation, but the idea of there being a "fixed end point and objective" is something more a part of Schiller's philosophy than any other philosopher surveyed here. But this is still, nonetheless, another area in which a dialogue can be visualized between Schiller and Ortega in some specific areas. For Ortega, as we have seen, man or woman accumulates the past over the course of his or her experiences, which in turn becomes his or her 'historical dialectic.' This then stretches into envisioning his possible future. Man, or

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992 Ibid., p. 189.
woman, therefore is unstable and in a process of continual progress, and to use Schiller's term, "evolution," as he or she continues accumulating "pasts." Again, man (or woman)

Va acumulando ser —el pasado: se va haciendo un ser en la serie dialéctica de sus experiencias. Esta dialéctica no es la de razón lógica, sino precisamente de la histórica. [...] El hombre es lo que le ha pasado, lo que ha hecho. [...] no tiene una naturaleza, sólo hay una línea fija preestablecida y dada, que puede orientarnos, sólo hay un límite: el pasado. Las experiencias de vida hechas estrechan al futuro del hombre. Si no sabemos lo que va a ser, sabemos lo que no va a ser. Se vive en vista del pasado. En suma, que el hombre no tiene naturaleza, sino que tiene... historia. O, lo que es igual: lo que la naturaleza es a las cosas, es la historia —como res gestae— al hombre. [...] Tampoco el hombre tiene otra <<naturaleza>> que lo que ha hecho.

Es sobremanera cómico que se condene el historicismo porque produce en nosotros o corrobra la conciencia de que lo humano es, en todas sus direcciones, mudadizo y nada concreto es en él estable. [...] Su ser consiste en progreso. Ahora bien: del hombre es preciso decir, no sólo que su ser es variable, sino que su ser crece y, en este sentido, que progresa.  

While "man is history" for Ortega, as clearly stated here, he (or she) is also oriented toward the future, as he also adds in this quote—and as we have seen throughout. So despite Ortega's great reliance on the past for understanding anything human, the future still plays a key role in our orientation and focus as well, being therefore a point of dialogue with pragmatism in general. However, unlike in the case of Ortega, who is clearly quite adamant about the

993 Ortega, Historia, pp. 48-49.
importance of our pasts and us being our histories, at times it is a bit hard to be clear as to which of the three elements; history, past, or future, Schiller deems most "important" though it is most often cited as being the future. Perhaps then we can safely say that for Schiller they are all simply required elements, and they are separate but inextricably linked in conceptualizing life, reality, the world, or history even. Again arguably most of the time there is more of an emphasis on the future, as he is a pragmatist, but this is not always the case. But as a point of divergence he was more forward looking than Ortega; "The teleological explanation, therefore, is not only a perfectly valid one, but the only possible one."994 But none of this is to say that an envisioned dialogue would not be possible, nonetheless, in the specific aforementioned areas. Moreover, Schiller has a somewhat different notion of "teleology" from the more traditional conception in that there is not just one fixed future, rather there are various possible futures depending on which ones we want to move toward (again we are free in a limited sense). And this conditions our presents in our actions and beliefs, and thus what will then become our histories later, logically. So Schiller's teleology is not deterministic in being pre-programmed or some sort of singular destiny, rather he is simply highlighting how as very future-oriented beings, we are focused on where we are going; we live (at least mostly) in view of the future, or perhaps we could say 'various teleologies'. And conceptualizing teleology more loosely as such is something Ortega would possibly converse with Schiller on.

In the following excerpt, while Ortega does not use the term "teleological," he does to a certain extent imply this, and he cites Hegel, one of the chief teleological historicists, albeit leading to a slightly different interpretation of this;

994 Schiller, Riddles of the Sphinx, p. 203.
[...] en suma, que la realidad histórica, el destino humano avanza dialécticamente, si bien esa esencial dialéctica de la vida no es, como creía Hegel, una dialéctica conceptual, de razón pura, sino precisamente la dialéctica de una razón mucho más amplia, honda y rica que la pura —a saber, la de la vida, la de la razón viviente.

Pero claro es que si al reconstruir nosotros el pasado mediante la historia, hallamos que cada nueva época o estadio emerge del anterior con una cierta lógica o, dicho de otro modo, que a cada forma de vida sucede otra que no es cualquiera, sino precisamente una que la anterior predetermina [...] que es en serio posible la profecía. [...] el profeta es [también] un historiador a la inversa, un hombre que narra por anticipado el porvenir.995

So we use history to try to create possible predictions of the future. Hence again there is at least some degree of future orientation here in Ortega's thought as well.

Perhaps part of Schiller's lack of greater stress on history is because along the continuum it forms part of a group of "dead fixed points" because it is past. Not being "alive" in a literal sense we can, therefore, use it primarily for understanding our present alive situation and circumstance, and potential future.996 So again there clearly is a greater stress on being future-oriented—but what must be clarified is that to be such in the first place requires historical study—an important point perhaps left out too often in Schiller's work, but logically implied. As we know this is what Ortega does elaborate on, however. Ortega also declares that the past is

995 Ortega, Galileo, pp. 183-184.

996 As we saw, he argued, “The past is dead and done with, practically speaking; its deeds have hardened into facts, which are accepted, with or without enthusiasm; what it really concerns us to know is how to act with a view to the future. And so like life, and as befits a theory of human life, Pragmatism faces towards the future" (Schiller, Studies in Humanism, p. 123).
dead, but he takes the next step in a slightly different direction by stating that history, nonetheless, is the discipline we have to revive to better understand our presents, and then continuing as Schiller would by arguing that all the while this is with an eye on hopefully also improving the future. In other words, *history should not just remain dead*, it should be revived in a sense. Ortega proclaims,

"[...]


Ibid., p. 109.
study of the history of a thing that we can determine the direction of its development, and discover the general principle which formulates its evolution. 999

As with the chicken and the egg metaphor, again we somewhat need to understand this all as separate but connected inextricably; somewhat one and the same, because "the teleological method just reverses the order of historical explanation." 1000 Again we must understand this anti-dualistically.

Schiller's teleological leaning is also important in understanding specifically the role of the individual in all this, and that of our individual lives. As briefly noted, evolution, in one sense of Schiller's use of the term, can be partially understood as comprising both our nature and our "histories," in that, as he defines it to be

[...] the development of the individual in society. [...] Evolution is the process of the gradual perfectioning of the individual in society, its purpose and its meaning must be the adaptation of the individual to the social environment. The ultimate aim, therefore, of the world-process is a harmonious society of perfect individuals. 1001

The continual use of the term "Evolution" by Schiller must be noted here, as arguably we can assume that at least two essential characteristics of this term imply both history and nature, to tie in the dialogue here with Ortega in which, as has been argued, when Ortega declares that

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999 Schiller, *Riddles of the Sphinx*, p. 205.
1000 Ibid., p. 205.
1001 Ibid., p. 432.
man has no nature, only history, it is because *history is his nature*. In reference to the aforementioned quote from Schiller, it must be noted that what he does not much seem to elaborate on in his work is on what this "perfection" means, exactly. But in part what he refers to is our living individually, while also in harmony with each other, within a society.

Why does the individual need to adapt socially and live as such harmoniously? Ortega succinctly explains in the following instance how 'circunstancia' also implies the social milieu, and this could be a possible answer on his behalf; "[...] la circunstancia no se compone sólo de cosas en sentido estricto, sino también de personas: la circunstancia es también sociedad humana, el mundo es también <<mundo>> en el sentido social." So here we have another possible piece to this potential dialogue in that humans are also social animals, so we must not also ignore this important, key element.

Moreover, as we saw in Ortega's central theory on generations, which is a 'social' theory of course, this is one of the more defining characteristics of our historical natures, as this is how he divides up and categorizes that social milieu we live in. This is logical within Ortega's philosophy because the concept of generation will be a particularly defining characteristic since being closer in age means being of the same historical time period, and for Ortega what we are is our history.

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1002 Life is history, for Ortega, as we have seen in depth in this dissertation. The historicity of life for Ortega is well summarized in the following quote that man is "un ente esencialmente histórico," and he continues that in life, man "[...] se ve obligado a entrar en escena en un preciso momento del amplísimo drama humano que llamamos <<historia>>" (Ortega, *Galileo*, p. 172).

Schiller further elaborates, although in a somewhat general sense, on defining the aforementioned concept of "perfection" that

[...] the world-process will come to an end when all the spirits whom it is designed to harmonize have been united in a perfect society. [...] when the individual has become a perfect individual, and has been developed to the utmost of his powers, and is in perfect harmony and completely adapted to the whole of his environment.1004

Schiller's view, therefore, is that we and the world are finite, headed toward a teleological end of individuals perfectly harmonized among each other and our environment within a society. So then of course we need to each 'adapt socially and live as such harmoniously.' But can we really know when we reach this end? It is so general; is this the only possible teleological end? Meaning, this is perhaps why, in part, Schiller does not really describe in any specific detail what that perfect teleological end is like other than as "individuals perfectly harmonized with each other and our environments in a society," because there is what we think is that situation and circumstance, and then there is what it really is, but we can never know for sure when and if the two ever coincide (i.e., anti-dualism). The following excerpt helps clarify this last point a bit:

[...] the fact that the world is in process contains the assurance that the end of its process may be achieved. [...] though the end of the world-process is finite, yet the approximations to it are infinite, and hence it will never be reached. Progress may be compared to an asymptote, always approaching the state of Perfect Being and never attaining it. [...] And so the case is proposed; the approximations to perfection could not go on indefinitely; they would sooner or later approach so nearly to perfection, that the

1004 Schiller Riddles of the Sphinx, pp. 435-436.
discrepancy between the real and the ideal would be too minute to enter into consciousness.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 452-453.}

Perhaps further dialogue with Ortega can be envisioned in how what Ortega would agree on is that our perspectives may indeed be finite, but the process of the combinations and comprehensions of perspectives are infinite. There is no one, absolute perspective. And we can never gather them all, as Schiller also posits in regards to the end of the 'world-process' or perfection; "approximations to it are infinite, and hence it will never be reached." But the more we gather, the closer we get to accuracy, and in continuing with Schiller's thought process in our imaginary dialogue here, the closer we get to "perfection."

Moreover, we must take into account the anti-dualism in this in that even if we did arrive at perfection, there is really no way to be certain of having reached it; there is perfection, and there is what we think is perfection, and one cannot exist without the other though they will remain separate concepts because we have no way of corroborating and verifying what perfection really is.

And this notion is no different than how we need to view and study history; history can be contemplated as a set of perspectives in which we cannot gather them all, nor is there one, absolute perspective or recording of history; at best we can work to gather as many historical perspectives as possible to get closer to accuracy or "perfection," but we will never arrive there exactly. So perhaps this would be another direction in an envisioned dialogue between the two.
Further, perhaps this is all simply one way to accommodate and rectify the seeming confusion within Schiller's philosophy about how to define the historicity of life, and why in one instance he directly declares that "our nature is never fully harmonised"\textsuperscript{1006} by saying that there is a historicity of life for Schiller, and which there most certainly is for Ortega, but for Schiller, this historicity is more so defined as a form of teleological evolution toward "perfection." This is because the goal is to gather as many approximations to perfection as possible, or as many perspectives as possible, but we will never be able to assemble them all—not to mention the anti-dualism in this in that we cannot know when what we think is perfection coincides with what is really perfection since he also mentions in the aforementioned quote that at some point, in fact, the discrepancy becomes too blurred for us to even be conscious of it. Therefore, for Schiller this historicity is simply one of a number of key factors, elements, and influences to consider. Again Ortega does not discuss teleological ends as such. For Ortega, our history is always with us and the (even if there are others, this is the most important) key factor, element, and influence in our lives; "Pues la verdad es que el hombre lleva a cuestas siempre todo su pasado humano, incluso el más primitivo, es decir, lo sigue siendo y gracias a eso es hombre."\textsuperscript{1007} In other words, \textit{there is historicity of life for Schiller, but for Ortega life is historicity.}

\textsuperscript{1006} Schiller, \textit{Studies in Humanism}, p. 118.

\textsuperscript{1007} Ortega, \textit{Interpretación}, p. 216.
X. Ideas for the Study of History

Now that we have established a somewhat convoluted conception of history within Schiller's philosophy, and then with an imagined dialogue on this with Ortega who has a more clear conception, the next quandary to ponder is the following: how should we study history along these lines and limitations (to add to all that has already been proposed in the previous two parts of this dissertation)? Most tersely stated, perhaps we can simply add that while a study of history should have the main objective of illuminating some details and knowledge about our future, specifically this is in reference to the teleological aims that Schiller was referenced to be speaking of. There may not be a specific teleological end in sight for Ortega, but neither was a very detailed, specific one elaborated on by Schiller, so we can at least say that historical study can be focused on creating better futures. The following excerpt illustrates a bit of an image of this idea on Schiller's behalf:

[...] it will be from a study of history that we shall see the drift of that process, and if that process should admit of, or demand, teleological interpretation, we shall thus be enabled to forecast its end, and to anticipate its future, sufficiently for our purposes, even though the whole nature of a thing could only be fully expressed in its whole history. The attempt, on the other hand, to determine the validity of a thing apart from its history and prospects would seem sheer folly.1008

This all connects to pragmatist notions on the truth, which he we can simply add "historical" truths, in that again at best we find only approximations.

1008 Schiller, Studies in Humanism, p. 150.
As we know Ortega gives history more importance, proclaiming that *to understand anything human at all*, one must tell its history. As we have seen, "Para comprender algo humano, personal, o colectivo, es preciso contar una historia. [...] La vida sólo se vuelve un poco transparente ante la razón histórica."\(^{1009}\) So for Ortega, history not only can help in some future aims, but it can help us study and clarify *anything* human—but again we have established that Ortega places greater emphasis and importance on history as a set of past points along a continuum. Schiller would arguably dialogue with this being the case when we view history as part of a larger continuum that also includes the present and the future. In other words, Ortega emphasizes more the set of past points along that continuum, but he would likely carry on a dialogue with Schiller in applying this as well more broadly to encompass the present and future, as was also the case with the other two pragmatists explored here.

Another important conclusion we can draw here, as we have seen and is also applicable in this third part's imaginary dialogue is that *history is historical*, concisely stated. For instance, Ortega declares, "Cualquier término histórico, para ser preciso, necesita ser fijado en función de toda la historia."\(^{1010}\) And for Schiller, every history is a new history, as Porrovecchio cites,

> [...] every age demands a new history of the past." But to what end a past picture for a philosopher with a forward-thinking program? A "practical desire for guidance which inspires our interest in the future, as in the past." [...] All history is aided by what we

\(^{1009}\) Ortega, *Historia*, p. 47.

\(^{1010}\) Ibid., p. 51.
recall and how we articulate it. The question is not how true the tales are, but whether they will prove useful.\textsuperscript{1011}

Moreover, another conclusion we can add to the methodology for the study of history is that it, again, should be studied as a continuum, because "we can confidently lay it down that no event will ever occur which will not seem intelligently connected with its antecedents after it [has] happened."\textsuperscript{1012} If "experience" is a pragmatist fundamental in all this (in adding to understanding what in part leads to our interpretations, knowledge, behavior, etcetera), we must also add that this happens in time, or history; "all our experience is in time."\textsuperscript{1013} This is why the central argument has been proposed throughout this dissertation that we can read "experience" and "history," understood as part of a continuum, as synonymous in specific regards. Again here we have the thread that experience accumulates over history. History, or the accumulation of experiences, is therefore a source of "guidance for the future," as well as a source of "causes operative in bringing about the historical processes," to use Schiller's own words as quoted in Porrovecchio, who adds that "The Historical Method is not merely a matter of laying out all the details in chronological row. For facts never simply are and are never simply enough."\textsuperscript{1014} Here it sounds very much like, as Ortega would argue, history is not just dead—because it is essentially "alive" in the present and the future. This is again another reason for seeing history more broadly as part of a continuum. It is important, therefore, to recognize that history is imperative for understanding not just the future, but the present as well (hence yet again the need to view it here

\textsuperscript{1011} Porrovecchio, \textit{F.C.S. Schiller}, p. 238.


\textsuperscript{1013} Schiller, \textit{Humanism: Philosophical Essays}, p. 216.

\textsuperscript{1014} Porrovecchio, \textit{F.C.S. Schiller}, pp. 258-259.
throughout this dissertation as a continuum). As Porrovecchio further explains on behalf of Schiller, "[...] change and time, it would seem, more forward. We should study our history for clues to our present."\textsuperscript{1015}

However, even though Schiller sees this continuum to have a teleological end (though not very clearly defined, one or more), he also as we saw somewhat paradoxically argues that this does not "condemn" us to "determinism." This is because key in Schiller's philosophy is his emphasis on our "limited freedom." Our lives, and therefore our histories (history in general really), is not condemned to determinism because we have the power of choice. As we saw our different choices can lead us down different paths, and therefore create differing histories depending on those choices. But for Schiller, and where he differs a bit from the other thinkers explored here, there is some sort of teleological end in sight, even if this may change at times, as a way to clarify how he can emphasize degrees of teleology and freedom simultaneously. Hence, as aforementioned, "there will be alternative courses of history, and a real indetermination in a universe which harbours a free agent."\textsuperscript{1016} It sounds illogical to declare 'various teloelogies,' but not in this sense, and when considered that this is in terms of 'possibilities,' but just one will end up manifesting of course.

Part of the importance, therefore, of this forward, functionalist and instrumentalist thinking is because "We want to be able to make predictions about the future behaviour of things for the purpose of shaping our own conduct accordingly."\textsuperscript{1017} Another piece, therefore, of the

\textsuperscript{1015} Ibid., p. 257.

\textsuperscript{1016} Schiller, \textit{Studies in Humanism}, p. 246.

\textsuperscript{1017} Schiller, \textit{Humanism: Philosophical Essays}, p. 104.
methodology being developed here to further elaborate is that history is also a process of evolution and becoming because different choices can have different affects and therefore can play a role in shaping the course of possibly alternate histories. We are "free" in this sense to move toward different points in the future; therefore, we have influence over the movement of our continuums, but we do not have complete control over what those points are, so this freedom is limited in this way—just like we can choose among the circumstances that surround us, but we cannot control which are all those circumstances, thus being a possible area of conversation between the two thinkers Schiller and Ortega respectively.

It must also be briefly noted that in pondering how history should be studied, we must add here that history is selective and subjective, which is a common theme throughout this entire thesis as well, as few would disagree with this. While Schiller does not directly refer to "historical study" in this next quote, his more general indication could plausibly be understood to include this (along with other elements and disciplines); "our conception of the world will still depend on our subjective selection of what it interested us to discover in the totality of existence." So as has been repeated at length, history can never be entirely objective, and therefore it can never be entirely accurate, and this is something we must always keep at the forefront for the methodology of historicism as another key in our standards for study that we are outlining in this section. As aforementioned,

[...] the great events in history are utterly unique, and turn the course of things so thoroughly that they need never be repeated. [...] Hence the teleological and anti-

teleological interpretations of events will never decide their conflict by appealing to the facts: for in the facts each finds what it wills and comes prepared to see.\textsuperscript{1019}

Historical truths are no different than "truths" more broadly; as we saw they are approximations only. So again, what this means is that history cannot be recorded perfectly or objectively, logically. Again history is selective, and therefore subjective, and thus individual as well—these same conclusions are reached by Schiller. What is selected individually in history is based largely on what is considered useful for that individual in Schiller's deliberation (or in what we at times consider "truthful" or here "historical truths")—this is quite pragmatist as we have seen. As Porrovecchio concisely interprets, "If history is selective, it is because it is individual. If the individual is to be effective, it is because the selection accords with the most useful social needs."\textsuperscript{1020} This quote also exemplifies more clearly how Schiller can accentuate both the individual and the social in that at times what is useful for the individual is what is useful socially. We can understand history and its study similarly; at times what is useful in history for us individually is what is useful socially—and vice versa of course, it must be noted.

For Schiller a crucial part of the methodology for the study of history, therefore, is to consider how it is written from a useful point of view, and not necessarily, per se, how truthful it might possibly be; "All history is aided by what we recall and how we articulate it" explains Porrovecchio on Schiller, as we saw, "[...] the question is not how true the tales are, but whether they will prove useful."\textsuperscript{1021} Again, the philosophy behind this is the same; historical truths are like truths in general. And this relates to Schiller's general philosophy aforementioned of being


\textsuperscript{1021} Ibid., p. 238.
quite the anti-absolutist, not believing that there is any absolute or universal truths for all, or at all times—again this is something applicable to all thinkers analyzed here. And this emphasis on the usefulness of something of course is again quite the pragmatist concept.

Again the following important key standard needs to be reiterated: because history is selective, individual, subjective, and always in a state of evolution along a continuum, this also means that history, therefore, can neither be captured nor recorded completely; in its entirety—something true in Schiller's philosophy as well. History is 'interpretation, it is tentative, and it is conjectural,' and in turn can only be captured in "snippets," proclaimed Schiller. The subjectivity of history and historical records must come into the methodology for its study, for because it is subjective interpretation, in a sense how we study history is itself historical because it is subject to how we were trained and conditioned at that 'historical' point in time to think of it and to interpret it. In other words, it tells us more about, for example, how we are educated and cultured at that time; how we are children of the time we are born into—more so than the details that are recorded of the time in and of themselves. Moreover, perhaps this is also a way to understand Ortega's concept of "beliefs" and how we are installed in our beliefs subconsciously as we saw (until periods of crises come to question them). This proposition is, therefore, another example of the goal of this dialogue in general to offer additional and newly innovative ways to read and interpret Ortega's philosophy.

So again, as has been aforementioned in this thesis, arguably at times historical records tell us more about what people thought history was, meant, what was important, etcetera, at the time, rather than the history in and of itself. Moreover, at no time can we ever incorporate all the

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possible views, perspectives, pieces, details, etcetera of any historical moment as history is like a puzzle that has virtually infinite pieces. These points are revisited in each of these three parts of this dissertation to show how each thinker shares, at least to a certain degree, these standards, thereby forming the key threads interwoven throughout.

This important point on how 'history is historical' Schiller expounds in his essay "Plato and his Predecessors," as Plato and how he has been read and understood over time is a good example of this, since it has changed, and it has changed in part depending on the historical moment. Plato, being a classical philosopher, has been long studied, and long interpreted in multiple different ways. Interpretation, therefore, is also historical. Interpretation is embedded in a historical moment. So our readings of Plato have depended on our histories of the time. Once more, concisely stated, we can say here, as an important piece of our methodology, history is historical.

So, given, once again, how limiting this may sound, what can we really take from history? After all, as Schiller, writes, "In other words, we must recognize it as an intrinsic limitation of historical evidence that it can hardly ever be, and can never remain, scientifically adequate, and that therefore our evidence also can never be made scientifically cogent, so long as it remains historical."\(^{1023}\) By scientific, part of what we can assume is being referred to is that history simply cannot be entirely objective or universal (there are no absolute truths and no absolute perspectives). What we can take, as Porrovecchio helps elucidate here, is a greater sense of prediction about the future the more thorough the study of the past. Simply stated, this

\(^{1023}\) Quoted in: Ibid., p. 160.
improves our chances of having better, more foreseeable futures, and perhaps, as has been discussed in this dissertation, reveal some human trends of trends.

What can be done to cross this seeming impasse? The first thing is to recognize that almost all knowledge is, in fact and origin, historical. Even if events do not repeat themselves, events occur so as to establish a higher degree of probability that a law is either (more probably) true or in need of revision; in short, historical events can lend themselves to better attempts at prediction.¹⁰²⁴

Again the important characteristic that we can establish and can take from history is that its recording helps us understand human interests and needs at the time, because our selectively recorded history is dependent on this. Hence again why history is historical. And in this endeavor, Schiller emphasizes the need for science and history to work together, something that Ortega on occasion stressed as well, as we saw previously. So again another piece of our methodology is to add the standard that historical study should become as 'scientific' as possible, which in general is quite the pragmatist sort of emphasis (but not of course unique to pragmatism only). But again this is always keeping in mind that history could never be completely scientific.

As Porrovecchio explains, while citing Schiller,

Hence, science is a matter of "prediction and control," and history's purpose is to provide "the power over things that comes from knowledge of the past"; thus both "minister to the need of controlling a reality that kills us if we don't." Both, then, must cooperate with each other in understanding the past and working to predict the future. [...] For if science is to have a basis, it must be in historical record. But it is no less true that the past is not

¹⁰²⁴ Ibid., p. 160.
pure. "Its history is only a hypothetical reconstruction, often highly imaginative, out of utterly inadequate materials." Schiller sides with science in the end. In searching toward a definitive, it grasps the threads of the historical past and does what history cannot: experiments. "Hence verification is a much more potent weapon in Science than in history" though no verification is to be taken as absolutely true. For Schiller, then, science and history are partial reconstructions; the former just happens to be on firmer ground than the latter.  

The assumption here that for Schiller a methodology of history should strive to be as scientific as possible is something that Ortega explicitly calls for as well, as cited in the other sections of this thesis, and as further evidenced in the following quote:

Este principio, que espero —por lo menos, someramente— desarrollar en algunas de las lecciones inmediatas, me permite fundar sobre nuevas bases la metodología de la historia, y esperar que esta admirable ocupación humana llamada <<historia>> deje de ser un cuento o, a lo sumo, una técnica maravillosa —admirable, imprescindible, respetabilísmo, pero... una técnica y nada más— y llegue a convertirse de verdad en una ciencia.  

In the following excerpt of Ortega's we, arguably, further find a potential dialogue with Schiller in this, albeit one in which that basis of science in history is stronger (meaning, there is more emphasis on historical study), however, for Ortega—but the link is still there, nonetheless:

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1025 Ibid., p. 200.

1026 Ortega, Obras Completas Tomo IX, p. 503.
Creer en la ciencia, en la razón es contar con que el hombre es capaz de construir teorías que dado el horizonte de los hechos en cada momento conocidos poseerán todos los quilates posibles de verdad, por tanto, teorías cada vez más precisas, cada vez más extensas y más firmes.\textsuperscript{1027}

In another instance Ortega states that history is "la ciencia de las vidas humanas."\textsuperscript{1028} But in this he is emphasizing the importance of history rather than declaring it to be something objective or universal.

Tal es, señores, la preeminencia de la historia sobre todas las demás ciencias. La historia, hable de lo que hable, está siempre hablando de nosotros mismos, los hombres actuales, porque nosotros estamos hechos de pasado [...] La historia habla siempre de nosotros, \textit{de te fabla narratur}. La cuestión está en que nos la sepan contar y que nosotros sepamos escucharla.\textsuperscript{1029}

History is the "preeminent science" for Ortega because it is about humanity, human lives, and the evolution of our lives singularly, as well as societies and cultures; as declared at the very start of this dissertation, its value cannot as such be overstated since it is about \textit{us}. As we saw he further argues, "La historia es ciencia sistemática de la realidad radical que es mi vida."\textsuperscript{1030} And while no specific methodological steps are mentioned in this more scientific endeavor, there is hope of establishing this at some point, as Ortega does believe that history can be systematic, to a

\textsuperscript{1027} Ibid., p. 493.

\textsuperscript{1028} Ortega, \textit{Galileo}, p. 68.

\textsuperscript{1029} Ortega, \textit{Interpretación}, p. 87-88.

\textsuperscript{1030} Ortega, \textit{Historia}, p. 52.
certain extent and in specific ways—hence again the connection here with science and the goal to make historical study as scientific as possible. But key here is to note as much as possible, as history can never be completely scientific. This is because Ortega thinks that "[...] es imposible nada que de lejos merezca llamarse ciencia histórica." This "science" of history is not so much about positive reason in the form of objectivity and universality in its study and applications. Rather, it is about historical reason, which is more focused on perspective, notions of 'perspectivism,' and as argued here in this dissertation, in a novel way anti-dualism as well.

Again history, as the past points on the continuum, is the key and most important factor, element, and influence as the "preeminent science," going thus further than Schiller. For Schiller, on the other hand, and in a specific sense in which we cannot find as strong a possible dialogue, science becomes a more powerful tool than history in and of itself for understanding the world in general. But, we must add here, arguably science is still, nevertheless, based in history—it would be convenient and interesting to be able to actually ask Schiller if he agrees with this. Schiller may not, therefore, be much of one to emphasize specifically and solely historical study for basic metaphysical concepts, but he does recognize how this is the center and starting point for quite a lot. So in our methodology of history here, we must incorporate a cooperation, and a working together with science, in a goal to make history and historical study as scientific as possible. As noted clearly Schiller does not completely disregard history, so there is still a bit of a possible dialogue that we could envision, nevertheless, in this with Ortega.

Since Schiller is keen on choosing his own terms for concepts (as we saw with his "Humanism" replacing "Pragmatism") perhaps in determining a sort of vision of a methodology

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1031 Ortega, Interpretación, p. 92
of historical study along the lines of Schiller's philosophy, as has been briefly noted maybe it is best to call it "Evolutionism," or "the study of evolution." This can be surmised upon considering the following excerpt from Schiller:

[...] nowadays we can as little dispense with the explanation of things by their history as with their explanation by universal 'laws.' [...] And if we regard the fact that there is a development of the world in Time as the essence of Evolution, it is obvious that only a theory which accepts this Time-process as an ultimate datum will be capable of yielding a philosophy of Evolution and is worthy of the name Evolutionism.1032

To a certain extent one could arguably find some evolutionism in Ortega's views on the meaning of history; after all, the argument here is that what man has is history because man's nature is his history. Moreover, a leaning on biology, albeit slight, is present in Ortega's work, as has been explored. He writes, "El hombre, señores, es justamente el que conserva presente ese pasado. El hombre es un animal que lleva dentro historia, que lleva dentro toda la historia. No cabe definición del hombre menos <<darwiniana>>."1033 Here Ortega admits a somewhat "Darwinian" leaning, which cannot be a more clear inclination toward adding some possible propensity toward to evolution and evolutionism, thereby adding to a potential dialogue here that we could imagine with Schiller because history can include a history of genetic information passed on over generations as well.

Most importantly, as we have seen for Ortega, since history is our nature, and therefore essentially fundamental in life, nothing human can be understood or clear until we study its


history; [...] nada pueda estar verdaderamente claro en historia mientras no está toda ella clara." Of the many excerpts summarizing the broad conception of the term "history" and Ortega's notion of "historical reason," the following is one which perhaps most potentially dialogues with Schiller as it emphasizes a process of becoming:

La razón histórica, en cambio, no acepta nada como mero hecho, sino que fluidifica todo hecho en el fieri de que proviene: ve cómo se hace el hecho. [...] muestra lo que el hombre hace con esos instintos y facultades, e inclusive nos declara cómo han venido a ser esos <<hechos>> —los instintos y las facultades—, que no son, claro está, más que ideas —interpretaciones— que el hombre ha fabricado en una cierta coyuntura de su vivir.  

While these pieces of a possible methodology we have searched for within the philosophies of Ortega and Schiller are a bit general and abstract, they can be of use for the discipline of history as further efforts towards improving its study. To summarize these conclusions explored: first, we must conclude here that history has the **broad** "teleological" objective to create better futures. Next, we must wrap up that history is selective, subjective, individual, and varies based on choices because we each live within a limited freedom to have, to a certain extent, an influence over the course of history. History is a continuum, history is evolution, and therefore history is historical. Moreover, history can, therefore, never be fully, completely, or entirely accurately recorded because it depends to a great extent on what is useful to record at that time (not to mention that "usefulness" will vary based on the individual, the society of the time, the traditions of the time; the history of the times, etcetera), which is why

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again *history is historical*. And finally, the last set of standards that has been added is to create
the objective to make historical study more scientific. While these are quite broad
methodological standards, they can certainly be applied nonetheless to improve the discipline of
history.
XI. Conclusions

As noted at the start of this third part of this dissertation, the goal was outlined to imagine a possible pragmatist based dialogue between Ferdinand Schiller and José Ortega y Gasset without drawing any specific conclusions on similarities. Rather, this section has simply been about, as with all the thinkers in this dissertation, where we could imagine a conversation, and where within they might achieve a level of coinciding some in dialogue. In other words, the objective has been to see how some of these coincidences and points of dialogue may permit us to apply another profound sense and reading to how to interpret certain areas of Ortega's work, as well as that of Schiller's possible responses to the concept of history, its study, and the philosophy of history, all in adding to better contemplating and understanding humanity in general as well. This is also why many areas have been revisited to see how there might be an arguable dialogue in Ortega's work with pragmatism in general. The hope has been to gain a better understanding that for Ortega arguably man has no nature, only history, because nature is his history as they are anti-dualistic, in an analysis of some basic metaphysical concepts, as well as of historicism and historiology. Again the objective has been to show not how Ortega was a pragmatist, but rather to demonstrate how it is arguably possible to imagine a dialogue with some other pragmatist thinkers as a way to not only hopefully better understand an important part of Ortega's philosophy, but also more broadly to improve upon the academic discipline of history.

One common thread that has been weaved throughout, and that is quite pragmatist, is the idea that so much of these metaphysical topics and the study of history are all really in a state of becoming and evolution along a continuum of time. Hence again we should see all of this study in the same way; as something not meant to be complete, but that is meant to keep us studying
further. Rather than establish any definitive links or truisms, the objective here, therefore, has been to dig deeper into philosophical quandaries, specifically within an imagined dialogue between Ortega and Schiller in this third and final part, that might help us better study, and help us continue to better study in the future, Ortega and historicism, as well as pragmatism in general. As Ortega once said, "Estudiar y ser estudiante es siempre, y sobre todo hoy, una necesidad inexorable del hombre."\textsuperscript{1036}

\textsuperscript{1036} Ortega, \textit{Metafísica}, p. 23.
General Conclusion

Ortega succinctly declared, "All historical knowledge is, in truth, the never-ending story." In other words, we can summarize in part our meditations here to say that everything is historical as part of a continuum that proceeds ceaselessly from past to the present into the future. History in its details and study is historical, but again along a continuum that has no absolute start and finish. While there are other elements, logically, in interpreting, understanding, and defining notions of life, reality, truth, or history itself, there is always, nonetheless, the historical component (even if among others). It has been proposed here that none of the philosophers explored would deny this, though they might not always coincide exactly on the extent of it. Hence further argument for the importance of this study, and for more generally the philosophy of history and the discipline of history.

And this has been one of the main goals of this dissertation; to add to the general philosophy on history, and thus hopefully improve the discipline of history itself. Thus, in this final conclusion, what will be discussed are only the most pertinent derivations, repercussions, and consequences that this imagined dialogue could have on the concept of history, the study of history, and specifically of that within the philosophy of José Ortega y Gasset and the three Pragmatists explored here John Dewey, William James, and Ferdinand Schiller.

The interpretation explored here of history in a general sense is that it exists within a continuum, anti-dualistically interdependent with the present and future. Therefore, history is

1037 Quoted in: Graham, Theory of History, p. 127.
really not dead; history lives on, this is also part of why we are our histories. Thus just the same this study, hopefully, should live on as well, and be further pursued and explored. As noted in the introduction, there have been recent developments in studying how there is arguably an important historicist element in pragmatism, and hopefully this study will add to this growing area. And this is relevant because as Davaney argues well,

Pragmatic historicism acknowledges human historicity and its implications for all of our human efforts to understand life and to endow existence with meaning and value. It extends the recognition of fallibility, contingency, and partiality to our most cherished beliefs and practices. It affirms that we live mediated lives, always encountering reality through the particularities of bodies, cultures, languages, geographies, and histories. To embrace such finitude and historicity does not lead to despair or to seeking safety in the narrow confines of a self-enclosed world. It leads instead to the possibility of a risk-taking, life-embracing existence among our fellow humans and all those who share our fragile world, grounded in who we have been and open to the possibility of new and more vital ways of being.1038

As referenced throughout, Graham and his studies on Ortega and pragmatism is really the only major investigation attempting to link the two. However, as all scholarly revision needs to start somewhere, hopefully more will come in an effort to better understand Ortega's philosophy, his historicism, and specifically his maxim that man has no nature only history. Humanity, and our history, is ever so complex—so much, in fact, that it is quite doubtful of course whether we could ever completely understand it; the influences or motivations in our movements, behaviors,

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1038 Davaney, Historicism, p. 169.
reactions, decisions, words, etcetera. Hence part of the reason why James argues as referenced that "to a certain degree, therefore, everything here is plastic." Just the same, we cannot presume to know everything about a philosophy, or what leads a philosopher to expound upon what he or she does in their work.

Ortega is by no means strictly a pragmatist, and again to conclude it must be reiterated and emphasized that the objective here has not been to demonstrate him as such—the aim and goal here, in all three of the sections, has been to further analyze a small piece of specifically his historical meditations through this imagined dialogue on various metaphysical topics and historicism in an attempt to better understand what is a somewhat seemingly polemical dictum that 'man has no nature, only history.' The goal has not been to argue that Ortega's historicism is pragmatist, rather the purpose has been to envision a possible pragmatist dialogue—again not outline areas of direct parallel or similarity—in an endeavor to propose a possible better and more thorough reading of that maxim as 'man has no nature, only history, because history is his nature; history contains his nature' in an anti-dualistic sense. Every such type of analysis will only further add (and not necessarily be definitive of course) to the study and perhaps better understanding of Ortega's philosophy—just as history itself, and the study of history, is ceaseless, again so is this study here of a potential dialogue between Ortega and these three pragmatists.

History as a discipline is important because it is a study about ourselves and the changes we experience over time. Hence, it is important to better ponder the philosophy of history to help us further understand what history is and how to study it. Again this dissertation has been a development of a philosophy of history centered on how we might be able to imagine a dialogue
about this between Ortega and three pragmatists. And this has also been about seeing how there might be more historicism than previously thought in pragmatism. More explicitly, to reiterate, this has been in an effort to not just broadly improve the discipline of history but more specifically to hopefully better understand some of Ortega's philosophy, expressly focused on his maxim that man has no nature, only history, adding yet again that because nature is his history in an anti-dualistic sense. To reiterate this central conclusion: history is simply broader and therefore more defining since it contains our nature, and more, and thus is what most appropriately defines, identifies, and characterizes us. This leads us toward not just a better study of history, but of ourselves, therefore as well.

History (in and of itself in its details, as an object of study) is our nature because it contains our nature (and more of course), and this is even more strongly argued as being a viable perception when viewed as being part of a continuum inextricably linked as well with the present and the future. This is where the dialogue with Ortega and pragmatism has helped us better understand this, because Ortega focuses on historicism and the pragmatists on the future, so a dialogue between the two is a way to see how this is all linked as such as really being part of a larger continuum. Everything is contained within this continuum anti-dualistically. There is a natural-social anti-dualism, and vice versa, moving between the two in both directions. But we can also say that there is a social-historical anti-dualism, and vice versa moving between the two in both directions. The past present and future are connected in the various combinations anti-dualistically. Nature exists and subsist along this continuum within our histories. We cannot speak of nature in Ortega's interpretation as a trans-historical notion, it is explicitly historical because it is also social and temporal, not just individual. The continuum is therefore temporal and pragmatic. And this has been again in an effort to also see where there might be more
historicist emphasis than previously studied within the philosophy of pragmatism, and in these three specific cases of Dewey, James, and Schiller. Again seeing how there might be more historicism than previously thought within pragmatism helps with the central goal of imagining a pragmatist dialogue with Ortega given his great emphasis on the importance of history. And again pragmatist conversation with Ortega and historicist dialogue with pragmatism is quite innovative and novel.

As has been elaborated throughout, a key element in imagining this possible dialogue in both directions; pragmatism with Ortega, and historicism with pragmatism, is keeping at the forefront the concept of anti-dualism just summarized. As a general formula that we have applied to so many notions in this dissertation, such as the metaphysical topics of life, reality, truth, or as we would apply to defining, understanding, and studying history; there is what we think there is, there is what there really is, and we cannot ever confirm when they coincide exactly. Thus at best we can get closer to accuracies when keeping this (among other requisites) in mind. Here, therefore, we have looked at some of these ways to get closer, always remembering that we cannot get right on target of complete precision of absolutely comprehensive understanding of concepts and notions such as these of life, reality, truth, or history in its study and specific details.

And this means that our study of history and the resulting interpretations that we generate are subjective and incomplete, as it is impossible for them to ever be entirely objective or include the recording of every moment, event, person; any historical detail. This is another important part of our philosophy of history that we have added here in this dissertation to a methodology for the study of history.
Further, in this endeavor we have also seen the shared belief in how seeing what we think we see is based on and funneled through perspective, of which there are at least seemingly infinite combinations and there is no one, absolute perspective. And as we live life via our perspectives as individuals among also social circumstances (and other types and forms of circumstances), time and our natures of history must be understood to exist and persist to exist along a continuum. This is succinctly defined as follows: while the past is the most tangible, we live in the present, with an eye on the future—but at each moment we are all defined by our pasts. Moreover, at some future point the present and the future will become part of the past; past points along that continuum, so what we can most tangibly study to better understand that continuum in general and thus ourselves, is our past, or our histories.

In studying history, therefore, we have seen that along with it being simply what we think it is, this means that in its subjectivity historical details can sometimes tell us more about the historian and the time the historian lived in than the actual history being recorded. For example, there are times and areas in which in reading a history of Ancient Greece written by a historian in the eighteenth century versus one written in the twentieth century, for example, perhaps can tell us a lot (and maybe sometimes more) about that historian and their corresponding centuries than their histories of Ancient Greece specifically in and of themselves. This is not to say that the books would be ‘worthless’ of course, just that we need to keep this critique in mind. We should then add this philosophy on how those books could also become history books on their corresponding time periods of writing and publication to our methodology for the study of history as opposed to their content material itself. We should simply remember to keep this important critique in mind.
History in its details and study, therefore, is historical as well, as is everything else examined in this dissertation. We saw that in Ortega's philosophy, the truth is historical, being founded on and from beliefs, or what we can call "true beliefs" (as least in our perspectives) in part passed down and inherited via generational divisions. Truths are historical truths. Historical details are historical truths. And this concept of the truth is provisional as it is maintained until it is challenged in times of crises per Ortega's meditations; i.e., this is part of why the truth is historical because it depends on history corroborating its persistence and usefulness. Again, truth as beliefs is temporal and therefore historical. And while they are active as beliefs, or 'true beliefs,' being part of us latently, they add to providing and defining our sense of reality via our perspectives, which again survive and persist when they are pragmatically useful. History is the past along that continuum, which is a set of past dates, moments, events—that set being defined by simply whichever block of time we want to examine—but it exists anti-dualistically with the present and the future in terms of there being history and then there being that larger continuum that includes the present and future; they are all separate but connected interdependently along a continuum that is time (to clarify further, the anti-dualistic aspect here is that history is a specific point on that continuum as well as the larger continuum in and of itself; it is a page in a book and that book in its entirety—past with present, and past with future, for instance). And the set of past moments that are grouped together to define at least some block of history are also anti-dualistic; the moments are separate but exist interdependently as a portion of that continuum on the past side (and of course more largely part of the broader continuum as well). We can take specific pieces of history and understand them solely as historical details, but they cannot be fully understood without looking at 'the bigger picture,' just as with the metaphors explored of reading a book in its entirety (versus a page), or watching a film in full (versus a still screen shot). We
need to create some sort of narration, to use Ortega's specific term, to properly study, appreciate, and better interpret history.

These ways to see and interpret history in regards to its study have been arrived at via imagining a dialogue between Ortega and pragmatism; between his historicism with instrumentalism and functionalism; and with pragmatist anti-dualism present at all times. This imaginary conversation has led us down some novel combinations to understand history pragmatically and thus new areas within the philosophy of history in regards to specifically Ortega and pragmatism. Again hopefully this will all just enlarge and expand further, as any study of humanity is of course invaluable since it is relevant and useful to us all.

And again, just as history is a continuum that proceeds also into the immediately present moment, as well as unforeseeable and unreachable future, so is our study of, in this case, Ortega's philosophy—or as he preferred to term his historicism, his 'meditations.' And "meditation" is a very proper term to apply here, as it is not something that we definitively start and finish; it is something that becomes part of our daily life. Meditation can be a way of life to a certain extent, as it is a process of thought, of reflection, and not of something meant to be a direct solution or resolution to a specific objective. So again our meditations on the meaning and study of history, therefore, should not, and will not, end. With our meditations we will only continue to reach further clarity, though perhaps not ever reaching absolute, pure, or definitive lucidity. But as the pragmatists would argue, this is not the objective either. The objective is to ponder and contemplate all this in smart, useful ways. Nevertheless, again these envisioned dialogues serve as essentially a 'period of meditation' toward further analyzing the possible
interpretation and meaning of Ortega's historicism, and specifically his axiom that man has no nature, only history, adding that this is because history is his nature.
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1039 This collection of writings is also within various other references here, such as Dewey's collected works.


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